Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 22, 2026

2024-10561, (Index No. 516657/20)

Francesca E. Connolly, J.P.

Linda Christopher

Barry E. Warhit

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In a putative class action, inter alia, to recover damages for violations of Labor Law article 19, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Francois A. Rivera, J.), dated June 27, 2024. The order granted the plaintiffs' motion pursuant to CPLR article 9 for class certification.

ORDERED that the order modified, on the law, (1) by deleting the provision thereof granting those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which were pursuant to CPLR article 9 for class certification on the second and third causes of action and substituting therefor a provision denying those branches of the motion, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof granting the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on the first, fourth, and sixth causes of action to the extent of certifying the proposed class from September 4, 2014, through June 28, 2024, and substituting therefor a provision granting those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which were for class certification on the first, fourth, and sixth causes of action to the extent of certifying the proposed class from September 4, 2014, through December 31, 2021; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiffs, who were previously employed by the defendants as medical assistants, commenced this putative class action against the defendants on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated employees. The complaint alleged, among other things, that the defendants violated the Labor Law by failing to pay overtime and spread-of-hours wages to medical assistants and by failing to provide wage notices and statements. The plaintiffs moved pursuant to CPLR article 9 for certification of a class, inter alia, defined as all individuals who were employed by the defendants as a "Medical Assistant, Assistant, Office Assistant, Call Center employee, [and] Secretary" between "September 4, 2014 and today [June 28, 2024]." The defendants opposed the motion. In an order dated June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The defendants appeal.

"The proponent of a motion for class certification bears the burden of establishing compliance with the requirements of CPLR 901 and 902" (Medina v Fairway Golf Mgt., LLC, 177 AD3d 727, 727-728; see Krobath v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 178 AD3d 805, 806). "CPLR 901(a) sets forth the five requirements for certification of a class action: '1. the class is so numerous [*2]that joinder of all members, whether otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable; 2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; 3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; 4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and 5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy'" (Medina v Fairway Golf Mgt., LLC, 177 AD3d at 728, quoting CPLR 901[a]).

Generally, "the determination to grant class action certification ultimately rests in the sound discretion of the trial court" (Krobath v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 178 AD3d at 806; see Konstantynovska v Friendly Home Care, Inc., 241 AD3d 1537, 1539). "[I]nquiry on a motion for class action certification vis-a-vis the merits is limited to a determination as to whether on the surface there appears to be a cause of action which is not a sham" (Jenack v Goshen Operations, LLC, 222 AD3d 36, 40-41 [internal quotation marks omitted]). However, "[a] class action certification must be founded upon an evidentiary basis" (Yonkers Contr. Co. v Romano Enters. of N.Y., 304 AD2d 657, 658; see Jenack v Goshen Operations, LLC, 222 AD3d at 44).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which were for class certification on the issues of whether the defendants violated the Labor Law by making unlawful wage deductions (first cause of action), failing to pay overtime wages (fourth cause of action), and failing to pay spread-of-hours wages (sixth cause of action). Contrary to the defendants' contention, the plaintiffs' evidentiary submissions in support of those branches of their motion satisfied the requirements of CPLR 901(a) (see Stepanov v Five Borough Home Care, Inc., 247 AD3d 812; Medina v Fairway Golf Mgt., LLC, 177 AD3d at 728; cf. Konstantynovska v Friendly Home Care, Inc., 241 AD3d at 1539-1540).

However, with respect to those issues, the Supreme Court should have limited the class period to September 4, 2014, through December 31, 2021. The plaintiffs failed to provide a sufficient evidentiary basis for concluding that the defendants had a policy of making unlawful wage deductions and failing to pay overtime and spread-of-hours wages subsequent to December 31, 2021 (see Konstantynovska v Friendly Home Care, Inc., 241 AD3d at 1539-1540).

Further, the Supreme Court erred in granting those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which were for class certification on the second and third causes of action, seeking to recover statutory penalties plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, based upon the defendants' alleged failure to provide wage notices and statements in violation of Labor Law § 195(1) and (3). CPLR 901(b) provides that, "[u]nless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action." The Labor Law provides for statutory penalties for violations of Labor Law § 195(1) and (3) (see id. §§ 198[1-b], [1-d]; Idahosa v MFM Contr. Corp., 239 AD3d 536, 537; Mendoza v Cornell Univ., 215 AD3d 590, 592). Inasmuch as Labor Law § 198(1-b) and § 198(1-d) do not specifically authorize recovery as part of a class action, the court should not have granted certification with respect to those issues (see Idahosa v MFM Contr. Corp., 239 AD3d at 537; Richmond v Perfetto Enter. Co., Inc., 85 Misc 3d 1242[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50402[U], *5 [Sup Ct, Kings County]; Thomas v JRCruz Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 31149[U], *12 [Sup Ct, Kings County]).

The defendants' remaining contentions are without merit.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court