Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on March 19, 2026

Docket No. CR- 006112-26NY

Kacie A. Lally, J.

[*1]

Defendant David Thami moves to reargue the Court's decision to set increased monetary bail following the Defendant's arraignment on a Superseding Information ("SSI"). For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's motion is denied.

I. Procedural History

a. The Underlying Case

On February 8, 2025, the Defendant was arraigned on charges of Menacing in the Second Degree (PL § 120.14 [1]), Unlawful Imprisonment in the Second Degree (PL § 135.05), Coercion in the Third Degree (PL § 135.60 [1]), and Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26 [1]) (Docket CR-004376-25NY, hereinafter the "Underlying Case"). The underlying accusatory instrument alleges that the Defendant physically prevented the complainant, his spouse Carmin Thami, from leaving her apartment by pointing a knife at her and stating, "if anyone comes to the door, I will kill you." At arraignment, the arraignment judge issued a full temporary order of protection in favor of the complainant (the "Underlying TOP"), which remained in effect until August 9, 2025. The arraignment judge released the Defendant on his own recognizance and adjourned the case to March 10, 2025, for the People to obtain a supporting deposition.

On March 10, 2025, the Defendant appeared in court. The People filed and served a supporting deposition, and the case was adjourned to April 10, 2025, for trial.

In the interim, on March 27, 2025, the complainant filed a police report in the New York City Police Department's 20th Precinct. The police report alleged that between March 23, 2025, and March 27, 2025, the Defendant had sent the complainant approximately 26 emails, in [*2]violation of the Underlying TOP.

On April 10, 2025, the Defendant did not appear in court. According to the People, the Defendant had absconded from the court's jurisdiction and had fled to Brazil. The People informed the presiding judge that the Defendant had repeatedly contacted the complainant, in violation of the Underlying TOP. The presiding judge ordered, but stayed, issuance of a bench warrant, and adjourned the case to April 15, 2025, for the Defendant to appear.

On April 14, 2025, the day before the scheduled court date, defense counsel confirmed to the court that the Defendant was located in Brazil. Counsel requested that the case be adjourned to April 16, 2025, for the Defendant to appear. Defense counsel did not request, and the presiding judge did not authorize, a virtual appearance by the Defendant.

On April 16, 2025, the Defendant appeared in court virtually via Microsoft Teams, without the presiding judge's approval. Defense counsel stated that it was financially impossible for the Defendant to fly to New York to appear in court. The presiding judge issued a bench warrant and directed that the warrant would not be vacated unless the Defendant appeared in court in person.

Almost one year later, on February 26, 2026, the Defendant re-entered the United States from Brazil. He was detained by Port Authority Police at John F. Kennedy International Airport ("JFK Airport"). The Defendant was then arrested pursuant to the bench warrant issued in the Underlying Case, as well as the March 27, 2025 police report that the complainant had filed with the NYPD. The Defendant was returned to court on February 27, 2026 by the NYPD. The bench warrant was vacated in the Underlying Case; that case remains pending.

b. The Instant Case

Upon the Defendant's arrest at JFK Airport on February 26, 2026, the People attempted to contact the complainant regarding the March 27, 2025 police report that she had filed. The People were unable to reach the complainant between the Defendant's arrest on February 26, 2026, and his arraignment the next day, on February 27, 2026. Accordingly, on February 27, 2026, the People filed a misdemeanor complaint charging the Defendant with 26 counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (PL §215.50 [3]) (Docket CR-0016112-26NY, hereinafter the "Instant Case"), alleging that between March 25, 2025 and April 1, 2025, the Defendant had sent 26 emails to the complainant, in violation of the Underlying TOP. The factual allegations in this complaint were based upon the arresting officer's review of bodyworn camera footage from the complainant's March 27, 2025 police report.

The Defendant was arraigned on the Instant Case on February 27, 2026. At arraignment, the People requested monetary bail in the amount of $25,000 cash, $25,000 insurance company bond, or $25,000 partially secured bond.^FN1 After hearing argument from both parties, the arraignment judge set monetary bail in the amount of $5,000 cash, $10,000 insurance company bond, or $10,000 partially secured surety bond at 10%. The arraignment judge also issued a full [*3]TOP, which remains in effect until August 8, 2026.^FN2 The Instant Case was adjourned to March 4, 2026, for the People to obtain a supporting deposition.

The Defendant did not post monetary bail, and on March 4, 2026, the Defendant was produced in court in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"). At the March 4, 2026 appearance, the People stated that they had re-established contact with the complainant, and that the complainant had informed the People of numerous additional communications that she had received from the Defendant. Based upon the additional information provided by the complainant, including copies of "emails not already in the People's possession, as well as a 20-minute long screen recording of her Instagram thread showing the Defendant's repeated attempts to contact" her, the People filed and served an SSI.

The SSI charged the Defendant with one count of Stalking in the Third Degree (PL § 120.50 [1]), 83 counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (PL § 215.50 [3]), and one count of Stalking in the Fourth Degree (PL § 120.45 [2]). The SSI alleges that between March 23, 2025 and April 8, 2025, the complainant received approximately 67 emails from the Defendant, in violation of the Underlying TOP, and that between April 20, 2025 and June 25, 2025, the Defendant contacted the complainant approximately 16 times via Instagram direct messages, also in violation of the Underlying TOP. The SSI further alleges that between August 11, 2025 and February 18, 2026, the Defendant contacted the complainant approximately 65 times via Instagram direct messages; that between January 5, 2026 and February 14, 2026, the Defendant contacted the complainant approximately 5 times via email; and that this conduct caused the complainant extreme emotional distress, anxiety, and fear.^FN3

The Court deemed the SSI an information.^FN4 Following that determination, the Court [*4]arraigned the Defendant on the SSI. Defense counsel then sought the Defendant's release under the supervision of CASES. The defense asserted that prior to the Underlying Case, the Defendant had lived in an apartment that he had shared with the complainant. Once the Underlying TOP was issued, however, the Defendant was rendered homeless in the United States, because he could no longer share a residence with the complainant. A friend in Brazil had offered him a plane ticket, and he had thus returned to his native country of Brazil. Defense counsel represented that the Defendant had remained in contact with him, and that the Defendant had saved money for a return ticket to the United States, as well as for rent in New York City.

The People, in turn, requested that the Court set bail in the amounts originally requested by the People at the Defendant's arraignment on the misdemeanor complaint: $25,000 cash, $25,000 insurance company bond, or $25,000 partially secured bond. In addition to referencing the Defendant's flight to Brazil and lengthy absence from court, the People argued that the SSI differed significantly from the misdemeanor complaint that had been presented to the arraignment judge: whereas the misdemeanor complaint had charged the Defendant with 26 counts of criminal contempt, the SSI now charged the Defendant with 83 counts of criminal contempt, as well as two counts of stalking.

This Court granted the People's application in part, and set monetary bail in the amounts of $10,000 cash, $15,000 insurance company bond, or $15,000 partially secured surety bond at 10%. The case was adjourned to March 27, 2026, for trial.

On March 6, 2026, the Defendant moved to reargue the Court's decision to set the aforementioned bail; the case was advanced for that purpose. At argument, the defense asserted that CPL 530.60 governs modifications of monetary bail during the pendency of a case. The defense stated that CPL 530.60, on its face, did not apply to the March 4, 2026 appearance, because the Defendant was not "at liberty." Rather, he had remained in the custody of DOCCS since his initial arraignment. The Defendant further argued that the Court was without any other authority to modify the terms of the Defendant's release.

The People responded that the Court possessed authority, pursuant to CPL 530.60, to modify conditions of release, even where a defendant has been unable to post monetary bail and remains in the custody of DOCCS.

The Court issued an interim oral decision adhering to its prior determination; however, the Court permitted the parties to file simultaneous memoranda of law on the issue of whether a court possesses the authority to increase monetary bail in a misdemeanor proceeding when the [*5]defendant remains incarcerated following his arraignment.

The parties filed their memoranda of law on March 10, 2026. The Defendant reiterated his argument that, pursuant to CPL 530.60, a court lacks authority to modify conditions of release unless a defendant is "at liberty." The People's memorandum of law, on the other hand, abandoned any reliance on CPL 530.60. Rather, the People argued that: (1) a court possesses authority to impose a new securing order upon a defendant's arraignment on an SSI, and (2) a court possesses an inherent authority to modify bail, based on changed circumstances.

Because the People had asserted arguments outside the scope of those that had been raised at the March 6, 2026 oral argument, the Court permitted the Defendant to file a reply memorandum of law to address the People's arguments. The Defendant filed his reply brief on March 13, 2026. He argues that the Court cannot impose a new securing order when a defendant is arraigned on an SSI, and that courts do not possess an inherent authority to modify bail during the pendency of a case.

II. Legal Analysis

a. CPL 530.60

CPL 530.60 is entitled "Certain modifications of a securing order" and provides, in relevant part:

Whenever in the course of a criminal action or proceeding a defendant is at liberty as a result of an order of recognizance, release under non-monetary conditions or bail . . . and the court considers it necessary to review such order, whether due to a motion by the people or otherwise, the court may . . . by a bench warrant if necessary, require the defendant to appear before the court.

Upon such appearance, the court, for good cause shown, may revoke the order of recognizance, release under non-monetary conditions, or bail. If the defendant is entitled to recognizance, release under non-monetary conditions, or bail as a matter of right, the court must issue another such order.

(CPL 530.60[1]). The Defendant argues that the clear language of the statute mandates that it applies only when "a defendant is at liberty." The People do not contest this reading of the statute. Here, the Defendant is not at liberty, but rather, in the custody of DOCCS, as he has not posted monetary bail. Accordingly, the Court declines to modify the securing order pursuant to CPL 530.60. This does not end the inquiry, however, as the Court possessed another source of authority to set monetary bail on March 4, 2026.

b. Arraignment on SSI

The Defendant argues that a court may issue a securing order only when a defendant "comes under the control of a court" (CPL 510.10[1]), and that the court obtains such control over a defendant only at his initial arraignment. He asserts that the arraignment of a defendant on an SSI "is considered one more step in the same criminal action" (Def. Reply Mem. 6), and that a court thus lacks authority to issue a securing order when arraigning a defendant on an SSI. This Court disagrees.

"The law . . . authorizes the filing of multiple instruments in the course of a criminal action, including the filing of a superseding instrument containing additional facts and charging offenses not included in a previously filed instrument" (People v Copeland, 52 Misc 3d 372, 375 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2016]). Thus "a misdemeanor complaint" may be "replaced and [*6]superseded by an information" (CPL 100.50 [3]). "An information which replaces a misdemeanor complaint need not charge the same offense or offenses," but "at least one count thereof must charge" an offense "based upon conduct which was the subject of the misdemeanor complaint" (CPL 170.65 [2]). The information may also, "subject to the rules of joinder, charge any other offense which the factual allegations" and any accompanying supporting depositions "are legally sufficient to support, even though such offense is not based upon conduct which was the subject of the misdemeanor complaint" (id.).

Once the People file an SSI, that information "replac[es] and supersed[es] the misdemeanor complaint in its entirety" (Copeland, 52 Misc 3d at 377). Dismissal of the original misdemeanor complaint occurs "by operation of law" (id.).

Where a misdemeanor complaint is replaced by an SSI, "the defendant must be arraigned thereon" (CPL 170.65 [1]; CPL 170.10[1]). Criminal Procedure Law § 1.20 defines "arraignment" as:

the occasion upon which a defendant against whom an accusatory instrument has been filed appears before the court in which the criminal action is pending for the purpose of having such court acquire and exercise control over his person with respect to such accusatory instrument and of setting the course of further proceedings in the action

(CPL 1.20 [9] [emphasis added]; see Peter Preiser, Prac Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, CPL 170.10 [arraignment is "the occasion upon which the defendant is apprised of the charge, advised of his or her rights and submits to the control of the court"]).

Criminal Procedure Law § 170.10 thus "imposes upon the court a duty to arraign defendants" on "superseding accusatory instruments" that is "mandatory, not discretionary" (People v Ress, 25 Misc 3d 82, 84-85 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2009]). The arraignment of a defendant on an SSI is not simply an esoteric requirement of the Criminal Procedure Law, disconnected from any real purpose. Rather, it represents a crucial procedural step by which the court acquires "control over [the defendant's] person" with respect to the new allegations and charges in that accusatory instrument, namely, the SSI (CPL 1.20 [9]; cf. People v England, 84 NY2d 1, 4-5 [1994] [dismissing felony case pursuant to CPL 30.30, where defendant had been arraigned on felony complaint, but due to delay by the People, "arraignment within the statutory period" was rendered "impossible," and noting that "[d]efendant could not have been brought to trial before arraignment, the process by which the court acquires jurisdiction over a defendant" [citing CPL 1.20 [9]]).

Contrary to the Defendant's contention, arraignment on an SSI is not merely a continuation of the original arraignment. Rather, at the arraignment of the SSI, the Defendant is notified of the charges against him. These may include new charges not previously included in the misdemeanor complaint, and even separate offenses, which are "not based upon conduct which was the subject of the misdemeanor complaint" (CPL 170.65 [2]). A defendant is certainly entitled to a formal procedure notifying him of new criminal charges and new factual allegations against him. At the SSI arraignment, a defendant is also informed of his rights, including the right to counsel,^FN5 and is provided with a physical copy of the new accusatory [*7]instrument (see CPL 170.10).

In arguing that arraignment on an SSI is merely an "extension" of the original proceeding, the defense notes that, pursuant to CPL 1.20, "a criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument," and "if more than one accusatory instrument is filed in the course of the action, it commences when the first of such instruments is filed" (CPL 1.20 [17]). It is true that the filing of the original accusatory instrument starts the prosecution's "speedy trial clock" pursuant to CPL 30.30, and the filing of an SSI does not "reset" that clock (see People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 239 [1986]). Yet in other respects, it is clear that arraignment on an SSI is not simply a continuation of the original arraignment. Indeed, "[a]fter a defendant is arraigned on a superseding information, the People are allowed to file a new CPL 710.30 notice within the requisite 15-day time period" (People v Lamendola, 57 Misc 3d 153(A) [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2017]). The defense is also entitled to serve and file additional pretrial omnibus motions within 45 days of arraignment upon an SSI (People v Lopez, 159 Misc 2d 264, 267 [Crim Ct, NY County 1993]; People v Lewis, 21 Misc 3d 1125[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52171[U] [Nassau Dist Ct, 1st Dist 2008]). The Court thus concludes that an arraignment on an SSI constitutes an "arraignment" pursuant to CPL 170.10, rather than some other auxiliary proceeding.

CPL 170.10 provides:

Upon the arraignment, the court . . . must, as provided in subdivision one of section 530.20, issue a securing order either releasing the defendant on his own recognizance or fixing bail for his future appearance in the action.

(CPL 170.10 [7]). Criminal Procedure Law § 530.20 (1) (b), in turn states, in relevant part^FN6:

Where the principal stands charged with a qualifying offense, the court, unless otherwise prohibited by law, may in its discretion release the principal pending trial on the principal's own recognizance or under non-monetary conditions, fix bail, [or] order non-monetary conditions in conjunction with fixing bail . . . The court shall explain its choice [*8]of securing order on the record or in writing.^FN7

Similarly, CPL 510.10 (1) provides that when a defendant "comes under the control of a court," the court "shall impose a securing order." Thus where a defendant is arraigned on an SSI, and comes under the control of the court on that accusatory instrument (CPL 1.20 [9]; England, 84 NY2d at 4-5), then the court possesses the authority to set a securing order on the SSI.

Here, the Defendant was originally charged, via a misdemeanor complaint, with 26 counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree. He was arraigned on that complaint on February 27, 2026. Subsequently, on March 4, 2026, the People filed an SSI charging the Defendant with one count of Stalking in the Third Degree, 83 counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree, and one count of Stalking in the Fourth Degree.

The Court then arraigned the Defendant on the SSI. Specifically, the Court informed the Defendant of the charges against him ("Mr. Thami, I have before me a misdemeanor information charging you with Penal Law § 120.50 [1], Stalking in the Third Degree, and other related charges," tr at 8); provided an opportunity for the Defendant to be read his rights ("[Counsel], does your client waive the reading, but [not] the rights thereunder?" tr at 8); and the defense was provided with a physical copy of the SSI (tr at 3). The SSI thus replaced the misdemeanor complaint in its entirety, and the original complaint was dismissed by "operation of law" (Copeland, 52 Misc 3d at 377). In arraigning the Defendant on the SSI on March 4, 2026, the Court obtained control over the Defendant "with respect to" that "accusatory instrument" (see CPL 1.20 [9]).

Following the arraignment, the Court heard arguments from both parties regarding the appropriate securing order (see CPL 170.10 [7]). The Defendant was charged with a bail qualifying offense (CPL 510.10 [4] [h]; CPL 530.20 [1] [b] [viii]), and Court therefore had discretion to release the Defendant pending trial on his own recognizance, release the Defendant under non-monetary conditions, or fix bail (CPL 510.10 [4]; CPL 530.20 [1] [b]).

In evaluating the factors set forth in Criminal Procedure Laws 510.10 (1) and 530.20 (1) (b), the Court considers: that the Defendant failed to appear in court on the Underlying Case; that the Defendant instead fled the jurisdiction of the court to Brazil; that, while in warrant status on the Underlying Case, the Defendant allegedly contacted the complaining witness numerous times in violation of the Underlying TOP (see People ex rel. Hose v. Molina, 83 Misc 3d 980, 986 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024]); that the Defendant's warrant status in the Underlying Case lasted for almost a full year; and that the Defendant was ultimately apprehended by the Port Authority Police at JFK Airport.Moreover, the Defendant was originally charged with 26 violations of the Underlying TOP; however, once the People made contact with the complainant, she informed them of numerous additional alleged violations of the Underlying TOP, and the SSI thus alleged two counts of stalking, as well as 83 counts of criminal contempt. Upon consideration of these factors, the Court determines that monetary bail in the amounts of $10,000 cash, $15,000 insurance company bond, or $15,000 partially secured bond at 10% are the means necessary to reasonably assure the Defendant's return to court (CPL 510.10 [1]).

c. Inherent Authority to Modify Conditions of Release

The People maintain that, even without arraigning the Defendant on the SSI, the Court possessed an inherent authority to alter conditions of monetary bail during the pendency of the case. Certain case law indicates that, "[n]otwithstanding the absence of statutory inclusion of a right" for the People "to seek an increase in bail," an "inherent judicial power" exists "to maintain the integrity of court orders such as bail" (People ex rel. Henle v Brann, 72 Misc 3d 1165, 1170 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2021]). Such courts have held that "[w]hen the People present reliable information establishing that circumstances directly relating to bail have significantly changed in a manner that reflects an enhanced flight risk" and the court determines "that the original order setting bail no longer reflects accurately the risk of flight," then "a judge may entertain a bail application by the People" (id.; see People v Rosenthal, 48 NY2d 230 [1979]; People v Sidell, 37 Misc 3d 1213[A] [Crim Ct, Queens County 2012]). In light of the Court's determination that it had authority to set bail after arraigning the Defendant on the SSI, the Court need not consider the applicability of that case law to the Instant Case, nor whether such case law survives the recent statement by the Court of Appeals that "[m]odifications of securing orders is governed by CPL 530.60" (People ex rel. Rankin v Brann, 41 NY3d 436 [2024]).

For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant's motion is denied.

This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: March 19, 2026

New York, New York

Kacie A. Lally, J.C.C.