Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on March 20, 2026

Docket No. CR-032921-25NY

Marva C. Brown, J.

[*1]

Tyron Carroll, hereinafter "defendant," is charged with Assault in the Third Degree (PL 120.00[1]), and various related charges. By Notice of Motion to Dismiss, dated February 19, 2026, the defense challenges the validity of the People's Certificate of Compliance (COC) and seeks dismissal pursuant to CPL 30.30. The defense also moves for various omnibus relief. The People oppose by motion filed on March 6, 2026, and the defendant submitted a reply on March 13, 2026.

Upon review of the submissions, the Court file and relevant legal authority, this court finds that the People's COC is INVALID, and thus, the People's Statement of Readiness (SOR) is ILLUSORY. As there are 94 days chargeable to the People, Defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument is hereby GRANTED. The defendant's remaining motions are moot.

I. VALIDITY OF THE PEOPLE'S CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Under CPL 245.20(1), "the prosecution shall disclose to the defendant, and permit the defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph and test," all items listed in CPL 245.20(1)(a)-(v) that are "in the possession, custody and control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control". In May of 2025, the Legislature added CPL 245.20(1)(v), which now requires the prosecution to disclose "[a]ny other material and information relevant to the subject matter of the charges against the defendant in the instant case or a defense thereto". "[A]ll items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution" (CPL 245.20[2]; see also CPL 245.55[1] [prosecution must "ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the police and other investigative personnel and his or her office"]). Further, where material or information discoverable under CPL 240.20(1) exists but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control, the prosecutor shall make "a diligent, good faith effort" to ascertain the existence such material to be made available for discovery (CPL 245.20[2]).

Pursuant to CPL 245.50(1), when the prosecution has exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide all required discovery, it shall serve upon the defendant and file with the court a certificate of compliance (COC). Any COC shall state that, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery, the prosecution has disclosed and made available all known material and information it has obtained subject to discovery." The COC must also identify the items provided, along with items "that the prosecution is required to disclose and of which the prosecution is aware but has been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence (id.). If additional discovery is disclosed after a COC is filed, the prosecution must serve and file a supplemental certificate of compliance (SCOC) detailing "the basis for the delayed disclosure so that the court may determine whether the delayed disclosure impacts the propriety of the certificate of compliance" (CPL 245.50[1-a]). However, the filing of an SCOC shall not impact the validity of the original COC if filed "in good faith and after exercising due diligence", or [*2]if the additional discovery did not exist at the time of the original COC's filing (id.).

According to CPL 245.50(5)(a), "[i]n assessing a party's due diligence, the court shall look at the totality of the party's efforts to comply with the provisions of this article, rather than assess the party's efforts item by item" (see also CPL 30.30[5][b]). "Relevant factors for assessing the prosecutor's due diligence include, but are not limited to: the efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with the requirements of this article; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial" (CPL 245.50[5][a]; see also CPL 30.30[5][b]). "The court's determination shall be based on consideration of all factors listed in [CPL 245.50(5)(a)] and no one factor shall be determinative" (CPL 245.50[5][b]). "A court shall not invalidate a certificate of compliance where the party has exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material required to be disclosed" (CPL 245.50[6]).

The defense argues that the People's COC was invalid for their belated disclosure of the following: three 911 calls; BWC for four officers;FN1 radio run; the SPRINT report; DAS report; medical treatment of prisoner form; email correspondence between the People and the complainant and Shake Shack's legal department; the ambulance call report; unredacted LED materials for Officer Vinci; LED materials for other testifying officers; unredacted officer notes; and names and contact information for the EMTs.

Given CPL 245.50(5)(a)'s factors, here, the People failed to meet their burden to establish that they exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries to comply with their discovery obligations for this case. Notably, the People have served a large portion of the items requested by defense counsel since their initial COC, but the People have failed to file even one supplemental COC (SCOC) with either the defendant or this court identifying this additional material and explaining the reason for this belated disclosure "so that the court may determine whether the delayed disclosure impacts the propriety of the certificate of compliance" (CPL § 245.50[1-a]). This failure renders the People currently non-compliant with Article 245 and evinces an overall lack of due diligence (see CPL §245.50[1]; CPL § 245.50[1-a]). The People also failed to complete their initial discovery obligations within 35 days from the defendant's arraignment, further evincing a lack of due diligence (see CPL § 245.10[1][a] [requires the People to perform their initial discovery obligations on a case "as soon as practicable" but within twenty days after arraignment for incarcerated defendants, and, within thirty-five calendar days after arraignment for all others]).

Additionally, in their opposition, the People failed to address many of the discovery issues flagged by the defense — specifically, the missing or redacted disciplinary records, the redacted officer notes, and the EMT names and contact information. The People also do not contest the discoverability of these items in their opposition (see People v Serrano, 234 AD3d 879, 883 [2d Dept 2025] ["'Normally what is not disputed is deemed to be conceded'"], quoting People v Gruden, 42 NY2d 214, 216; citing People v Cole, 73 NY2d 957, 958). With all of these items outstanding, the People provided no explanation in their opposition as to why or whether they made any attempts to disclose what the defense requests. The only reference to officer disciplinary records in the People's entire opposition is that "analysts from the Office's LED group ordered law enforcement disclosure records for numerous officers," and that prior to certifying compliance, they disclosed "law enforcement disclosure materials related to the incident" (P.'s Opp. at pp. 12-13). The People do not mention that they ever attempted to obtain the names and contact information of the EMTs who [*3]responded to the scene, either before or after their COC. The same can be said for Officer Vinci's redacted notes — there is no mention of these notes anywhere in the People's response.

The People also failed to address why they were unable to turn over the 911 calls, radio run, sprint report and discoverable email correspondences until January 23, 2026. The People only mention that they originally requested these items on October 28, 2025, and shared them once they were in possession of the materials. However, this statement is slightly inaccurate, as the People admit that they first received these materials on January 12, 2026, but did not disclose them to the defense until nearly two weeks later on January 23, 2026. The People failed to articulate any steps taken to attempt to disclose these items in a more expeditious manner, despite their obvious importance in a criminal case. It also took the People months and several requests from defense counsel to disclose the "Medical Treatment of Prisoner Form." As the defense articulates, this document is especially important in this case, because the defendant was also substantially injured during the altercation that is the subject of the criminal case.

The only outstanding items requested by the defense that the People claim are not discoverable are the EMS records. The People's sole argument is that, "in order to obtain EMS records related to the incident, the prosecutor would have needed to obtain a subpoena for Mr. Govan and Mr. Aguirre's medical records" and "[b] Because the People are not required to obtain a subpoena to obtain information related to Mr. Govan and Mr. Aguirre's medical records and EMS records, those items are not discoverable" (P.'s Opp. at p. 14). First, this is simply not true. As the People's complaining witnesses in this assault case which requires that they prove the element of physical injury, they could have and should have asked these individuals for their medical records. If they were unable to obtain them from the complaining witnesses, unlike the defense, the People could have easily obtained a signed HIPAA form from these individuals to subpoena these records directly from the providers (see CPL 245.20[2] ["(t)he prosecutor shall not be required to obtain material or information if it may be obtained with use of a subpoena duces tecum where the defense is able to obtain the same material with the use of a subpoena duces tecum"]) (emphasis added). It appears the People did nothing to attempt to obtain the two complainants' medical records, despite the fact that these materials were not in the People's possession. Doing absolutely nothing does not constitute "a diligent, good faith effort" under the discovery statute (id.). Further, the People indicated in their own automatic disclosure form that they intended to introduce the complainants' medical records at trial. Therefore, this court remains in the dark as to why the People did not do more to obtain these records, either before or after their COC.

In sum, given the fact that the People are currently non-compliant with Article 245, that several items remain outstanding with no explanation from the People, and that the majority of the items are crucial to preparing an adequate defense for this case, this court finds that the People failed to exercise due diligence in complying with their discovery obligations for this case. As such, considering all factors in CPL 245.50(5)(a), the defense's motion to invalidate the People's COC is GRANTED.

II. SPEEDY TRIAL

Pursuant to CPL 30.30[1][b], when a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of more than three months, such as in this case, the prosecution must be ready within 90 days from the commencement of that criminal action. To satisfy the initial burden under CPL 30.30, the defendant need allege "only that the prosecution failed to declare readiness within the statutorily prescribed time period" (People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 (1995); see alsoPeople v Goode, 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]). Once the defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed since the commencement of the action, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay (seePeople v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]). Absent a valid COC, the People cannot be deemed ready for trial (CPL 245.50[3]).

This case was filed, and the defendant was arraigned on October 21, 2025. The defendant was released, and the case was adjourned to December 18, 2025, for a supporting deposition. On December 12, 2025, the case was advanced for the People to request orders of protection for the complainant and another witness to this case. The People were heard on December 12, 2025, and the case was adjourned to January 23, 2026, for trial. The time period from October 21, 2025, to December 12, 2025, is chargeable to the People, because they were not ready during this time, the case remained unconverted and no COC was filed. [*4](52 days charged)

On December 18, 2025, off-calendar, the People served and filed a new complaint along with supporting depositions, a COC and COR. However, as stated above, the People's COC and accompanying COR were invalid and ineffective in stopping the speedy trial clock. Therefore, this entire adjournment from December 12, 2025, to January 23, 2026, is chargeable to the People. (42 days charged; 94 days total)

On January 23, 2026, the People stated ready, and the defense requested the instant motion schedule. The case was adjourned to March 20, 2026, for a decision. This adjournment is excluded for motion practice.

As 94 days of chargeable days have accrued for this case, defense counsel's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The defendants' remaining motions are rendered moot. This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: March 20, 2026

HON. MARVA C. BROWN, JCC