Jeganathan v Molloy

Supreme Court, Putnam County

Decided on March 24, 2026

Index No. 502205/2025

Anthony R. Molé, J.

Recitation being made in accordance with CPLR 2219 (a), the following papers were read and considered on the New York State Courts Electronic Filing System ("NYSCEF") in connection with the motion made by the Defendants JOHN MOLLOY and MICHELLE THOMAS MOLLOY, pursuant to CPLR 3024 (b), to strike the "scandalous or prejudicial matter in the Summons and Verified Complaint," filed by the Plaintiff's attorney on the ground that "said scandalous or prejudicial matter was unnecessarily inserted in the Complaint."

Papers:

• Notice of Motion; Defendant's Affidavit in Support, Exhibits A-G; Memorandum of Law in Support (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 5-14 [filed Dec. 30, 2025])

• Counsel's Memorandum of Law in Opposition (NYSCEF Doc No. 17 [filed Jan. 9, 2026])

• Reply Affidavit in Support of Motion (NYSCEF Doc No. 20 [filed Jan. 12, 2026])

Upon review of the aforesaid papers,FN1 the Court finds, holds, and determines as follows:

Preliminarily, this Court has history with these parties based on a prior action between them that was commenced by the defendants under Index No. 502218/2024. The Court incorporates by reference herein its prior decision and order dated April 21, 2025 (Molloy v [*2]Jeganathan, Tr. of Jeganathan Family Irrevocable Tr., 85 Misc 3d 1273[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50705[U] [Sup Ct, Putnam County 2025]); as well as the decision and order dated June 5, 2025 (Molloy v Jeganathan, Tr. of Jeganathan Family Irrevocable Tr., 86 Misc 3d 1216[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50948[U] [Sup Ct, Putnam County 2025]).

The parties are homeowners who own neighboring houses on October Lane in the Hamlet of Mahopac, Town of Carmel. They have been involved in litigation concerning a 50-foot easement located on defendants' property which allows plaintiff, and others, to use a right-of-way for ingress and egress (see Molloy v Jeganathan, Tr. of Jeganathan Family Irrevocable Tr., 2025 NY Slip Op 50705[U], at *1). Insofar relevant here, the 2024 action was dismissed as against Jeganathan (plaintiff herein) because the attempted service of the amended summons and complaint upon him was found to be defective, and therefore, the Court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over him (see Molloy v Jeganathan, Tr. of Jeganathan Family Irrevocable Tr., 2025 NY Slip Op 50948[U] at *5).FN2

On December 2, 2025, plaintiff commenced this action by filing a summons and complaint verified by his attorney. The complaint asserts five causes of action against defendants: (1) abuse of process; (2) tort for "malicious actions"; (3) tortious interference with contractual relations; (4) tortious interference with prospective contractual relations; and (5) punitive damages in excess of $1 million dollars. This action initiated by plaintiff stems from defendants' alleged conduct in impeding his endeavor to market and sell his real property (the premises known as 11 October Lane).

Defendants — who have yet to file or interpose a responsive pleading in this action — filed a motion on December 30, 2025, pursuant to CPLR 3024 (b), seeking a court order to "strik[e] the scandalous or prejudicial matter in the Summons and Verified Complaint, verified by [the Plaintiff's attorney] on or about an unstated date, on the ground[] that said scandalous or prejudicial matter was unnecessarily inserted in the Complaint" (NYSCEF Doc No. 5, defendants' notice of motion).FN3 Plaintiff filed opposition papers on January 9, 2026. Defendants, in turn, filed reply papers on January 12, 2026. Defendants' motion is thus fully submitted.

Defendants claim, through counsel's memorandum of law in support,FN4 that "every paragraph in the [c]omplaint should be stricken" (NYSCEF Doc No. 14, affirmation of defendants' counsel at 3). They press that most of the complaint is "founded on hearsay evidence," inasmuch as the pleading alleges facts therein that "have already been adjudicated or for which the statute of limitations has long since passed" (id. at 2). Defendants posit that the [*3]five causes of action pled in the complaint hinge on what plaintiff claims was a "reign of terror" allegedly perpetrated by them upon him (see id.; NYSCEF Doc No. 1, plaintiff's' complaint para 25). Defendants contend that "[n]ot one paragraph in the Complaint from paragraph 6 to the last paragraph, 68, are alleged 'on information and belief,'" despite being verified by plaintiff's attorney (NYSCEF Doc No. 14, mem of law of defendants at 2).FN5

Further, defendants argue that the affidavit in support of this motion by Mr. Molloy tends to prove that many of the allegations in the complaint are, in fact, false (see NYSCEF Doc No. 6, aff of defendant ¶ 2). They claim that "every allegation in the Plaintiff's Complaint should be stricken as irrelevant, inadmissible, time barred, hearsay" (id. ¶ 9 [emphasis added]). Defendants reiterate this request in their memorandum of law by asking that the "demonstrably false allegations should be stricken from the Complaint and Defendant[s'] motion should be granted in its entirety" (NYSCEF Doc No. 14, mem of law of defendants at 5). Also, defendants, in reply, advance that plaintiff's failure to submit sworn affidavits in opposition, including one from plaintiff, dictate that they should prevail on this motion and, thus, authorize this Court to essentially strike all of the paragraphs set forth in the complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 20, reply affidavit of defendant Molloy para 2). The Court disagrees with this premise.

Plaintiff opposes striking the complaint. He argues that defendants stray far from the applicable standard on a motion made under CPLR 3024 (b) by improperly requesting to, in effect, dismiss the complaint in its entirety pursuant to CPLR 3211. Plaintiff correctly points out that the defendants fail to identify the particular enumerated allegations in the complaint they are moving to strike. In addition, plaintiff asserts that the complaint properly "alleges a series of malevolent actions [Mr.] Molloy directed towards the Jeganathan Family for decades" and the defendants are being sued here for their "recent actions" (NYSCEF Doc No. 17, mem of plaintiff's counsel at 3). After closely reviewing the parties' contentions, the undersigned is unpersuaded and unconvinced by defendants' arguments to strike the complaint in toto.

CPLR 3024 (b) states that "[a] party may move to strike any scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in a pleading." "It is generally held that the test under this section is whether the allegation is relevant, in an evidentiary sense, to the controversy and, therefore, admissible at trial" (LG 101 Doe v Wos, 216 AD3d 1393, 1394 [4th Dept 2023] [internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted]). "Matter that is scandalous or prejudicial will not be stricken if it is relevant to a cause of action in a complaint . . . or its material elements" (Gawel v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 244 AD3d 693, 694 [2d Dept 2025]; accord Pisula v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of NY, 201 AD3d 88, 97 [2d Dept 2021]). It has been held that "the mere striking of matter from a pleading under CPLR 3024 (b) does not, ipso facto, preclude related facts or evidence from being admitted at a later trial" (Pisula v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of NY, 201 AD3d at 97).

"CPLR 3024 (b) is a procedural rule that is not raised with particular frequency. Most always, attorneys draft pleadings with an appropriate level of relevant factual averments and elemental detail, each tailored to the unique procedural needs of the case. The statute [*4]nevertheless serves a worthwhile purpose of assuring that civil pleadings, which are public documents except for those involving matrimonial and family relief, not contain matter that unnecessarily scandalizes or prejudices the adversary party either within the litigation or beyond it" (Pisula v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of NY, 201 AD3d at 97).

"Motions to strike scandalous or prejudicial matter from pleadings are generally disfavored. Whether to strike allegedly scandalous or prejudicial matter from a pleading in a given instance is left to the discretion of the trial court" (id. [citations omitted]; see Walker v Sheldon, 10 NY2d 401, 405 n 3 [1961] [upholding denial of motion to strike demand for punitive damages as "irrelevant and prejudicial" pursuant to what is now codified in CPLR 3024 (b)]; Manhattanville Coll. v James John Romeo Consulting Engr., P.C., 28 AD3d 613, 614 [2d Dept 2006], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 852 [2007]; Halford v First Jersey Sec., 182 AD2d 1003, 1005 [3d Dept 1992]; see also CPLR 5701 [b] [3]).

In exercising such discretion here, the Court denies defendants' motion (see Bristol Harbour Assoc. v Home Ins. Co., 244 AD2d 885, 886 [4th Dept 1997]). "[T]he CPLR does not authorize a court to strike factual allegations except when they are scandalous or prejudicial" (Kelly v City of New York, 221 AD3d 534, 534-535 [1st Dept 2023]). "In reviewing a motion pursuant to CPLR 3024 (b)[,] the inquiry is whether the purportedly scandalous or prejudicial allegations are relevant to a cause of action" (Soumayah v Minnelli, 41 AD3d 390, 392 [1st Dept 2007]).

Examining the pleading at issue, plaintiff's complaint consists of 15 pages (excluding the verification page) and contains 68 numbered paragraphs (see NYSCEF Doc No. 1, complaint). Given the very early stage of this action and a wholly limited record, the Court is unable to discern and conclusively decide which paragraph(s) or factual allegation(s) and what matter may be admissible at trial and whether it may be "necessary for the sufficiency of the [plaintiff's] pleading" (JC Mfg. v NPI Elec., 178 AD2d 505, 506 [2d Dept 1991]).

Defendants' issues with paragraphs 15-21, 22 (e), 24, 28, 32, and 36-38 tend to hinge on different views and perspectives of personal beliefs, filings, and factual events from their own perspective (see NYSCEF Doc No. 6, aff of defendant ¶ 4-65); and thus, they naturally disagree with how those allegations in the complaint are framed and worded. Such, however, does not warrant striking those factual allegations as scandalous or prejudicial, inasmuch as they arguably could be relevant and related to the causes of action pled in the complaint (see id.).

At the same time, defendants' motion asks this Court to sweepingly strike almost all of the factual allegations pleaded in the complaint. The Court declines to apply their suggestion of such a heavy-handed approach. As plaintiff correctly notes, defendants fail to squarely specify which enumerated allegation(s) in the complaint are arguably scandalous or prejudicial (see CPLR 3024 [b]). Rather, they ask this Court to blanketly strike out almost everything in the pleading. This the Court will not do. Defendants neglected to specifically identify or list which paragraph(s) of the complaint they seek to strike (compare e.g. Gawel v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 244 AD3d at 694-695; Forty Cent. Park S., Inc. v Anza, 130 AD3d 491, 492 [1st Dept 2015]).

"In our adversarial system of adjudication, [courts] follow the principle of party presentation. The parties frame the issues for decision, while the court serves as neutral arbiter of matters the parties present" (Clark v Sweeney, 607 US 7, 9 [2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). This is to say that if a party fails to clearly articulate a cogent argument, with the requisite specificity when needed, a court does not assume the role of advocate. [*5]Instead, a court normally decides the issues that a party chose to present. Indeed, "[t]he Court of Appeals has cautioned the judiciary that 'we are not in the business of blindsiding litigants, who expect us to decide matters on rationales advanced by the parties, not arguments their adversaries never made'" (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v St. Louis, 229 AD3d 116, 122 [2d Dept 2024] [internal brackets omitted], quoting Misicki v Caradonna, 12 NY3d 511, 519 [2009]).

Here, defendants' notice of motion fails to identify exactly which enumerated allegation(s)/paragraph(s) in the complaint that they are requesting to strike as "scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in [the] pleading" (CPLR 3024 [b]; see CPLR 2214 [a] [requiring a notice of motion to "specify the relief demanded and the grounds therefor"]). Parts of defendants' motion identify certain allegations in the complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 6, aff of defendant ¶ 4-65), while other parts of their motion ask to strike every allegation asserted in the complaint (see id. ¶ 9; NYSCEF Doc No. 14, mem of law of defendants at 5). Such bemuses defendants' contentions, thus preventing this Court from intelligently rendering a well-reasoned decision on the merits with respect to their motion.

The undersigned declines to assume the role of an advocate on the defendants' behalf by parsing and wading through 68 paragraphs in the 15-page complaint and arbitrarily make rulings as to the propriety of each lone paragraph in the complaint and whether it constitutes scandalous or prejudicial material. It is perhaps telling that the defendants neglected, in their notice of motion, to identify which enumerated paragraph(s) in the complaint that they are moving to strike under CPLR 3024 (b), despite the cursory reference therein to "said scandalous or prejudicial matter" concerning the pleading in question (see NYSCEF Doc No. 5, defendants' notice of motion). Hence, defendants' moving papers obfuscate as to what exactly the disputed allegations are, to the extent indicated (cf. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v St. Barnabas Community Health Plan, 22 AD3d 391, 391 [1st Dept 2005]).

Contrary to defendants' assertion that plaintiff failed to furnish sworn affidavits in opposition to this motion, there is no requirement that he must do so on a "[m]otion to correct pleadings" made under CPLR 3024. Surely, defendants' present application is not a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action upon (see CPLR 3211 [a] [7]), nor is it one requesting summary judgment (see CPLR 3212). The Court declines to treat it as either (see CPLR 2214).

For these reasons, the Court rejects defendants' request to strike all of the allegations in the complaint. Defendants' motion is therefore denied.

To the extent not specifically mentioned herein, the parties' remaining contentions have been evaluated and determined to be without merit. Any other relief that is not squarely addressed herein is rendered academic or denied based on this decision. Accordingly, it is hereby:

Ordered that the motion of Defendants JOHN MOLLOY and MICHELLE THOMAS MOLLOY (Mot. Seq. No. 1), made pursuant to CPLR 3024 (b), to strike the "scandalous or prejudicial matter in the Summons and Verified Complaint" is DENIED in its entiretyFN6; and it is further

Ordered that the Plaintiff shall cause a copy of this Decision and Order to be served, with notice of entry, within fifteen (15) days from the date herein and electronically file proof of such [*6]service on the NYSCEF system.

The foregoing decision constitutes the order of the Court.

Dated: March 24, 2026

Carmel, New York

E N T E R:

HON. ANTHONY R. MOLÉ

Acting Justice of the Supreme Court