People v Gonzalez

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

Decided on March 28, 2026

Docket No. CR-023728-25BX

Philip Tisne, J.

On September 1, 2025, the People commenced this action by filing a complaint charging defendant with Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 120.00(1)), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law § 265.01(2)), and Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.26(1)). Because defendant was charged with no offense higher than misdemeanor grade, and at least one of the charges carried a potential jail sentence exceeding three months, the People were required to announce their trial readiness within 90 days of the action's commencement—i.e., by November 30, 2025. See CPL 30.30(1)(b), (4). The People filed a certificate of compliance ("COC") and statement of readiness on December 1, 2025, and a supplemental COC on December 19, 2025. Defendant now moves to dismiss the action on speedy-trial grounds. The court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and arguments raised in the motion. As explained below, the motion is DENIED.

1.

Defendant argues that the action must be dismissed because the People filed their statement of readiness belatedly, 91 days after the action commenced. In cases like this one, a motion to dismiss must be granted where the People "are not ready for trial within . . . ninety days of the commencement of a criminal action." CPL 30.30(1)(b). Binding precedent, however, enlarges the People's statutorily-prescribed time to be ready where, as here, the final day of the 90-day period falls on a weekend or a holiday. See People v. Powell, 179 Misc 2d 1047, 1048 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 1999); see also People v. Mandela, 142 AD3d 81, 85-86 (3d Dep't 2016); People v. Jones, 176 AD3d 1397, 1398 (3d Dep't 2019); People v. Pierre, 83 Misc 3d 134(A) (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2024). Although the court is bound by these precedents, there is a compelling argument that the CPL 30.30 period should not be enlarged in this manner. See, e.g., People v. Korovskyi, 84 Misc 3d 1242(A), at *3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2024).

Whether to recognize an enlargement for terminal weekends presents a question of statutory interpretation, the principal aim of which is to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Statutory text is the clearest indicator of legislative intent, see, e.g., People v. Blue, 42 NY3d 584, 596 (2024), and nothing in CPL 30.30 suggests an intent to enlarge the People's 90-day [*2]deadline when the final day falls on a weekend. Courts that have endorsed an enlargement have instead looked to the General Construction Law ("GCL"), which states that "[w]hen any period of time, computed from a certain day, within which or after which or before which an act is authorized or required to be done, ends on a Saturday, Sunday or a public holiday, such act may be done on the next succeeding business day." GCL § 25-a. The General Construction Law is "applicable to every statute unless its general object, or the context of the language construed, or other provisions of law indicate that a different meaning or application was intended from that required to be given by this chapter." GCL § 110. Courts have thus applied GCL § 25-a to CPL 30.30 based on their conclusion that "[n]othing in the language of CPL 30.30(1)(a) mentions weekends or holidays or otherwise indicates a legislative intent that General Construction Law § 25-a should not be applied."FN1 Mandela, 142 AD3d at 86; see also Powell, 179 Misc 2d at 1048 (concluding that CPL 30.30 "does not express a contrary intent"). But CPL 30.30 does reflect a legislative intent not to exclude terminal weekends and holidays: the statute contains other provisions that have the effect of enlarging the People's speedy-trial period, but contains no provision indicating that such an enlargement should be available merely because the final day of the period falls on a weekend or holiday. A negative inference thus arises that the Legislature's omission from CPL 30.30 of an enlargement for weekends and holidays was "an indication that its exclusion was intended." People v. Tychanski, 78 N.Y2d 909, 911 (1991); seeStefanik v. Hochul, 43 NY3d 49, 69-70 (2024).

There is no sound policy reason to enlarge the CPL 30.30 deadlines to account for terminal weekends and holidays. Perhaps this approach was justified historically to ensure that the People received the full statutory period to become ready for trial, since they would be unable to declare their readiness on days when courts would be closed. The premise of this argument is not obviously true, since the People could validly state ready without physical access to a court through a "written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense [*3]counsel and the appropriate court clerk." People v. Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 (1985); see People v. Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434, 440 (1998) (concluding that a Saturday-filed statement of readiness was "the kind of record commitment to proceed which satisfies the People's duty to be ready for trial, and serves to toll the 'speedy trial clock'"). Regardless, the advent and widespread use of electronic filing and electronic document delivery systems make the argument untenable in the modern era. See, e.g., People v. Licius, 2025 NY Slip Op. 05873, at *2 (Ct. App. 2025). It is simply not true that the People cannot timely declare ready if their deadline falls on a weekend or a holiday. Enlarging their speedy-trial period under those circumstances serves only to give the People more time to prepare their case than the 90 days that the Legislature provided.

Stare decisis reflects a powerful interest in continuity and caution, but it "is not an inexorable command." Flanders v. Goodfellow, 44 NY3d 57, 67 (2025). Precedents remain precedents "not because they are established but because they serve the underlying nature and object of the law itself, reason and the power to advance justice." People v. Bing, 76 NY2d 331, 338 (1990). An exclusion for terminal weekends and holidays appears no longer to advance the ends of justice. Until an appellate court revisits the issue, however, this court is bound by existing precedents to deny defendant's challenge.

2.

Defendant next argues that the action must be dismissed because discovery violations render the People's COC invalid and their statement of readiness illusory. To declare ready, the People must first certify that, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery, [they have] disclosed and made available all known material and information subject to discovery." CPL 245.50(1), (3). The "key question" in determining if the People have satisfied this standard is whether they made "reasonable efforts to comply with statutory directives." People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 (2023) (cleaned up); see CPL 245.50(6). This is a "fundamentally case-specific" inquiry that turns on a variety of factors, including a list of factors set out in the discovery statute. Bay, 41 NY3d at 212; see CPL 245.50(5)(a). Where the defense challenges the validity of a COC, the People bear the "burden of establishing that they did, in fact, exercise due diligence and made reasonable inquiries prior to filing the initial COC." Bay, 41 NY3d at 213. Where the People fail to carry this burden, the court must strike their COC as invalid and must deem their accompanying statement of readiness illusory. See id.

The People's brief articulates their efforts to comply with their discovery obligation in adequate detail. See People v. Jacobs, 87 Misc 3d 1254(A), at *2 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2025). The People allege that, before they filed their COC, they requested relevant activity logs, any aided report, property vouchers, 911 materials, and "all relevant evidentiary photographs" first on September 23, 2025, with follow-up requests on October 10, November 19 and December 1. The People filed their COC on December 1, and disclosed body-worn camera ("BWC") footage for 20 police officers, impeachment materials for testifying law enforcement personnel, and other arrest paperwork. The People's COC stated that the aided report, property vouchers, activity logs, and 911 materials had been requested but remained outstanding. On December 10, 2025, the police department provided the aided report and activity logs for multiple officers and indicated that no property voucher existed; the People disclosed those materials with a supplemental COC on December 19, 2025. On this record, having considered the relevant factors, including the nature and volume of discovery disclosed and allegedly withheld, the People's explanation for any discovery lapses, their response when apprised of those lapses, their self-correction of [*4]omissions without court intervention, as well as any potential prejudice to defendant, the court concludes that the People validly certified their discovery compliance pursuant to CPL 245.20. see CPL 245.50(5)(a). On the record before the court, the discovery violations alleged by defendant, even if credited in full, would not warrant the drastic remedy of dismissal.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the court makes the following findings. First, the People are not required to disclose photographs purportedly taken by Police Officer Jermaine Pink, as the People have made reasonable inquiries into the existence of those photographs and have been told that they do not exist. Second, the People are directed to disclose discoverable materials that they obtain in response to the subpoena they served for defendant's medical records before they filed their COC. See CPL 245.60; see alsoPeople v. Rahman, 79 Misc 3d 129(A), *2 (App. Term 2d Dep't 2023) (invalidating COC where medical records were requested 47 days after the People filed their COC). Last, the People are directed to provide any outstanding information for all civilian personnel whom they know to have evidence or information relevant to any offense charged or to any potential defense thereto, to the extent that that information has not been disclosed already. CPL 245.20(1)(c).

Defendant's application for a Mapp/Wade/Dunaway hearing is granted on the People's consent. Defendant's remaining requests are reserved for the trial court. This constitutes the order of the court.

Dated: March 28, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Philip V. Tisne