Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: July 16, 2026

Index No. 2875/13|Appeal No. 6215|Case No. 2024-04166|

Sallie Manzanet-Daniels

Saliann Scarpulla Barbara R. Kapnick John R. Higgitt Llinét M. Rosado

The People appeal from an order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Raymond L. Bruce, J.), entered on or about June 12, 2024, which granted defendant's CPL 440.10(1)(h) motion and vacated defendant's judgment of conviction.

Kapnick, J.

[*1]

The People appeal from an order of Supreme Court, Bronx County (Raymond L. Bruce, J.), entered on or about June 12, 2024, which granted defendant's CPL 440.10(1)(h) motion and vacated the judgment, rendered December 14, 2016, as amended January 19, 2017 and February 1, 2017, convicting him, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life. Defendant is currently remanded to pretrial custody on the open indictment.

The issue on this appeal is whether the motion court properly found that the People violated their duty under Brady v Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]) when they withheld three federal civil lawsuits filed against Detective Davie Rodriguez and a Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) Officer History of Detective Rodriguez. For the following reasons, we conclude that the civil complaints and CCRB Officer History are Brady material that the People suppressed, and defendant was denied a fair trial as a result. Accordingly, we affirm the motion court's order vacating defendant's judgment of conviction on all counts and remand for a new trial.

The Trial

By indictment No. 2875/2013, defendant Frederick White was charged by a grand jury with second-degree murder, first-degree manslaughter, and two counts of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. On November 10, 2016, the trial commenced. To support a conviction for second-degree murder, the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to kill his wife Cleopatra "Tamika" Lovelace, and to reject the defense's theory that the shooting was an accident. In support of their case, the People relied on testimony from numerous witnesses who stated that defendant made incriminating statements to them after the shooting. Those witnesses included: Lovelace's daughter Sasha Quamie, Lovelace's friend Ebony Gales, defendant's sister Robin White, a 911 operator, and multiple police officers. As set forth below, all of the statements that defendant made to each of these individuals could be interpreted as consistent with an accidental shooting, except defendant's confession to intentional murder made to Detective Rodriguez.

[*2]

In 2013, defendant, Lovelace, and their children, Quamie and Samara White, lived together at 3576 Dekalb Avenue in the Bronx. Quamie, who was 13 years old on the date of the incident, recounted that on the evening of September 10, 2013, Lovelace returned home from dinner with Gales, and they both went to bed. Shortly thereafter, Quamie heard "keys rattling" in the apartment doorway, followed a little while later by "a popping noise." Defendant then entered Quamie's bedroom appearing "panicked" and instructed her to stay away from her mother's bedroom, and to meet him outside with Samara, her younger sister. In the car, Quamie overheard defendant make a phone call where he stated in a "panicked" voice: "I did something and I can't go back."

Gales explained to the jury that the relationship between defendant and Lovelace had been deteriorating before the shooting. After defendant dropped Quamie off at Gales's apartment on the evening of the shooting, Gales called defendant and asked to speak with Lovelace. Defendant replied, in a "nonchalant" tone, "You know, I love your friend, right," but added that "he did something he couldn't take back." Defendant said to Gales, "Oh well. Sorry. I did it. But I can't take it back now. Oh well."

White testified that defendant's relationship with Lovelace had its ups and downs. Several months before Lovelace's death, defendant asked White whether she would "be willing to take care of Samara if something was to ever happen to [Lovelace]." On the evening of the shooting, defendant called White to tell her that he was dropping Samara off at their mother's home where White was staying. When defendant arrived, he was "crying and shaky." He told her to "call the police" because "he killed [Lovelace]." He did not give any further details. Defendant then went into his mother's room and when he came out, he said he was going to kill himself.

White called 911 and directed them to Lovelace's apartment. She begged the police to "please hurry up" because defendant had "said he shot her" and that "she's dead, he killed her."

Defendant then drove to the 41st precinct located at 1086 Simpson Street to find a detective he knew who worked there, Detective Ciuffi. Police Officer Ivan Gomez was covering the front desk when defendant entered the precinct. He testified that defendant was "hysterical[ly] crying, w[ailing], screaming," "exhibiting despair" and "[g]rief." Defendant "crossed his wrist[s] in front of [Officer Gomez]" urging him to "[t]ake me in, take me in." He repeatedly said "I did something bad, I killed her, I did something bad." Officer Gomez proceeded to place defendant in handcuffs for the officers' safety.

Detective Dietrich responded to the commotion and described defendant as "very emotional." He overheard defendant say, "I couldn't take it anymore. I couldn't take it anymore, I had to do it, I had to do it, put it in my hand, put it in my hand."

[*3]

Lieutenant Hassiem Mitchel testified that he overheard defendant say "something to the effect [of] he either killed or shot a person I believed to be his wife." Defendant urged the officers to "check [his] back pocket." Detective Dietrich did so and recovered a 9mm handgun. While Detective Dietrich was removing the gun from defendant's pocket, he heard defendant yell, "I shot her, I shot her." The police did not test the gun for DNA or fingerprints.

Lieutenant Mitchel then alerted Detective Rodriguez of the Bronx Homicide Squad about the events that had transpired at the precinct. Shortly thereafter, Detective Rodriguez came downstairs to speak with defendant in a conference room.

Detective Rodriguez said that on the night of the shooting, he found defendant handcuffed and crying in a conference room. Defendant told him "I shouldn't have done that sh*t," "I was supposed to kill myself with her,"^FN1 "I ruined my daughter's life." Because he had left his memo book in his office, Detective Rodriguez took handwritten notes on a piece of paper he found in the conference room to memorialize defendant's statements. Detective Rodriguez denied asking defendant any questions to elicit these statements. At this point, defendant had still not been advised of his Miranda rights, even though he had spoken to several officers and was handcuffed.

Detective Rodriguez proceeded to escort defendant upstairs to question him in an interview room with his partner, Detective Aasheim, who did not testify at defendant's trial. Unlike the brief statements that defendant made to the other witnesses, Detective Rodriguez testified about defendant's detailed confession to intentional murder. Detective Rodriguez testified that once the detectives began questioning defendant in the interview room, he read defendant his Miranda rights using a Miranda warning form. Notably, Detective Rodriguez filled out the form himself and signed it at the bottom because defendant allegedly refused to write on the form. Defendant then allegedly made an unrecorded statement that Detective Rodriguez documented in his notes. Contrary to police policy, Detective Rodriguez did not write the start and end time of the interview. He also said that he did not record defendant's statement because recording equipment was not available, despite Detective Dietrich's contradictory testimony that video recordings for suspect interviews were in place during that time.

[*4]

Defendant allegedly told both detectives that Lovelace had recently "c[o]me into money from an accident and since then has been playing around." When he arrived home, Lovelace was upset and wanted him out of the house. Defendant then "left the bedroom, went to the closet, retrieved a gun from the closet, put it in his right rear pocket and went back to the bedroom." Lovelace said she was going to call the police, at which time defendant became upset and "shot her twice." He then heard gurgling, left the room, closed the door, and woke up his kids. Defendant said he had bought the firearm for $600 two weeks before Lovelace died.

Later that night, at around 3:00 a.m., Detective Rodriguez heard banging coming from defendant's cell. The detective heard defendant saying, "I went too far, I went too far." Detective Rodriguez later visited the crime scene and returned to the precinct around 7:00 a.m. to speak to defendant. He asked how far defendant held the gun from the victim when he shot her, and defendant demonstrated five inches. The following day, the detective asked defendant whether he shot the gun through the pillow because the autopsy identified "wadding of the pillow on her." Defendant did not recall but stated that Lovelace sometimes "keeps a pillow between her legs and sometimes it cover[s] her face." These statements were not recorded and were conveyed to the jury through the detective's testimony and notes.

The People introduced medical and ballistic evidence which supported their theory that one of the pillows on the bed was held within close range of the gun and covered Lovelace's neck and chest when the gun was fired. The expert testimony suggested that defendant shot Lovelace twice at a downward angle through a pillow while she was sleeping, but did not conclusively establish that defendant intentionally caused her death.

[*5]

Defendant and his friend, Kim Porter, testified for the defense. During defendant's testimony, he acknowledged that his relationship with Lovelace had deteriorated, and that they had been fighting by text and over the phone on the day of the incident. He testified that when he returned home that night he found Lovelace in bed, and they began arguing. Lovelace told defendant to get out of the house. According to defendant, he left the bedroom to gather his belongings and went to his closet to look for his gun. When he could not find the gun, he returned to the room and asked Lovelace if she had moved it. As he continued searching for it, he noticed that one of Lovelace's hands was under her pillow. When he moved the pillow, he saw the gun and attempted to retrieve it from her. As Lovelace pulled the gun towards herself, defendant placed one knee on the bed standing over Lovelace, held her wrist with one hand, and squeezed the fingers in her other hand so that she would release the gun. The gun then fired twice, back-to-back, even though defendant testified that he never pulled the trigger. He testified that he kept his gun fully loaded, with a bullet in the chamber, but with the safety mechanism on. When he reached the police precinct, he recalled saying "I f*cked up and I killed my daughter's life," which officers misunderstood to mean he killed his daughter. He confessed to second-degree manslaughter, but he maintained throughout his testimony that he did not intend to kill Lovelace.

On cross-examination, defendant was asked about his statements to Detective Rodriguez. He denied that Detective Rodriguez had ever explained his Miranda rights, and denied confessing to intentionally shooting Lovelace or making the statements Detective Rodriguez wrote down in his notes. He testified that "what I said and what they wrote is "[sic]" two different things." He also denied that he demonstrated to Detective Rodrigez the next morning how he shot Lovelace. On the stand, defendant was visibly combative with the prosecutor. The court had to admonish him to "not argue with the DA."

Detective James Clontz, the People's ballistics expert, rebutted defendant's testimony that the firearm that killed Lovelace did not have a manual safety mechanism. The gun also did not have a "hair trigger," meaning it would require two separate five-pound trigger pulls for the pistol to discharge twice. Detective Clontz noted that it was "very unlikely" the gun could have fired "by accident," but acknowledged that if Lovelace's finger was inside the guard, "the force of [defendant's] pressure on her finger might have resulted in her firing the weapon."

[*6]

During summations, the defense tried to secure a conviction of only the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree. Defense counsel argued that the jury should credit defendant's testimony that the shooting was an accident over Detective Rodriguez's testimony that defendant confessed to an intentional shooting. Defense counsel emphasized that "when you think about my client I want you to, if you can, juxtapose some of the things that [Detective] Rodriguez told you against what my client told you. My client told you it was an accident." He argued that Detective Rodriguez and the police did not follow proper procedures, lied repeatedly under oath, and ran a "sloppy, sloppy investigation." He highlighted that defendant did not sign the Miranda waiver card, and that Detective Rodriguez did not get a written statement from defendant, did not write the start and end time of the interview on his written statement, did not record the interview despite the availability of video recording equipment and did not collect defendant's phone. The police also failed to send the gun for DNA or fingerprint analysis, which could have shown that Lovelace's DNA or fingerprints were on the gun.

The prosecution argued that defendant killed Lovelace "in cold blood," and acknowledged in summation that "Detective Rodriguez is another person that [the] defense spent a lot of time trying to convince you was not a credible witness." However, the People stated, "I submit that he was a credible witness." The prosecutor emphasized he was "credible" four times, in addition to calling him "truthful" and "honest." The prosecution also rejected the defense's theory that Detective Rodriguez coerced defendant to confess because he had already confessed to other officers.

The jury convicted defendant of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and, as indicated above, sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 25 years to life.

CPL 440.10 Hearing

On May 5, 2022, defendant filed a CPL 440.10(1)(h) motion seeking, among other relief, a vacatur of the judgment of conviction based upon the People's suppression of and failure to disclose certain Brady, Giglio, and civil litigation materials relating to Detective Rodriguez's past misconduct. Following motion practice, the court held a CPL 440.10 hearing, after which the parties filed posthearing memoranda of law.

Defendant argued that the People possessed but did not disclose (i) two federal complaints brought by pro se plaintiff Dale Robertson against Detective Rodriguez, (ii) a complaint brought by plaintiff Enger Miguel Javier against Detective Rodriguez in Bronx Supreme Court, and (iii) a three-page CCRB Officer History. Defendant argued that the People's failure to disclose these materials undermined the fairness of his trial and may have impacted the verdict.

[*7]

The verified complaint for Javier v City of New York, filed approximately one year before Lovelace died, alleged that Detective Rodriguez and his partner interrogated the plaintiff, Javier, over two days without Miranda warnings and deprived him of access to a lawyer (see Javier v City of New York, Sup Ct Bronx County, Mar. 13, 2016, Danziger, J., index No. 21694/2016E). It further alleged that the detectives forced a witness to falsely accuse Javier of the crime, even though Javier repeatedly told the detectives that he was innocent and identified the actual perpetrator. Ultimately, the Bronx DA dismissed the charges against Javier.

In Robertson, the plaintiff alleged that Detective Rodriguez coerced him into confessing that he had accidentally murdered the victim while he was being transported to Central Booking(see Robertson v City of New York, US Dist Ct, SD NY, No. 14-CV-0184, Broderick, J., 2014; Robertson v City of New York, US Dist Ct, SD NY, No. 12-CV-03659, Broderick, J., 2012). Robertson claimed that Detective Rodriguez and another officer transported him in the back of an unmarked police vehicle with the front seat pushed all the way back, crushing Robertson's legs. Detective Rodriguez, who was seated next to him, allegedly pressed him against the window to coerce the confession.

The People conceded that they possessed but did not disclose a CCRB Officer History containing summary information regarding 40 allegations made against Detective Rodriguez, including the dates, categories of allegations, and disposition of each incident. The 40 allegations of misconduct reflect 16 discrete CCRB incidents where Detective Rodriguez allegedly used physical force, caused property damage and threatened arrest. The People denied possession of the underlying CCRB complaints or CCRB investigation materials.

In a comprehensive 15-page decision dated June 12, 2024, the motion court granted defendant's CPL 440.10(1)(h) motion, vacated the judgment of conviction, and ordered a new trial based on the People's Brady violation.

Legal Standard

In criminal prosecutions, the government is constitutionally required to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant if it is material to their guilt or punishment (Brady, 373 US at 87). The prosecution's duty to disclose "encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence" (Strickler v Greene, 527 US 263, 280 [1999]; see also Giglio v United States, 405 US 150, 154-155 [1972]). These principles apply with equal force under both the Federal and New York State Constitutions (People v Flores, 217 AD3d 29, 40 [1st Dept 2023]; US Const, 14th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6).

[*8]

To establish that the People committed a Brady violation warranting a new trial, a defendant must show that "(1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material" (People v Rong He, 34 NY3d 956, 958 [2019], quoting People v Giuca, 33 NY3d 462, 473 [2019]). Where, as here, defendant sought to vacate his conviction under CPL 440.10(1)(h) based on a Brady violation, he bears the "burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support the motion" (CPL 440.30[6]; see also People v Jones, 24 NY3d 623, 636 [2014]).

In this case, the sole issue at the CPL 440.10 hearing, and on this appeal, is whether defendant met his burden on the third prong of the test to establish that the evidence suppressed concerning Detective Rodriguez meets the materiality standard. Where a defendant made a general demand for the evidence, the test for materiality is whether "there is a reasonable probability that had [the suppressed evidence] been disclosed to the defense, the result would have been different" (People v Ulett, 33 NY3d 512, 519 [2019], quoting People v Garrett, 23 NY3d 878, 891 [2014]; People v Wright, 86 NY2d 591, 597 [1995]).^FN2

"In determining materiality, the 'question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence' " (Ulett, 33 NY3d at 519, quoting Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 434 [1995]). In that regard, "[d]efendant need only show that 'the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict' " (Ulett, 33 NY3d at 520, quoting Kyles, 514 US at 435; see also People v Bryce, 88 NY2d 124, 128 [1996]).

Discussion

This appeal addresses a troubling Brady violation that deprived defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. The motion court correctly found that the People's suppression of civil complaints and a CCRB Officer History against Detective Rodriguez violated Brady and deprived him of a trial "resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence" (Kyles, 514 US at 434). Viewing the trial record as a whole, the People's disclosure of the suppressed evidence before trial "would have made a different result reasonably probable" (id.; Flores, 217 AD3d at 45 [the reasonable probability test requires determining whether the suppressed evidence "would have raised enough reasonable doubt to affect the outcome of the trial"]).

[*9]

The People argue that the motion court erred when it found that the People committed a Brady violation because there was no reasonable probability that disclosure of the civil lawsuits and CCRB Officer History for Detective Rodriguez would have changed the jury's verdict. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.

First, the People contend that defense counsel would not have been permitted to cross-examine Detective Rodriguez on the Javier and Robertson lawsuits because the allegations are too dissimilar from this case. However, as the Court of Appeals made clear in People v Smith, "law enforcement witnesses should be treated in the same manner as any other witness for purposes of cross-examination" (27 NY3d 652, 661-662 [2016]). The Court held that:

"[W]here a lawsuit has not resulted in an adverse finding against a police officer, . . . defendants should not be permitted to ask a witness if he or she has been sued, if the case was settled (unless there was an admission of wrongdoing) or if the criminal charges related to the plaintiffs in those actions were dismissed. However, subject to the trial court's discretion, defendants should be permitted to ask questions based on the specific allegations of the lawsuit if the allegations are relevant to the credibility of the witness" (id.at 662).

Thus, in order to ask about an officer's prior alleged misconduct, a defense attorney must (i) "present a good faith basis for inquiring" based on "the lawsuit relied upon" and (ii) the allegations in the complaint must be relevant to the officer's credibility (id.). In particular, "civil allegations of misconduct" against a law enforcement officer may be "favorable to defendant as impeachment evidence" even where they have not been proven at trial, if they "demonstrate[] an untruthful bent" or a "willingness . . . to place the advancement" of the officer's "self-interest ahead of principle or of the interests of society" (Smith, 27 NY3d at 661, citing People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 461 [1994]).

[*10]

Applying the Smith framework here, defense counsel could have questioned Detective Rodriguez on the allegations in the Javier and Robertson complaints, and it is reasonably probable that doing so could have changed the verdict in this case. The verdict in this case hinged largely on credibility determinations — specifically, whether the jury believed defendant's account that Lovelace was accidentally shot during a struggle between her and defendant, or the People's theory, that defendant confessed to Detective Rodriguez that he intentionally killed Lovelace. Defendant denied confessing to Detective Rodriguez and maintained that Detective Rodriguez's account of the interrogation, as reflected in his notes, was inaccurate. Given that jurors generally view "confessions as relatively strong indicators of guilt," the defense's strategy hinged on undermining Detective Rodriguez's credibility (see Amelia Mindthoff et al., A Survey of Potential Jurors' Perceptions of Interrogations and Confessions, 24 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 430, 442 [2018]).The defense highlighted Detective Rodriguez's multiple alleged departures from accepted police practices and procedures in this case, including that: (i) Detective Rodriguez did not properly advise defendant of his Miranda rights, (ii) defendant never signed the Miranda waiver card, (iii) Detective Rodriguez did not document the start or end time on the witness interrogation statement, (iv) defendant did not sign the witness statement that Detective Rodriguez prepared, and (v) Detective Rodriguez did not video record defendant's interrogation, even though recording equipment was available.

The Robertson and Javier civil lawsuits against Detective Rodriguez alleged similar misconduct to what the defense maintains occurred in this case—coerced confessions and Detective Rodriguez's failure to Mirandize a suspect.

[*11]

People v Hubbard (132 AD3d 1013 [2d Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 965 [2016]) is instructive in this regard. In Hubbard, the most potent evidence against the defendant at trial was his admission to a detective that he shot the victim. The Appellate Division, Second Department vacated the defendant's judgment of conviction because the prosecution failed to disclose evidence bearing on the detective's procurement of a false confession. The court reasoned that "[g]iven the importance of [the detective's] testimony in establishing the defendant's guilt, the [motion court] properly determined that evidence concerning allegations that he had procured a false confession in an unrelated matter involving two police officers . . . was favorable to the defense and material" (id. at 1013-1014; see also People v Fishbein, 238 AD3d 543, 544 [1st Dept 2025] [reversing and remanding for a new trial where the trial court "improvidently exercised its discretion, under the standard set forth in People v Smith (27 NY3d 652 [2016]), in not permitting cross-examination regarding the underlying facts of a civil suit"]; People v Conner, 184 AD3d 431, 431 [1st Dept 2020] [the trial court erred in denying defendant's request to cross-examine a police officer regarding allegations that he falsified charges in a civil complaint which bore on the officer's credibility at trial]; People v Holmes, 170 AD3d 532, 533 [1st Dept 2019] [the defendant was entitled to a new trial in part because the motion court "improperly precluded [defense] counsel from cross-examining the only police officer who allegedly saw the pistol falling from his person about allegations raised in a federal civil action against the officer, which had settled"]; People v Robinson, 154 AD3d 490, 491 [1st Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1108 [2018] [motion court "erred in precluding defense counsel from questioning a detective about the factual allegations in a pending federal civil lawsuit" that bore on his credibility]; People v Enoe, 144 AD3d 1052, 1054 [2d Dept 2016] [motion court erred by prohibiting the defendant from cross-examining the sergeant "with respect to the specific allegations of the federal lawsuit filed against him," which were relevant to the sergeant's credibility]).

Moreover, People v Smith squarely undermines the People's position that the two Robertson lawsuits could not have provided the defense with a good faith basis to inquire because the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss the case without prejudice (see Smith, 27 NY3d at 661 [discussing "relevance of prior bad acts that have been alleged in court filings, but not proven at trial"]).

[*12]

Next, the People maintain that the CCRB Officer History for Detective Rodriguez did not provide a good-faith basis to inquire because the allegations were unsubstantiated. The People's argument ignores that suppressed evidence is material if it would have "provided leads for additional admissible evidence" (Ulett, 33 NY3d at 521; see also Kyles, 514 US at 445-446 [discussing how defense counsel might have used undisclosed material to impeach police officers "to good effect"]; United States v Gil, 297 F3d 93, 104 [2d Cir 2002] [a memo containing hearsay was Brady material, even assuming no part of the memo was admissible in evidence, because it "could lead to admissible evidence"]; Rong He, 34 NY3d at 959 [the suppressed evidence "could have allowed defendant to develop additional facts, which in turn could have aided him in establishing additional or alternative theories to support his defense"]). Had defense counsel received a copy of the CCRB Officer History or the three civil complaints before trial, they would have been aware of multiple allegations of misconduct involving Detective Rodriguez when he interviewed and arrested suspects. With this evidence in hand, an effective defense attorney could have investigated publicly available records to uncover additional complaints against Detective Rodriguez ^FN3 and subpoenaed the CCRB for an in camerainspection of the underlying CCRB records pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 50-a (2)^FN4 and CPL 610.25 (see People v Gissendanner, 48 NY 2d 543, 550 [1979] [the defendant must set forth "in good faith . . . some factual predicate which would make it reasonably likely that the file will bear such fruit and that the quest for its contents is not merely a desperate grasping at a straw"]).

[*13]

While we recognize that defendant faced a heavy burden in seeking a subpoena for the underlying CCRB records, there is sufficient authority to suggest that he might have prevailed in obtaining those files had he presented the other civil complaints alleging misconduct by Detective Rodriguez similar to the misconduct he claimed occurred in this case (see Fishbein, 238 AD3d at 545 [reversing the defendant's 2018 conviction and remanding for a new trial because, among other things, the motion court erred in denying the defendant's motion for an in camerareview of the officer's disciplinary records where the "defense learned of two lawsuits in which the officer was alleged to have engaged in similar conduct" to the misconduct at issue in that case]; People v Ruiz, 57 Misc 3d 1029, 1034 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2017] [granting defendant's motion to subpoena CCRB and NYPD records because prior lawsuits against the officer suggested that his "records may contain information bearing on the unreliability of either the criminal charges or his testimony on which they depend"]; People v Calderon, 48 Misc 3d 1226[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51273[U], *2 [Sup Ct, NY County 2015] [granting defendant's request for in camera review of CCRB and NYPD records pertaining to a key prosecution because "defendant made a clear showing of prior acts of misconduct (through a federal civil rights action against the detective) which would bear peculiarly on the circumstances of his own case"]).

Defendant's trial counsel never had the opportunity to subpoena Detective Rodriguez's CCRB records because they had been suppressed. Defendant's appellate counsel ultimately obtained the CCRB materials following the motion court's order of May 11, 2023 compelling the People to turn over all exculpatory and impeachment materials in their possession, and through a FOIL request made during the CPL 440.10 proceedings. The CCRB records provided ample impeachment material for defense counsel's cross-examination of the detective. For example, Detective Rodriguez's CCRB Officer History reflects "unsubstantiated" complaints filed with the CCRB against Detective Rodriguez on August 1, 2003. The underlying CCRB records and federal civil complaint associated with the CCRB complaint in London v City of New York (US Dist Ct, SD NY, No. 03-cv-10205, Peck, M.J., 2003) reveal that Detective Rodriguez allegedly punched a 15-year-old boy twice in the face, breaking his jaw.

[*14]

The CCRB records also show that the judge presiding over the complainant's Family Court case doubted Detective Rodriguez's testimony and personally requested that the Family Court records be provided to the CCRB. The records further reflect that Detective Rodriguez made false statements to CCRB investigators. The People place undue emphasis on the fact that the allegations in the CCRB Officer History were ultimately deemed "unsubstantiated." However, according to the CCRB, an unsubstantiated finding is one where "the available evidence is insufficient to determine whether the officer did or did not commit the misconduct" (People v Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d 371, 374 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2021]). As courts have recognized, "[u]nlike truncated, exonerated, and unfounded complaints, the underlying facts of substantiated and unsubstantiated findings may provide a good faith basis for cross examination" (id.). Like the civil complaints discussed above, Detective Rodriguez's CCRB records could have undermined his credibility on cross-examination.

Against this backdrop, timely disclosure of the suppressed material may well have materially changed defense counsel's strategy, especially if Detective Rodriguez's testimony regarding defendant's alleged confession was effectively impeached on cross-examination. Indeed, defendant may have decided not to testify at trial to challenge the reliability of his alleged confession to Detective Rodriguez. Deciding not to take the stand could have altered the jury's perception of defendant where, as here, he was combative with the prosecutor during cross-examination.

[*15]

Finally, although the People argue that the suppressed evidence was not material because they had other overwhelming evidence to support defendant's murder conviction, they concede that the materiality standard turns on whether the trial was fair, considering "the importance of the witness to the People's proof and whether the defendant effectively attacked the witness's credibility in the absence of the information."^FN5 We reject the People's attempt to minimize the significance of Detective Rodriguez's testimony because defendant made incriminating statements to other individuals on the night of the incident. Defendant admitted to White, Gales, Police Officer Gomez, Detective Dietrich, and Lieutenant Mitchel that he killed Lovelace. However, his distraught and brief statements to these individuals that "I did something and I can't go back," "I did it. But I can't take it back now," "I did something bad, I killed her," and "I killed her" are equally consistent with a distressed man reacting to the accidental death of his wife and immediately deciding to turn himself into the police. None of those statements, standing alone, suggests that defendant acted in accordance with a premeditated plan to kill Lovelace. Even defendant's statement to Officer Dietrich, "I couldn't take it anymore. I couldn't take it anymore. I had to do it" was materially different from his confession to Detective Rodriguez, because it was devoid of any meaningful context establishing a deliberate intent or plan to kill Lovelace (see Conner, 184 AD3d at 431 ["Although the sergeant's testimony was corroborated by other evidence, none of this corroborating evidence was sufficient, on its own, to prove defendant's guilt, as all of it relied on the sergeant's testimony for context"]).

It was only during defendant's lengthy interrogation by Detective Rodriguez that defendant allegedly confessed to an express intent to kill Lovelace. That confession was elicited by the lead detective who had the most extensive interaction with defendant on the night of the incident. The People themselves underscored the importance of Detective Rodriguez's testimony during summations, vouching for his credibility on several occasions, and later acknowledging during the CPL 440.10 proceedings that his testimony was "undoubtably important to the People's case" (see People v Archer, —AD3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op 03975, *1 [2d Dept 2026] ["The failure to turn over [Brady] evidence was aggravated by the prosecutor's argument during summation that the witness was 'the only independent witness' and had 'absolutely zero motive to lie' "]).

[*16]

Nor is the People's reliance on their ballistics, forensic, and medical evidence dispositive. Although that evidence may have supported the prosecution's theory that defendant shot Lovelace through a pillow twice while she was sleeping, the People's ballistics and medical examiners could not exclude the possibility that Lovelace's death occurred under circumstances more consistent with defendant's account. As a result, Detective Rodriguez's testimony about defendant's interrogation remained the critical evidence distinguishing an intentional, premediated killing from an accidental shooting that was then followed by defendant's remorseful admissions.

Accordingly, the People's Brady violation deprived defendant of a meaningful opportunity to challenge a key prosecution witness and undermines our confidence in the verdict (Ulett, 33 NY3d at 514, 515 [even though proof of defendant's guilt was "substantial," the People's failure to produce a surveillance video "raises a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a different result at trial"]; see also Kyles, 514 US at 453 ["But the question is not whether the State would have had a case to go to the jury if it had disclosed the favorable evidence, but whether we can be confident that the jury's verdict would have been the same"]).

Accordingly, the order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Raymond L. Bruce, J.), entered on or about June 12, 2024, which granted defendant's CPL 440.10(1)(h) motion and vacated the judgment of conviction should be affirmed, and the matter remanded for a new trial.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Raymond L. Bruce, J.), entered on or about June 12, 2024, which granted defendant's CPL 440.10(1)(h) motion and vacated the judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Opinion by Kapnick, J. All concur.

Manzanet-Daniels, J.P., Scarpulla, Kapnick, Higgitt, Rosado, JJ.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: July 16, 2026