Supreme Court, Rensselaer County

Decided on April 6, 2026

Index No. EF2026-282103

Noel Mendez, J.

[*1]

In this application submitted pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"), Petitioner Tajae Sandlers ("Petitioner") seeks an order prohibiting the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") from holding a final parole revocation hearing until the court adjudicating his pending criminal charges has held a suppression hearing. Respondents Acting Commissioner Daniel F. Martuscello III ("Acting Commissioner") and Administrative Law Judge Jonathan Moberg ("ALJ") (collectively, "Respondents") oppose. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion.

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted in Rensselaer County of Third Degree Robbery in 2020, in violation of Penal Law § 160.05. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of two to six years' incarceration and released to parole supervision on September 4, 2025. On October 23, 2025, the Troy Police Department arrested Petitioner, charging him with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 265.03 (3); Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree, in violation of Penal Law § 220.16 (1); Criminal Use of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of Penal Law § 220.50 (3); Criminal Possession of a Narcotic, in violation of Penal Law § 220.09 (1); and Improper Crossing, in violation of Troy City Code § 270-19 (a). All of the criminal charges stem from a stop and search of Petitioner for jaywalking.

Parole Officer Scott Bailey filed a Notice of Violation and Violation of Release Report (consisting of a Charge Sheet; a Case Summary; and supporting documents, including the Conditions of Release), alleging nine separate condition violations against Petitioner, all of which stem from the October arrest. Troy City Court (Maier, J.) ordered that Petitioner be remanded to the Custody of the Rensselaer County Sheriff's Office. On October 31, 2025, after a preliminary hearing, the New York State Executive Department's Board of Parole (Saldarelli, S.A.L.J.) found that the Rensselaer County Parole Violation Unit met its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner failed to notify his parole officer of the October arrest. The Board of Parole (Saldarelli, S.A.L.J.) thereafter issued a Preliminary Revocation Hearing Decision and Summary, dated November 3, 2025, memorializing the determination made at the hearing and setting the date of the final hearing for November 5, 2025.

The final hearing was adjourned several times. On January 28, 2026, the ALJ named by Petitioner in the action scheduled the final hearing for February 11, 2026, on the basis that it would be contested. During the February appearance, while appearing before a different administrative law judge, Petitioner requested an adjournment due to the Order to Show Cause filed with this Court. That administrative law judge granted the adjournment. This Court signed the Order to Show Cause, staying the administrative proceeding temporarily pending a determination. Respondents interposed an Answer with supporting papers. The Court heard oral argument and now renders the following decision.

II. Parties' Arguments

The gravamen of the Verified Petition and accompanying Memorandum of Law is that the final hearing before the Board of Parole should be stayed because a criminal court has yet to address the legality or illegality of the stop and search of Petitioner at a suppression hearing. In this regard, the Rensselaer County District Attorney's Office had yet to present their case to a Grand Jury for indictment even though the matter had been held for action of the Grand Jury since the commencement of the criminal proceeding.FN1 Petitioner claims he seeks to challenge the legality of the stop and search of his person in the criminal matter at the first opportunity. As such, Petitioner argues that the Court should stay the final hearing until such suppression issues are resolved.

Citing People ex rel. Piccarillo v New York State Bd. of Parole (48 NY2d 76 [1979]) and other cases, Petitioner claims the ALJ erred in "forcing" (i.e., scheduling) the final hearing prior to a suppression hearing in a criminal court. Petitioner argues that moving forward with the final hearing under these circumstances would violate his State and federal due process rights, insofar as, under Piccarillo, the exclusionary rule—which proscribes the use of illegally obtained evidence in criminal matters—applies to parole revocation hearings here in New York. According to Petitioner, the better course would be for the Board of Parole to adjourn the final hearing pending a determination of a motion to suppress in the criminal matter. Further, Petitioner takes umbrage with the putative position taken by DOCCS in parole revocation hearings adjudicated in Rensselaer County, to the extent DOCCS argues that the Less is More Community Supervision and Revocation Reform Act (L 2001, ch 427) ("LIM") necessarily requires the denial of adjournment requests in contested final hearings. Petitioner claims that LIM is ameliorative in nature and was meant to expand upon a releasee's rights, rather than curtail them, and that DOCCS' position, both elsewhere and here, is inconsistent with the legislative purpose of LIM. Petitioner claims that, in any event, nothing in section 259-i of the Executive Law, whether prior to or after the enactment of LIM, prevents the final hearing from being adjourned, both on consent of the releasee and as it applies to a contested final hearing. Petitioner compares his case to that of the releasee in Skinner v Martuscello (86 Misc 3d 1222(A) [Sup Ct, Erie County 2024]), an unreported case where Supreme Court granted the petition and DOCCS had withdrawn their Notice of Appeal.

In opposition, Respondents claim that the United States Supreme Court abrogated Piccarillo in Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v Scott (524 US 357 [1998]). In their view, the exclusionary rule neither applies to nor mandates the adjournment of a final hearing. The purpose of the exclusionary rule, according to Respondents' reading of Scott, is to deter future unlawful conduct of law enforcement and thus protect against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Citing the jurisprudence of both the United States Supreme Court and the New York State Court of Appeals, Respondents assert that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, rather than a personal constitutional right belonging to an aggrieved party that provides redress for privacy violations. Respondents further argue that under New York case law post-Piccarillo, courts are required, when assessing the applicability of the rule in the administrative context, to balance the [*2]foreseeable deterrent effect of the rule's application against the detrimental impact on the truth-finding process. Respondents also claim that, in any event, the adjournment of a final hearing is discretionary under subdivision (d) of 9 NYCRR 8005.17, and that LIM, whether pre- or post-codification, does not alter that discretion. The sole purpose of LIM, they claim, is to accelerate the parole revocation process.

Additionally, Respondents claim that Petitioner has yet to apply for a suppression hearing in criminal court. Furthermore, they claim that the releasee in Skinner pled guilty prior to a suppression hearing and before DOCCS could appeal the matter, and that DOCCS is currently appealing this issue before the Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department, in Kadenhead v Martuscello (CA 25-00145), with oral argument having been heard this past March of 2026.

III. Applicable Law and Analysis

Section 259-i (3) (f) (i) (C) of the Executive Law allows for time to be extended upon the finding of a violation at a preliminary hearing where the alleged violator either asks for the revocation hearing to be postponed, consents to the postponement, or otherwise acts in a manner that precludes the prompt advancement of the proceeding. State regulations expand on the Executive Law by providing that time may be extended to the next available date (see 9 NYCRR 8005.17 [d] [1]). An adjournment may be granted, either by motion or sua sponte, upon good cause shown, considering the interests of the parties and the obligations of the Board of Parole to hear the case (see id. at [d] [2]). A request for a continuance of a final hearing already in progress may be granted for good cause and must be noted on the record (see id. [d] [3]). Finally, adjournments and continuances must be managed in a manner consistent with the guidance of the Board of Parole (see id. [d] [4]).

In Piccarillo, heard by the New York State Court of Appeals in 1979, the releasee was placed under parole supervision after having served three concurrent sentences for attempted robbery (see Piccarillo, 48 NY2d at 78). Thereafter, the police stopped the releasee for operating a motor vehicle without working taillights (see id.). The ensuing search by the police of the releasee's vehicle revealed a container of pills for which the releasee was then charged (see id. at 78-79). Like Petitioner here, the Board of Parole found there was probable cause to revoke the releasee's parole (see id. at 79). After holding a final hearing, the Board of Parole found that the releasee failed to lead a law-abiding life per the terms and conditions of his parole (see id.). As relevant to this case, the releasee in Piccarillo had moved at the commencement of the final parole revocation hearing to suppress certain evidence obtained during the search of his vehicle, alleging the search violated his constitutional rights (see id.). The Board of Parole denied the motion, allowing the matter to proceed to the ultimate determination of revocation (see id.).

Meanwhile, the releasee's criminal matter continued (see id.). The court in the criminal proceeding granted the releasee's motion to suppress on the ground that the search was indeed illegal (see id.). The releasee sought relief in the form of habeas corpus, arguing that the Board of Parole ought not to have considered the evidence that would later be suppressed and asking for his parole status to be restored (see id.). The Supreme Court there denied the requested relief, holding that the Board of Parole acted appropriately regardless of whether or not the evidence was later suppressed in the criminal proceeding (see id. at 79-80). The Appellate Division reversed and restored the releasee's status (see id. at 80).

The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the exclusionary rule applies to [*3]administrative as well as criminal proceedings (see id. at 81). The Court premised its decision in large part on the consequences that may befall a parolee should their charges be sustained, which include a deprivation of liberty akin to that which may befall a criminal defendant in a criminal proceeding (see id. at 80-81). In a footnote, the Court noted that the proper procedure, where there is a criminal proceeding pending and a parolee seeks to suppress evidence at a parole revocation hearing, the Board of Parole should adjourn the final hearing until the matter of suppression in the criminal proceeding is resolved (see id. at 79, n 2).

Almost a decade later, in 1998, the United States Supreme Court would explore the issue in Scott, wherein the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to parole revocation hearings (see Scott, 524 US at 359). The releasee in Scott pleaded nolo contendere to a murder charge in Pennsylvania and was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 10 to 20 years (see id. at 359-360). He was released to parole supervision, and upon the issuance of a warrant, was arrested by three parole officers for violating the terms of his probation, which included, inter alia, a condition prohibiting the releasee from owning or possessing a firearm (see id.). The releasee gave the parole officers the keys to his home, which he shared with his mother, who owned the building (see id.). The officers waited for the mother to arrive to conduct a search but did not obtain consent to conduct the search (see id.). The mother directed the officers to the releasee's room (see id.). Failing to find evidence there, the officers searched an adjacent room and found five firearms and a compound bow (see id.).

The releasee objected to the introduction of the evidence at his parole violation hearing on the ground that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment (see id.). The hearing examiner rejected the challenge and admitted the evidence (see id.). As a result, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole found there was sufficient evidence to sustain the weapons charge and recommit the releasee (see id. at 360-61).

Finding that the exclusionary rule applies, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania reversed and remanded the matter, holding that the hearing examiner erred in admitting the weapons because the search was conducted without the consent of the homeowner-mother and otherwise not authorized by law (see id. at 361). Insofar as the exclusionary rule is concerned, the Court held that the deterrence benefits of the rule outweighed its costs (see id.). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the releasee's right against unreasonable searches and seizures as protected by the Fourth Amendment was unaffected by the releasee agreeing in writing to the terms and conditions of parole granting parole officers the right to conduct warrantless searches (see id.). According to the Court, the search was unreasonable, given that it was supported by mere speculation and not reasonable suspicion of the parole violation (see id.). The Court ruled that the exclusionary rule applied to the case because the parole officers who conducted the search knew the releasee's parole status (see id.). The Court further held that, under these circumstances, the exclusionary rule would deter future misconduct on the part of parole officers (see id.).

Upon granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held the federal exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction of illegally obtained evidence in parole revocation hearings (see id. at 359, 362, 364). The majority began its analysis with the legal proposition that a government's use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment does not, by itself, violate the Constitution (see id. at 362). According to the Court's majority, exclusion of any evidence in an administrative proceeding cannot cure the harm already suffered when a person's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated (see id.). The majority noted that the exclusionary [*4]rule applies where its remedial objectives are efficaciously served, describing the rule as a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures and stating that the rule does not proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all people (see id. at 362-363). The majority described the rule as prudential, rather than constitutional, and noted that other cases have held it is applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social cost (see id. at 363). Citing several of their cases, the Court observed that it had repeatedly declined to extend the exclusionary rule to any proceedings other than criminal trials because it would hinder the functioning of state parole systems, change the flexible nature of these administrative proceedings generally, and provide only minimal deterrence benefits (see id. at 364). The Court further determined that applying the rule would impose a significant cost in that it would undeniably detract from the fact-finding process in the context of parole matters and hamper the state's ability to ensure compliance of the terms and conditions of parole, which allow the state to grant parole in the first place (see id. at 364-365).

New York courts have addressed Piccarillo mostly prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Scott, though some have done so after as well. For example, in 1983, the New York Court of Appeals cited Piccarillo approvingly before holding that the releasee there, who sought relief in the form of habeas corpus, failed to justify their request for an adjournment (see People ex rel. Matthews by Greenberg v New York State Div. of Parole, 58 NY2d 196, 199-201, 203, 204 [1983]). The issue presented in that case was whether the petitioner's argument in the administrative proceeding in support of an adjournment—that an adjournment was required as a matter of law because the Board of Parole would be collaterally estopped from going forward with a parole revocation hearing in the event the criminal matter was dismissed or the petitioner was acquitted—was too general of a proposition where the case law merely supported collateral estoppel in cases where the petitioner successfully raised an affirmative defense against a criminal charge that, in turn, had served as the basis for the revocation (see id.).

In People ex rel. Taylor v Van Dyk (166 AD2d 855 [3d Dept 1990], lv denied 77 NY2d 802 [1991]), the Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department, noted it was the petitioner's assertion of their right to a determination of the suppression motion in the criminal matter pursuant to Piccarillo that precluded the petitioner from habeas relief despite not having been afforded a final hearing within 90 days (see id. at 856). The Court held that the adjournment was properly charged to the petitioner because his own actions—seeking the adjournment of the entire matter pending the outcome of the suppression motion—precluded the prompt adjudication of his parole matter (see id.). On that basis, the Court there held that the petitioner waived their right to strict adherence to the statutorily prescribed time limits (see id.).

In Matter of Boyd v Constantine (81 NY2d 189 [1993]), the New York Court of Appeals, applying a deterrence analysis, concluded that marihuana seized by certain Buffalo City police officers was appropriately admitted in the Division of the State Police's administrative proceeding seeking charges and specifications against the petitioner state trooper despite the evidence having been suppressed in criminal court and the criminal matter dismissed (see id., at 192-194, 196). In Boyd, the Court reasoned that the police who made the arrest and seized the marihuana could not have foreseen that the petitioner was a state trooper that would have been subject to an administrative disciplinary proceeding as a result of the arrest and seizure (see id. at 196). Approximately four years later, In Matter of Juan C. v Cortines, (89 NY2d 659 [1997]), the Court of Appeals, in deciding whether collateral estoppel applies to foreclose education officials from suspending a student for having a firearm even though Family Court had [*5]suppressed the firearm on constitutional grounds, noted that Piccarillo was distinguishable in that the case involved a quasi-law enforcement proceeding in the form of a parole violation (see id. at 674).

After Scott, in People ex rel. Victory v Travis (288 AD2d 932 [4th Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 611 [2002]), the Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department, concluded that Piccarillo was still good law despite upholding the dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus filed immediately after a preliminary hearing, holding that evidence yet to be suppressed in criminal court may supply the basis for a probable cause determination at a preliminary parole revocation hearing and that a subsequent judicial determination suppressing the evidence does not undermine the validity of that administrative determination, but the parolee cannot be denied the opportunity to litigate the prospective use of that evidence against him at a final parole revocation hearing (see id. at 933; see also Johnson v. New York State Div. of Parole, 299 AD2d 832, 833 [4th Dept 2002]). Victory does not mention Scott.

The Court further notes trial courts are split as to whether Scott abrogated Piccarillo (compare State of NY ex rel. Thompson v Harder, 8 Misc 3d 764, 766, n 2 [Sup Ct, Broome County 2005] ["In any event, it is this court's view that until the Court of Appeals declares otherwise, the express holding of Piccarillo remains the law of this state"], with People ex rel. Gordon v O'Flynn, 3 Misc 3d 963, 971 [Sup Ct, Monroe County 2004] ["Accordingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Scott is held to abrogate Piccarillo, and the court finds that no separate state constitutional rule has been created which calls for application of the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings"]).

The parties dispute whether Scott abrogated Piccarillo. At least one trial court has held that "[f]ederal and state courts are diametrically divided upon the issue of whether the exclusionary rule is available," and that the cases discussing the question are inconclusive (People ex rel. Gueits v Warden, George Motchan Detention Ctr., 38 Misc 3d 1217(A) [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2013]). At any rate, the Appellate Division is a single Statewide court divided into Departments merely for administrative convenience, and the doctrine of stare decisis requires trial courts to follow precedents set by the Appellate Division until the Court of Appeals pronounces otherwise (see Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v. Storms, 102 AD2d 663, 664 [2d Dept 1984]). Therefore, the Court finds that Victory controls and Piccarillo is still good law.

Piccarillo advises, in pertinent part:

"The proper procedure to be followed where there is a criminal proceeding pending and a parolee seeks to suppress evidence at a parole revocation hearing would be for the Board of Parole to adjourn the hearing pending the determination of the parolee's application to the court for an order to suppress"

(Piccarillo, 48 NY2d at 79, n 2 [emphasis added]).

The question of whether a criminal proceeding is "pending" for purposes of Piccarillo is simpler to answer at this point, given that the People have already indicted Petitioner. There can be no doubt that the criminal matter is officially underway.

The question of whether Petitioner "seeks" to suppress evidence, however, is [*6]complicated by the fact that Petitioner was and continues to be precluded from filing a motion to suppress. Prior to indictment, Petitioner was forced to wait because the People had yet to indict. Now, Petitioner must wait for the appropriate moment within the criminal proceeding to file an omnibus motion asking the criminal court for the appropriate suppression hearing. Should the Court now interpret the word "seek" merely in terms of filing a motion with the criminal court, then anyone in this situation would face the same dilemma. The Court finds that the better course, where the person seeking to suppress evidence has informed the Board of Parole of their desire to have certain evidence suppressed but must wait for the appropriate procedural posture in the criminal proceeding where the action is pending, is for the parole revocation hearing to be adjourned pending resolution of the motion to suppress.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that Petitioner's motion for an order staying the parole revocation hearing until the matter of suppression has been decided by an appropriate court is hereby GRANTED.

This shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court. This Decision and Order will be uploaded to the NYSCEF system for filing and entry by the Office of the County Clerk. The signing of this Decision and Order and uploading onto NYSCEF shall not constitute filing, entry, service, or notice of entry under CPLR 2220 and section 202.5-b (h) (2) of the Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Courts. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of those Rules with respect to filing, entry, service, and notice of entry of the original Decision and Order.

Dated: April 6, 2026

Troy, New York

Hon. Noel Mendez

Acting Justice of the Supreme Court

Papers Considered:

All motion and opposition papers on NYSCEF, along with their exhibits