Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 22, 2026

2023-03124, 2025-14253, (Index No. 59834/18)

Francesca E. Connolly, J.P.

Valerie Brathwaite Nelson

Barry E. Warhit

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lewis J. Lubell, J.), dated January 31, 2023, and (2) an order of the same court dated January 31, 2023. The first order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the motion of the defendant Allen J. Reyen which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against him. The second order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the motion of the defendant Allen J. Reyen, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he fell from a ladder while performing certain work on a barn located on property in Pound Ridge. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, Allen J. Reyen and Allen J. Reyen, Inc., alleging, inter alia, violations of Labor Law §§ 240 and 241(6). The defendants separately moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. The Supreme Court granted those branches of the defendants' separate motions which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against each of them. The plaintiff appeals.

"Labor Law § 240(1) imposes upon owners, contractors, and their agents a nondelegable duty to provide workers proper protection from elevation-related hazards" (Argueta v Hall & Wright, LLC, 230 AD3d 1200, 1201 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Thorpe v One Page Park, LLC, 208 AD3d 818, 820). In contrast, "Labor Law § 241(6) imposes upon owners and [*2]general contractors, and their agents, a nondelegable duty to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers, and to comply with the specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor" (Moscati v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 168 AD3d 717, 718 [internal quotation marks omitted]). A general contractor may be held liable under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) if it was "responsible for coordinating and supervising the entire construction project and was invested with a concomitant power to enforce safety standards and to hire responsible contractors" (Caiazzo v Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 AD3d 718, 720 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Temperino v DRA, Inc., 75 AD3d 543, 544). Moreover, a contractor may be held liable as an agent of an owner where it had the authority to supervise and control the work at issue (see Caiazzo v Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 AD3d at 720; Herrel v West, 82 AD3d 933, 934).

Here, Allen J. Reyen, Inc., established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against it by demonstrating it did not own the property and did not contract to have work performed for its benefit (see Paul v Village of Quogue, 178 AD3d 942, 943) and that it was neither a general contractor nor an agent of the owner with regard to the plaintiff's work (see Mejia v 69 Mamaroneck Rd. Corp., 232 AD3d 886, 888). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324).

Both Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) "exempt from liability 'owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work'" (Pawelic v Siegel, 220 AD3d 883, 884, quoting Labor Law §§ 240[1]; 241[6]). "'In order for a defendant to receive the protection of the homeowner's exemption, the defendant must show that (1) the premises consisted of a one- or two-family residence, and (2) the owner did not direct or control the work being performed'" (Walsh v Kenny, 219 AD3d 1555, 1556, quoting Marquez v Mascioscia, 165 AD3d 912, 913).

Here, Reyen demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against him by establishing that the work was related to the residential use of the home and that he did not direct or control the work. Moreover, Reyen demonstrated that the barn functioned as an "extension of the dwelling" and that the work had a substantially residential purpose (Bartoo v Buell, 87 NY2d 362, 369; see Rendon v Callaghan, 206 AD3d 945, 947; Bates v Porter, 203 AD3d 792, 794).

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324).

CONNOLLY, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WARHIT and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court