People v Hernandez
2026 NY Slip Op 50466(U)
March 30, 2026
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County
David L. Goodwin, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
The People of the State of New York,
v
J. Hernandez, Defendant.
Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County
Decided on March 30, 2026
Docket No. CR-023159-25BX
FOR THE DEFENDANT: Eli J. Massey, The Legal Aid Society
FOR THE PEOPLE: Bronx ADA Cara L. Hernandez
David L. Goodwin, J.
[*1]Pending is the defense's counseled omnibus motion. It is resolved as follows. As the parties are the primary audience, familiarity with the case is assumed.
The branch seeking to invalidate the COC and dismiss on C.P.L. § 30.30 speedy trial grounds is denied, as the People have narrowly met their burden of showing reasonable efforts to comply with their statutory discovery obligations. See C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a); People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 212 (2023).
As the defense points out, this case is not particularly complex, and the alleged errors and omissions bump up against the boundaries of what reasonable diligence can tolerate.FN1 Overall, however, the People's pre-readiness inquiries and outreach appear reasonable. See People's Resp. Aff. ¶ 17. And while the People took longer than strictly necessary to remedy some of the omissions identified by the defense—the record on why the People took the time they did also is not as developed as it should be, see Defense's Reply at 23—they were ultimately able to provide the correct activity logs. As to those logs, the People argue that they were substantively irrelevant and duplicative of other discovery provided, see People's Resp. at 27, which the defense does not contest, see Defense's Reply at 22-26.
The People otherwise confirm that certain materials do not exist. While the defense finds [*2]that position dubious, there is nothing beyond surmise to the contrary at this juncture, let alone anything to demonstrate that escalation to other sources would produce a different answer. Regarding the vehicle report, however, the People are ordered to conduct outreach to the arresting officer to confirm that the report does not exist. Should this material (or the dash cam) exist after all, the defense may avail itself of all appropriate remedies, including (if necessary) a renewed challenge to the COC or appropriate sanctions.
Regarding the Giglio material for the IDTU officer, the easiest place to start is the contested log. While defense counsel's argument on the potential unfairness of imputing actual or constructive possession of the log to the defense is well-taken, the fact remains that defense counsel does, in fact, have the log. As the People's motion for a protective order was filed around the time they declared ready—as of the time this motion schedule was set, the defense had agreed to the protective order in part, although the defense's position changed by the time of the motion response here—it is difficult to weigh the "belated" disclosure of the log too heavily against the People, especially as (per the discussion further below) the § 30.30 clock would have functionally stopped running for that period regardless. The "less-redacted" Giglio materials for the IDTU officer, IAB log attachments for the same officer, and CPI would not be themselves enough to swing the relevant statutory factors in the defense's favor, given the particular role played by the IDTU officer in this refusal case.
The People are nevertheless required to obtain, within 45 days of this order, the relevant "less-redacted" Giglio materials so that the People may, from personal knowledge, provide the information required by C.P.L. § 245.20(6). If, upon obtaining the less-redacted materials, the People determine that information was redacted that should not have been pursuant to Article 245, they must promptly disclose the in-the-clear versions to defense counsel and provide an explanation to the Court. The People are also ordered, as a matter of discretion, to provide the IAB log attachments and CPI to the defense within 45 days of this order.
Finally, the defense argues that the pending motion for a protective order was filed in bad faith, and should not lead to § 30.30(4)(a) excludable time, because Judge Sorrentino already ordered disclosed the IAB log that is the subject of the motion. But the People's motion was filed in November,FN2 while Judge Sorrentino's decision was issued the following January. Thus, at the [*3]time it was filed, the People's motion for a protective order could not have been in bad faith on the grounds identified by the defense.
In sum, the People have established that they discharged their statutory discovery obligations with the requisite good faith and due diligence. Their COC is deemed valid. There being no apparent argument that the § 30.30 time would have run otherwise, the defense's request for dismissal is denied.
The People's motion for a protective order is denied as academic. The defense is in actual possession of the relevant log without any restrictions, and the People do not argue that C.P.L. § 245.70(1) permits a court to reimpose restrictions on discovery disclosed without restrictions to the same office in a prior case, or to limit the use or dissemination of that material; the People also (as of the time of this decision) do not rely on any other source of authority for their request. This denial, however, is without prejudice to the People renewing their application under some other source of authority that may support the limitation on the dissemination or use of this material. And in light of the repeated mentions of the underlying incident from the log in the defense's reply brief—see Defense's Reply at 14, 20, 22 n.4, 28, 30 n.5—it is worth emphasizing that discretion by the defense may nevertheless be warranted despite the lack of any formal restrictions.
As to omnibus relief, the sworn record does not quite establish the sequence leading to the alleged refusal, and the elements of the video that the parties describe suggest that additional investigation would be helpful. Accordingly, an 1194 hearing is ordered, along with a so-called Gursey hearing to determine whether any limited right to counsel may have been violated. A Mapp/Dunaway hearing is also ordered in the interest of judicial economy.
Any Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia issues are reserved for the trial court. Any requests for relief not specifically mentioned are denied.
Dated: March 30, 2026
Bronx, NY
David L. Goodwin
Judge of the Criminal Court
Footnotes
- Footnote 1: In the conclusion portion of the reply brief, the defense observes that Bronx prosecutors "routinely ignore" the 35-day initial-discovery deadline of C.P.L. § 245.10(1)(a), which should count against the People's due diligence. Defense's Reply at 26. But arguments like this should not be raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Eastmore Owners Corp. v. Zelmanovich, 85 Misc 3d 143(A), 2025 NY Slip Op. 50787(U), at *1 (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2025). The issue was mentioned in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the initial motion as part of a recitation of the legal standard, but the defense did not actually argue there that the People failed to meet the obligation.
- Footnote 2: As Judge Sorrentino flagged in his Encarnacion decision, the First Department has previously concluded that a COC filed while a protective-order motion is pending is "not proper." People v. Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 526 (1st Dept. 2022). The situation from Torres does not appear to have been revisited by the First Department, and it is not clear whether Torres means (1) that any COC filed while a protective-order motion is pending is per se invalid, or (2) that the specific COC filed while that particular protective-order motion was pending was "not proper" because the COC could not be valid without the relevant omissions. Context suggests the latter reading is the right one, especially as the request for a protective order may have encompassed, among other things, the very identities of both the complainant and witnesses. See Motion in People v. Torres, 2020 WL 13500008. Here, by contrast, the People's request was far less fundamental to the People's very ability to declare ready.
In any event, while Torres is mentioned in the standard-of-law portion of the defense's motion, see Defense's Mot. ¶ 5, the defense does not actually raise a Torres argument, so the issue need not be definitively resolved.