People v Young

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on March 14, 2026

Docket No. CR-053994-25KN

Juan D. Abreu, J.

Defendant VINCENT YOUNG ("defendant") is charged with Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs (Vehicle and Traffic Law ["VTL"] §§ 1192 [1], [3]) and Leaving Scene of an Incident Without Reporting (VTL §§ 600 [1] [A], [B]).

By motion dated January 9, 2026, defendant moves to invalidate the People's Certificate of Compliance ("COC"), deem the Statement of Readiness ("SOR") illusory, and dismiss the case pursuant to CPL § 30.30; and for such other relief as the court deems just and proper.

For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion is DENIED.

RELEVANT STATEMENT OF FACTS

On November 8, 2025, defendant was operating a vehicle on East 103 Street in Kings County when he attempted to overtake another vehicle driven by complaint, P.P., whose four-month-old child was seated in the rear of the vehicle. In the course of doing so, defendant collided with complainant's vehicle, lost control of his own vehicle, and subsequently struck two parked cars before coming to a stop upon impact with another vehicle. Defendant then exited his vehicle and fled the scene on foot.

Witness, H.W., the owner of the damaged parked vehicles and a resident of the location where the collision occurred, came outside shortly thereafter. Defendant returned to the scene and attempted to reenter his vehicle but was prevented from doing so by H.W.

Emergency medical personnel responded to the scene, followed by members of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), including Arresting Officer Jocelyn Rosado. In speaking with Officer Rosado, defendant admitted to consuming alcohol but denied operating the vehicle. He stated, in sum and substance, that he did not know who had been driving, did not know the driver's name or number, and that the individual "just drives" him. Based on [*2]defendant's statements, interviews with complainant and H.W., and Officer Rosado's observations of defendant's apparent intoxication, defendant was arrested. He was transported to Brookdale Hospital, where he refused to submit to a blood test.

On November 9, 2025, defendant was arraigned on the aforementioned charges. On November 10, 2025, the People submitted a request with Brookdale Hospital to preserve any blood samples taken from defendant. On November 12, 2025, a prosecutor was assigned. Thereafter, the People made repeated efforts to obtain discovery between November 10 and December 2, 2025.

On December 2, 2025, the People filed a COC, and an Initial Notice of Discovery which included a Witness Addendum. The People continued their attempts to obtain outstanding discovery and on December 5, 2025, they filed and served a converted charging instrument, and SOR.

On December 12, 2025, the court ordered Huntley, Dunaway, Wade, and refusal hearings; ordered the parties to confer by January 9, 2026; set a schedule for motion practice directing the defense to file an omnibus motion by January 9, and for the People to respond by January 30; and adjourned for decision on March 19, 2026.

On Friday, January 9, 2026, at approximately 4:45 p.m., defense counsel emailed the People regarding the case, noting that an earlier attempt to send the same correspondence at approximately 11:30 a.m. had been unsuccessful. The People responded within ten minutes, acknowledging receipt and advising that a substantive response would be provided at the beginning of the following week. This email was the first and only communication the People received from the defense prior to motion practice. Later that night, at 11:47 p.m., the defense filed the instant motion seeking to invalidate the People's COC and dismiss the accusatory instrument.

PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Defendant

The defense argues that the initial COC, filed on December 2, 2025, was invalid pursuant to CPL § 245.50 (1) because the People allegedly failed to satisfy their discovery obligations under CPL § 245.20 (1) due to a lack of diligence. Specifically, the defense contends that the following items were not disclosed at the time of the People's COC and remain outstanding: recordings of the 911 calls, including the 911 certification and heading; the Sprint report and radio runs; NYPD records, including aided reports for the complaining witness and any passengers, the prisoner pedigree card, and NYPD driving record reports; photographs taken by Officer Rosado; screenshots or copies of any text or email communications between the complaining witnesses and law enforcement or the District Attorney's Office transmitting photos or videos of the damage; Emergency Medical Services ("EMS") and ambulance call reports ("ACRs"), including electronic prehospital care reports (e-PCR) for the complaining witness, her child, and the defendant; FDNY prehospital care reports and related cover letters; the names, shield numbers, and contact information of EMS personnel who responded; medical records for the complaining witness and her child; Portable Breath Test ("PBT") calibration records; body-worn camera ("BWC") footage from the responding Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit ("IDTU") technician and the involved officers, including footage from the hospital where the PBT was administered, and all corresponding metadata and audit trails.

As a result of the alleged improper COC, the defense maintains that the accompanying December 5, 2025 SOR was illusory. Thereby, the People have never been ready for trial, the prosecution is untimely, and defendant's speedy trial rights were violated. Accordingly, the defendant seeks dismissal of the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL § 30.30.

The People

The People oppose the defendant's challenge to the COC in its entirety, arguing first that the defense failed to engage in a good faith conferral as required by CPL § 245.50 (4) (c), thereby, rendering the present challenge procedurally defective.

In the alternative, the People contend that, even if the court were to reach the merits, they exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in their efforts to obtain and disclose all discoverable materials. They assert that any items identified by the defense are either not discoverable, do not exist, were previously identified as outstanding, or are not within the People's custody or control and therefore fall outside their discovery obligations.

Accordingly, the People maintain that their initial COC and SOR were valid when filed, and that the speedy trial clock was properly and timely tolled.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant's Challenge to the COC

The court first addresses the procedural propriety of the defendant's challenge to the People's COC. Pursuant to CPL § 245.50 (4) (c), challenges to the validity of a COC must be made by motion "within thirty-five days of the service of the certificate," provided the prosecution has filed an information prior to the filing of the certificate. The statute further mandates that any such motion be accompanied by an affirmation demonstrating that, after the filing of the certificate, the moving party timely conferred in good faith or made good faith efforts to confer with the opposing party regarding the specific and particularized issues forming the basis of the challenge, and that those efforts were unsuccessful (CPL § 245.50 [4] [c]).

Here, defendant filed the instant motion thirty-eight days after the People served and filed their COC—three days beyond the statutory thirty-five-day period. However, because the People did not file a superseding information until December 5, 2025, when they filed their SOR, the defense's motion is deemed timely as of the thirty-fifth day. Timeliness alone, however, does not satisfy the statutory prerequisites. The record demonstrates that defendant failed to comply with the mandatory good faith conferral requirement.

On January 9—the thirty-eighth day after service of the COC—defense counsel sent their first and only email to the People at approximately 4:45 p.m. The defense asserts that they unsuccessfully attempted to send the same email earlier that day, around 11:30 a.m., but provides no explanation for what prevented the earlier transmission or why they waited over five hours to resend it. Nevertheless, at 11:47 p.m. that same night—just seven hours after the email was successfully transmitted—the defendant filed the instant motion.

In the motion papers, defense counsel affirms that she was ordered by the court to confer by January 9, 2026, and that she "conferred with the People regarding discovery as soon as she [*3]was possibly able to do so.FN1" That assertion misstates the governing standard. Following the 2025 legislative amendments to CPL Article 245, the prior requirement that parties notify the opposing party of alleged deficiencies "as soon as practicable" has been expressly replaced. The statute now requires that a party timely confer in good faith, or make good faith efforts to confer, regarding the specific and particularized issues forming the basis of the challenge (see CPL § 245.50 [4] [c]).

Rather than seeking a permissible good faith extension from the court due to defense counsel's schedule, defense sent an eleventh-hour email late on a Friday afternoon on the final permissible day (see CPL § 245.50 [4] [c] [i]). This email served only to satisfy the timeliness requirement of CPL § 245.50 (4) (c) and cannot reasonably be characterized as a good faith effort to confer. Nor can the perfunctory exchange that followed be deemed a "conferral." The People responded only by acknowledging receipt and advising that they would respond the following week. Defense filed the motion before any substantive response could be provided. While the statute permits informal conferral by email, such communication must elicit the parties' respective positions in order to establish that a resolution could not be achieved without judicial intervention (see People v Calvin Y., 239 NYS3d 827 [NY Crim Ct 2025]; see also CPL § 245.50 [4] [c]). Here, the People were afforded no meaningful opportunity to articulate their position or attempt to reach an accommodation.

Moreover, a seven-hour interval spanning the evening hours does not constitute a genuine opportunity to confer. By filing the motion the same night the email was sent, defense foreclosed the very dialogue the statute requires. There is no affirmation that conferral efforts were unsuccessful nor any representation that accommodation was attempted and rejected. The absence of such assertions is unsurprising, as no actual conferral occurred.

"Good faith" is defined as faithfulness to one's duty or obligation (Black's Law Dictionary [12th ed 2024]). An email sent on the final day permitted and followed almost immediately by motion practice does not satisfy that standard. The statute demands more than a token gesture undertaken for the purpose of manufacturing compliance. It requires a sincere effort to resolve disputes without court intervention. That effort is wholly lacking here despite defense's "affirmation" of conferral.

Additionally, defense's email did not set forth all the "specific and particularized" grounds later advanced in the motion (CPL § 245.50 [4] [c]). Thus, even had the timing been sufficient, the defense failed to confer regarding the full scope of the issues ultimately raised before the court. The amended provision is explicit: a challenge to a COC must be both timely and preceded by a good faith conferral or demonstrable good faith effort to confer (see CPL § 245.50 [4] [c] [emphasis added]). The defense has failed to satisfy the latter requirement.

The court finds that the defendant effectively waived any right to challenge the COC and SOR. Accordingly, the motion to invalidate the COC and SOR is DENIED. This determination, however, does not relieve the People of their continuing obligation to disclose automatic discovery pursuant to CPL Article 245.

II. Discovery

Despite the failure to confer, CPL § 245.20 (7) establishes a presumption of openness. Specifically, the provision states that there shall be a presumption in favor of disclosure when interpreting § 245.20 (1) which governs automatic discovery. Moreover, CPL § 245.60 codifies the parties' continuing obligation to disclose discoverable material. The statute requires that if either party later becomes aware of material that would have been discoverable under Article 245 at the time of the original exchange, that party must promptly notify the opposing side and disclose it in accordance with the rules governing initial discovery.

Accordingly, notwithstanding the defense's procedural inability to challenge the COC, the court will nevertheless address the outstanding items identified by the defense in the interest of completeness and to ensure full compliance with the People's discovery obligations.

911 Documentation

Defendant contends that 911-related materials, specifically 911 call recordings, Sprint reports, radio runs, 911 certification, and 911 heading (collectively, the "911 documentation") remains outstanding. The People assert that, as reflected in their COC, these materials were requested by subpoena on November 17, 2025. The request remained outstanding at the time the instant motion was filed due to the substantial backlog in processing 911 requests.

The People state that they will disclose any 911 documentation promptly upon receipt and are SO ORDERED to do so.

NYPD Documents

Defendant contends that the People failed to disclose certain NYPD materials pursuant to CPL § 245.20, specifically an aided report for the complaining witness and any other passengers, a prisoner pedigree card, and NYPD driving record reports. The People respond that none of the requested materials exist.

The record reflects that on the third day of the case which was also the first day the matter was assigned to the assigned prosecutor, the People submitted multiple discovery requests specifically seeking the above-referenced items (affirmation of the People, exhibits 2, 3, at 38-42). Additionally, the People conferred directly with arresting Officer Rosado on two separate occasions to confirm whether such materials had been generated. The People also received confirmation from the 69th Precinct that none of the requested records existed.

The defense articulates no basis to dispute these representations or suggests that the materials in fact exist. Even if driving records and a prisoner pedigree card existed, it would not be automatically discoverable, as neither relate to the subject matter of the case, and the latter merely documents duplicative pedigree information.

Accordingly, the People cannot disclose what does not exist.

Photographs taken by Officer Rosado

Defendant requests any photographs taken at the scene on the day of the incident by arresting officer Rosado. The People maintain the same argument as the above NYPD documents, that such photographs do not exist. Defendant argues to the contrary that the photographs exist because Officer Rosado is observed on BWC footage taking photographs of the scene. In light of that representation, the People are SO ORDERED to make an affirmative inquiry as to whether any such photographs exist and to promptly advise the defense of the results of that inquiry within two weeks of the date of this Decision and Order.

[*4]Communication with the Complainant

Defendant requests screenshots or copies of any text or email communications between the complaining witnesses and either law enforcement officers or the District Attorney's Office transmitting photographs or videos of alleged damage. This particular request does not seek the photographs or videos themselves, but rather the communications accompanying their transmission.

Text or email communications that merely transmit images, without any accompanying substantive commentary, are not discoverable under any subsection of CPL § 245.20. Although the underlying images themselves are subject to disclosure (but not at issue), screenshots of messages that simply transmit those images are not relevant to any charged offense or to a defense thereto within the meaning of CPL § 245.20 (1) (e). Nor do such transmissions constitute Rosario material. Accordingly, they are not subject to automatic discovery.

Nevertheless, to the extent that any communications exist in which the substance of the case is discussed, beyond the mere forwarding of images, the People are SO ORDERED to disclose them within two weeks of the date of this Decision and Order.

EMS Reports, ACR Reports, e-PCR Reports, Responder Information, FDNY Documentation

Defendant contends that the EMS reports, ACRs for both ambulances that responded to the scene, the e-PCRs for the complainant, her child, and the defendant, as well as the FDNY prehospital care reports and accompanying cover letters for the complainant and the defendant, are discoverable pursuant to CPL § 245.20 (1) (j) and remain outstanding. However, defense ignores operative language in the statute. The provision requires disclosure of reports and records, inter alia, of physical examinations "relating to the criminal action or proceeding" (CPL § 245.20 [1] [j] [emphasis added]).

A criminal action is typically commenced when an accusatory instrument is filed against a defendant in criminal court (see People v Farkas, 16 NY3d 190, 193 [2011]). A proceeding is the regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events from commencement through entry of judgment (Black's Law Dictionary [12th ed 2024]). More pointedly, a criminal proceeding is a judicial hearing, session, or prosecution in which a court adjudicates whether a person has committed a crime or, having already fixed guilt, decides on the offender's punishment; a criminal hearing or trial (Id.).

Accordingly, the reports and records at issue must relate to the prosecution of the formal charges brought against the defendant in court. If the requested discovery does not pertain to the charged offenses—rather than merely to the underlying incident—it is not automatically discoverable under CPL § 245.20 (1) (j).

Here, none of the charged offenses include physical injury as an element. The medical records of the complainant or her son bear no relation to the formal allegations of vehicle operation, inability to operate a vehicle, impairment, intoxication, defendant's blood alcohol content, property damage, leaving the scene of an accident, or intent. As such, those records are not subject to automatic discovery.

Nevertheless, the People attempted to obtain the requested records by filing an affirmation and subpoena; upon learning that the subpoena had not been filed due to an administrative error, they promptly refiled. After this court rejected the People's subpoena [*5]insofar as it sought EMS, FDNY, and ACR records relating to the defendant FN2, the People filed a subsequent affirmation and subpoena seeking the records of the complainant and her four-month-old child, which remain outstanding. Upon receipt of the requested documentation, the People are hereby ORDERED to disclose it to the defense FN3.

With respect to the request for the names, badge numbers, and contact information of civilian emergency responders, such information constitutes personnel information not within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecution and is likewise obtainable by the defense through its own subpoena power (see People v Carter, 2022 NY Misc LEXIS 4483, 16—17 [Crim Ct Kings Cty Aug 15, 2022] [noting that EMS personnel do not act in a law enforcement capacity and that their contact information and medical records are not under the control of the People]).

To the extent the People have already requested or possess such information, they are SO ORDERED to disclose it; however, they are under no obligation to obtain it.

Medical Records

Defendant contends that any medical records of the complainant and her four-month-old child are discoverable pursuant to CPL § 245.20 (1) (j) and remain outstanding. In the People's opposition, the requested outstanding materials are described as follows: "EMS reports/ACR reports for both of the ambulances that were on scene;" "MS Electronic Prehospital Care Report (e-PCR Database) for both the complaining witness, her child, and Mr. Young;" "FDNY prehospital care report for both the complaining witness and Mr. Young;" "FDNY cover letter for both the complaining witness and Mr. Young;" "name, badge numbers, and contact information for the EMS responders on scene from the two ambulances;" and "medical records for the complaining witness and her child" (collectively referred to herein as the "EMS documentation") (affirmation of the People at 24).

Notably, the People aggregate "medical records" with the broader EMS request, while simultaneously listing various EMS and prehospital reports as distinct categories. This creates ambiguity as to whether the People contend that "medical records" are separate and distinct from the EMS reports already identified or whether the terms are being used interchangeably. This lack of clarity is particularly significant because, in the defense request, EMS reports and medical records are delineated as separate categories of outstanding materials.

Further, the People represent that they subpoenaed "EMS records." It is unclear whether that representation refers solely to prehospital EMS documentation or whether the People are using "EMS records" as a proxy for what they previously described as "medical records." On the present record, it is entirely possible that no separate, additional "medical records" exist beyond the EMS documentation already identified and discussed. The People's imprecise terminology obscures the issue and prevents meaningful assessment of whether any outstanding discoverable [*6]"medical records" remain. However, the same analysis applicable to the EMS records also applies to any other outstanding medical records, which likewise would not be automatically discoverable.

PBT Calibration Documents

Defendant contends that a PBT was administered at the hospital and that the results of that test were provided to the People. The People maintain that, since arraignment, they have treated this matter as a refusal case and represent that no formal IDTU testing was conducted, including any PBT.

However, the People's own exhibit—the Report of Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test—reflects only a refusal to submit to a blood draw at Brookdale Hospital. It does not clarify whether any breath test was administered. Although PBT results are inadmissible at trial, related calibration records are discoverable pursuant to CPL § 245.20 (1) (see People v Wharton, 217 NYS3d 804 [NY App Term 2024]).

Accordingly, the People are SO ORDERED to make an affirmative inquiry and advise the defense of whether a PBT was administered. In the event that a PBT was conducted, the People are further ORDERED to disclose to the defense all related calibration records.

BWC

Defendant requested any BWC from officers Rosado and Hildenbrand or any other officers from the hospital where the PBT was conducted and any BWC from the responding IDTU technician, and the corresponding metadata and audit trail. The People maintain the same representations that such BWC footage and data does not exist.FN4 Defendant offers no argument to the contrary.

Accordingly, the People cannot disclose what does not exist. However, to the extent any BWC was disclosed, the People are SO ORDERED to disclose the accompanying audit trails within two weeks of the date of this Decision and Order.

III. Sanctions

The denial of the present motion on procedural grounds does not foreclose appropriate remedies should discoverable material later be shown to have been improperly withheld or belatedly disclosed. After deeming a COC valid, if the court still finds remedy warranted for belated or outstanding disclosures, it may issue relief. The court therefore defers to the trial court to determine any further appropriate sanctions pursuant to CPL § 245.80.

IV. Conclusion

The court finds that the defense is procedurally barred from challenging the validity of the COC. Accordingly, the COC and SOR are valid and the defendant's motion to invalidate them is DENIED.

The People are nevertheless SO ORDERED to comply with the directives set forth above as well as their continuing duty to disclose pursuant to CPL Article 245.

SPEEDY TRIAL

Where, as here, the highest charge is a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months, the People are required to be ready for trial within 90 days from the commencement of the criminal action (see CPL § 30.30 [1] [b]). A criminal action is typically commenced when an accusatory instrument is filed against a defendant in criminal court. (see People v Farkas, 16 NY3d 190, 193 [2011]).

To satisfy the initial burden under CPL § 30.30, the defendant need only allege "that the prosecution failed to declare readiness within the statutorily prescribed time period" (People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 [1995]). Once the defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time has elapsed since the commencement of the action, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay (see People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]).

November 9, 2025-December 18, 2025

On November 9, 2025 defendant was arraigned in criminal court, commencing the criminal action against him. The matter was adjourned to December 18, 2025, for conversion and compliance. On December 2, 2025 the People filed a COC and on December 5, 2025 a SOR. For the reasons stated above, the COC and SOR were valid, thereby tolling the speedy-trial clock. The period up to December 5, 2025 is chargeable to the People. 26 days charged.

December 18, 2025 — March 19, 2026

On December 18, 2025, the case was adjourned to March 19, 2026 for motion practice. This period is excludable, as the case was in a motion practice posture (CPL § 30.30 [4] [a]). 0 days charged (26 days total).

Because 26 days have been found chargeable to the People, defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30 is DENIED.

THE FOREGOING CONSTITUTES THE OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Dated: March 14, 2026

County of Kings, New York

ENTER:

HON. JUAN D. ABREU, J.C.C.