City Court of Utica, Oneida County

Decided on March 12, 2026

Docket No. CR-05616-25

F. Christopher Giruzzi, J.

[*1]

Procedural History and Purpose of This Decision

On November 3, 2025, this court held a felony preliminary hearing pursuant to CPL § 180.60 for the limited purpose of determining whether reasonable cause existed to believe that Defendant committed a felony and, if so, whether Defendant should be held for action by the Oneida County Grand Jury. The People presented testimony from a 911 operator, a responding police officer, and a police investigator, and introduced a recording of a 911 call and certified medical records. Defendant was represented by counsel and cross-examined each witness. At the conclusion of the hearing, after consideration of the testimony and exhibits received into evidence, the Court found that the People had established reasonable cause to believe that a felony had been committed and that Defendant committed that felony, and ordered the Defendant held for grand jury proceedings.

During the hearing, defense counsel raised objections and arguments concerning the admissibility and use of certain evidence at a felony preliminary hearing, including arguments grounded in hearsay principles and the Confrontation Clause. The Court addressed those objections on the record and rendered an oral ruling, including findings concerning the admissibility of the 911 call and related testimony in the context of an ongoing emergency. The Court also indicated its intent to issue a written decision supplementing its oral ruling.

Upon review of the transcript and the evidentiary issues raised, the Court notes the relative absence of New York case law directly analyzing the intersection of hearsay rules, Confrontation Clause principles, and the evidentiary standards applicable at a CPL § 180.60 felony preliminary hearing. Although the ultimate holding decision was properly based on the reasonable-cause standard governing such proceedings, the Court issues this supplemental decision to more fully explain the legal framework governing those evidentiary issues and to [*2]clarify the basis for the Court's rulings. This supplemental decision is issued for that purpose.^FN1

Hearing Record

The court conducted a felony preliminary hearing on November 3, 2025, at which the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence in support of the felony charges. The hearing record establishes the following facts and procedural history.

Evidence Presented by the People

The People first called C.B., a 911 operator employed by Oneida County, who testified that on October 4, 2025, while working his assigned shift, he received a 911 call from a female caller who identified herself as J.B C.B. testified that the caller presented as frantic and reported that the father of her child had broken into her residence with a firearm, assaulted her, and that she required medical assistance. C.B. further testified regarding standard 911 procedures, including the contemporaneous relay of information to dispatch and responding officers.

The People moved into evidence a CD containing the 911 recording, marked as People's Exhibit 1. Prior to the admission of People's Exhibit 1, the Court conducted a sidebar conference at which defense counsel lodged a timely and specific objection to both the 911 recording and the accompanying testimony. Defense counsel argued that the recording constituted hearsay and was therefore inadmissible at a felony preliminary hearing conducted pursuant to CPL § 180.60, which expressly requires that a holding determination be based upon legally sufficient evidence establishing reasonable cause and, by statute, excludes reliance on hearsay. Counsel further contended that hearsay exceptions do not alter the character of such evidence for purposes of CPL § 180.60, and that statements otherwise admissible at trial under recognized exceptions remain hearsay within the meaning of the statute governing preliminary hearings. In addition, defense counsel objected on constitutional grounds, asserting that admission of the 911 call and related testimony would violate Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause, as the declarant was not present for cross-examination and the statements were made to law enforcement personnel under circumstances that, in counsel's view, rendered them testimonial. The Court overruled these objections, permitted the People to proceed subject to further objection, and later addressed the admissibility and legal effect of the challenged evidence on the record.

The recording captured an emotionally charged and urgent exchange between the caller and the 911 operator, including statements describing a recent assault, concern for children present in the residence, uncertainty regarding the perpetrator's location, and an expressed need for medical assistance. A second female voice was also audible during the call. The People represented, and the Court clarified on the record, that the second voice was believed to be the caller's mother, who entered the room during the ongoing emergency.

The People next called Officer Gil of the Utica Police Department. Officer Gil testified that he responded to a dispatch concerning a domestic incident on Hart Street involving a report that the victim had been struck with a firearm. Upon arrival, Officer Gil encountered J.B., who identified herself by name. Officer Gil testified that J.B. had a visibly swollen right eye, redness [*3]to her face and neck, appeared agitated but coherent, and requested medical attention. Emergency medical services were summoned, and J.B. was transported to the hospital. Officer Gil testified that the alleged perpetrator was not present when he arrived, that J.B. provided a name and a description of clothing, and that he later followed J.B. to the hospital.

The People then called Investigator Williams of the Utica Police Department. Investigator Williams testified that he became involved in the investigation after receiving information of Defendant's status as a wanted person in connection with felony domestic-violence-related charges. Williams testified regarding efforts to locate Defendant, review of body-worn camera footage, investigative steps involving a cellular telephone, and receipt of information leading officers to a Hart Street address. Williams testified that Defendant ultimately exited the residence and surrendered, and he identified Defendant in court.

Finally, the People moved People's Exhibit 2 into evidence, consisting of certified medical records from MVHS documenting the victim's treatment following the incident. Defense counsel raised no objection. The People rested.

Defense Objections and Legal Arguments

The defense presented no witnesses. In summation, defense counsel argued that the People failed to establish reasonable cause and raised several evidentiary objections grounded in constitutional and evidentiary principles.

First, defense counsel argued that admission of the 911 recording and related testimony violated the Confrontation Clause, asserting that the caller's statements were testimonial under Davis v. Washington and Crawford v. Washington. Counsel contended that a reasonable person would understand the prosecution would utilize a 911 call in its case, and that the absence of the declarant for cross-examination rendered the evidence inadmissible. Counsel further argued that the presence of multiple voices on the recording created ambiguity as to who made which statements, undermining reliability and reasonable cause.

Second, defense counsel argued that the 911 operator could not recall a full description of Defendant, that the 911 call did not clearly allege strangulation, and that Officer Gil did not witness Defendant at the scene or independently identify him. Counsel emphasized that the evidence linking Defendant to the alleged injuries consisted primarily of hearsay statements and names relayed through third parties.

Third, defense counsel argued that Investigator Williams's testimony established only that Defendant was later arrested, not that Defendant committed the alleged acts, and that the People therefore failed to meet their burden even under the reasonable-cause standard applicable to a felony preliminary hearing.

People's Response

In response, the People argued that the hearing evidence satisfied the statutory standard of reasonable cause. The People contended that the victim made the 911 call during an ongoing emergency, rendering the call non-testimonial in nature. The People further contend that they offered the statement at a preliminary hearing where the evidentiary threshold is lower than at trial. The People further argued that the caller identified herself, described a recent assault, requested medical assistance, and that Officer Gil's observations as well as the medical records admitted into evidence corroborated those statements.

The People maintained that questions regarding credibility, weight of the evidence, and ultimate guilt are reserved for the grand jury and trial, and that the People need not prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt at this stage.

Court's Oral Rulings

After reviewing the exhibits and hearing arguments, the Court addressed the Confrontation Clause objection on the record, relying on Davis v. Washington and distinguishing testimonial statements from those made during an ongoing emergency. The Court found that the 911 call, viewed in its totality, reflected a contemporaneous request for emergency assistance rather than a calm narrative of past events. The Court therefore ruled that the admission of the 911 call did not transgress the Confrontation Clause and admitted the 911 recording and related testimony for purposes of the preliminary hearing.

The Court further found that, based on the totality of the evidence, the People established reasonable cause to believe that a felony had been committed and that Defendant committed that felony, and ordered Defendant held for action by the grand jury.

Legal Analysis

Purpose and Scope of a Felony Preliminary Hearing

A felony preliminary hearing constitutes a statutory screening proceeding with a limited and defined function. It exists solely to determine whether reasonable cause has been established to believe that a felony was committed and that the defendant committed it, and does not exist to adjudicate guilt, assess credibility, or resolve disputed factual issues reserved for trial (CPL §§ 180.60; 180.70; People v Hodge, 53 NY2d 313, 318 [1981]; People v Jones, 71 Misc 3d 771, 772 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2021]). The proceeding operates as a threshold safeguard against unwarranted felony prosecution while preserving the grand jury's constitutional role as the exclusive body empowered to return an indictment (Hodge, 53 NY2d at 318—320; NY Const, art I, § 6).

Reasonable cause remains the governing standard at a felony preliminary hearing, which requires proof sufficient to establish that it is reasonably likely that an offense was committed and that the defendant committed it (CPL § 180.70[1]; CPL § 70.10[2]). This standard sits substantially lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt and does not authorize the court to weigh competing inferences or determine ultimate guilt (see People v Mitchell, 38 NY3d 408, 410 [2022]; Landsman v Moss, 133 AD2d 359, 360—361 [2d Dept 1987]). When the People elect to proceed by preliminary hearing, CPL § 180.60 governs the nature and quality of the proof of reasonable cause rather than the more general reasonable cause provisions of CPL § 70.10.

Meaning of "Non-Hearsay" Under CPL § 180.60

CPL § 180.60(8) provides that "[u]pon such a [preliminary] hearing, only non-hearsay evidence is admissible to demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed a felony; except that reports of experts and technicians in professional and scientific fields of the kinds specified in subdivision two of section 190.30 are admissible to the same extent as in a grand jury proceeding." In other words, the case against the accused at a preliminary hearing must ordinarily rest on competent, direct evidence rather than mere hearsay (CPL § 180.60[8]; People v Bonilla, 74 Misc 2d 971, 971—972 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 1973]). Limited statutory exceptions permit admission of certain reliable forms of hearsay, including laboratory reports and sworn affidavits concerning ownership or consent as outlined in CPL § 190.30(2)-(3) in lieu of live testimony.

The statute, however, does not define the term "hearsay," nor does it set forth an independent evidentiary framework governing what constitutes hearsay or non-hearsay for purposes of a felony preliminary hearing (CPL § 180.60; CPL art 60; People v Fields, 74 Misc [*4]2d 109 [Dist Ct, Nassau County 1973]). That statutory silence gives rise to a fundamental interpretive question: whether, in mandating proof by "non-hearsay evidence," the Legislature intended to exclude all hearsay in every circumstance, including evidence traditionally deemed reliable and admissible under well-established exceptions, or whether it instead assumed the continued operation of those exceptions absent an express prohibition.

In the absence of a statutory definition, courts must look to common-law evidentiary principles to determine the meaning of hearsay as used in CPL § 180.60 (People v Nieves, 67 NY2d 125, 131 [1986]; People v Brown, 80 NY2d 729, 733 [1993]). Under long-settled common law, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and evidence falling within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule is deemed competent and admissible evidence (People v Brensic, 70 NY2d 9, 14 [1987]; Nucci v Proper, 95 NY2d 597, 602 [2001]). Courts treat statements admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted hearsay exception therefore, as non-hearsay for evidentiary purposes, notwithstanding their out-of-court origin (People v Brown, 80 NY2d at 733—734).

Early on, New York courts recognized some hearsay evidence as sufficiently reliable, and therefore admissible under established exceptions. In these instances courts would not treat these statements as objectionable hearsay for purposes of the CPL. In People v Fields (74 Misc 2d at 110), the court confronted directly "[w]hat is meant by 'non-hearsay'" in the statute. The court explained that hearsay may be understood in two distinct senses: hearsay in the broad sense, meaning any out-of-court statement offered for its truth, and objectionable hearsay, meaning hearsay that would be inadmissible at trial because it does not fall within any recognized exception (id.). Because business records, for example, are technically hearsay but are admissible at trial under a well-established exception, the court reasoned that such evidence must be treated as non-hearsay for purposes of statutory pleading and evidentiary requirements (id. at 113). Otherwise, the court observed, "we have the absurd result that the rules for making an information are more stringent than those applicable to criminal trials and hearings" (id.). The Fields court therefore held that "hearsay" as used in the Criminal Procedure Law must be construed to mean hearsay that would not be admissible at trial (id.). Under that construction, this court treats evidence falling within a recognized hearsay exception as non-hearsay evidence for the purposes of the CPL.

New York case law since Fields has consistently echoed this view when interpreting the "non-hearsay" requirements applicable to preliminary proceedings and accusatory instruments. For example, in People v Henry (167 Misc 2d 1027, 1029 [Dist Ct, Nassau County 1996]), the court explained that "'[h]earsay,' as that term is used under the statute, is hearsay that is not admissible at trial. Hearsay evidence that comes under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule, and as such would be admissible at trial, must be considered non-hearsay evidence." (id.). Courts therefore have not discerned any hidden or independent statutory definition of hearsay within the CPL. Instead, they apply the common-law definition and distinguish between inadmissible hearsay and hearsay falling within a recognized exception, treating the latter as non-hearsay for statutory purposes.

This understanding does not offend New York practice in closely analogous statutory contexts, including the rules governing the facial sufficiency of accusatory instruments. CPL §§ 100.15 and 100.40 require that an information contain non-hearsay allegations establishing every element of the offense, yet courts have long held that allegations based on recognized hearsay exceptions satisfy that requirement (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 361 [2000]; People v [*5]Belcher, 302 NY 529, 533—534 [1951]).

Applying a different construction to CPL § 180.60 would produce the same anomalous and illogical result, namely that it would hold the People to a stricter evidentiary standard at a preliminary hearing than at trial itself. Nothing in the text or history of CPL § 180.60 suggests a legislative intent to exclude competent and admissible evidence under settled common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the statutory requirement that the People establish reasonable cause by non-hearsay evidence at a felony preliminary hearing must permit the use of evidence admissible under recognized hearsay exceptions, consistent with common-law principles and parallel statutory schemes (People v Casey, 95 NY2d at 361).

The Confrontation Clause

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution provides a coextensive right of confrontation (see People v Bradley, 8 NY3d 124, 126 [2006]). When the People seek to introduce out-of-court statements offered for their truth against a defendant, this implicates the Confrontation Clause.

The modern framework governing confrontation analysis derives from Crawford v Washington (541 US 36 [2004]). There, the Supreme Court rejected the prior reliability-based approach of Ohio v Roberts (448 US 56 [1980]) and held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission at trial of testimonial hearsay unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination (Crawford, 541 US at 53—54). Reliability, standing alone, does not inaugurate admissibility. If a statement is testimonial, the constitutional inquiry is dispositive. If it is not testimonial, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated, and admissibility is governed solely by ordinary evidentiary rules (id. at 68).

Although Crawford did not comprehensively define "testimonial," it identified a core class of statements falling within that category, including prior testimony at preliminary hearings, grand jury proceedings, or trials, and statements made during police interrogations (id. at 51—52). Formality and purpose sit as the common feature of such statements. Such statements exist under circumstances objectively indicating an intention to establish or prove past events for possible use in a criminal prosecution. By contrast, casual remarks or statements made for purposes other than evidence gathering are not testimonial (id. at 51).

The Supreme Court refined this distinction in Davis v Washington (547 US 813 [2006]), and its companion case Hammon v Indiana. There, the Court articulated the "primary purpose" test: statements are nontestimonial when made under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the questioning is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. Statements are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no ongoing emergency and that the primary purpose of the questioning is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution (Davis, 547 US at 822).

Applying that test, the Court held that statements made during an active 911 call seeking immediate assistance amounted to non-testimony, while statements made to responding officers after the scene had stabilized, for the purpose of investigating a completed crime, do amount to testimony (id. at 828—830). The determination of an emergency depends on a factual inquiry informed by the nature of the threat, the timing of the statements, and the informality of the interaction.

The New York Court of Appeals has expressly adopted the Crawford and Davis framework. In People v Bradley (8 NY3d 124 [2006]), the Court held that statements made by a [*6]visibly injured domestic violence victim to a responding police officer were nontestimonial, notwithstanding that the declarant did not testify at trial. The Court reasoned that the officer asked, "what happened," in the context of an apparent ongoing emergency, and that the officer primarily sought to secure the victim's safety and assess the immediate situation, not to gather evidence for prosecution (id. at 128—129). As the Court emphasized, "[t]he admission of a statement made out of court does not violate a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights unless the statement is testimonial" (id. at 126).

The Supreme Court further clarified the scope of the "ongoing emergency" concept in Michigan v Bryant (562 US 344 [2011]). There, the Court held statements made by a mortally wounded shooting victim identifying the shooter nontestimonial because it deemed the primary purpose of the interaction as an attempt to address an ongoing threat to public safety posed by an armed assailant at large (id. at 370—378). The Court stressed that confrontation analysis must consider the combined perspectives of both the declarant and the questioner, viewed objectively, and that emergencies may extend beyond the immediate moment of injury (id. at 367—369).

Finally, it bears emphasis that the right of confrontation fundamentally exists as a trial right. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for cross-examination at trial, not at every stage of a criminal proceeding (see Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 480 US 39, 52—53 [1987]). Felony preliminary hearings provide a limited, pretrial screening proceeding focused solely on reasonable cause. The Constitution does not bestow full confrontation rights at that stage. Accordingly, even where defense counsel raises a confrontation objection at a preliminary hearing, the constitutional inquiry remains whether the challenged statement would be testimonial if offered at trial. Admission of nontestimonial statements under Crawford and its progeny do not violate the Confrontation Clause, and its use at a preliminary hearing does not offend constitutional principles.

The Court of Appeals further applied the Crawford and Davis framework in People v Nieves-Andino, 9 NY3d 12 (2007), a case that also addressed the interaction between confrontation principles and the excited utterance exception. There, police officers arrived within minutes of a street shooting and encountered the victim lying on the ground, bleeding and in obvious distress, with a small crowd gathered nearby. After summoning an ambulance, an officer asked the victim for basic pedigree information and then asked what had happened. The victim stated that he had argued with a man known as "Bori," who had shot him, and provided the assailant's address. The victim later died, and the statements were admitted at trial as excited utterances.

The defendant argued that the court should deem the victim's identification as testimonial, and therefore barred by the Confrontation Clause, because the assailant had fled, any emergency had ended. The Court of Appeals rejected that contention. Relying on Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 (2004), and Davis v Washington, 547 US 813 (2006), the Court reiterated that the admission of an out-of-court statement violates the Confrontation Clause only if the statement had a testimonial purpose, and that whether police direct questioning toward an ongoing emergency requires a fact-specific inquiry evaluated objectively (Nieves-Andino, 9 NY3d at 15—16).

Applying that standard, the Court held that the officer engaged in brief questioning for the primary purpose of assessing and responding to an ongoing emergency. Although the assailant had fled, the officer could not know whether the threat had abated. The shooting had occurred moments earlier, the shooter's whereabouts were unknown, the victim was gravely [*7]wounded, and bystanders lingered in the immediate vicinity. Under those circumstances, the officer's limited inquiries into what had occurred and who had perpetrated the crime were reasonably aimed at determining the nature of the danger and what necessary action, if any, could prevent further harm (id. at 16).

The Court further concluded that the statements were properly admitted as excited utterances. The victim had suffered multiple gunshot wounds, loss of blood, severe pain, and spoke in a low voice shortly after the incident. The victim spoke under the stress of a startling event and occurred before the victim had an opportunity for reflection or fabrication, satisfying the requirements of the excited utterance exception (id. at 14—15; see also People v Edwards, 47 NY2d 493, 497 [1979]). The Court made clear, however, that satisfaction of a hearsay exception does not resolve the constitutional inquiry. Rather, the excited utterance analysis and the confrontation analysis are distinct, and the statements were admissible because they were both nontestimonial and within a recognized hearsay exception (Nieves-Andino, 9 NY3d at 15—17).

The Court emphasized that an emergency does not necessarily end simply because the assailant has fled. Even in such circumstances, police questioning may objectively reflect an effort to resolve a continuing threat rather than to establish past events for later prosecution (id. at 15—16). While police questioning may evolve over time into investigative fact-gathering, statements testimonial, the record in Nieves-Andino did not support such a transition during the brief exchange at issue (id. at 17).

Read together with People v Bradley, 8 NY3d 124 (2006), Nieves-Andino confirms that prompt statements made by a victim to responding officers identifying an assailant can amount to nontestimonial statements where the objective circumstances indicate that law enforcement inquires for the primary purpose of assessing and addressing an ongoing emergency. Where, as here, an individual makes statements under the stress of a startling event, courts may admit those statements as excited utterances while not insulting the Confrontation Clause.

Application

Applying the foregoing principles to the record developed at the November 3, 2025 felony preliminary hearing, the Court further explains in this Supplemental Decision that it properly considered the challenged evidence in determining whether the People established reasonable cause pursuant to CPL § 180.60.

First, the Court rejects the defense contention that the 911 call and related testimony amounted to categorically inadmissible as hearsay at a felony preliminary hearing. As discussed above, the statutory requirement that the People establish reasonable cause by "non-hearsay evidence" does not impose a rigid exclusion of all out-of-court statements regardless of context or reliability. Rather, the term "hearsay" in CPL § 180.60 is properly understood to mean objectionable hearsay, that is, statements that would be inadmissible at trial because they do not fall within a recognized exception. Statements admissible under firmly rooted common-law exceptions are treated as competent, non-hearsay evidence for purposes of the Criminal Procedure Law. Nothing in the text, structure, or history of CPL § 180.60 suggests a legislative intent to exclude evidence that New York courts have long deemed sufficiently reliable to pass the evidence admission gates at trial.

Here, the statements contained in the 911 recording plainly satisfy the excited utterance exception. The evidence established that the victim initiated the call contemporaneously with, or immediately following, a startling and violent event. The caller reported that she had just suffered a firearm-involved assault in the presence of children, and that she required medical [*8]assistance. The recorded call revealed an audibly frantic and distressed victim who made statements before any opportunity for reflection, deliberation, or fabrication. The emotional tone of the call, the urgency of the requests for help, and the temporal proximity to the alleged assault all demonstrate a distressed declarant under the stress of the startling event when she uttered the statements. Under settled New York law, those circumstances establish an excited utterance. As such, the court properly admitted the statements under a recognized hearsay exception and therefore constituted competent, non-hearsay evidence for purposes of CPL § 180.60.

Second, the defense argument that admission of the 911 call violated the Confrontation Clause is unavailing. As an initial matter, the right of confrontation exists as a fundamental trial right, and felony preliminary hearings exist to provide limited, statutory screening proceeding focused solely on reasonable cause.

Third, assuming, arguendo, that confrontation principles applied with full force at a felony preliminary hearing, and even assuming further that the statements triggered constitutional inquiry, the result remains the same. Because the statements at issue were non-testimonial, their admission would not violate the Confrontation Clause under either the Federal or State Constitution. The absence of the declarant for cross-examination therefore did not bar the Court from considering the statements for purposes of the reasonable-cause determination.

Viewed objectively and in their totality, the court found the statements made during the 911 call non-testimonial. The caller and the 911 operator mutually sought to enable emergency assistance to address an ongoing and potentially dangerous situation. The caller reported an immediate threat involving a firearm, uncertainty as to the assailant's location, concern for children, and a need for medical help. The 911 operator directed informal, rapid questioning toward assessing the nature of the emergency and dispatching appropriate assistance, not toward creating a formal record of past events for later prosecution. Under the framework articulated in Crawford, Davis, and their progeny, statements made under such circumstances constitute paradigmatic examples of non-testimonial statements.

The physical absence of the assailant at the scene at the moment of the call does not alter this conclusion. An emergency does not end simply because an assailant has fled. At the time of the call, the victim did not know the whereabouts of an allegedly armed individual, the victim had sustained injuries, suffered distress, and no one involved could eliminate the risk of further harm. Objectively viewed, the call exchange aimed at resolving an ongoing emergency rather than establishing facts for evidentiary use at a later trial. Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause had no role to play by the admission or consideration of the 911 recording.

Finally, the Court notes that it did not consider the challenged evidence in isolation. Testimony of the responding officer who observed visible injuries consistent with an assault, the victim's demeanor, and her request for medical treatment, as well as certified medical records documenting treatment shortly after the incident corroborated the 911 call. At a felony preliminary hearing, the Court does not seek to resolve credibility disputes, reconcile inconsistencies, or determine ultimate guilt. The Court's limits its role to assessing whether the evidence, viewed as a whole, establishes reasonable cause to believe that a felony was committed and that the defendant committed it.

Accordingly, as set forth on the record on November 3, 2025, the Court overruled the evidentiary objections, considered the challenged evidence for the limited purpose permitted at a felony preliminary hearing, and ordered Defendant held for action by the grand jury.

This writing supplements the oral ruling placed on the record on November 3, 2025.

HON. F. Christopher Giruzzi

CITY COURT JUDGE

Dated: March 12, 2026