Michaelis v Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB
2026 NY Slip Op 26048
April 3, 2026
Supreme Court, Dutchess County
Christi J. Acker, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
Ellen Michaelis, Plaintiff,
v
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, D/B/A CHRISTINA TRUST, NOT INDIVIDUALLY BUT AS TRUSTEE FOR PRETIUM MORTGAGE ACQUISITION FSB Trustee, Defendant.
Supreme Court, Dutchess County
Decided on April 3, 2026
Index No. 2023-50982
Ellen Michaelis, Plaintiff, Pro Se
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, Defendant - no counsel
Christi J. Acker, J.
[*1]The Court considered NYSCEF Doc. #s 93-109 with respect to Plaintiff Ellen Michaelis' (hereinafter "Plaintiff") motion for an Order pursuant to CPLR §§5015(a)(2), (3) and (5) and CPLR §2221(3), vacating this Court's Decision and Order dated September 25, 2025, granting renewal of Plaintiff's motion for default judgment and reinstating this action and accepting for filing the Verified Amended Complaint annexed to the application.
Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Defendant Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, d/b/a Christina Trust, Not Individually but as Trustee for Pretium Mortgage Acquisition FSB, Trustee ("Defendant") on or about March 24, 2023, seeking to quiet title in her favor to property located at 33 Cumberland Road, Fishkill, New York ("Property").
Procedural History
The procedural history of this matter has been set forth at length in this Court's December 10, 2024 and September 25, 2025 Decisions and Orders, however, a brief overview is necessary. As relevant hereto, the Property was the subject of a foreclosure action entitled Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Alterio, et al, Dutchess County Index No. 6397/2012 ("Foreclosure Action"), in which a Judgment of Foreclosure was entered on November 23, 2016. The Property was sold at auction and title was transferred to Defendant pursuant a Referee's Deed dated August 14, 2018. Thereafter, non-party Pinhaus Rabenou ("Rabenou ") purchased the Property from Defendant on or about July 24, 2025.
This Court's December 10, 2024 Decision denied Plaintiff's motion for default against Defendant and directed Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed. Plaintiff filed an unsworn "Answer" in response thereto but failed to provide proof of service of the [*2]Decision upon Defendant as directed.
On or about August 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking permission to file an Amended Verified Complaint, for an Order declaring that Plaintiff is a devisee under Joseph Smith's 1991 will, declaring that a June 29, 1992 Deed to the Property is fraudulent and void, as well as all subsequent conveyances flowing therefrom and quieting title to the Property in accordance with Plaintiff's undivided one-fifth inheritance interest. Before that application was fully submitted, Plaintiff filed a new application seeking to add additional defendants, including, inter alia, Rabenou.
By Decision and Order dated September 25, 2025, this Court denied Plaintiff's motion to amend her Complaint and dismissed the action in its entirety based upon Plaintiff's failure to establish that she has a valid quiet title action related to this Property.
On that same day, Plaintiff filed a motion for an Order granting renewal of the September 25, 2025 Decision, vacating the dismissal and deeming Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint filed and restoring the Notice of Pendency.
Plaintiff then filed the instant application on October 27, 2025. The Notice of Motion states that this motion is a "corrected and supplemental motion," superseding Plaintiff's prior motion to renew. The Notice further states that it incorporates "new evidence and legal argument not previously available," including the duly executed Last Will and Testament of Joseph Smith and a "comprehensive matrix of forty-four (44) verified title defects." NYSCEF Doc. #93.
Discussion
As an initial matter, the majority of the legal cases proffered by Plaintiff appear to have been "hallucinated" through the use of Generative Artificial Intelligence ("GenAI"). "Hallucinated cases may look like a real case because they include familiar-looking reporter information, but their citations lead to cases with different names, in different courts and on different topics -- or even to no case at all." Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. LeTennier, — AD3d —, 2026 WL 53120 (3d Dept. 2026). "Even where GenAI provides accurate case citations, it nonetheless may misrepresent the holdings of the cited cases -- often in favor of the user supplying the query." Id.
Such is the case here. For example, in the third paragraph of Plaintiff's affirmation, she purports to quote from Matter of Sakow, 97 NY2d 436, 439 [2022] — "A void decree is open to collateral attack at any time." While this is an accurate case citation, the quoted language does not appear in the case. The second case cited in that paragraph, Kruger v. Kruger, 107 AD3d 1285, 1287 [3d Dept. 2013], does not exist. Rather, the citation is for Matter of Blocker v. Fischer, 107 AD3d 1285 [3d Dept. 2013], which involves an Article 78 proceeding. These type hallucinations affect virtually every legal citation that appears in Plaintiff's affirmation.
This Court's Part Rules require litigants, including the self-represented, to submit an certification or affirmation that either (1) no generative artificial intelligence program was used in the drafting of any affidavit, affirmation, or memorandum of law contained within the submission, or (2) that a generative artificial intelligence program was used but all generated text, including citations, quotations, and legal analysis was reviewed for accuracy and approved by the certifying attorney or the self-represented litigant.
In the normal course, Plaintiff's motion would be denied without prejudice for lack of this affirmation and clear evidence that GenAI was used without review. However, the [*3]determination of the instant motion is dependent upon the proffered "new facts," and not the hallucinated case law. Therefore, the Court will address the merits of Plaintiff's motion.
Renewal
"A motion for leave to renew 'shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination' and 'shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion' [citations omitted]." Citimortgage, Inc. v. Sparozic, 223 AD3d 867, 868 [2d Dept. 2024]. "What constitutes a reasonable justification is within the discretion of the Supreme Court." HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n v. Joseph, 238 AD3d 1009, 1011 [2d Dept. 2025]. "'When no reasonable justification is given for failing to present new facts on the prior motion, the Supreme Court lacks discretion to grant renewal [citation omitted].'" Id.
In support of her renewal motion, Plaintiff offers three categories of "newly discovered evidence:" (1) the mortgage servicer's correspondence from 2022-2025 treating the mortgage as "active" years after the foreclosure; (2) the August 2025 "admissions" of non-party Rabenou and (3) the 2018 referee's deed which Plaintiff maintains was not timely executed, rendering the deed void.FN1
Plaintiff's motion for leave to renew fails as she provides no reasonable justification for not presenting this "newly discovered" evidence on her prior motions. First, Plaintiff's only explanation for not presenting the Selene correspondence is because she "obtained" it after dismissal. This falls short of a reasonable justification. Plaintiff previously submitted mortgage statements from Selene dated November 7, 2023 and December 7, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. #s 72-74). Notably, the "newly discovered" correspondence, dated December 23, 2024 and January 21, 2025, was in existence well-before before Plaintiff filed her prior motion. Given her access to the 2023 correspondence, it is improbable that Plaintiff did not also have access to the "newly discovered" documents when she made her prior motion.
In a similar vein, in support of her motion to amend the Complaint, Plaintiff had relied upon a text message that Rabenou sent to Plaintiff's "co-occupant" Judith Alterio, in September 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. # 79). She now submits "new" text messages, which appear to be the earlier texts that led up to the September 2025 message. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim that these prior text messages were "unavailable" is not credible.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the 2018 Referee's Deed is void because it was not executed until 67 days after the foreclosure sale. Significantly, Plaintiff has twice submitted the Referee's Deed in support of her previous applications. See NYSCEF Doc. #13 and #39. She claims that she only discovered the "timing defect" through "post-dismissal investigation." [*4]However, given that Plaintiff has been in possession of this deed since at least March 24, 2023,FN2 her failure to raise this argument for more than two (2) years is rejected.FN3
"'[A] motion for leave to renew is not a second chance freely given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation [citations omitted].'" U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Cuencas, 233 AD3d 913, 915 [2d Dept. 2024]. This is Plaintiff's sixth motion. As Plaintiff has given no reasonable justification for failing to present these new facts on any of her prior motions, this Court lacks discretion to grant leave to renew and her motion is denied. HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n v. Joseph, supra.
Motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)
Point VII of Plaintiff's Affirmation asserts that "vacatur" is required under CPLR 5015(a) to prevent manifest injustice but Plaintiff fails to expressly identify what she seeks to vacate.
According to one of the few cases accurately cited by Plaintiff, the Court of Appeals held that "[u]nder CPLR 5015(a), a court is empowered to vacate a default judgment for several reasons, including excusable neglect; newly-discovered evidence; fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct by an adverse party; lack of jurisdiction; or upon the reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior order [emphasis supplied]." Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 68 [2003].
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to "vacate" this Court's September 25, 2025 Decision and Order pursuant to CPLR 5015(a), her application fails. The Court considered all of Plaintiff's submissions before dismissing her Complaint, so there is no default for Plaintiff to vacate. See HSBC Bank USA, Nat'l Ass'n v. Krebs, 219 AD3d 1417, 1419 [2d Dept. 2023].
If, instead, Plaintiff seeks to vacate the 2016 Judgment of Foreclosure pursuant to CPLR §5015(a), this Court's September 25, 2025 Decision specifically advised Plaintiff that "any challenge to the Judgment of Foreclosure must be obtained by way of a motion to vacate the judgment of foreclosure and sale in the earlier action pursuant to CPLR 5015(a). IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. v. Vincoli, 105 AD3d 704, 706 [2d Dept. 2013]." Given that Plaintiff was on notice that she could not challenge the 2016 Judgment of Foreclosure in this action pursuant to CPLR §5015(a), her attempt to do is denied in its entirety.FN4
As noted previously, this is Plaintiff's sixth motion, most of which have raised repetitive and legally insufficient arguments. Accordingly, any further applications by Plaintiff shall be made by proposed order to show cause.
The Court has considered the additional contentions of Plaintiff not specifically [*5]addressed herein. To the extent any relief requested was not addressed by the Court, it is hereby denied. Now, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for leave to renew is denied in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for an Order pursuant to CPLR §5015(a) is denied in its entirety.
The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated: April 3, 2026
Poughkeepsie, New York
CHRISTI J. ACKER, J.S.C.
Footnotes
- Footnote 1: Plaintiff does not identify the 1991 will as newly submitted evidence in support of her motion to renew. Regardless, Plaintiff provides no explanation, let alone a reasonable one, why it took her three attempts to submit a complete copy of the purported will. As noted in the December 10, 2024 Decision, Plaintiff did not originally submit a copy of the alleged will and Plaintiff's subsequent submission lacked the requisite number of witness signatures, making that instrument invalid. See NYSCEF Doc. #s 76-78.
- Footnote 2: This is the date on which Plaintiff first filed the 2018 referee's deed to NYSCEF, Doc. #13.
- Footnote 3: It bears mention that Plaintiff's argument regarding the Referee's Deed is unsupported by proof as to the date of the foreclosure sale and a misreading of RPAPL §1353(1).
- Footnote 4: SeeFenton v. Floce Holdings, LLC, 229 AD3d 768, 770 [2d Dept. 2024] ("Relief under CPLR 5015(a) must be sought by a motion in the court that rendered the challenged judgment"); see alsoMatter of Egloff v. Town of Lewisboro, 89 AD3d 792, 793 [2d Dept. 2011] ("the Supreme Court erred in conditionally vacating the final judgment of foreclosure entered in a separate proceeding. Any such relief must be obtained by motion filed in that proceeding.").