Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: July 23, 2026

Motion No. 2026-01230|Case No. 2026-01124|

Present — Hon. Dianne T. Renwick, Presiding Justice, Sallie Manzanet-Daniels Ellen Gesmer Julio Rodriguez III Kelly O''neill Levy

Disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department. Respondent, Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine, was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the First Judicial Department on June 1, 1992.

Per Curiam

[*1]

Respondent Dominique M. Lemoine was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the First Judicial Department on June 1, 1992, under the name Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine. Respondent maintains a registered address in the First Judicial Department.

By order and decision dated August 12, 2025, the Supreme Court of Georgia disbarred respondent for, inter alia, intentional conversion of client and third-party funds in two separate matters.

Now, by motion, the Attorney Grievance Committee (AGC) seeks an order, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(2), the Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) 1240.13, and the doctrine of reciprocal discipline, finding that respondent has been disciplined by a foreign jurisdiction and disbarring respondent.

In June 2022 and January 2023, the Georgia State bar filed formal complaints against respondent charging him with professional misconduct stemming from two separate matters. Respondent answered the charges and a hearing was held before a Special Master.

With respect to the first matter, respondent was the attorney for an entity, Kruseman LLC, which facilitated and engaged in transactions involving personal protective equipment. In August 2020, Kruseman arranged for a sale of surgical gloves to a Hong Kong-based company from a third-party supplier. As the buyer was hesitant to remit funds directly to the seller, Kruseman asked respondent if his IOLTA account could be used for the transaction, to which respondent agreed.

Respondent agreed not to disburse the sale funds until the goods had been inspected and approved by the buyer. Notwithstanding this representation, respondent wired $63,360 of the escrowed funds to the seller, and at Kruseman's direction, disbursed $17,200 of the escrowed funds to a Kruseman consultant for her work on the transaction. Several weeks later, the buyer received the goods and determined they were not what he had ordered, and told respondent not to disburse the funds. Respondent informed the buyer that he would return the funds, but ultimately repaid only $132,483.40 of the $222,400 he had received.

[*2]

Following a hearing, the Special Master determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent had committed professional misconduct. Among other things, respondent had commingled client and third-party funds with his personal/business funds in violation of Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (GARPC) rule 1.15(I)(a), deposited client and fiduciary funds into an improperly constituted escrow account in violation of GARPC rule 1.15(II)(a), and failed to maintain an escrow account separate from his business and personal accounts in violation of GARPC rule 1.15(III)(a). The Special Master also found that respondent had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of GARPC rule 8.4(a)(4) by misrepresenting to the buyer that he had wired funds when he had not done so, fraudulently converting the buyer's funds to pay other clients and respondent's personal expenses, and misleading the buyer into believing that his funds were being wired into a proper escrow account.

With respect to the second matter, respondent had been retained in April 2021 by an elderly French couple who lived abroad to represent them in their tax dispute with the IRS. Respondent told the couple that the IRS could seize their accounts, and advised them to transfer funds to respondent to hold in his escrow account. The couple wired $175,00 into one of respondent's escrow accounts (this one properly constituted) to pay IRS penalties and legal fees. In May 2021, respondent transferred $115,000 of those funds from his escrow account into his operating account, and transferred another $80,000 of the couple's funds to an improperly constituted escrow account. In November of 2021, the couple asked respondent to use a portion of the funds to pay the property taxes on their home in Florida, which respondent failed to do. Respondent ignored the couple's subsequent requests for return of the funds, returning only a small portion of the funds to them.

[*3]

Following a hearing, the Special Master found that respondent had committed professional misconduct. Specifically, respondent had, among other things, commingled client funds with his personal/business funds and had failed to promptly return the funds when requested to do so in violation of GARPC rules 1.15(I)(a) and 1.15(I)(c), failed to keep his clients apprised of developments in their IRS dispute, failed to abide by his clients' decisions on how to disburse their escrowed funds in violation of GARPC rule 1.2(a), failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in failing to timely pay the property taxes on their Florida home in violation of GARPC rule 1.3, failed to respond to his former client's requests that he return the balance of their funds, deposited a portion of the funds into an improperly constituted escrow account, and intentionally converted his client's $175,000 funds to pay the buyer in the surgical gloves transaction (the first incident described above) and for his own personal use.

The Special Master considered the aggravating factors of dishonest and selfish motives, a pattern of misconduct in multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victims in that the couple was elderly and in fragile health, and the fact that respondent had substantial experience in the practice of law. The only mitigating factor was respondent's lack of prior discipline. The Special Master recommended that respondent be disbarred.

The Special Master's misconduct findings and disbarment recommendation were reviewed by the Georgia State Disciplinary Review Board, and were affirmed by report dated December 11, 2024.

Respondent filed exceptions to the Disciplinary Review Board's report with the Supreme Court of Georgia. Specifically, respondent argued that the Special Master had not found that the Georgia State Bar had proven the charged conduct by clear and convincing evidence, the Special Master had failed to consider respondent's mental state which demonstrated that he should receive a sanction no higher than a suspension, and that the formal complaints should have been dismissed pursuant to Matter of Brown (319 GA 465 [2024]). By order dated August 12, 2025, the court rejected respondent's arguments and affirmed the Special Master's and the Review Board's misconduct findings and sanction recommendation, and disbarred respondent. Respondent may raise the following defenses in a reciprocal discipline proceeding pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b): (1) lack of notice or opportunity to be heard in the foreign jurisdiction constituting a depravation of due process; (2) an infirmity or proof establishing the conduct; or (3) that the misconduct for which the attorney was disciplined in a foreign jurisdiction does not constitute misconduct in this state (see Matter of Milara, 194 AD3d 108, 110 [1st Dept 2021]).

[*4]

None of these defenses are available to respondent. The record evidences that respondent received notice of the charges against him, which he answered and vigorously defended against before the Special Master, the Disciplinary Review Board, and the Supreme Court of Georgia, which included filing exceptions to the Special Master's report and making a motion to dismiss the State Bar's formal complaint.

The record also firmly supports the findings that respondent intentionally converted client and third-party funds in the two matters at issue, which included (among other things) respondent's admissions that he had used the funds to pay other clients and third parties for his personal expenses. While respondent maintains that he did not intend to permanently deprive the parties of their funds, this Court has made clear that "the scienter [i.e., venal intent] necessary to sustain a charge of intentional conversion is established by evidence that an attorney, with knowledge that he did not have permission or authority to withdraw client or third-party funds, used those funds for the attorney's own purposes" (Matter of Blau, 50 AD3d 240, 243 [1st Dept 2008]).

Thus, the Special Master properly found that "[r]espondent was acutely aware that he was converting client and fiduciary funds for his own use or to pay others." This Court has found that "[w]hether an attorney intended to repay, or actually repays, converted funds does not negate a finding of venal intent" (Matter of Kirschenbaum, 29 AD3d 96, 100 [1st Dept 2006]). Further, respondent's misconduct in Georgia would also violate New York Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.00) rules 1.3(a), 1.4(a), 1.15(a), 1.15(b), 1.15(c), and 8.4(c).

This Court generally defers to the sanction imposed by the jurisdiction in which the charges were originally brought because the foreign jurisdiction has the greatest interest in fashioning sanctions for misconduct (see Matter of Milara, 194 AD3d at 111; Matter of Tabacco, 171 AD3d 163, 165 [1st Dept 2019]). Only rarely does this Court depart from the general rule (see Matter of Karambelas, 203 AD3d 75, 80-81 [1st Dept 2022]). As this case does not present an exception to the general rule, disbarment is the appropriate sanction (see e.g. Matter of Carlos, 192 AD3d 170, 172-173 [1st Dept 2021]).

Accordingly, the motion should be granted, respondent disbarred, and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York.

All concur.

Wherefore, it is Ordered that the motion by the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department for Reciprocal Discipline, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(2) and 22 NYCRR 1240.13, is granted, and respondent, Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine, is disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law in the State of New York, effective immediately, and until further order of this Court; and

[*5]

It is further Ordered that, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, respondent, Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine, is commanded to desist and refrain from (1) the practice of law in any form, either as principal or agent, clerk or employee of another, (2) appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, Judge, Justice, board, commission or other public authority, (3) giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) holding himself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law; and

It is further Ordered that, respondent, Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine, shall comply with the rules governing the conduct of disbarred or suspended attorneys (see 22 NYCRR 1240.15), which are made part hereof; and

It is further Ordered that if respondent, Dominique Marc Henri Lemoine, has been issued a secure pass by the Office of Court Administration, it shall be returned forthwith.

Entered: July 23, 2026