Court of Claims

Decided on March 6, 2026

Claim No. 144888

Abby R. Perer, J.

[*1]

Claimant Freddie Streat filed this Claim seeking damages for personal injuries that he suffered when he was attacked by another incarcerated individual while incarcerated with the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"). Defendant the State of New York ("State" or "Defendant") makes this pre-answer motion to dismiss the Claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (2), (7), and (8), and Court of Claims Act §§ 10 and 11, alleging that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Claim because Claimant failed to serve the State with a "Notice Identifying the Claim as Subject to Electronic Filing," and Claimant did not timely serve the Claim within 90 days of its accrual (see generally Affirmation of Yvette Velasco, Esq., dated December 1, 2025 ["Velasco Affirm"]).^FN1

On December 19, 2025, while this motion was pending, Governor Hochul signed chapter 707 of the Laws of 2025, which, as relevant, added CPLR 208-a and amended Court of Claims Act §§ 10 and 11 (referred to herein, generally, as the "prison reform legislation" or the "legislation") (see L 2025, ch 707, part J, as amended by L 2026, ch 36, part J). On January 8, 2026, the Court adjourned this motion to February 25, 2026 to allow the parties to address the [*2]potential impact, if any, of the newly enacted legislation. The Court instructed the parties that they could seek additional time to submit their briefs in the event that the legislature enacted any chapter amendments to the legislation.

On February 13, 2026, Governor Hochul signed chapter 36 of the Laws of 2026, which included chapter amendments (see L 2026, ch 36). On February 18, 2026, Claimant filed his response to the motion, arguing that, inasmuch as Claimant is still incarcerated, the new CPLR 208-a tolls the statute of limitations for his Claim for three years after his release, and thus his Claim, which was filed 91 days after the incident, but well before the expiration of Claimant's three-year post-release window, is timely (see Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss of Masai I. Lord, Esq., dated February 17, 2026 ["Lord Affirm"], p. 1). The State did not file a reply or any supplemental briefing.

For the reasons explained below, the Court must grant the State's motion and dismiss the Claim.

The Claim alleges that, on August 20, 2025, Claimant was "violently assaulted by an unknown" incarcerated individual while under the supervision of DOCCS, and that the attack occurred because of "the negligence of a correction officer who failed to secure the front door of the housing unit" (Claim No. 144888, filed November 19, 2025 ["Claim"], ¶ 4). Claimant alleges that Defendant, and its agents, servants, and employees, were negligent and reckless in the "operation, maintenance, supervision, and control of the correctional facility and of the inmates therein" (id., ¶ 2). It is undisputed that the Claim was filed with the Court on November 19, 2025 (see Claim), and served on the State through the Office of the Attorney General the same day (see Velasco Affirm, Ex. A), which is 91 days after the alleged incident of August 20, 2025.

The State argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this Claim because Claimant failed to serve Defendant with a Notice Identifying the Claim as Subject to Electronic Filing ("Electronic Filing Notice") pursuant to 22 NYCRR 206.5-aa (c) (3) and 202.5-b (g) (1). The Court disagrees.

Court of Claims Act § 9 (9) delegates to the Court of Claims the power to issue court rules, which rules are contained in 22 NYCRR 206, et seq. The Court of Claims Act itself does not mention electronic filing, nor does it contain "any particularities as to the mechanics of filing" (Goins v State of New York, UID No. 2023-065-044, Claim No. 139062 [Ct Cl, Brindisi, J., Sept. 13, 2023]). "The suggestion that a failure to comply with a rule of the Court is of jurisdictional significance is without merit" (Peart v State of New York, 10 Misc 3d 1070[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 52215[U], *1 [Ct Cl 2005], citing Harvey Chalmers & Son, Inc. v State of New York, 271 App Div 699, 703 [3d Dept 1947] ["failure to comply (with the rules of the Court of Claims) is not a jurisdictional defect"], affd 297 NY 690 [1947]; see Southern Blvd., LLC v State of New York, UID No. 2017-045-053, Claim No. 127695 [Ct Cl, Lopez-Summa, J., Dec. 22, 2017] [failure to comply with the rules of the Court of Claims "does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the action"]). Defendant's argument that Claimant's failure to include the Electronic Filing Notice with service of the Claim is, therefore, unavailing, and the Court will not dismiss the Claim on this basis.

Turning next to the timeliness issue, Court of Claims Act § 10 (3) provides that an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the negligent conduct of the State must be filed and served within 90 days of the accrual of the claim. "Because suits against the State are allowed only by the State's waiver of sovereign immunity and in derogation of the common law, statutory requirements conditioning suit must be strictly construed" (Dreger v New York State [*3]Thruway Auth., 81 NY2d 721, 724 [1992]; see Kolnacki v State of New York, 8 NY3d 277, 280 [2007], rearg denied 8 NY3d 994 [2007]; Lichtenstein v State of New York, 93 NY2d 911, 913 [1999]). The failure to serve a notice of intention or to file and serve a claim within 90 days is a jurisdictional defect that requires dismissal of the claim (see Kolnacki, 8 NY3d at 280-281; Ivy v State of New York, 27 AD3d 1190, 1190-1191 [4th Dept 2006]). Even if a Claim is only one day late, it must be dismissed (see Dependable Trucking Co. v New York State Thruway Auth., 41 AD2d 985, 986 [3d Dept 1973]; Carter Williams v State of New York, UID No. 2017-040-026, Claim No. 122324 [Ct Cl, McCarthy, J., Mar. 1, 2017]; Goode v State of New York, UID No. 2016-049-047, Claim No. 128221 [Ct Cl, Weinstein, J., Dec. 2, 2016]).

The recently enacted prison reform legislation, as amended, does not alter this conclusion.

Claimant argues that this Claim is timely because it was filed before the expiration of the three-year window after Claimant will be released from custody (see Lord Affirm, p. 1). Claimant would have been correct under the original version of the legislation, which dictated that any "civil claims or causes of action brought by any person to recover damages for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition suffered while under the jurisdiction and in the care and custody or supervision of: [DOCCS] . . . shall be extended to three years after such person is released from such custody" (L 2025, ch 707, § 1, part J [emphasis added]). Concurrently, section 5 of part J of chapter 707 of the Laws of 2025 amended Court of Claims Act § 10 by adding subsection 11, which stated that "this section shall not apply to any civil claims or causes of action brought by any person to recover damages for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition suffered while in custody pursuant to [CPLR 208-a]" (L 2025, ch 707, § 5, part J). In other words, the original version of the legislation eliminated the 90-day statute of limitations for personal injury claims arising in State-operated correctional facilities, instead providing up to three years from an incarcerated person's release from such custody to bring relevant claims in this Court.

However, the chapter amendments to the legislation, enacted on February 13, 2026 with a retroactive effective date of December 19, 2025, revised the provisions of CPLR 208-a from a three-year post-release toll of the statute of limitations to a two-year lookback or revival window for such claims or causes of action (see CPLR 208-a; compare L 2025, ch 707, § 1, part J with L 2026, ch 36, § 1, part J). Specifically, the amended CPLR 208-a states that a person bringing a claim for personal injuries suffered during a period of incarceration in a DOCCS correctional facility has "the full benefit of the limitations period provided in the relevant section of law and, in addition, shall have a two-year window following the date of the person's release from the relevant period of custody within which to commence an action based on such injury or condition" (CPLR 208-a [emphasis added]; see also L 2026, ch 36, § 1, part J). The lookback window is reiterated in Court of Claims Act § 10 (11), as amended by section 5 of part J of chapter 36 of the Laws of 2026 (see Court of Claims Act § 10 [11]; see also L 2026, ch 36, § 5, part J). In other words, the amended version of the legislation reinstated the 90-day statute of limitations applicable to incarcerated individuals' personal injury actions against the State, but separately added a two-year revival period after a person is released from custody to allow them to pursue their claim.

Section 6 of part J of chapter 36 of the Laws of 2026 clarifies that the prison reform legislation applies "to periods of custody that end on or after the effective date of this act and shall not revive or otherwise extend any claim that was time-barred prior to such effective date" [*4](L 2026, ch 36, § 6, part J). The legislative history of chapter 36 of the Laws of 2026 clarifies that the effective date of these chapter amendments is retroactive to the original effective date of the prison reform legislation, that is, December 19, 2025 (see Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2026, ch 36).

The Claim, which was filed and served on November 19, 2025, one day after the expiration of the 90-day limitations period of Court of Claims Act § 10 (3), was time-barred prior to the effective date of the prison reform legislation, meaning the new legislation does not apply to it. Thus, the Court must grant Defendant's motion to dismiss, and dismiss the Claim. Although nothing in the prison reform legislation, including the amendments to Court of Claims Act § 10, prevented Claimant from cross-moving for permission to file a late claim, he has not done so here.

Conclusion

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss (M-103152) Claim No. 144888 is hereby GRANTED.

March 6, 2026

Syracuse, New York

ABBY R. PERER

Judge of the Court of Claims

Papers Considered:

1. Claim No. 144888, filed November 19, 2025

2. Defendant's Pre-Answer Notice of Motion to Dismiss, dated December 1, 2025.

3. Affirmation in Support of Motion to Dismiss of Yvette Velasco, Esq., dated December 1, 2025, with attached Exhibits A-E.

4. Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss of Masai I. Lord, Esq., dated February 17, 2026.