Supreme Court, Warren County

Decided on April 15, 2026

Index No. EF2026-75496

Martin D. Auffredou, J.

[*1]

This action for the partition of real property comes before the court by defendant's request for judicial intervention (RJI) seeking a partition settlement conference. At issue is the threshold determination that is required in all partition actions of whether the subject real property is "heirs property" within the meaning of RPAPL 993, also known as the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (see RPAPL 993 [1], [2] [e], [3] [b]).^FN1

Plaintiff brought the action by the filing of its summons and complaint seeking to partition the real property by sale pursuant to RPAPL 901 and an equitable adjustment of the sale proceeds to account for monies expended by the parties to carry the property. Defendant answered, asserting in various affirmative defenses and counterclaims that the property is heirs property subject to disposition under RPAPL 993. Upon receipt of the RJI, the court solicited plaintiff's position on the heirs property question, as to which the parties must be given "notice and the right to be heard" before the court makes the required threshold determination (RPAPL 993 [3] [b]). Plaintiff thereafter supplied the court with a letter in which it takes the position that the property is not heirs property. It has since filed a reply to the counterclaims in which it reiterates that position.

At the beginning of the relevant history of the property, it was owned by Harry Ruecker, [*2]who, in 2014, conveyed it to his sons Tyson and Garrett, as cotrustees of the Ruecker Family Irrevocable Trust U/A Dated August 29, 2014 (hereinafter the Ruecker Trust). In 2023, Tyson and Garrett, acting as trustees of the Ruecker Trust, conveyed 50% interests to themselves as tenants in common, as cotrustees of plaintiff and defendant, each of which is a separate trust formed under the authority of the Ruecker Trust, one for the benefit of each of Tyson's and Garrett's families. Thereafter, Garrett resigned as cotrustee of plaintiff and Tyson resigned as cotrustee of defendant, leaving each brother as trustee of the separate trust that existed for the benefit of his family. This is the current status of the property's ownership.

"Heirs property" means real property held in tenancy in common which satisfies all of the following requirements as of the filing of a partition action:

"(i) there is no agreement in a record binding all of the co-tenants which governs the partition of the property;

"(ii) any of the co-tenants acquired title from a relative, whether living or deceased;

"(iii) the property is used for residential or agricultural purposes; and

"(iv) any of the following applies:

"(A) twenty percent or more of the interests are held by co-tenants who are relatives;

"(B) twenty percent or more of the interests are held by an individual who acquired title from a relative, whether living or deceased;

"(C) twenty percent or more of the co-tenants are relatives of each other; or

"(D) any co-tenant who acquired title from a relative resides in the property" (RPAPL 993 [2] [e]).

Plaintiff argues that trusts are not natural persons and cannot have relatives, thus neither party can have "acquired title from a relative" (RPAPL 993 [2] [e] [ii]).^FN2 The court rejects this position and, there appearing no dispute over the other elements of the definition, finds that the subject property is heirs property subject to the procedures prescribed in RPAPL 993.

The "heirs property" definition speaks in terms of title (see id.). Trustees hold legal title to the property that forms the corpus of a trust (see EPTL 1-2.6 [a], 7-2.1 [a]). The trustees here, being brothers, are unquestionably relatives, and each took legal title from their father, also clearly their relative, when he conveyed the property to them in their capacities as cotrustees of the Ruecker Trust. When each brother conveyed the 50% interests into each of their family trusts, legal title to the property did not change hands. Each brother still held the legal title that he acquired from their father. When each resigned as cotrustee of the other's family trust, he resigned his legal title to the 50% interest held in that trust, leaving the other with sole legal title to the 50% tenancy in common, held in trust for the benefit of his own family (of which he is [*3]presumably a part and therefore also holds a beneficial interest in the property).

The court's analysis of the plain language of the relevant statutes leads to this result and is supported by the holdings of other courts of this state of coordinate jurisdiction, which have applied RPAPL 993 in contexts where one or more parties had received their title from a trust or were trusts themselves (see e.g. Salamone v Salamone, Sup Ct, Bronx County, May 2, 2024, Semaj, J., index No. 813185/2021E, 2024 NY Misc LEXIS 8889; Fouret v Sagland, LLC, Sup Ct Suffolk County, June 26, 2024, Hackeling, J., index No. 600983/2022, 2024 NY Misc LEXIS 52761). The court also perceives sound policy reasons for rejecting plaintiff's position; to wit, the remedial purpose of the statute would be thwarted with respect to any family who had resorted to a trust to manage the descent of their property from one generation to the next (see Gelinas LLC v Hayes, 85 Misc 3d 1012, 1024-1025 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2024] [statute's purpose is to protect families from predatory investors who buy minority interests in real estate after descent of partial interests upon death of family member]). While that remedial purpose does not appear to be squarely implicated in this particular case, a holding that deprives family trustees of the protection of the statute could have harmful implications in other cases. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the property subject to partition in the within action is "heirs property" within the meaning of RPAPL 993 and subject to the procedures for partition that are prescribed therein.

A notice scheduling the heirs property partition settlement conference, which will also address those findings and admonitions that are required by statute, shall issue commensurately herewith.

The within constitutes the decision and order of this court.

Signed this 15th day of April 2026, at Lake George, New York.

ENTER:

HON. MARTIN D. AUFFREDOU

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT