Justice Court of the Town of Patterson, Putnam County

Decided on April 15, 2026

Docket No. XXXXX

Michael V. Caruso, J.

[*1]

The Court considered the following submissions regarding Defendant's omnibus motion pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30(1)(a), 170.35(1)(a), and 100.40 to dismiss the accusatory instrument herein:

1. Affirmation of Joseph Rizzo, Esq. in support of motion, dated January 30, 2026 with exhibits;

2. Affirmation of Andres Gil, Esq. in opposition, dated February 25, 2026 with exhibits; and

3. Reply affirmation of Joseph Rizzo, Esq., dated March 6, 2026.

For the reasons set forth herein Defendant's motion is denied.

A. The nature of the applications before the Court

By omnibus motion, Defendant principally seeks dismissal of the accusatory instrument on the grounds of facial insufficiency pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30(1)(a), 170.35(1)(a), and 100.40. The motion argues that the Information fails to contain non-hearsay factual allegations establishing each element of Harassment in the Second Degree under Penal Law § 240.26(3), particularly the required "course of conduct" element. Defendant contends that the allegations describe, at most, isolated or conclusory incidents insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate repeated acts or the requisite intent to harass, annoy, or alarm. The motion further asserts that the accusatory instrument improperly relies on generalized or unsupported claims, failing to meet the "four corners" pleading standard mandated by controlling case law.

Defendant additionally argues that the charges are impermissibly predicated, in part, on conduct attributable to third parties rather than defendant personally, in contravention of Penal Law § 20.00. The motion maintains that there are no factual allegations establishing accomplice liability or any concerted action, and thus any attempt to impute liability based on the acts of others is legally defective. Further, Defendant seeks to preclude the introduction of "other acts" evidence including remote or unrelated neighbor complaints, on the grounds that such material [*2]would constitute improper propensity evidence under People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), and would be unduly prejudicial. The motion also challenges the admissibility of videos or recordings absent proper authentication or foundation.

Alternatively, Defendant seeks dismissal in the interest of justice pursuant to CPL § 170.40, arguing that the matter represents a non-criminal, neighbor-based dispute that does not warrant prosecution. The motion invokes relevant factors, including the nature of the allegations, the absence of demonstrable harm, and broader fairness considerations, to contend that continued prosecution would serve no legitimate penal purpose. Defendant further raises constitutional concerns, asserting that to the extent the allegations involve speech or expressive conduct, such conduct may be protected under the First Amendment absent true threats or unlawful behavior.

Finally, Defendant seeks ancillary relief, including enforcement of discovery obligations under CPL Article 245, preclusion of improperly disclosed evidence, and vacatur or modification of the Temporary Order of Protection issued in the case. The motion argues that the existing order is overly broad and unsupported by the factual record, particularly with respect to any firearms surrender provisions. In summary, Defendant requests that the Court grant dismissal or, alternatively, limit the scope of the prosecution and evidentiary record while modifying interim restraints pending resolution of the matter.

In opposition, the People argue the Information charging Defendant with Harassment in the Second Degree is facially sufficient within the meaning of CPL §§ 100.15 and 100.40(1). The People further argue the accusatory instrument sets forth non-hearsay factual allegations of an evidentiary character establishing each element of the offense and Defendant's commission thereof. Specifically, the Information identifies the complainant, the date, time, and location of the incident, and describes Defendant's conduct in a manner sufficient to demonstrate the requisite intent to harass, annoy, or alarm. The People further assert that the allegations provide adequate notice to Defendant to prepare a defense.

The People additionally oppose Defendant's remaining requests for suppression and preclusion, arguing that such relief is either premature or unsupported by sworn allegations of fact. With respect to suppression of statements, the People maintain that they have provided appropriate notice pursuant to CPL § 710.30, and that Defendant has failed to allege a sufficient factual basis to warrant suppression as a matter of law. Instead, the People consent only to the extent of a Huntley hearing to determine the voluntariness of any statements, if the Court deems such a hearing appropriate. Similarly, as to any identification procedures, the People contend that there has been no improper police-arranged identification requiring suppression, but consent, in an abundance of caution, to a Wade hearing,^FN1 if necessary.

With respect to discovery and inspection, the People assert that they have complied with their obligations under CPL Article 245 and will continue to do so, rendering many of Defendant's demands moot or academic. The People further oppose any request for a bill of particulars beyond that which is required by statute, maintaining that the Information itself provides sufficient detail as to the charges. To the extent Defendant seeks broader relief, including dismissal in the interest of justice or preclusion of evidence, the People argue that such requests are unsupported by the record, lack a legal basis, and should be denied. Accordingly, [*3]the People request that defendant's omnibus motion be denied in all respects, except for such limited relief as the Court may grant in its discretion with respect to hearings.

B. Procedural history

This prosecution was commenced by the filing of an information sworn to on June 20, 2025, and filed with the Court on July 11, 2025. The accusatory instrument charged Defendant with Harassment in the Second Degree in violation of Penal Law § 240.26(3), which is a violation.

The complainant alleges, based upon personal knowledge, that on May 30, 2025, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Defendant stopped her vehicle in front of the complainant's driveway and played music at an excessive volume, causing annoyance and alarm. The complainant further alleges that the music included the phrase "it's the sound of the police," and that this conduct, as a whole, was undertaken in response to the complainant's prior report to law enforcement concerning Defendant's alleged excessive noise. According to the information, Defendant then backed up her vehicle and shouted to the complainant, "Why don't you call them [the police] for me being too loud."

The information is supported by a supporting deposition, sworn under penalty of perjury on June 20, 2025, and filed on July 11, 2025, which describes additional conduct. The supporting deposition alleges that on May 29, 2025, an individual identified as "Frank" drove past the complainant's residence and shouted vulgar and offensive language, including "Fucking faggot!" It further alleges that, later that same day, the same individual parked his vehicle in the roadway, thereby obstructing the complainant's wife from operating her vehicle, while staring at her and her daughter.

The supporting deposition further alleges that on May 30, 2025, the same individual again drove past the complainant's residence, shouting additional vulgar and offensive remarks, including "Gay fuck," directed at the complainant. It is also alleged that Defendant engaged in a course of conduct over a time period, including parking her vehicle conspicuously near the complainant's residence for extended periods with the windows down while playing loud music, specifically the song "Sound of da Police" by KRS-One, and operating her vehicle at excessive speeds along the roadway. The deposition further alleges that Defendant repeated the conduct described in the information, including stopping near the complainant's driveway and shouting, "Why don't you tell them I'm being a little loud," thereby indicating that such conduct had occurred on prior occasions.

C. Discussion

In determining whether the accusatory instruments are legally sufficient for purposes of this omnibus motion, the Court is guided by CPL § 100.40, which requires that an information contain nonhearsay allegations of fact that, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and Defendant's committing them. When assessing the facial sufficiency of an accusatory instrument, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the People. People v Bender, 14 Misc 3d 1223A (Crim Ct, New York Cty 2007), citing, People v Gonzalez, 184 Misc 2d 262 (App. Term 1st Dep't 2000). Further, the Court must accept the factual allegations as true and determine whether they provide reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed the offenses charged, while also ensuring that the allegations are sufficiently evidentiary in character to support a prima facie case. Certain facts may be inferred circumstantially from the allegations in the instrument, provided "common human experience" would permit a reasonable person to accept such inference. People v Reyes, 126 Misc 2d 399, 400 (Crim Ct, New York [*4]Cty. 1984), citing, People v Borrero, 26 NY2d 430 (1970). On a motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency, the court's review is limited to whether or not the People's allegations, as stated in the accusatory instrument(s) and any supporting depositions, establish the existence of a prima facie case, even if those facts would not be legally sufficient to prove guilt. People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677 (1999); People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103 (1986).

Applying these standards, and viewing the allegations in their totality, the Court finds that the accusatory instruments met the minimum requirements to sustain the charges of Harassment in the Second Degree under Penal Law § 240.26(3) and are, therefore, legally sufficient. The factual allegations set forth a repeated course of conduct involving Defendant's use of a motor vehicle, at times in concert with others acting on her behalf, in a manner designed to intimidate, harass, and cause fear and apprehension to the complainant. An individual does not need to repeatedly commit acts to be found guilty under this subsection, however, there still must be a "pattern of behavior" in relation to a complainant. People v. Tralli, 88 Misc 2d 117 (App. Term 2nd Dep't 1976). Critically, the accusatory instruments must evidence "a continuity of purpose." People v. Todd, 57 Misc 3d 157(A)(App. Term 2nd Dep't 2017), quoting, People v. Payton, 161 Misc 2d 170, 174 (Kings Cty. Crim. Court, 1994). Here, the accusatory instruments describe multiple incidents in which Defendant allegedly drove near the complainant's residence, shouted offensive and threatening remarks, and played loud music from the vehicle. Taken together, these allegations establish a sufficient continuity of purpose, as Defendant is alleged to have engaged in highly similar, repeated conduct directed at the complainant. In other words, the accusatory instruments set forth detailed facts demonstrating that Defendant acted with a consistent objective: to harass, annoy, and alarm the complainant in close proximity to his residence, a location where he is entitled to reasonably expect freedom from harassment and intimidation.

The Court is mindful that the playing of music constitutes artistic expression protected by the First Amendment, and it is not the function of this Court to adjudicate the expressive value or viewpoint of a particular musical work. The song at issue, which neither of the parties dispute, is "Sound of da Police" by KRS-One. This song, like countless others, is widely recognized as a form of constitutionally protected political expression, employing metaphor, hyperbole, and socio-political critique. Accordingly, the lyrics themselves are not to be construed as literal threats in the absence of contextual evidence demonstrating such intent. The Court will not construe them as such on this application.

However, the protections afforded to expressive content do not preclude the Court from considering the manner, context, and surrounding circumstances in which such expression is allegedly used relative to the parties herein. Thus, the inquiry at this stage is not whether the song and musical, more generally, is protected in the abstract, but whether its repeated use, in conjunction with other alleged conduct, forms a factual basis sufficient to establish the elements of the charged offenses. The Court finds that it does.

Here, the accusatory instruments allege that Defendant, on multiple occasions, played the KRS-One song entitled "Sound of da Police" at a high and disruptive volume from her vehicle while simultaneously directing offensive, suggestive, and threatening remarks toward the complainant near the complainant's home. While the playing of music alone would not suffice to establish criminal liability, the allegations, taken together, describe a pattern of conduct that may reasonably be interpreted as intended to alarm, annoy, threaten, or harass.

The Court takes judicial notice of the recording "Sound of da Police" by KRS-One [*5](1993), a widely distributed hip-hop song.^FN2 The work features a forceful vocal delivery, repetitive chant elements, and a pronounced rhythmic beat that distinguish it from more subdued or conventionally "soothing" musical genres such as, for example, classical music or certain modes of jazz. For example, the refrain "woop woop, that's the sound of da police" is delivered in a loud, attention-commanding manner in the song. The Court makes this reference not to evaluate the speech, lyrics, or song itself, but to assess how a reasonable listener might perceive its volume, tone, and expressive content. Accepting the allegations of the accusatory instrument as true and according them every favorable inference, the Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the use or playing of such a recording, especially given its emphatic and high-energy auditory qualities, would be incapable of producing the type of reaction or effects on the complainant as alleged by the People. To the contrary, the obvious and observable features of the song recording, of which the Court takes judicial notice only as to their existence and content, tend to support the allegations and render them facially plausible rather than inherently incredible or unsupportable as a matter of law.^FN3 Whether the recording was in fact played at the volume, in the manner, or under the circumstances as alleged, and whether it had the effect attributed to it on the complaint, are factual questions ultimately to be resolved on trial and not on this motion.

Accordingly, the Court declines to treat the nature of the song and recording as dispositive in Defendants' favor at the pleading stage. Rather, it provides contextual support for the sufficiency of the allegations when viewed under the governing legal standard at this juncture in the case.

The Court further recognizes that hip hop and rap music as a genre often employs figurative and exaggerated language, and should not be interpreted literally without the appropriate context. Nevertheless, the Court may take notice that the song at issue is forceful and confrontational in tone, such that, when repeatedly amplified and directed toward a specific individual in conjunction with alleged verbal confrontations and targeted presence when using a motor vehicle, it may plausibly contribute to an atmosphere of intimidation and apprehension.

Thus, it is not the content of the song itself, but the contextualized use of that content, that is relevant to the sufficiency analysis under CPL § 100.40. The repeated playing of loud, confrontational music, coupled with the alleged operation of a vehicle very close to the complainant's residence and the simultaneous use of offensive and threatening language, provides nonhearsay factual allegations of an evidentiary nature sufficient to support the inference of a course of conduct directed at the complainant. Defendant's reply argument (i.e., that the accusatory instruments are deficient for referencing repeated play of the same song [*6]without "factual details regarding when any prior incident allegedly occurred, how many times it occurred, or the circumstances surrounding such conduct") is unavailing. The accusatory instruments do not rely solely on generalized allegations of repeated conduct. Rather, they identify specific actions occurring on May 29, 2025, as distinct from the May 30, 2025 incident, involving similar conduct with the same apparent purpose. The May 29th allegations describe similar categories of conduct including yelling obscenities and blocking the complainant's wife's ingress and egress at her home while Defendant, or someone acting at her direction, operated a motor vehicle. From these allegations, the Court can plausibly infer a continuity of conduct across both dates as alleged.

Thus, accepting the allegations as true and affording them the reasonable inferences to which they are entitled, the Court finds that the People have met their burden under CPL § 100.40 by sufficiently alleging facts establishing every element of the charged offenses and facts that could plausibly support Defendant committing them. The accusatory instruments are therefore facially sufficient, and the matter may proceed.

In addition to seeking dismissal, Defendant raises several ancillary issues relating to discovery and potential evidentiary matters, including references to Wade and Molineux-type hearings. Those issues, however, are not properly before the Court on this motion. To the extent Defendant seeks relief concerning discovery disputes or pretrial evidentiary determinations, such requests are denied without prejudice as premature. The parties remain free to pursue appropriate discovery-related remedies and to make such applications for pretrial hearings as may be warranted in due course. The Court declines to rule at this juncture on the availability or scope of any such relief. Nothing in this Decision and Order shall be construed as precluding Defendant from seeking appropriate pretrial relief including discovery remedies or evidentiary hearings, upon proper application.

In view of the foregoing, Defendant's motion is, in all respects, denied. The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to enter this Decision and Order in the Court's records and serve the parties in accordance herewith.

Dated: April 15, 2026

Patterson, New York

ENTER:

HON. MICHAEL. V. CARUSO

Patterson Town Justice