Waldman Dev. of NY, LLC v Ruisi

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on February 27, 2026

Index No. 151675/2025

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 003) numbered 33-37 were read on this motion. Reply was waived on the record on February 26, 2026. Oral argument was completed on February 26, 2026.

Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a], the Court has considered the following papers in connection with the motion of Defendant Christopher J. Ruisi seeking an Order vacating the default judgment entered against him on December 9, 2025: the Notice of Motion dated January 27, 2026 (NY St Cts [*2]Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 33); the Affidavit/Affirmation of Christopher J. Ruisi in Support of the Motion (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 34); and the Affirmation of Jordan A. Weiner, Esq., in Opposition thereto, dated February 23, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 37). These submissions constitute the entirety of the papers considered by this Court in rendering the within Decision and Order.

II. Findings of Fact

This matter arises from a civil action commenced by Plaintiff, Waldman Development of NY, LLC, against Defendant, Christopher J. Ruisi. Plaintiff ultimately obtained a default judgment against Defendant, which was entered on December 9, 2025, and thereafter reduced to a money judgment by Order dated January 5, 2026, in the amount of $290,277.65. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 29). Plaintiff further asserts that subsequent orders were issued on January 22, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 32), and that Plaintiff duly complied with all procedural requirements attendant to the entry and enforcement of said judgment.

Defendant now moves to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [1], on the ground of excusable default, and alternatively pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [4], on the ground that the judgment is void due to improper service.

In his sworn affirmation, Defendant asserts that he never received personal service of the summons and complaint and was entirely unaware of the pendency of this action until after the default judgment had been entered against him. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 34). Defendant specifically avers that service was purportedly effected pursuant to CPLR § 308 [4], by affixing and mailing process at XX BXX, Apartment XXX, Brooklyn, New York 11214, with affixing allegedly occurring on August 5, 2025, and mailing allegedly occurring on August 11, 2025. (see id).

Defendant unequivocally denies residing at that address on the dates in question, or at any relevant time, and further affirms that during the period of purported service his actual residence was located at XXX LXXXX Place, Staten Island, New York 10310. (see id). Defendant further asserts that the Brooklyn address was neither his dwelling place, usual place of abode, nor last known residence, and that he maintained no regular presence at that location. (see id). Defendant contends that because service was effected at an address where he did not reside, he had no notice of the action or of the hearing that resulted in the entry of default judgment.

Defendant further contends that his lack of notice constitutes excusable default under CPLR § 5015 [a] [1], and alternatively that vacatur is warranted pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [4], on the ground that the judgment is void for lack of proper service.

In opposition, Plaintiff, through counsel, asserts that Defendant's claims are factually inaccurate and unsupported by the record. Plaintiff affirms that prior to effectuating service, it conducted a diligent investigation to determine Defendant's last known address, including conducting a Department of Motor Vehicles search, reviewing leasehold agreements, and performing LexisNexis searches. These investigative efforts identified Defendant's addresses as including XX BXX, Apartment XXX, Brooklyn, New York 11214, and XX EXXXXX Street, Staten Island, New York 10314. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 37).

Plaintiff further asserts that process was served at both of these identified addresses, and that service was additionally effectuated at XXX LXXXX Place, Staten Island, New York, after that address was subsequently identified through further LexisNexis searches. (see id). Plaintiff [*3]maintains that proof of such service was filed in the record and that service was effectuated in full compliance with statutory requirements. (see id).

Plaintiff further asserts that the lease agreement governing Defendant expressly provided that notices may be sent to the Brooklyn address, and that Defendant cannot now benefit from his alleged failure to maintain accurate address information. (see id). Plaintiff contends that Defendant previously had an opportunity to contest service and failed to do so, and that vacatur at this stage would result in substantial prejudice to Plaintiff. (see id).

III. Conclusions of Law

Defendant moves pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [1], which provides that a court may relieve a party from a judgment upon the ground of excusable default. Defendant asserts that his default was excusable because he did not receive notice of the summons and complaint due to service being effectuated at an address where he did not reside. Defendant further moves, alternatively, pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [4], which provides that a court may vacate a judgment where the judgment is void.

Defendant's claim rests upon his sworn assertion that service was effectuated pursuant to CPLR § 308 [4], by affixing and mailing process at an address which he unequivocally asserts was not his dwelling place, usual place of abode, or last known residence at the time of service. Defendant asserts that his actual residence was located at XXX LXXXX Place, Staten Island, New York, and that he had no notice of the action or the hearing that resulted in default judgment.

Conversely, Plaintiff asserts that it conducted a diligent investigation and effectuated service at multiple addresses identified through Department of Motor Vehicles records, LexisNexis searches, and leasehold documentation. Plaintiff further asserts that service was effectuated not only at the Brooklyn address but also at multiple Staten Island addresses associated with Defendant, including the Llewellyn Place address identified by Defendant himself.

Thus, the record before the Court establishes competing sworn assertions regarding the propriety of service and Defendant's notice of the action.

"A defendant seeking to vacate a default in answering a complaint pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [1] must show both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense" (see Marquez v GSB Supply, Inc., 240 AD3d 877 [2d Dept 2025] quoting 6 Crannell St., LLC v Urban Green Equities, LLC, 207 AD3d 603 [2d Dept 2022]; citing Natanel v Plaza Ins. Co., 200 AD3d 890 [2d Dept 2021]).

"A motion to vacate a default is addressed to the sound discretion of the court" (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Hunte, 215 AD3d 887 [2d Dept 2023] citing Wilmington Trust, N.A. v Ashe, 189 AD3d 1130 [2d Dept 2020]; Pusey v Morales, 181 AD3d 621 [2d Dept 2020]).

Defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [1] requires the Court to consider whether Defendant's default was excusable. Defendant asserts that he lacked notice of the action due to improper service at an address where he did not reside. Plaintiff, however, has submitted sworn assertions that it effectuated service at multiple addresses identified through official records and investigative searches.

Defendant also seeks vacatur pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [4], asserting that the judgment is void. A judgment is subject to vacatur pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [4] where jurisdiction has not been properly obtained. Defendant's sworn denial of residence at the Brooklyn address and assertion of lack of notice are placed in direct opposition to Plaintiff's sworn assertions of diligent [*4]investigation and service at multiple addresses.

"To be entitled to vacatur of a default judgment and dismissal of a complaint under CPLR § 5015 [a] [4] defendant must overcome the presumption raised by the process server's affidavit of service." (see Machovec v Svoboda, 120 AD3d 772 [2d Dept 2014]).

"The mere denial of the receipt of the summons and complaint is insufficient to rebut the presumption of service established by a process server's affidavit" (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v DaCosta, 97 AD3d 630 [2d Dept 2012]; citing Wassertheil v Elburg, LLC, 94 AD3d 753 [2d Dept 2012]; Matter of Rockland Bakery, Inc. v B.M. Baking Co., Inc., 83 AD3d 1080 [2d Dept 2011]; Irwin Mtge. Corp. v Devis, 72 AD3d 743 [2d Dept 2010]; Beneficial Homeowner Serv. Corp. v Girault, 60 AD3d 984 [2d Dept 2009]; Hamlet on Olde Oyster Bay Homeowners Assn., Inc. v Ellner, 57 AD3d 732 [2d Dept 2008]; Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Schotter, 50 AD3d 983 [2d Dept 2008]).

The record demonstrates that Plaintiff effectuated service at multiple addresses identified through official and investigative sources, including the very address which Defendant now asserts was his actual residence.

"[B]are and unsubstantiated denials of service are insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service created by a duly executed affidavit of service, and a hearing is not required where 'the defendant fails to swear to specific facts rebutting the statements in the process server's affidavit'" (see Tuttnauer USA Co., Ltd. v Russo, 216 AD3d 846 [2d Dept 2023] quoting US Natl. Bank Assn. v Melton, 90 AD3d 742 [2d Dept 2011]; citing U.S. Bank N.A. v Smith, 210 AD3d 725 [2d Dept 2022]; U.S. Bank, Natl. Assn. v Arias, 85 AD3d 1014 [2d Dept 2011]; Scarano v Scarano, 63 AD3d 716 [2d Dept 2009]).

Upon consideration of the sworn submissions of the parties, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to establish a sufficient basis to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [1], as Plaintiff has demonstrated that service was effectuated at multiple addresses identified through official and investigative means.

Similarly, Defendant has failed to establish that the judgment is void pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [4], as the record reflects that Plaintiff effectuated service in accordance with statutory procedures at multiple addresses associated with Defendant.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Defendant Christopher J. Ruisi's motion to vacate the default judgment pursuant to CPLR § 5015 [a] [1] and CPLR §5015 [a] [4] is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED, that the default judgment entered against Defendant Christopher J. Ruisi, including the Order dated January 5, 2026, granting Plaintiff a money judgment in the amount of $290,277.65, and all related orders, shall remain in full force and effect; and it is further

ORDERED, that any relief requested but not expressly granted herein is DENIED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: February 27, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT