Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on April 20, 2026

Docket No. CR-028201-25NY

Marva C. Brown, J.

[*1]

Mouctar Guisse, hereinafter "defendant," stands charged with Assault in the Third Degree (PL § 120.00[1]), a class A misdemeanor, and various related offenses. By Notice of Motion to Dismiss, dated February 25, 2026, the defense seeks dismissal pursuant to CPL § 30.30. The People oppose by motion filed March 16, 2026, and the defense did not reply.

SPEEDY TRIAL

Pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1)(b), when a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of more than three months such as this one, the prosecution must be ready for trial within 90 days from the commencement of that criminal action. To satisfy the initial burden under CPL § 30.30, the defendant need allege "only that the prosecution failed to declare readiness within the statutorily prescribed time period" (People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 (1995); see also People v Goode, 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]). Once the defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay (see People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]).

This defendant appeared pursuant to a desk appearance ticket and was arraigned on the instant charges on October 20, 2025. The defendant was released on his own recognizance, and the case was adjourned to December 4, 2025, for conversion.

As a threshold issue, the defense incorrectly argues that this case was filed on October 19, 2025, and that as such, the speedy trial clock should begin on that date. If the defendant appears pursuant to a desk appearance ticket, the criminal action is said to commence when the defendant first appears "in local criminal court in response to the ticket," not when the accusatory instrument is filed with the court (CPL § 30.30 [7][b]; People v Parris, 79 NY2d 69 [1992]). Here, the case was filed as a desk appearance ticket with the court on October 7, 2025, however, the defendant did not appear in court to be arraigned on the instant charges until October 20, 2025. Therefore, contrary to the defense's claims, this criminal action commenced for speedy trial purposes on October 20, 2025, not October 19, 2025, and not when the case was filed with the court on October 7, 2025.

On December 4, 2026, the People were not ready, did not file a supporting deposition, [*2]and the case was adjourned to January 29, 2026, for conversion. On January 19, 2026, off-calendar and 91 days from the defendant's arraignment, the People served and filed a superseding accusatory instrument (SSI), a certificate of compliance (COC) and statement of readiness (SOR). On January 29, 2026, the People were ready for trial, and defense counsel requested the instant motion schedule. The case was adjourned to April 21, 2026, for a decision.

Here, the defense argues that the People were not validly ready within the speedy trial period. Normally, since this case commenced on October 20, 2025, the People would be required to be ready sometime either on or before January 18, 2026, which would be the 90th day from this case's commencement (see, e.g., People v DiMeglio, 294 AD2d 239, 240 [1st Dept 2002]["New York courts have consistently held that, when computing a period of days, the first day is excluded but the last day is included"]). Since the People here filed their first statement of readiness on January 19, 2026, that would normally be the end of the inquiry and the case dismissed for the People's failure to be ready within the applicable speedy trial period.

However, January 18, 2026, the 90th day from the defendant's arraignment, was a Sunday, and January 19, 2026, was a Monday court holiday. To date, neither the Court of Appeals nor the First Department has ruled on the specific issue of speedy trial periods that expire on weekends or legal holidays. However, some appellate courts and several trial courts have held that when the People's speedy trial period does expire on a weekend or legal holiday, the People's time to announce their readiness is extended to the next business day pursuant to General Construction Law § 25—a (see People v Mandela, 142 AD3d 81, 86 [3d Dept 2016]; People v Pierre, 83 Misc 3d 134[A] [App Term, 2d Dept 9th & 10th Jud Dist 2024]; People v Powell, 179 Misc 2d 1047, 1048 [App Term, 2d Dept 2d & 11th Jud Dist 1999]).

Normally, given the fact that the Third Department in Mandela has a clear ruling on this issue, this court would be bound to rule consistently (see People v Turner, 5 NY3d 476 [2005][holding that the only appellate decision on point, by a different Appellate Division Department from 1914, "though old, was still a valid precedent, binding on all trial-level courts in the State"], citing Mountain View Coach Lines v Storms, 102 AD2d 663, 664-65 [2d Dept 1984]; Tzolis v Wolff, 39 AD3d 138 [1st Dept 2007]["Absent any authority from this Court, the motion court was bound to follow the applicable ruling of another department"], aff'd, 10 NY3d 100 [2008], citing People v Shakur, 215 AD2d 184 [1st Dept 1995]["Trial courts within this department must follow the determination of the Appellate Division in another department until such time as this court or the Court of Appeals passes on the question"]). However, neither Pierre or Powell are binding on this court, and this court disagrees with the reasoning in those decisions, as they use Mandela to justify the validity of readiness statements made beyond the applicable speedy trial period, and in doing so, ignore both established and more recent Court of Appeals precedent (see, e.g., People v I.S., 88 Misc 3d 1222[A][Crim Ct, Bronx County 2026]["It is generally accepted that a branch of the New York City Criminal Court is not bound by the decisions of another Department's Appellate Term"]; People v Pestana, 195 Misc 2d 833, 839 [Crim Ct, NY County 2003]["in light of the provisional status of the appellate term, the irregular reporting of its decisions, the requirement that only two justices concur in its decisions, and the absence of clear authority according to it precedential authority as set forth in Mountain View, there is insufficient justification for this court to deem itself bound by a decision of the appellate term of another judicial department"]; People v Silas, 1 Misc 3d 209, 217 [Dist Ct, Nassau County 2003][court found that it was not bound by Appellate Term cases contrary to the clear rulings of appellate courts of superior jurisdiction]).

Further, Mandela was decided prior to the implementation of the Electronic Document Delivery System (EDDS) and during a time when prosecutors could not file statements of readiness when court clerks' offices were closed. In May of 2020, EDDS was first authorized and has drastically changed criminal court operations.^FN1 Now, with the advent of EDDS, the People face no constraints as to when they can declare readiness on the court record. The Court of Appeals also recently held that prosecutors can now validly declare trial readiness via EDDS even at times when courts are closed, when the commencement of trial is impossible (see People v Licius, 2025 NY Slip Op 05873, *1 [2025]). As explained by the Court of Appeals in Licius, "[t]he People, not the court, are subject to the CPL 30.30 deadline. . . the People's trial readiness does not depend on whether the court is closed, about to close, or otherwise unavailable to commence trial. The statutory speedy trial framework requires the People to be ready to commence trial by a date certain, without regard to whether the court is able to commence trial . . . CPL 30.30 was enacted for the narrow purpose of insuring prompt prosecutorial readiness for trial, and its provisions must be interpreted accordingly" (id.)(emphasis added)(internal citations and quotations omitted). Having directly addressed the effect of EDDS on prosecutorial readiness statements, the holdings and reasoning articulated in Licius guide this court, not the Third Department in Mandela, which was decided nearly a decade prior and did not concern readiness statements made via a system that allows for filings 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

In Licius, the Court of Appeals also confirmed that the General Construction Law is "applicable to every statute unless its general object, or the context of the language construed, or other provisions of law indicate that a different meaning or application was intended" (id.)(emphasis added). CPL § 30.30 articulates concrete timelines by which the People need to be ready to avoid dismissal. Therefore, unlike the Licius court's need to clarify CPL § 30.30's use of the terms "ready for trial" and "calendar day",^FN2 there is no need to look to the General Construction Law for clarification to determine what the Legislature meant by the words "ninety days" in that same statute. Ninety days means ninety days. And if the People can now validly declare trial readiness after 5 p.m. when courts are closed, it follows that they can also declare readiness on weekends and holidays. The fact that CPL § 30.30 does not mention weekends or holidays does not change the fact that the Legislature specifically requires that the People be ready for trial within 90 days on a case charging an A misdemeanor, such as the instant one (see also People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 [1986][CPL § 30.30 "was enacted to serve the narrow purpose of insuring prompt prosecutorial readiness for trial, and its provisions must be [*3]interpreted accordingly"]). To apply the General Construction Law to permit extension of this time period would impermissibly broaden the clear timeframes established in the speedy trial statute (People v Galindo, 38 NY3d 199, 203 [2022]["The primary consideration of courts in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. . . Generally, the plain meaning of the statutory text is the best evidence of legislative intent"][internal quotations and citations omitted]; People v Pagan, 19 NY3d 368, 370 [2012]["(c)ourts must construe clear and unambiguous statutes as enacted and may not resort to interpretative contrivances to broaden the scope and application of statutes]; People v Zimmerman, 9 NY3d 421 [2007]["Where the natural signification of the words employed in a statute leaves no room for construction, courts have no right to add to or take away from that meaning and the task of judicial interpretation is finished"]). Further, the prior rationale for doing so no longer applies in a world where prosecutors declare trial readiness at any time, regardless of whether courts are open (see People v Korovskyi, 84 Misc 3d 1242[A][Crim Ct, Kings County 2024][finding the People had until Monday where the 90th day fell on a Sunday under Mandela and Powell, supra, but noting "[i]n this circumstance with the advent of electronic filing providing an extra day for the weekend and holiday appears to be an outdated legacy that should be revisited"]).

In sum, here, the case commenced for speedy trial purposes on October 20, 2025, and as such, pursuant to CPL § 30.30 the People were required "to be ready to commence trial by a date certain" (Licius, supra), and in this case, that date certain was 90 days from this case's commencement on January 18, 2026. However, here, as the People concede, they first declared readiness on January 19, 2026 — 91 days from the defendant's arraignment.^FN3 Therefore, because the People failed to declare readiness within the applicable speedy trial period, defense's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: April 20, 2026

HON. MARVA C. BROWN, JCC