Supreme Court, Albany County

Decided on January 21, 2026

Index No. 904390-25

Thomas Marcelle, J.^FN1

[*1]

Petitioner seeks to employ the Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law § 87) to obtain certain tax records. Respondent, the Department of Taxation and Finance, resists disclosure. It contends that, notwithstanding FOIL's broad mandate of transparency, tax information remains secret because of the highly sensitive financial data that taxpayers are compelled to provide to the government. There is no serious dispute that tax returns contain proprietary information.^FN2 Yet FOIL commands that government records are open for inspection unless the Legislature has affirmatively shielded them from public view. The question presented is therefore narrow but consequential: has the Legislature exempted from FOIL the tax records that petitioner now seeks?

This dispute did not arise in a vacuum. Petitioner's request is the outgrowth of an ongoing conflict between Global Companies LLC (Global) and the Department of Taxation and Finance (Department). The Department has alleged that Global, a distributor of diesel and motor vehicle fuel, owes more than nine million dollars in unpaid taxes. Global is entitled to contest that determination through administrative and judicial processes, and it vigorously does so.

Global explains that the Department calculated the alleged deficiency by reviewing the [*2]tax returns of third-party companies that purchased fuel from Global. By comparing those purchasers' reported volumes with Global's own filings, the Department concluded that certain petroleum, motor fuel, and diesel taxes had not been paid. During the dispute-resolution process, Global asked the Department to show its work—specifically, to disclose the third-party return information that formed the basis of the calculation. The Department refused, citing statutory secrecy provisions. Petitioner now seeks those same third-party tax records through FOIL.

The returns at issue arise under two distinct articles of the Tax Law. Article 12-A imposes an excise tax on gasoline, diesel motor fuel, and related products when such fuel is produced in or imported into New York, and when diesel fuel is first sold or used in the State. It also imposes a petroleum testing fee. Article 13-A, by contrast, taxes petroleum businesses for the privilege of operating in New York through a cents-per-gallon levy on petroleum products sold or used in the State. Article 13-A reaches refiners, importers, and sellers and applies to certain products not taxed under Article 12-A. Although the two articles address overlapping subject matter, they are not textually identical.

Beginning with first principles, FOIL embodies a sweeping policy of governmental transparency. It "promote[s] open government and public accountability" and imposes a broad duty to make records available to the public; access does not depend upon the requester's purpose (Matter of Gould v New York City Police Dept., 89 NY2d 267, 274 [1996]). All records are therefore presumptively available unless the agency demonstrates that the material "falls squarely within the ambit" of a statutory exemption (Newsday LLC v New York State Educ. Dept., — AD3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op. 06775, *2 [3d Dept 2025]). Exemptions must be narrowly construed (see id.; Reclaim the Recs. v New York State Dept. of Health, — NY3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 03102, *4).

Against this backdrop, the Department asserts that the requested documents are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (see Public Officers Law § 87[2][a]). It relies upon Tax Law § 314(a), which makes it unlawful for any tax commissioner "to divulge or make known in any manner the amount of income or gross receipts or any particulars set forth or disclosed in any return under [Article 13-A]." The statute speaks in mandatory and unequivocal terms.

From this, one proposition is plain: Tax Law § 314(a) bars disclosure of tax records generated under Article 13-A. The section, however, is silent as to Article 12-A. This silence carries dispositive significance in the eyes of the petitioner. Since Article 12-A and Article 13-A govern different commercial activity,^FN3 the two taxes are distinct. The Legislature separated them, and they must be treated separately. Consequently, petitioner argues that since Public Officers Law § 87(2)(a) only allows an agency to deny access to records specifically exempt from disclosure by statute, given that Article 12-A return information is untouched by any secrecy clause, information procured under Article 12-A remains subject to FOIL's presumption of openness. The argument has force.

The Department offers a substantial rebuttal. It notes, and correctly so, that Articles 12-A and 13-A are administered jointly (see Tax Law § 315[b]). Distributors report liabilities under [*3]both articles on a single monthly form—the PT-100—which is created pursuant to Article 13-A. Because the form is mandated under Article 13-A, the Department maintains that the entirety of its contents falls within Tax Law § 314(a), even if some information originates from Article 12-A obligations. The administration of the tax law occurs under the auspices of Article 13-A, so information gained by the administration under Article 13-A is protected under Tax Law § 314(a). That, too, is a powerful argument.

This is a close case. Yet, the governing principles are impeccably plain: (1) all records are presumptively available for public inspection (New York Civ. Liberties Union v City of Rochester, 43 NY3d 543, 548 [2025]); and (2) statutory exemptions to that general rule must be narrowly construed (id.; Hassig v New York State Dept. of Health, 294 AD2d 781, 782 [3d Dept 2002]). Narrow construction means at least this much—a secrecy provision must be explicit rather than implicit to defeat a FOIL claim, and that is the ultimate issue in this case.

Here, the Legislature chose to shield tax information generated under Article 13-A and chose not to do so in Article 12-A. If Article 12-A information becomes confidential because it is administered jointly with Article 13-A, then the court would be extending § 314(a) beyond its text—which would be an anathema to the narrow construction of FOIL exemptions required by both the Third Department and Court of Appeals. The court may neither imply, enlarge, nor graft Article 13-A's secrecy provision onto Article 12-A records. Respect for legislative choice requires restraint.

Finally, the Executive branch, like the Judicial branch, may not enlarge the amount of information concealed from public inspection in the face of statutory silence. Although the court need not defer to the Department, the Department's interpretation is legitimate and reasonable (see, e.g., County of Suffolk v First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F3d 179, 191 [2d Cir 2001] [ concluding "New York courts [are] not [] required to defer to [an agency's] opinion, and indeed, [are] required to analyze independently both FOIL and any conflicts FOIL might raise . . . .").

Moreover, the Department's motives are pure, and the court has no doubt it seeks to protect taxpayers for good reasons. As a matter of policy, the court would concur with the Department's interpretation. However, just as statutory interpretation is left to the courts, public policy is left to the wisdom of the Legislature and its wisdom, once exercised (even by silence), is beyond disruption, including disruption by addition. In sum, it is for the Legislature and the Legislature alone to determine what is to be withheld from public inspection.

Therefore, under the doctrine that secrecy exemptions denying access to government information are to be narrowly construed, the court concludes that Tax Law § 314(a) does not apply to records reflecting taxes levied under Article 12-A.

There still exists one practical problem—the tax forms contain both privileged and disclosable information. Petitioner says that presents no issue for disclosure; the Department can redact any privileged information. This may not be an easy feat. Taxation under Article 12-A is derived from the total gallons of motor fuel subject to tax and whether tax has previously been paid on those gallons. Article 13-A, by contrast, allocates those gallons into categories bearing different rates. The court is most assuredly incapable of divining which information applies to which tax (or if it even can be done). Consequently, the court, after an in camera review, directs the Department to make the appropriate redaction to the following privilege log pages: 185-214; 242; 254-290; and 318-340.

Finally, petitioner asks the court to release other records that the Department claims to be non-final intra-agency communications, reports, and drafts, and therefore exempt under Public [*4]Officers Law 87(2)(g). The court conducted an in camera review of the documents that the Department claims are exempt under this section. It finds that all pages definitively fall into this exempt category except pages 1-9. The Department may disclose these pages or submit an ex parte explanation why these emails are exempt. Either disclosure or submission shall be made within 20 days of this decision.

For the foregoing reasons, it is therefore,

ORDERED that the petition is granted to the extent that Tax Law § 314(a) does not exempt from disclosure records reflecting taxes owed under Article 12-A of the Tax Law; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondent NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE shall, consistent with this Decision and Order, redact the documents identified on the privilege log pages 185—214, 242, 254—290, and 318—340 to withhold only information protected by Tax Law § 314(a); and it is further

ORDERED that, with respect to records withheld pursuant to Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g), Respondent shall disclose privilege log pages 1—9, unless within twenty (20) days of this Decision and Order Respondent submits to the court, ex parte, a written explanation demonstrating why those pages are exempt from disclosure; and it is further

ORDERED that, in light of the privacy interests implicated and to permit appellate review, disclosure of all records subject to this Decision and Order is stayed for a period of thirty (30) days from service of this Decision and Order with notice of entry; and it is further

ORDERED that, if no notice of appeal is filed within the stay period, Respondent shall disclose the required redacted records within twenty (20) days after the expiration of the stay.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.

DATED: January 21, 2026

Thomas Marcelle

Supreme Court Justice