Decided and Entered:July 23, 2026

CR-25-0297

Calendar Date: May 27, 2026

Before: Aarons, J.P., Pritzker, Ceresia, Fisher And Mcshan, JJ.

[*1]

McShan, J.

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Montgomery County (Chad Brown, J.), rendered June 5, 2024, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree, and (2) from a judgment of said court, rendered June 5, 2024, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.

In August 2023, defendant was charged by indictment with one count of criminal contempt in the first degree (hereinafter the first indictment). Thereafter, defendant and a codefendant were charged by indictment with various crimes, including criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (hereinafter the second indictment). Defendant and the codefendant proceeded to trial on the second indictment. However, after trial had commenced and before the People rested, defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a global plea agreement, to one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, in satisfaction of the second indictment, and one count of criminal contempt in the first degree, in satisfaction of the first indictment. As part of the plea agreement, defendant waived his right to appeal both orally and in writing. Before sentencing, County Court denied defendant's pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on the ground that they were coerced. Thereafter, the court sentenced defendant to a prison term of six years, to be followed by two years of postrelease supervision, on the criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree conviction, to be served concurrently with a prison term of 1⅓ to 4 years on the criminal contempt in the first degree conviction. Defendant appeals.

Defendant argues that County Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We disagree. "[W]hether to permit a defendant to withdraw his or her plea of guilty is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, withdrawal will generally not be permitted absent some evidence of innocence, fraud or mistake in its inducement and an evidentiary hearing will be required only when the record presents a genuine question of fact as to the plea's voluntariness" (People v Bryan, 247 AD3d 1414, 1415 [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Rose, 238 AD3d 1323, 1324-1325 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 984 [2025]). The transcript of defendant's plea colloquy roundly contradicts his allegations of compulsion, as defendant denied that he had been threatened to induce his guilty pleas, repeatedly stated that he understood the implications of his pleas, acknowledged that he had been afforded sufficient time to confer with counsel and assured the court that he was pleading guilty voluntarily (see People v Jackson, 170 AD3d 1040, 1040-1041 [2d Dept 2019], lv denied 33 NY3d 1070 [2019]; People v Nealon, 166 AD3d 1225, 1226 [3d Dept 2018]; People v Alfred, 142 AD3d 1373, 1373 [4th [*2]Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1142 [2017]). To the extent that defendant suggests that his allocution to the charge on the first indictment was deficient and supports his claim of innocence, although defendant initially equivocated on his admission to the allegations contained in the indictment by stating that he had "[a]llegedly" committed such acts, County Court made further inquiry and reminded defendant that he was not required to plead guilty, to which defendant indicated his understanding and assured that the allegations were true and that he wanted to plead guilty (see People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666 [1988]; People v Freeman, 244 AD3d 1722, 1723 [4th Dept 2025]).

Defendant's contention that his pleas were coerced by circumstances involving a dismissed juror is unpreserved because it was not raised in defendant's postallocution motion (see People v Hunter, 175 AD3d 1601, 1603 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1078 [2019]; People v O'Neill, 116 AD3d 1240, 1241 [3d Dept 2014]). For the same reason, defendant's reliance on his claims of innocence during the presentence interview is unpreserved and, in any event, "there is . . . no duty on the part of a sentencing court to inquire into such out-of-court statements" (People v Hardie, 211 AD3d 1418, 1420 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 39 NY3d 1111 [2023]; see People v Rios, ___ NY3d ___, ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 00963, *1-2 [2026]; People v Brunson, ___ AD3d ___, ___, 256 NYS3d 204, ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 03513, *1 [1st Dept 2026]; People v Quarterman, 238 AD3d 1385, 1386 [3d Dept 2025]).

Finally, defendant's pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claims survive the unchallenged appeal waivers only to the extent that they implicate the voluntariness of his guilty pleas (see People v Tripp, 249 AD3d 1396, 1399 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Koontz, 166 AD3d 1215, 1217, 1218 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1206 [2019]). However, considering the substance of his claims and the record on appeal, "defendant's ineffective assistance claims concern matters outside the record — including his assertion that counsel failed to pursue a CPL 30.30 speedy trial claim" with respect to the first indictment and any effect from that on counsel's negotiation of the global plea agreement encompassing both indictments, as well as his assertions that counsel failed to move to sever his trial on the second indictment from that of his codefendant's — and are therefore "more properly the subject of a CPL 440.10 motion" (People v Brown, 248 AD3d 1415, 1418 [3d Dept 2026]; see People v Nolan, 224 AD3d 996, 997 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 929 [2024]; People v Sanders, 202 AD3d 573, 576 [1st Dept 2022]; People v Castro, 166 AD3d 448, 450 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 946 [2019]).^FN1

Aarons, J.P., Pritzker, Ceresia and Fisher, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.