Supreme Court, Montgomery County

Decided on May 20, 2026

Index No. EF2025-12556

Rebecca A. Slezak, J.

[*1]

On March 6, 2026 Plaintiffs filed Motion #7 seeking leave to amend their amended complaint. In support of this motion Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion For Leave to Amend Complaint dated March 6, 2026; and an Affirmation in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend with Exhibit 1 (Proposed 2nd Amended Complaint) and Exhibits A through E.

On March 6, 2026 Plaintiffs filed Motion # 8 seeking leave to reargue and/or renew Motions #1, #2 & #4. In support of this motion Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion to Reargue and/or Renew CPLR 2221 (d), (e) dated March 6, 2026; Affirmation of Aidria Torres in Support (CPLR 2221) dated March 6, 2026; and undated Memorandum of Law.

On March 9, 2026 Defendant, The Law Office of Christopher Stanyon, PLLC filed a motion brought on by Order to Show Cause signed and on March 12, 2026 seeking to quash the subpoena signed by the Pro Se litigant, Aidria Torres and served on KeyBank. The subpoena was seeking Attorney Stanyon's escrow account information. In support of the motion Defendant Chirstopher Stanyon, PLLC filed an Attorney Affirmation with Exhibits A through C annexed thereto sworn to by Attorney Stanyon on March 11, 2026.

In deciding the pending motions the Court reviewed the following documents:

NYSCEF Doc. No. 167 [Plaintiffs'] Notice of Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint

NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 168-174 [Plaintiffs'] Affirmation in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend with Exhibits A through E

NYSCEF Doc. No. 176 [Plaintiffs'] Notice of Motion to Reargue and Renew (CPLR 2221 (d), (e)

NYSCEF Doc. No. 177 [Plaintiffs'] Affirmation of Aidria Torres in Support (CPLR 2221)

NYSCEF Doc. No. 178 [Plaintiffs'] Memorandum of Law

NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 205 unsigned and 211 Order to Show Cause signed on March 12, 2026

NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 200-203 (and reuploaded as NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 206-209) Attorney Affirmation [in Support of Order to Show Cause] and Exhibits A through C

NYSCEF Doc. No. 204 (an reuploaded as NYSCEF Doc. No. 210) Plaintiffs' Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant Stanyon's Order to Show Cause to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum

NYSCEF Doc. No. 233 Letter from Robert Abdella to the Court as and for his clients Jack Spraker and Thin Lines Realty's response to Plaintiffs' various motions

NYSCEF Doc. No. 235 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affirmation in Support of Pending Motions dated April 6, 2026

NYSCEF Doc. No. 236 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affirmation in Support of Pending Motions dated April 6, 2026

NYSCEF Doc. No. 237 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affirmation in Support of Pending Motions dated April 6, 2026

NYSCEF Doc. No. 238 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affirmation in Support of Pending Motions dated April 6, 2026

NYSCEF Doc. No. 239 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affirmation in Support of Pending Motions dated April 6, 2026

NYSCEF Doc. No. 240 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affirmation in Support of Pending Motions dated April 6, 2026

NYSCEF Doc. No. 241 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affirmation in Support of Pending Motions dated April 6, 2026

NYSCEF Doc. No. 242 Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affirmation in Support of Pending Motions dated April 6, 2026

The Plaintiffs do not cite any caselaw in their papers. Plaintiffs simply reference statutes and present arguments on how the Court should interpret and apply said statutes. Plaintiffs are [*2]not attorneys. Plaintiffs admit that they are using Artificial Intelligence to draft the legal documents that have been offered to the Court. The Court must address the fundamental issue that is presented by the pro se litigant using Artificial Intelligence in lieu of either doing proper legal research or hiring an attorney to present their case.

Artificial Intelligence ("AI") is not legal authority and cannot be used interchangeably with legal research and writing (Gurpreet Kaur v Desso, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129902 at 7 [NDNY 2025] [footnote omitted] [

Indeed, courts in this Circuit have not hesitated to find that the submission of fabricated legal authority resulting from the use of artificial intelligence is sanctionable conduct. See id.; see also Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 779 F. Supp. 3d 341, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78895, 2025 WL 1195925, at *6 (E.D.NY Apr. 24, 2025); Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.NY 2023).

]; see also Mata v Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp3d 443 [SDNY 2023] [sanctioning lawyer and law firm for submitting fabricated cases generated by ChatGPT]). Instead, AI is a computer-based application that uses datasets input by its creator to generate text and images in response to a user's prompts. Any research is limited to the datasets contained within the application and the user's search prompts. Bias is inherent in the system as it is impossible to know what prompts were entered and the AI application is simply answering the question or prompt entered. AI applications are also not a search limited to only legal datasets. The search is, therefore, subject to simply compiling probabilities based upon an algorithm mining a limited dataset, which may result in irrelevant and nonsensical information being offered as a response. AI is incapable of the reasoned decision making process upon which our legal system is based, which can lead to frivolous and unwarranted legal theories and arguments. Stare decisis and legal precedent are terms that have meaning and cannot be met with a simple AI search of datasets compiled by a company seeking to make a profit with its application (see Mata, 678 F Supp3d at 451 [

As it was later revealed, Mr. Schwartz had used ChatGPT, which fabricated the cited cases. Mr. Schwartz testified at the sanctions hearing that when he reviewed the reply memo, he was "operating under the false perception that this website [i.e., ChatGPT] could not possibly be fabricating cases on its own." (Tr. At 31.) He stated "I just was not thinking that the case could be fabricated, so I was not looking at it from that point of view." (Tr. At 35.) "My reaction was, ChatGPT is finding that case somewhere. Maybe it's unpublished. Maybe it was appealed. Maybe access is difficult to get. I just never thought it could be made up." (Tr. At 33.)

]).

Furthermore, AI search engines are created to be sycophantic and flattering to the user (see Kashmir Hill and Dylan Freedman, Chatbots Can Go Into a Delusional Spiral. Here's How It Happens, NY Times, Aug. 8, 2025, updated Aug. 12, 2025 ["We wanted to understand how these chatbots can lead ordinarily rational people to believe so powerfully in false ideas,"]). AI engines create feedback loops that are meant to engage and reinforce the user's beliefs and anticipated responses. In a case study conducted by the NY Times, the authors reported on a sane, average 47 year old man who was convinced by ChatGPT that he "had discovered a novel mathematical formula, one that could take down the internet and power inventions like a force-field and a levitation beam" (id.).

ChatGPT's tone begins to change from "pretty straightforward and accurate", Ms. Toner^FN1 said, to sycophantic and flattering. ChatGPT told Mr. Brooks that he was moving into uncharted, mind-expanding territory."

Sycophancy, in which chatbots agree with and excessively praise users, is a trait they've manifested partly because their training involves human beings rating their responses. "Users tend to like the models telling them that they're great, and so it's quite easy to go too far in that direction," Ms. Toner said.

. . . .

OpenAI released GPT-5 this week, and said one area of focus was reduced sycophancy. Sycophancy is also an issue for chatbots from other companies, according to multiple safety and model behavior researchers across leading A.I. labs.

. . . .

Ms. Toner has described chatbots as "improv machines." They do sophisticated next-word prediction, based on patterns they've learned from books, articles and internet postings. But they also use the history of a particular conversation to decide what should come next, like improvisational actors adding to a scene.

"The story line is building all the time, " Ms. Toner said. "At that point in the story, the whole vibe is: This is a groundbreaking, earth-shattering, transcendental new kind of math. And it would be pretty lame if the answer was, 'You need to take a break and get some sleep and talk to a friend.'"

Chatbots can privilege staying in character over following the safety guardrails that companies have put in place. "The longer the interaction gets, the more likely it is to kind of go off the rails," Ms. Toner said.

A new feature—cross-chat memory—released by OpenAI in February may be exaggerating this tendency. "Because when you start a fresh chat, it's actually not fresh. It's actually pulling in all of this context," Ms. Toner said.

A recent increase in reports of delusional chats seems to coincide with the introduction of the feature, which allows ChatGPT to recall information from previous chats.

Cross-chat memory is turned on by default for users. OpenAI says that ChatGPT is most helpful when memory is enabled, according to a spokesman, but users can disable memory or turn off chat history in their settings.

. . . .

We asked Terence Tao, a mathematics professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, who is regarded by many as the finest mathematician of his generation, if there was any merit to the ideas Mr. Brooks invented with Lawrence.^FN2

Mr. Tao said a new way of thinking could unlock these cryptographic puzzles, but he was [*3]not swayed by Mr. Brooks' formulas nor the computer programs that Lawrence generated to prove them.

"It's sort of blurring the precise technical math terminology with more informal interpretations of the same words," he said. "That raises red flags for a mathematician."

ChatGPT started out writing real computer programs to help Mr. Brooks crack cryptography, but when that effort made little headway, it feigned success. At one point, it claimed it could work independently while Mr. Brooks slept—even though ChatGPT does not have the ability to do this.

"If you ask an L.L.M for code to verify something, often it will take the path of least resistance and just cheat" Dr. Tao said, referring to large language models like ChatGPT. "Cheat like crazy actually."

Mr. Brooks lacked the expertise to understand when Lawrence was just faking it. [D]r. Tao said the aesthetics of chatbots contributed to this. They produce lengthy, polished replies, often in numbered lists that look structured and rigorous.

But the information A.I. chatbots produce is not always reliable. This was acknowledged in fine print at the bottom of every conversation—"ChatGPT can make mistakes"—even as Lawrence insisted that everything it said was true.

(id.). AI engines are designed to keep users coming back. In contrast the Law is a consistent set of standards that are not designed to make everyone happy, or to feel any emotion. The Law is meant to be applied without bias and equally to all that seek to have it applied to their specific case, without regard to sycophancy or flattery. Blind Justice is the gold standard asked of all judges being tasked with determining a case. This consistent application of the Law is why litigants can leave a court proceeding feeling upset or bewildered. Court is not a feedback loop meant to please everyone, it is a means to find the truth of the situation and properly determine who is right and who is wrong, and determine what, if any damages have been incurred. The Law is also used to root out frivolous and harassing litigation as evidenced by all 50 States and the Federal Courts having procedural rules to award sanctions for frivolous lawsuits; and many states having anti-SLAPP laws to protect people from expending needless funds to defend against frivolous lawsuits.

Legal research is the process by which a litigant researches statutes, regulations and caselaw to solve and litigate legal problems. The primary sources of law such as statutes and caselaw, and secondary sources such as treatises and commentary, provide the legal standard by which a problem is not only defined, but the remedy is also defined. The variation of the facts on any given case requires a Court to use past precedent (stare decisis-respect for precedent) and discretion to ensure a just and consistent result. When a case is dismissed or a motion is denied it is because a litigant cannot prove the relevant facts, or perhaps, the inferences presented by the proven facts do not support the legal conclusions the litigant believes should be drawn. If the same information is typed into a chatbot, however, the result is tainted by the unfortunate feedback loops built into the system to reinforce one's misguided or misunderstood conclusions and inferences. The Court is not an AI chatbot, it is an established institution of government.

The analysis needed to make the determination of the proven facts and legal conclusions requires the Court to draw from the applicable law and use reasoning which is beyond the capability of a computer search. AI on the other hand is not analyzing anything and simply attempting to respond to prompts by conducting word searches using algorithms designed to find [*4]probabilities based upon language. AI may be able to assist a person with summarizing a search or writing text, but if used for legal research it can create false information or hallucinations that are inappropriate to present to a court (Andre v Warden, FCI Danbury, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232986 at 13-15 [D CT 2025] [

"Federal courts increasingly confront filings prepared with the assistance of generative artificial intelligence. While such tools can enhance efficiency, they also create a new professional hazard, synthetic authority presented as precedent. No uniform standard yet governs this issue." Mattox, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214632, 2025 WL 3012828, at *5. The main problem with filings that rely on generative artificial intelligence, of course, is that they often include hallucinations. The Court defines a "hallucination" in the context of AI-assisted legal research as one of three errors: (1) fabricated cases (whether a nonexistent case name and citation, an existing case name with an invented citation, or a real citation that leads to a wholly unrelated decision); (2) fabricated quotations from actual cases; and (3) misstatements of law (representations of legal rules, standards, or holdings that are inaccurate, incomplete, or unsupported by any real authority, including AI-generated summaries that distort or materially alter what a case actually decided).

In an adversarial system that depends on litigants to candidly present accurate authority, such hallucinations mislead the Court, forcing it either to expend substantial resources verifying fabricated material or, worse, risk reliance on an erroneous statement of the law.

]). The Court in Mata v Avianca, Inc. succinctly summed up the perils of AI as a legal research tool as follows,

Many harms flow from the submission of fake opinions. The opposing party wastes time and money in exposing the deception. The Court's time is taken from other important endeavors. The client may be deprived of arguments based on authentic judicial precedents. There is potential harm to the reputation of judges and courts whose names are falsely invoked as authors of the bogus opinions and to the reputation of a party attributed with fictional conduct. It promotes cynicism about the legal profession and the American judicial system. And a future litigant may be tempted to defy a judicial ruling by disingenuously claiming doubt about its authenticity.

(578 F Supp3d at 448-449).

Primary sources of law are statutes and regulations and the caselaw that interprets said laws. Civilizations have always had a code of conduct, which if one starts with the Garden of Eden was simple, do not eat of the fruit from the tree of knowledge (Genesis 3:2-4). But even using this as a starting point of the Law is random and as it requires you to believe in this biblical book. Over time this one rule expanded into the ten commandments, and the Mosaic Law which is the basis of our law today.

The Code of Hammurabi is believed to be the first organized code that made the law accessible and better able to be consistently applied. The Code of Hammurabi is defined as,

The oldest known written legal code, produced in Mesopotamia during the rule of Hammurabi (who reigned from 1792 to 1750 B.C.). the code consisted of nearly 300 provisions, arranged under the headings such as family, trade, real property, personal [*5]property, and labor.

(Black's Law Dictionary 274 [8th ed 2004]). The Justinian Code was an index of all laws in the Roman Empire, again specifically compiled and organized by category. The Justinian Code is defined as,

Justinian Code. Roman Law. A collection of imperial constitutions drawn up by a commission of ten persons appointed by Justinian, and published in A.D. 529. Ten jurists, headed by Tribonian, carried out the project beginning in February A.D. 528 and ending in April 529. It replaced all prior imperial law, but was in force only until A.D. 534, when it was supplanted by a revision, the Codex Repetitae Praelectionis. The precise contents of the first work are unknown. But the second work, containing 12 books of the revised code, includes imperial constitutions of the Gregorian, Hermogenian, and Theodosian Codes, together with later legislation, revised and harmonized into one systematic whole. It deals with ecclesiastical law, criminal law, administrative law, and private law. In modern writings, the A.D. 534 version is the work referred to as the Justinian Code.

(id. at 883). The determination to organize laws and rules, made it easier to apply the laws to real life situations in a consistent, fair and just manner. The codification of laws has expanded in the modern age to the extent that each state or territory of the United States, the Federal government as well as each Nation has its own code.

In New York State the laws are codified and referred to generally as the Consolidated Laws of New York. The collected laws include the New York State Constitution and laws promulgated by the New York State Legislature. In addition, New York State has agency rules categorized and published in the New York State Codes, Rules and Regulations. These rules assist the government with organizing itself, enforcing the law, and determining rights and remedies for various types of legal issues.

It is noted that not all legal disputes end in a court decision, but when the Courts are involved in litigation they issue decisions that are collected and published in the Official Reports. That collection of cases forms another source of law that can be used to formulate legal arguments regarding the rights and remedies available to litigants. Again, research of law and caselaw is meant to support a litigant's position, and if no authority can be found, it means either it is a case of first impression, or no such cause of action exists. An AI application is incapable of reasoned legal conclusions as it has no reasoning capability, it is solely generating results from a prompt and searching for patterns in its datasets to generate a response that is engaging to the user, not necessarily accurate. AI cannot be the sole source of legal determinations as the application of the statutes, rules and caselaw requires the unique reasoning ability of the human mind, as well as respect for the determinations of existing, past legal disputes and interpretations. With this distinction with a difference between AI and the Law the Court shall turn to the pending motions.

A party has a right to amend their pleading once as of right within twenty days of service, or after by leave of court (CPLR § 3025). CPLR § 3025 specifically provides,

(a) Amendments Without Leave. A party may amend his pleading once without leave of court within twenty days after its service, or at any time before the period for responding to it expires, or within twenty days after service of a pleading responding to it.

(b) Amendments and Supplemental Pleadings by Leave. A party may amend his or her pleading, or supplement it by setting forth additional or subsequent transactions or occurrences, at any time by leave of court or by stipulation of all parties. Leave shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just including the granting of costs and continuances. Any motion to amend or supplement pleadings shall be accompanied by the proposed amended or supplemental pleading clearly showing the changes or additions to be made to the pleading.

(CPLR §§ 3025 [a & b]). In the analyzing whether to allow an amendment, the Appellate Division, Third Department follows the reasoning of the Appellate Division, Second Department in that "[i]n the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, such applications are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit" (Palmatier v Mr. Heater Corp., 156 AD3d 1167, 1169 [3d Dept 2017], quoting Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220 [2d Dept 2008], citing CPLR 3025 [b] [internal quotations omitted] [emphasis added]; LaLima v Consolidated Edison Co. of NY, Inc., 151 AD3d 832, 834, [2d Dept 2017]). Additionally, a trial court is afforded great latitude in deciding whether to grant leave to amend the pleadings and "absent a clear abuse of that discretion, [its decision] will not be lightly cast aside" (NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self Ins. Trust v People Care, Inc., 156 AD3d 99, 101 [3d Dept 2017], citing Cowsert v. Macy's E., Inc., 74 AD3d 1444, 1444-1445 [3d Dept 2010] [internal quotations omitted]). In NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self Ins. Trust, the Appellate Division, Third Department further abrogated the ruling in Cowsert, by holding that on a motion for leave to amend a pleading, the merits of the proposed amendment need not be established by the movant (NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self Ins. Trust, 156 AD3d at 102). Cases following NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self Ins. Trust clarify that "a motion for leave to amend is not the appropriate forum to litigate factual issues" and matters that would require an evidentiary inquiry would be more appropriately decided under a motion for summary judgment, rather than one for leave to amend pleadings (Catlyn & Derzee, Inc. v Amedore Land Developers LLC, 169 AD3d 1319, 1322 [3d Dept 2019]). The decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is left to the discretion of the Court and will not be overturned unless the Court has abused its discretion (Walden v Varricchio, 195 AD3d 1111, 1113-1114 [3d Dept 2021]).

A bill of particulars may be used in any case to amplify a pleading (CPLR § 3041; Myers v Community Gen. Hosp. of Sullivan County, 51 AD3d 1359, 1360 [3d Dept 2008] [

"The purpose of a bill of particulars is to amplify the pleadings, limit the proof and prevent surprise at trial" (Twiddy v Standard Mar. Transp. Servs.,162 AD2d 264, 265, 556 NYS2d 622 [1990] [citation omitted]; see Graves v County of Albany, 278 AD2d 578, 717 NYS2d 420 [2000]).

]; Allen v. Krna, 282 AD2d 946, 948 [3d Dept 2001] [

"The purpose of a bill of particulars is to describe the general claims of the complaint with specificity, thereby limiting proof and preventing surprise at trial [citation omitted]" (MacDormand v Blumenberg, 182 AD2d 991, 992; see, State of New York v Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Assn., 34 AD2d 769, 770).

]). The essential function of a bill of particulars is to reveal the contentions upon which a party relies to substantiate the claims in their pleading, i.e., complaint (Weinstein-Korn-Miller NY Civ [*6]Prac CPLR ¶ 3041.03 [2026]).

Attorneys that receive funds in a fiduciary capacity from a client or beneficial owner typically deposit said funds in an "interest on lawyer account" or IOLA. An IOLA account is controlled by Judiciary Law § 497. Qualified funds for deposit in an IOLA account are defined as,

[M]oneys received by an attorney in a fiduciary capacity from a client or beneficial owner and which, in the judgment of the attorney, are too small in amount or are reasonably expected to be held for too short a time to generate sufficient interest income to justify the expense of administering a segregated account for the benefit of the client or beneficial owner.

(id.). An attorney holding a down payment for a real estate or contract transaction may indeed determine said funds are "qualified funds" for deposit in an IOLA account (id.).

No attorney or law firm shall be liable in damages nor held to answer for a charge of professional misconduct because of a deposit on moneys to an IOLA account pursuant to a judgment in good faith such moneys were qualified funds.

(id. at § 5).

In holding a deposit in escrow an attorney does not become a party to the contract of sale but instead is merely a stakeholder for the purposes of interpleader (CPLR § 1006 [defining stakeholder as an entity, like an insurance company or escrowee, who simply has possession of a sum of money that more than one person lays claim to, but in fact has no independent liability to any claimant]; see also Geddes v Rosen, 22 AD2d 394, 397 [2d Dept 1965] [explaining interpleader]). Stakeholders are not independently liable to a claimant if they await a judicial determination as to the rights of each claimant, and may also opt to pay the disputed funds into Court, thereby discharging them from liability to any claimant, in whole or in part (id.; Sun Life Ins, & Annuity Co., of NY v Braslow, 38 AD3d 529 [2d Dept 2007]). An attorney who maintains any down payment in escrow pending the conditions of the escrow agreement being met, or a court order determining the rights of the claimants to the stake, is absolved of independent liability (see Takayama v Schaefer, 240 AD2d 21, 24-27 [2d Dept 1998] [

The cases cited by the Appellate Term in support of its conclusion (see, Jensen v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 AD2d 934, supra; Pray v Cement & Concrete Workers, Dist. Council Welfare Fund, 65 Misc 2d 530; Septembertide Publ. v Stein & Day, 884 F2d 675, supra) do not involve escrow agents. In Jensen, an insurance carrier was discharged from liability upon payment into court of policy proceeds subject to conflicting claims. In Septembertide, the stakeholder was holding royalties subject to different claims; the money was not held in escrow. In Pray, the court held that a union benefit fund which retained $ 2,500 in death benefits was liable for interest, since (1) its obligation to make payment under the policy arose upon proof of the decedent's death, and (2) it "elected to retain possession and use of the death benefits pending the resolution of the conflicting claims" ( Pray v Cement & Concrete Workers, Dist. Council Welfare Fund, supra, at 532). In contrast, the appellant, as escrow agent, had no right to use the funds he held in escrow (see, 22 NYCRR 1200.46 [b]).

. . . .

These cases, none of which involve attorneys' escrow accounts, rest on a well-established [*7]premise, notably that a person who holds assets that are the subject of a dispute should protect the assets by using the interpleader-stakeholder device, so that the assets are secure and will not be diverted or misdirected. An attorney-escrowee, however, is already pledged and obligated to secure the funds and is absolutely prohibited from disposing of them unilaterally. In the case before us, the appellant simply continued to keep the funds secure in his escrow account while awaiting a court order, and in so doing accomplished the functional equivalent of an interpleader. We know of no case in which an attorney has ever been held personally liable under these circumstances, and given the existence of Judiciary Law § 497 (5) and the other circumstances of this case, we see no occasion to make this the first such instance.

An escrow agent not only has a contractual duty to follow the escrow agreement, but additionally becomes a trustee of anyone with a beneficial interest in the trust (see, Farago v Burke, 262 NY 229; Oppenheim v Simon, 57 AD2d 1006) with the "duty not to deliver the escrow to anyone except upon strict compliance with the conditions imposed" (Farago v Burke, supra, at 233). Thus, an escrow agent can be held liable for breach of the escrow agreement and breach of fiduciary duty as escrowee (see, Grinblat v Taubenblat, 107 AD2d 735). It would have been improper for the appellant to give the money to his client, and no less improper for him to turn it over to his client's adversary. He asserts that under these circumstances, and because the escrow agreement did not dictate otherwise, he secured the money by retaining it in his escrow account.

It is well settled that, in the event of a dispute, the escrow funds may not be released until the conditions of the escrow agreement are fully performed and it is "clear that no factual issues or viable claims exist under the closely scrutinized terms of the escrow agreement" (E.S.P. Adj. Servs. v Asta Group, 125 AD2d 849, 850; see, Matter of Kaplan v Shaffer, 112 AD2d 369). In a dispute between the buyer and the seller over escrow funds, the escrow agent is a proper party, "so that he [or she] will be amenable to any judgment rendered after trial with respect to the disposition of the escrow funds" (Zwirn v Goodman, 206 AD2d 360, 362; BTS, Inc. v Webny Corp., 157 AD2d 638; Pomeranz v Dineen, 114 AD2d 944, supra). These cases make no mention of an obligation to pay money into court or any liability that follows when an attorney continues to secure the money, in escrow. While the remedy of interpleader is available to an escrow agent, the escrow agent may retain money and "compel proof of a clear right to the stake" (Falk v Goodman, 7 NY2d 87, 91, supra). Although an interpleader action is an appropriate (and perhaps the safest) course, there is no legal or ethical obligation to commence an interpleader action under pain of liability. The escrow agent may attempt to facilitate a settlement of the dispute, or hold the funds indefinitely (see generally, Brooklyn Bar Ethics Opn 1993-1, NYLJ, Dec. 20, 1993, at 6, col 4; Nassau County Bar Assn Ethics Opn 91-21).

We emphasize the specific wording of the contract of sale before us, which requires the escrow agent to hold the $ 12,000 until "closing of title". Closing is defined elsewhere in the contract as "settlement of the obligations of seller and purchaser to each other under this contract". In this case, settlement of those obligations never occurred.

In short, the fact that an escrow agent is permitted to implead his or her clients, and that others similarly situated may have done so, is insufficient to impose liability. To impose liability, the condition precedent to such "liability clearly contemplated by the escrow [*8]agreement" must be satisfied (Roossin v Rodin, 140 NYS2d 315, 316). The plaintiff must show the escrow agent breached its duty under the escrow agreement, or breached its fiduciary duties to either the seller or the buyer (see, Grinblat v Taubenblat, supra). However, there was no such proof here.

Indeed, the issue never came up at trial, nor is it mentioned in the decision of the Civil Court. Moreover, we note that Judiciary Law § 497 (5) absolves an attorney from liability for the "good faith" placement of escrow monies in an IOLA account and that the appellant's good faith was never questioned or even raised at any point in the proceedings. This is not to say that there are no circumstances under which an attorney may be held responsible or that the safe-harbor provision of Judiciary Law § 497 (5) has no limits. In the case before us, however, for the reasons stated above, we find no basis to impose personal liability on the appellant.

[emphasis added]]; cf. Grinblat v Taubenblat, 107 AD2d 735, 736 [2d Dept 1985] [holding escrowee is independently liable when in violation of the escrow agreement it paid out the funds held in escrow prior to the conditions of the escrow agreement being met or a court order determining the rights of the claimants to the stake]).

Only parties to a contract are liable under the contract (Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. v Targeted Delivery Tech Holdings, Ltd., 184 AD3d 116, 121 [1st Dept 2020]; Clavin v CAP Equip. Leasing Corp., 156 AD3d 404, 405 [1st Dept 2017]). The decision in Victory State Bank v EMBA Hylan, Inc., is particularly instructive as it granted a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a) (1) because it showed the moving defendants were not a party to the subject contract (169 AD3d 963, 965 [2d Dept 2019] [holding "one cannot be held liable under a contract to which he or she is not a party"]). The Appellate Division, Second Department further held that the corporate veil could not be pierced solely because of the actions taken by principals to further the corporate business (id. at 966 [

Moreover, there is generally no individual liability for principals of a corporation for actions taken "in furtherance of the corporation's business" (Worthy v New York City Hous. Auth., 21 AD3d 284, 286, 799 NYS2d 518 [2005], citing Savoy Record Co. v Cardinal Export Corp., 15 NY2d 1, 4, 203 NE2d 206, 254 NYS2d 521 [1964]). As such, the individual defendants cannot be held liable for SIEP's contractual obligations merely because they owned and managed SIEP or because the lease was executed by two of SIEP's managers/owners in such capacity.

]).

A motion for leave to renew or reargue is controlled by CPLR § 2221.This section specifically states:

(a) A motion for leave to renew or to reargue a prior motion, for leave to appeal from, or to stay, vacate or modify, an order shall be made, on notice, to the judge who signed the order, unless he or she is for any reason unable to hear it, except that:

1. if the order was made upon a default such motion may be made, on notice, to any judge of the court; and

2. if the order was made without notice such motion may be made, without notice, to the judge who signed it, or, on notice, to any other judge of the court.

(b) Rules of the chief administrator of the courts. The chief administrator may by rule [*9]exclude motions within a department, district or county from the operation of subdivision (a) of this rule.

(c) A motion made to other than a proper judge under this rule shall be transferred to the proper judge.

(d) A motion for leave to reargue:

1. shall be identified specifically as such;

2. shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offered on the prior motion; and

3. shall be made within thirty days after service of a copy of the order determining the prior motion and written notice of its entry. This rule shall not apply to motions to reargue a decision made by the appellate division or the court of appeals.

(e) A motion for leave to renew:

1. shall be identified specifically as such;

2. shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination; and

3. shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion.

(f) A combined motion for leave to reargue and leave to renew shall identify separately and support separately each item of relief sought. The court, in determining a combined motion for leave to reargue and leave to renew, shall decide each part of the motion as if it were separately made. If a motion for leave to reargue or leave to renew is granted, the court may adhere to the determination on the original motion or may alter that determination.(CPLR § 2221.) A motion for leave to renew must be based upon newly discovered evidence or facts which existed at the time of the prior motion, but were unknown to the party seeking renewal (Bansbach v Zinn, 20 AD3d 629, 630; Alexy v Stein, 16 AD3d 989, 990-991; Stocklas v Auto Solutions of Glenville, Inc., 9 AD3d 622, 625; Barrett v State of New York, 13 AD3d 775, 776). In addition, the moving party must provide a justifiable excuse as to why the newly proffered evidence or facts were not previously submitted to the court with the underlying motion papers (Bansbach, 20 AD3d at 630; Alexy, 16 AD3d at 990-991; Stocklas, 9 AD3d at 625; Barrett, 13 AD3d at 776).

A motion for leave to renew must be based upon newly discovered evidence or facts which existed at the time of the prior motion, but were unknown to the party seeking renewal (Bansbach v Zinn, 20 AD3d 629, 630; Alexy v Stein, 16 AD3d 989, 990-991; Stocklas v Auto Solutions of Glenville, Inc., 9 AD3d 622, 625; Barrett v State of New York, 13 AD3d 775, 776). In addition, the moving party must provide a justifiable excuse as to why the newly proffered evidence or facts were not previously submitted to the court with the underlying motion papers (Bansbach, 20 AD3d at 630; Alexy, 16 AD3d at 990-991; Stocklas, 9 AD3d at 625; Barrett, 13 AD3d at 776).

A motion for leave to reargue must show that the Court misapprehended facts presented in the last motion, or misapplied a principle of law (Loris v S & W Realty Corp., 16 AD3d 729, 730; Matter of Dambrowski v Dambrowski, 8 AD3d 913, 914-915). A motion for leave to [*10]reargue is not an opportunity to present new factual information or legal arguments not previously before the court (Pryor v Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 17 AD3d 434, 436; Amato v Lord & Taylor, Inc., 10 AD3d 374, 375).

Finally a statute must be read using the plain meaning of the language used (Matter of Alvarez v. Annucci, 38 NY3d 974, 975 [2022] [

When interpreting statutes, the clearest indicator of legislative intent, and "the starting point in any case of interpretation[,] must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" (People ex rel. McCurdy v Warden, Westchester County Corr. Facility, 36 NY3d 251, 257, 140 NYS3d 170, 163 NE3d 1087 [2020] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, "[c]ourts must harmonize the various provisions of related statutes and . . . construe them in a way that renders them internally compatible" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).

When using the plain meaning, courts must also avoid any interpretation that would be absurd or create an application that would be antithetical to the purpose of the statute (People v Pabon, 28 NY3d 147, 156 [2016] [

The plain language of CPL 30.10 (3) (e) and (f), the natural interplay between these provisions, and the legislative history of the 1996 and 2006 amendments provide ample reasons to reject defendant's proposed interpretation, but there is also the problem that defendant's construction leads to absurd results. We carefully scrutinize this impact of defendant's approach because courts are "governed by the principle that we must interpret a statute so as to avoid an unreasonable or absurd application of the law" (People v Garson, 6 NY3d 604, 614, 848 NE2d 1264, 815 NYS2d 887 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted], citing People v Santi, 3 NY3d 234, 244, 818 NE2d 1146, 785 NYS2d 405 [2004]). Indeed, "courts have repeatedly rejected statutory constructions that are unconscionable or antithetical to legislative objectives" (Matter of New York State Assn. of Criminal Defense Lawyers v Kaye, 96 NY2d 512, 519, 755 NE2d 837, 730 NYS2d 477 [2001]).

In this case Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint. They seek to add Christopher Stanyon, Esq., in his personal capacity as a defendant. Plaintiffs further seek to amend some minor parts of the pleading with regard to their previously stated contentions and causes of action.

Plaintiffs were the assignees of a contract to purchase real estate (NYSCEF Doc. 152). The Law Office of Christopher Stanyon, PLLC, was simply the escrowee of the deposit (id.). The law firm was not a signatory to, or a party to the assignment document, nor the contract of sale. The contract is only signed by the sellers and Plaintiffs as purchasers and the only reference to the law firm is:

15. DEPOSITS — It is agreed that any deposits by the Purchasers are to be deposited with the SELLER'S ATTORNEY, as part of the purchase price. If the Seller do [sic] not accept the Purchasers' offer, all deposits shall be returned to Purchaser. If the offer is accepted by Seller, all deposits will be held in escrow by the SELLER'S [sic] until the contingencies and terms in the contract have been met. The Purchaser will receive credit on the total amount of the deposit toward the purchase price. Broker shall then apply the total deposit to the brokerage fee. Any excess of deposit over and above the fee earned [*11]will go to the Seller. If the contingencies and terms contained in the contract cannot be resolved, or in the event of default by the Seller or the Purchaser, the deposits will be held by the ATTORNEY pending a resolution of the disposition of the deposits.

(id.). To date, The Law Office of Christopher Stanyon, PLLC is holding the deposit until the resolution of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs' proposed amendment to add Attorney Stanyon in his personal capacity is palpably devoid of merit. He is not a signatory to the contract. The arguments that there is some sort of fraud are also unavailing and wholly insufficient to add an escrowee attorney. Attorney Stanyon is maintaining the deposit pending the "contingencies and terms contained in the contract . . . be[ing] resolved" through Plaintiffs' lawsuit (id.). Furthermore, he has maintained the deposit, which properly was deemed to be "qualified funds" under Judiciary Law § 497, and by the contract defined as funds to be placed in escrow, in his IOLA account. Plaintiffs cannot sue the escrowee other than pursuant to CPLR § 1006, interpleader, and they have wholly failed to state any basis to pierce the corporate veil. Plaintiffs lack of understanding of their lawsuit also is of no moment to the fact that the proposed amendment is palpably devoid of merit.

Plaintiffs also cannot demand the return of the funds in escrow until this litigation is ended as the question of whether they breached the contract and forfeited the deposit, or alternatively, if Defendants breached the contract and cannot claim the deposit, has yet to be resolved. If the escrowee were to release the funds to either litigant, it would then be susceptible to being sued for failing to comply with its fiduciary duty to maintain the funds in escrow. Plaintiffs clearly do not understand the meaning of escrow or the obligations of an escrowee. Plaintiffs' amendments to fix some language or flesh out their contentions is also unnecessary as those proposed "minor" amendments may be sufficiently handled by a bill of particulars. Plaintiffs' motion amend the complaint for a second time is denied in its entirety.

Plaintiffs' motion to renew is completely devoid of any new information. Moreover, in reply Plaintiffs simply uploaded their original motion papers. This motion is bordering on frivolous as it completely fails to meet the requirements of a motion to renew. A party's dislike of the outcome of a motion is not a basis to renew the motion. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to state any coherent argument on how this Court misconstrued the applicable law when determining the prior motions. Plaintiffs' use of AI generated arguments is not a substitute for arguments based on the actual Law. Plaintiffs' motion to renew and reargue is denied in its entirety.

Defendant, The Law Office of Christopher Stanyon, PLLC, moved to quash the self-represented litigant's subpoena. It is clear that non-attorneys do not have the power to subpoena anyone or anything (Bottini v Bottini, 164 AD3d 556, 558-559 [2d Dept 2018] ["As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff was unable to issue subpoenas on her own, and her subpoenas need to be so-ordered by the Court." [citations omitted]]; People v Jordan, 2024 NY Misc. LEXIS 35719 at *7 [Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 2024] [same]). The Plaintiffs' argument that this Court said a self-represented litigant may subpoena is incorrect. Self-represented litigants must present unsigned, completed form subpoenas to the Clerk of the Court to present to the presiding judge for signature. They do not have the power to issue their own subpoenas.

Plaintiffs' argument that CPLR § 105 somehow makes Aidria Torres an attorney is so absurd it should not even be addressed. However, it is important to clarify the reason the term is being defined in the Civil Practice Law and Rules. CPLR § 105 defines terms used in the [*12]procedural statute, which is essentially the rules of litigation. Specifically, CPLR § 105 (c) defines the word "'attorney' to include a party prosecuting or defending an action in person." This definition read with the plain meaning allows a litigant to understand their obligations under this procedural statute with regard to prosecuting or defending a case. In other words, the obligations of an attorney to comply with procedure apply equally to the self-represented litigant. Plaintiffs' expansion of the definition as bestowing a law degree and all of the responsibilities of an attorney is not only absurd but antithetical to the idea of attending law school, passing the bar exam and being admitted to practice law in the state of New York. No self-represented litigant becomes an attorney when representing themselves (see People v Jordan, 2024 NY Misc. LEXIS 35719 at *6-7 [

It is also well settled that "[a] self-represented litigant acquires no greater rights than any other litigant (see Duffen v State, 245 AD2d 653, 665 N.Y.S.2d 978; Brooks v Inn at Saratoga Ass'n., 188 AD2d 921, 591 N.Y.S.2d 625)" (Greenfield v Gluck, 2003 NY Misc. LEXIS 386, 2003 WL 1961333 [App Term 2d & 11th Dists 2003]). While courts generally allow pro se litigants some leeway in the presentation of their case, they must nevertheless comply with Court procedures (Stoves & Stones, Ltd. v Rubens, 237 AD2d 280 [2d Dept 1997].) Pro se litigants acquire no greater rights than those of any other litigant and cannot use such status to deprive a defendant of the same rights as other defendants (Correnti v Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, 34 AD3d 578 [2d Dept 2006]; Goldmark v Keystone & Grading Corp., 226 AD2d 143 [1st Dept 1996)]). "The fact that one appears pro se is not a license to abuse the process of the Court and to use it without restraint as a weapon of harassment and libelous bombardment" (see Zappin v Comfort, 49 Misc 3d 1201[A] [NY Sup. Ct. 2015], aff'd, 146 AD3d 575 (2017); citing Kane v New York, 468 F Supp 586, 592 [SDNY 1979] [Weinfeld, J.] [internal quotations omitted]).

]). The definition referenced by Plaintiffs is only to give effect to the procedural requirements they are expected to follow in prosecuting or defending their case. Defendant, The Law Office of Christopher Stanyon, PLLC's motion to quash the subpoena is granted in its entirety as the subpoena is a nullity. Furthermore, as this Defendant is only in this litigation as an escrowee the information sought to subpoenaed, on the record before this Court, is beyond the scope of discovery. The motion is quashed on the merits of the subpoena as the bank account in question is immaterial to the determination of the contract cause of action.

In making the above determinations the Court is relying upon legal research. Plaintiffs use of AI complicates the matter, but it is not controlling. Any remaining issues raised by the parties not specifically addressed herein have been determined to be without merit.

Based upon the forgoing, it is

ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's failed to sustain their burden with regard to motion # 7 seeking to amend the complaint; and it is further

ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's failed to sustain their burden with regard to motion # 8 seeking to renew and reargue the previously determined motions #1, #2 and #4; and it is further

ADJUDGED that defendant, The Law Office of Christopher Stanyon, PLLC, sustained its burden on motion # 8 seeking to quash the subpoena served upon KeyBank; therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that motion # 7 is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that motion # 8 is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that motion #9 is granted in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the subpoena served upon KeyBank in the above captioned matter shall be and hereby is QUASHED; and it is further

ORDERED that KeyBank shall be and hereby is directed not to disclose any documents or information regarding the account of The Law Office of Christopher M. Stanyon, PLLC.

This Decision and Order On Motions 7, 8 & 9 constitutes the Order of the Court.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Court is hereby uploading the original Decision and Order to the New York State Courts Electronic Filing system for filing and entry by the County Clerk. Counsel for Defendants are still responsible for serving notice of entry of this Decision and Order On Motions 7, 8 & 9 in accordance with the requirements of CPLR §2220 and the Local Protocols for Electronic Filing for Montgomery County.

DATED: May 20, 2026

ENTER

HON. REBECCA A. SLEZAK

Justice of the Supreme Court