MN v AN

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on February 10, 2026

Index No. REDACTED

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion No. 003) numbered 106-110, 113, 148, 151, and (Motion No. 004) numbered 114-124, 128-147, 149 were read on this motion. The Court has considered the Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 003), the Cross-Motion noticed December 16, 2025 (Motion Seq. No. 004), and all affirmations, affidavits, replies, and exhibits annexed thereto, including the attorney affirmation dated November 18, 2025 seeking relief under 22 NYCRR 202.48 [b]; the affirmations in opposition and reply; the Notice of Cross-Motion and supporting affidavit addressing the New Jersey rental properties and related financial accounts; and the sworn affirmation opposing the cross-motion concerning authority over lien filings and ownership of the relevant business entities.

II. Findings of Fact

On September 9, 2025, the Court conducted proceedings in connection with Defendant's application for civil contempt. At the conclusion of that appearance, the Court rendered findings from the bench and issued a directive requiring that a transcript be ordered and that notice of settlement be served. The record reflects that no written contempt order memorializing the September 9, 2025 ruling has been settled, submitted, signed, or entered. The chronology thereafter is reflected in the record. The sixty-day period referenced in 22 NYCRR 202.48 [a] is identified as expiring on November 8, 2025. An attempted filing of a proposed order occurred on November 13, 2025 and was rejected due to an incorrect index number. A subsequent filing occurred on November 18, 2025. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 98). No motion for extension, no application to settle nunc pro tunc, and no formal request for excusal upon a showing of good cause was made.

Plaintiff now seeks a declaration that Defendant's contempt motion is deemed abandoned pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48 [b] and further seeks a determination that incarceration may not be imposed on the present record. Defendant's cross-motion seeks extensive interim relief concerning two rental properties located in Elizabeth, New Jersey, including removal of construction liens, reallocation of financial control, exclusive rent-collection authority, restraints on mortgage-related conduct, and restrictions on dealings with third parties.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. The Nature of Civil Contempt and the Requirement of Procedural Regularity

Civil contempt is a remedial mechanism through which the Court enforces compliance with its lawful directives. When exercised properly, it serves the important function of preserving the authority of judicial orders and ensuring that litigants do not disregard binding obligations.

At the same time, contempt is among the most serious powers entrusted to the judiciary. Where coercive sanctions may include confinement, the exercise of that power is circumscribed by statutory, regulatory, and constitutional safeguards. Those safeguards are not formalities. They exist to ensure that enforcement rests upon clear, precise, and reviewable judicial mandates.

The statutory framework governing contempt, including Judiciary Law §§ 753 and 770 and CPLR § 5104, requires that commitment to jail be predicated upon a valid written order. The Court of Appeals has emphasized that such an order must specify the acts constituting contempt, identify the violated provisions, and set forth purge conditions (see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19 [2015]).

The procedural rules governing settlement and submission of orders, including 22 NYCRR 202.48, operate in direct service of these substantive protections. They ensure that oral determinations are timely reduced to written form, settled on notice, and entered in a manner that provides certainty, transparency, and enforceability.

Accordingly, in contempt proceedings implicating liberty interests, the Court is obligated to enforce these rules with exacting fidelity.

B. The September 9, 2025 Ruling and the Obligation to Settle an Order

On September 9, 2025, the Court rendered findings from the bench and directed that a transcript be ordered and that notice of settlement be served. That directive was mandatory in character and was expressly designed to initiate the process by which the oral ruling would be transformed into a settled and entered written order. It identified the procedural bridge between judicial determination and enforceable mandate and assigned responsibility for constructing that bridge.

In the contempt context, that process is indispensable. An oral ruling, standing alone, lacks the precision, permanence, and notice required for lawful enforcement through coercive means. Only a settled, signed, and entered order supplies the institutional form necessary for compliance, review, and enforcement.

The Court therefore treats the September 9, 2025 directive as a direction to proceed with settlement within the meaning and purpose of 22 NYCRR 202.48.

C. Compliance with 22 NYCRR 202.48 and the Consequence of Noncompliance

22 NYCRR 202.48 [a] requires that proposed orders be submitted within sixty days after a decision directing settlement. Subdivision (b) provides that failure to do so shall be deemed an abandonment unless good cause is shown. The rule employs mandatory language. Its structure reflects a deliberate policy choice: oral determinations must be reduced to written orders within a defined period, and unjustified delay results in abandonment.

The record establishes that no compliant proposed order was submitted within the identified sixty-day period. An attempted filing occurred after expiration of that period and was rejected for clerical defect. A subsequent filing also occurred beyond the deadline. No motion was made invoking subdivision (b)'s "good cause" provision.

The Court of Appeals has held that failure to comply with 22 NYCRR 202.48 results in abandonment as a matter of law absent good cause (see Funk v Barry, 89 NY2d 364 [1996]).

This authority, coupled with the rule's mandatory language, forecloses discretionary relaxation where the prescribed mechanism for excusal has not been invoked. The Court declines to construe Rule 202.48 in a manner that would permit indefinite delay in reducing contempt determinations to written form. Such a construction would undermine the rule's purpose and erode the procedural discipline essential to lawful enforcement.

Accordingly, Defendant's contempt motion is deemed abandoned pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48 [b].

D. The Legal Effect of Abandonment Upon Prior Judicial Findings

The Court addresses expressly the institutional concern that abandonment under Rule 202.48 might render prior judicial findings meaningless.

It does not.

The abandonment of a motion under Rule 202.48 does not vacate, nullify, or erase judicial determinations made on the record. Findings rendered from the bench remain part of the official proceedings. They are preserved in the transcript, remain part of the case history, and [*2]may inform subsequent rulings.

What is affected by abandonment is not the existence of the Court's determinations, but their immediate enforceability through coercive mechanisms.

Rule 202.48 governs the transformation of judicial reasoning into an operative order. When that process is not timely completed, the pending application is deemed abandoned. The consequence is procedural: the enforcement pathway is closed. The Court's authority and reasoning are not extinguished.

This distinction is fundamental. A judicial finding is an exercise of adjudicative authority. An enforceable order is an institutional instrument that carries defined obligations and consequences. The latter cannot exist without compliance with settlement and entry requirements.

Abandonment therefore terminates a defective enforcement attempt. It does not diminish the validity of the Court's prior determinations. Where appropriate, a party may seek renewed relief in proper form, at which point prior findings may be incorporated, reaffirmed, or expanded upon, consistent with procedural requirements.

E. Incarceration and the Absence of a Written Contempt Order

Independently of abandonment, the Court must determine whether incarceration may lawfully be imposed on this record.

It may not.

The record establishes that no written contempt order has been settled, signed, or entered following the September 9, 2025 ruling. Under Judiciary Law § 770 and controlling precedent, incarceration may not be imposed absent a written order specifying the offending conduct and setting forth purge conditions (see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19 [2015]). This requirement is not technical. Without a written order, a contemnor cannot know with precision what conduct is required to purge the contempt, what deadlines apply, or what consequences attend noncompliance. Enforcement under such circumstances would violate fundamental due process.

Accordingly, incarceration is procedurally barred on the present record.

F. The Cross-Motion for Interim Property and Financial Relief

The cross-motion seeks sweeping relief affecting ownership, management, and control of two out-of-state rental properties and associated financial accounts. The record contains serious allegations of financial distress, increased mortgage obligations, lender concerns, and potential foreclosure. These matters are not trivial.

At the same time, the record reflects substantial disputes concerning authority to remove construction liens, ownership and control of business entities, responsibility for financial management, and causation of alleged defaults. These disputes lie at the core of the requested relief. The cross-motion seeks to reallocate control, impose restraints, and compel action affecting third-party rights and relationships. Granting such relief would effectively adjudicate contested merits issues without an evidentiary record.

The Court will not restructure control of assets, finances, and external obligations based on contested affidavits where material facts remain unresolved. Accordingly, the extraordinary relief sought is not warranted on this record. The cross-motion is denied without prejudice.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

The procedural safeguards governing contempt proceedings, particularly where incarceration is implicated, require strict adherence. The failure to timely settle and submit a [*3]written order, coupled with the absence of a formal good-cause application, results in abandonment pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48 [b]. Prior judicial findings remain part of the record but lack immediate enforceability.

Separately, incarceration is barred in the absence of a written contempt order satisfying statutory and decisional requirements. The cross-motion seeks relief that cannot be granted in light of unresolved material factual disputes.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. 003) is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's contempt motion is deemed ABANDONED pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48 [b]; and it is further

ORDERED, that incarceration is DECLINED in the absence of a written contempt order conforming to statutory and decisional requirements; and it is further

ORDERED, that Defendant's Cross-Motion dated December 16, 2025 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further

ORDERED, that all relief not expressly granted herein is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: February 10, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT