Supreme Court, Kings County

Decided on March 31, 2026

Index No. [Redacted]

Jeffrey S. Sunshine, J.

[*1]

This application by plaintiff for counsel fees and expert fees is based on defendant's allegations that he had been "defrauded" out of cryptocurrency that he now concedes that he did not disclose and which plaintiff only uncovered through subpoenaed discovery. When confronted by plaintiff's counsel about the discovery that defendant allegedly had $2,000,000.00 in cryptocurrency he did not disclose the defendant asserted that he no longer had any cryptocurrency: initially alleging he had been "victim" of a "catfishing" scheme and then claiming he lost the cryptocurrency in an online investing scheme but asserting that either way the cryptocurrency was "gone". Plaintiff's expert submitted an affirmation that there was no indication that the transfers out of defendant's cryptocurrency accounts after the [*2]commencement of this divorce action were the result of a fraud against him but rather the activity appeared to be an attempt to move the cryptocurrency into off-shore accounts.

On August 11, 2025, plaintiff's counsel filed an order to show cause seeking the following:

(a) Pursuant to D.R.L. § 237(a), ordering Defendant to pay $500,000 in pendente lite counsel fees payable to Krauss Shaknes Tallentire & Messeri LLP within fifteen (15) days of an Order of the Court, and further granting Krauss Shaknes Tallentire & Messeri LLP leave to record a money judgment against Defendant in the event any portion of such an award is not paid within fifteen (15) days of an Order of the Court; and

(b) (a) Pursuant to D.R.L. § 237(a), ordering Defendant to pay $150,000 in pendente lite expert fees payable to Krauss Shaknes Tallentire & Messeri LLP within fifteen (15) days of an Order of the Court, and further granting Krauss Shaknes Tallentire & Messeri LLP leave to record a money judgment against Defendant in the event any portion of such an award is not paid within fifteen (15) days of an Order of the Court;

(c) Pursuant to 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 202.18, reapportioning the parties' responsibility to pay the ongoing fees of the Court-appointed neutral business valuator, Empire Valuation Consultants, to be apportioned 100% to Defendant subject to reallocation in settlement or at trial; and

(d) Granting Plaintiff such other and further relief as this Court may deem just, proper and equitable under the circumstances.

Plaintiff's counsel submitted an affirmation in support [NYSCEF #370] and plaintiff submitted an affirmation in support [NYSCEF #372]. The application was also supported by an affirmation of Richard Widmann, Esq., the expert retained by plaintiff, related to the issues of cryptocurrency assets [NYSCEF #371]. Plaintiff's application included exhibits 1 — 16 [NYSCEF #373-388].

On September 22, 2025, the parties stipulated to adjourn the order to show cause to November 20, 2025 [NYSCEF #390] and set a briefing schedule on consent for opposition and reply submissions. The parties subsequently entered into an amended briefing schedule [NYSCEF #399].

On November 10, 2025, defendant filed an affirmation in opposition [NYSCEF #393] and defendant's counsel filed an affirmation [NYSCEF #394] supported by exhibits A — D [NYSCEF #395-398].

On November 19, 2025, plaintiff's counsel filed an affirmation in reply [NYSCEF #401] and plaintiff filed an affirmation [NYSCEF #400]. Plaintiff's reply was also supported by an affirmation from Richard Widmann, Esq., an expert retained by plaintiff, related to cryptocurrency issues [NYSCEF #402] together with exhibits 17 — 24 [NYSCEF #403-410].

On November 20, 2025, this matter was scheduled for oral argument on the motion; however, during that court appearance, defendant's counsel sought the right to file a sur-reply based upon new information raised in the plaintiff's reply.

The Court granted defendant the right to file a sur-reply and plaintiff's counsel the right to file a sur-sur-reply. On application of plaintiff's counsel, the Court issued an interim order of pendente lite counsel fees to plaintiff in the sum of $50,000.00 without prejudice pending full submission [NYSCEF #412].

On December 2, 2025, defendant filed a sur-reply [NYSCEF #414] supported by exhibits A — D [NYSCEF #415-418]. Plaintiff's counsel filed a sur-sur reply, dated December 12, 2025 [NYSCEF #419]. The parties and counsel filed a consent stipulation waiving further oral argument on the submission of the sur-reply and sur-sur-reply [NYSCEF #422].

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties' marriage was solemnized in a religious ceremony on July 6, 2014. Plaintiff-Wife commenced this action for divorce on February 12, 2023 [NYSCEF #1]. Plaintiff-Wife is thirty-one (31) [*3]years old: she owns a beauty services business which she avers she started in October 2022. Defendant-Husband is thirty-eight (38) year old and owns a dental practice where he works as a dentist. There are two (2) children of the marriage, E. B., age 10, and El. B., age 7. The plaintiff-wife and the parties' children currently reside in the marital residence in Brooklyn.FN1 The defendant-husband alleges that he pays rent to live in an apartment owned by his mother which was purchased by her during this litigation. Plaintiff contends that defendant purchased this apartment in his mother's name after the commencement of this divorce action and that any money he is paying is under the guise of "rent" and merely a way to funnel income. There have been allegations by both parties of large-scale, hidden financial assets and extensive underreporting of income of their respective businesses. Defendant contends that plaintiff earns much more than the $20,000.00 to $30,000.00 annual income she represents for her beauty business. Plaintiff contends that defendant has not explained why his reported income dropped more than 50% from nearly $420,000.00 in 2021 [NYSCEF #44] to $213,000.00 in 2022 [NYSCEF #169] shortly before plaintiff commenced this divorce litigation while he reported gross receipts of well over $2,000,000.00 on his 2021 business tax returns [NYSCEF #17] given that he concedes that he controls the salary he draws from his dental practice [NSYCEF #221, p. 17]. In written decisions, this Court has noted that the "allegations appear to require extensive discovery and depositions which may require both parties to incur considerable counsel fees" [decision and order dated June 4, 2024 [NYSCEF #285]).

This Court has issued numerous written decisions detailing the procedural history and the parties' positions related to this case and those decisions must be read in conjunction with this decision and order: decision dated January 23, 2024 [NYSCEF #221]; A.S. v. A.B., 84 Misc 3d 692 [Kings County, July 3, 2024] [NYSCEF #310]; A.S. v. A.B., 85 Misc 3d 1264(A) [Kings County, March 14, 2025] [NYSCEF #365].

Both parties have been represented by two (2) prior attorneys in this divorce action prior to their current representation.

Prior Pendente Lite Counsel Fee Awards

On June 12, 2023, this Court issued an Interim Support Order [NYSCEF #71]. On May 17, 2024, plaintiff moved by order to show cause seeking contempt for defendant's failure to comply with various provisions of the June 12, 2023 Interim Support Order. Defendant satisfied the arrears after the enforcement application was filed but did not consent to pay counsel fees related thereto. Plaintiff's counsel notified the Court that plaintiff was withdrawing the relief of a contempt finding but that the issue of counsel fees related to the enforcement application remained unresolved.

In a decision and order dated June 5, 2024 [motion seq. #7], this Court awarded plaintiff $25,000.00 in pendente lite counsel fees pursuant to DRL 237 after finding that defendant was "clearly the monied spouse as contemplated by DRL 237(a) [NYSCEF #285] without prejudice to future applications for additional counsel fees as necessary at the time of trial or sooner upon the requisite showing.

In a decision and order dated November 6, 2024, the Court addressed the sole remaining issue of plaintiff's request for counsel fees for enforcement pursuant to DRL 238 related to the contempt application. The Court found that defendant's failure to abide by the interim support order clearly resulted in plaintiff having to incur unnecessary counsel fees to seek enforcement and awarded plaintiff [*4]the additional sum of $10,000.00 in counsel fees pursuant to DRL 238 [NYSCEF # 325, p. 7]. In that decision, the Court noted that:

. . . from the beginning of this litigation the defendant has provided an extensive litany of excuses as to why his court-ordered support obligations have not been paid or have been paid late when they are eventually paid: the constant has been that the plaintiff has steadfastly maintained that defendant only pays what he wants, when he wants. The plaintiff has repeatedly alleged that due to the defendant not making timely payments that utilities are at risk of shut-ff and other services that she and the children use in the marital residence have been jeopardized. Each time plaintiff raises these allegations the defendant asserts shock or surprise and has offered numerous different excuses . . . [NYSCEF #325, p. 9].

After the appointment of an attorney for the children and full preparation for a custody and parenting time trial and after Dr. Samantha Stehle had issued a forensic evaluation report, the issues of custody and parenting time were resolved on the first date of trial by a custody and parenting time agreement, dated December 9, 2024 [NYSCEF #363]. The attorney for the child was relieved on consent. Only the parties' financial and other ancillary issues remain before the Court.

In November 2024, plaintiff filed for pendente lite counsel fees and expert fees alleging that the defendant planned to "drag out this case, play dirty, require me to litigate every issue, and use our disparate resources to force me to concede to his demands" [NYSCEF #365, p. 4] and plaintiff's counsel averred that "in fourteen years of representing exclusively matrimonial litigants, [he has] not encountered a more recalcitrant litigant than the Defendant" [NYSCEF #365, p. 4]. Plaintiff alleged defendant failed to disclose accounts with more than $700,000.00 in cash while asserting that he could not afford to pay for Comprehensive Family Services (CFS) supervision for his parenting time with his children and opted to reduce his parenting time with the children. At that time, the Court awarded plaintiff additional $125,000.00 in pendente lite counsel fees "without prejudice to future applications for additional counsel fees, as necessary at the time of trial or sooner, upon the requisite showing" by written decision and order dated March 14, 2025 [NYSCEF #365, p. 16].

Current Application

Plaintiff now seeks an additional award of pendente lite counsel fees and expert fees because she alleges that through subpoenaed discovery she and her attorney together with assistance from an expert uncovered that the defendant had (or has) vast sums of cryptocurrency that he did not disclose and that she believes that his cryptocurrency far exceeds the sum that he eventually conceded that he had: she argues that to conduct the discovery necessary to ascertain the true nature of defendant's cryptocurrency will require hundreds of hours and will also require the assistances of a cryptocurrency expert to trace the sophisticated transfers she believes defendant made in an attempt to, in effect, "hide" these cryptocurrency assets from her and this Court to shield them from consideration in this divorce litigation.

Defendant does not dispute that he did not disclose that he owned cryptocurrency in his initial Statement of Net Worth and he conceded that he had owned cryptocurrency as of the date of commencement of the action only after plaintiff uncovered it during subpoenaed discovery; however, he asserts that he never owned as much cryptocurrency as plaintiff alleges and that he no longer owns any. He initially alleged that he was "defrauded" of his cryptocurrency by an online cyber-romance scheme ("catfishing") but, subsequently, he alleged that he was a victim of a crypto-investing scheme: either way, defendant contends that he was defrauded of any cryptocurrency after the date of commencement and that plaintiff should not be awarded counsel fees or expert fees to trace the many alleged [*5]cryptocurrency transfers she claims to have uncovered. Defendant contends, in effect, that additional discovery is pointless because the cryptocurrency is gone.

Plaintiff contends that tracing is required to ascertain the sum of cryptocurrency defendant had at the date of commencement and whether he transferred it away into accounts he controls because it applies to defendant's ability to pay support as well as to claims of equitable distribution and/or any possible claims of wasteful dissipation. She avers that given the complexities of cryptocurrency she and her attorney require the expertise of a cryptocurrency expert and that under the facts and circumstances — including the allegation that defendant failed to disclose the asset and may be trying to hide it now — that defendant should pay her expert fees for this tracing.

Plaintiff's Argument

Plaintiff contends that " . . . since the very day this action commenced, Defendant has shown that he will stop at nothing to transfer, hide, secrete, dissipate and obfuscate marital assets in violation of the Automatic Orders" [NYSCEF #370, p. 1-2] including transferring almost $400,000.00 to his aunt on the same day he was served with the summons and automatic orders in this divorce action allegedly for repayment of a loan [NYSCEF #196, p. 13] and that he allegedly purchased an $820,000.00 apartment in Brooklyn in cash through an LLC in his mother's name where defendant alleges he lives and pays rent to his mother. The Court noted in the written decision and order dated January 23, 2024 that despite a full opportunity to do so, defendant did not submit a lease, receipts or any other documentation in support of his representation that he is legally obligated to pay rent to his mother [NYSCEF #221, p. 14].

Plaintiff contends that in addition to defendant's lack of transparency about his financial circumstances throughout this litigation that he has also demonstrated a pattern of behavior during this litigation that reveals that he is not willing to be forthright. She argues that " . . . there were the lies and obfuscation surrounding the GPS tracking device that Defendant had a private investigator place on [plaintiff]'s vehicle" [NYSCEF #370, p. 2] and that defendant was not forthcoming at his deposition related to direct questions about this which required plaintiff to subpoena documents including defendant's bank records showing that he transferred more than $23,000.00 to the private investigator [NYSCEF #370, p. 2].

Plaintiff's counsel contends that "[plaintiff] has also been forced to issue subpoenas to uncover, what now amounts to millions of dollars Defendant has failed to disclose to this Court and has attempted to hide" [NYSCEF #370, p. 2]. Plaintiff's counsel avers that through subpoenas plaintiff has uncovered more than a million ($1,000,000.00) in assets that she believes defendant did not disclose during discovery [NYSCEF #370, p. 2].

Plaintiff's counsel contends that because defendant has been recalcitrant in providing full financial disclosure that plaintiff has had to engage in extensive subpoena discovery and that only through that due diligence has plaintiff been able to uncover defendant's true financial circumstances.

He alleges that during subpoena discovery plaintiff uncovered that defendant had access and control over extensive cryptocurrency during the marriage that he did not disclose during discovery and that it appears that defendant engaged in an elaborate pattern of transferring those cryptocurrencies during this litigation. She contends that these transfers were designed to shield his cryptocurrency holdings from plaintiff and the Court so that it would not be subject to this litigation:

. . . over $2.6 million worth of cryptocurrency in Defendant's possession and control. The existence of cryptocurrency owned by Defendant has never been disclosed throughout this two and a half year litigation. In fact, Defendant lied about this as well in his deposition, stating under oath that he owned $20,000 worth of Bitcoin (which was never disclosed) and that he never owned any other Bitcoin or any other cryptocurrency" [NYSCEF #370, p. 3].

At plaintiff's deposition of defendant on May 7, 2025, defendant asserted that " . . . I don't know much about crypto" [NYSCEF #373, p. 63, l. 6] and that other than a limited attempt to "mine" cryptocurrency in 2016 [during the marriage] that he had not been involved in cryptocurrency again until approximately March 2025 [after the date of commencement] when he purchased approximately $20,000.00 worth of Bitcoin [NYSCEF #373, p. 64]. When questioned during his deposition by plaintiff's counsel as to whether he had ever held any other cryptocurrency, defendant testified [NYSCEF #373, p. 65-66]:

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Other than what we had just talked about, the investment with [plaintiff]'s uncle and brother and the $20,000 that you invested in Bitcoin two months ago, have you ever held any cryptocurrency?

DEFENDANT: (No response)

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Have you ever owned any cryptocurrency other than what we just talked about?

DEFENDANT: Whatever the activity was back then with her uncle and brother, that's what it was.

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Other than that and other than the 20,000, have you ever owned any other Bitcoin?

DEFENDANT: No.

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL: Or any other cryptocurrency?

DEFENDANT: No.

Plaintiff's counsel contends that, notwithstanding his deposition testimony, subpoenaed discovery and analysis thereof by plaintiff's cryptocurrency expert revealed that defendant had much greater involvement with cryptocurrency than he had disclosed. Plaintiff's counsel asserted that based on the amount of ongoing discovery and expert analysis to trace the cryptocurrency necessary based on this discovery he prepared the instant motion; however, he avers that "the very hour after I notified (as a courtesy) Defendant's counsel that I would be filing a motion relating to this cryptocurrency issue, Defendant converted all of his ETH [cryptocurrency] to USDC stablecoin" and began transferring his cryptocurrency holdings out of the identified accounts in elaborate routes [NYSCEF #370, p. 3]. Plaintiff contends that when defendant learned she had uncovered his hidden cryptocurrency he started trying to hide these assets and that defendant's actions make her need for a cryptocurrency expert even more necessary to trace the assets.

As detailed herein below, when confronted with these transfers, defendant would come up with several claims of how he was "defrauded" of the cryptocurrency first as the "victim" of catfishing and then as the "victim" of an organized cryptocurrency investment scheme scam.

Plaintiff's counsel avers that "[w]e believe this to be the tip of the proverbial iceberg" [NYSCEF #370, p. 3] and asserts that:

. . . based upon Defendant's actions throughout this litigation, that he cannot be trusted to disclose the existence of his cryptocurrency holdings, and as such, [plaintiff] is in need of a substantial amount of expert fees with which my firm will retain on her behalf a sophisticated team of [*6]cryptocurrency experts consisting of an attorney specializing in litigations involving complex cryptocurrency issues (Mr. Widmann) as well as a tracing firm who will be able to perform complex tracing work that is needed to fully trace Defendant's cryptocurrency holdings [NYSCEF #370, p. 3].

Plaintiff retained Mr. Widmann as her cryptocurrency expert. Mr. Widmann submitted an affirmation in support of plaintiff's application, averring that based upon an initial review of the currently obtained subpoenaed discovery, defendant has maintained and traded in cryptocurrency throughout the marriage most extensively since 2017 despite defendant's deposition testimony attempting to disavow his knowledge and involvement with cryptocurrency. Mr. Widmann contends that:

. . . [m]y preliminary tracing determined that [defendant]'s use of decentralized exchanges, numerous self custody wallets and swaps in and out of multiple types of cryptocurrencies indicates that he has a deep understanding of cryptocurrency and would be familiar with techniques to make it difficult for a lay person to trace, track or follow his cryptocurrency ownership" [NYSCEF #371, p. 15].

Mr. Widmann contends that it appears that defendant has engaged in a pattern of cryptocurrency transactions known as "hopping" to "break the relational connection" between one cryptocurrency account and other cryptocurrency exchanges/services, including one, he asserts, that often fails to collect information about account holders making it "the platform of choice for individuals seeking to avoid tying their identity to any cryptocurrency ownership for a host of reasons including money laundering, tax avoidance or shielding assets from US-based courts" [NYSCEF #371, p. 17-18]. He asserts that "beginning in February 2024 and ending in June 2025" the defendant made "prolific interactions" in effect moving all funds from his known "wallet" to decentralized exchanges [NYSCEF #371, p. 18].

Mr. Widmann's affirmation details that he reviewed several wallets associated with the defendant that, he asserts, show a similar pattern of moving funds in and out of off-shore exchanges that are not intended for US users because they do not require the same level of identity verification or reporting [NYSCEF #371, p. 19]. He states that some of these off-shore exchanges rely on self-authentication so it is easy for a person to avoid reporting if they are acting in bad faith to hide assets.

Mr. Widmann asserted that while drafting his affirmation, one of the cryptocurrency accounts believed to belong to defendant held more than $2,000,000.00 but that on August 7, 2025, that wallet engaged in "several transactions" and sold the holdings [NYSCEF #371, p. 22-23]. He asserts that his initial review of subpoenaed discovery includes at least nine (9) other wallets that "received funds that appear to have relational connections to [defendant]" [NYSCEF #371, p. 23-24].

Despite defendant's initial contention when plaintiff filed this application that he had, in effect, been "scammed" out of any cryptocurrency he may have had (and he did not deny at that time that he had held cryptocurrency that he had not disclosed), Mr. Widmann asserts in his affirmation that active scam accounts are, in effect, flagged by the cryptocurrency community, and that there is no indication from a review of the transactions that defendant's "transaction activity was unauthorized or the result of an account takeover or hack" [NYSCEF #371, p. 24].

Mr. Widmann affirmed that "[defendant's] frequent use of US-based centralized exchanges, offshore centralized exchanges, decentralized exchanges, and various self custody wallets indicates that the full nature of his cryptocurrency activity will require significant efforts to trace the source and destination of the funds" [NYSCEF #371, p. 26]. He also asserts that these wallets are "self-custody assets" so the holder has a private key so "unlike traditional bank or account passwords, there is no help desk or password recovery option" so there is no way to access the funds if the "individuals refuse to [*7]provide truthful statements regarding their ownership of self custody wallets" [NYSCEF #371, p. 26].

Mr. Widmann asserts that multi-hop transactions between centralized exchanges such as the ones he alleges are shown in the subpoenaed discovery "does not have any legitimate purpose other than obfuscating the ownership of the funds" [NYSCEF #371, p. 28]. He also contends that defendant's cryptocurrency activity patterns is "consistent with individuals seeking to obfuscate or hide their ownership of cryptocurrency" [NYSCEF #371, p. 28]. It does not appear that defendant's engagement with cryptocurrency is that of a passive or casual user.

Plaintiff's counsel argues that:

. . . the primary reason [plaintiff's] legal fees have accumulated and will continue to accumulate at a rapid rate is Defendant's abhorrent conduct in this litigation in failing to comply with Court Orders, transferring marital assets to third parties requiring third party depositions, lying in his deposition and to this Court, and attempting to hide what now amounts to millions of dollars. This has required my office to issue more subpoenas in this matter than I probably have in any other case in my career, and there is seemingly no end in sight as to the discovery that will be required to unwind the web of lies Defendant has woven, as nothing Defendant says at this point can be taken at face value [NYSCEF #370, p. 8].

Plaintiff's counsel contends that plaintiff is "faced again with an impending mountain of legal and expert fees" to "finalize discovery" which, he asserts "was just made infinitely more difficult and complex due to Defendant's failure to disclose another $2.6 million in an asset class that is highly complex and technical . . . " [NYSCEF #370, p. 4].

He also contends that additional pendente lite counsel fees are necessary " . . . to finish Defendant's deposition; to conduct several third parties, including Defendant's girlfriend, [D.S.], whom Defendant has transferred at least $10,000 of cryptocurrency and we believe is acting as a straw for Defendant to hide cryptocurrency; and to ultimately prepare for the financial trial of this matter, which I have no doubt Defendant will force us to prepare for in full just as he did the custody trial, which we settled the morning of the first day of trial" [NYSCEF #370, p. 4].

Plaintiff's counsel avers that plaintiff "owes my firm $95,022.34 in fees as of July 31, 2025. I note that at the time I received payment of the $125,000 in counsel fees the Court ordered Defendant to pay my firm (which occurred on April 7, 2025), that infusion of counsel fees brought [plaintiff]'s balance with my firm to $20,000" [NYSCEF #370, p. 4].

Plaintiff's counsel also asserts that counsel fees will be necessary for third-party depositions of individuals related to large financial transfers to them immediately prior to and during this litigation [NYSCEF #370, p. 12-13]. Plaintiff's counsel avers that these individuals

" . . . were set to be deposed at the end of July, but in the 11th hour, an attorney surfaced who indicated he was retained by [defendant's aunt] and [defendant's mother] to represent them in the depositions. This caused the cancellation of the depositions and loss of the $650 we paid the Russian interpreter for these depositions, despite both of these women speaking fluent English. We are still trying to schedule these depositions, which has proven to be quite difficult, undoubtedly by the design of Defendant and his agents [NYSCEF #370, p. 12-13].

As to the time he believes will be necessary to finish discovery and prepared for trial, plaintiff's counsel also asserts that:

. . . [a]s unfortunate as it is, I am quite certain Defendant will not settle this matter, and if he does, it will be after I have prepared to conduct a full financial trial. Preparing for this trial will be an enormous, time consuming endeavor. I estimate that we will need at least 10 to 15 full days of trial in this matter at eight hours per day (9:30 am to 5:00 pm plus travel time). I would estimate two days of [*8]trial for each party's testimony, a day for Mr. Dieters FN2, one day for any potential rebuttal expert to Mr. Dieters; a day for [plaintiff's] cryptocurrency expert; one day for a rebuttal cryptocurrency expert; and one day to two days for other third party witnesses. I would also imagine other experts or witnesses will surface along the way. As such, even at 10 days of trial times eight hours each day equals 80 hours of trial time. To prepare for 80 hours of trial testimony, I anticipate the preparation will take approximately 240 hours of time" [NYSCEF #370, p. 13].

He asserts that based on the total hours listed in his affirmation, which does not include "routine day to day emails and calls with Defendant's counsel, calls and emails with [plaintiff], etc." that he believes more than four hundred (400) hours will be necessary to bring the matter to conclusion which, at his billing rate will mean more than $450,000.00 in counsel and expert fees [NYSCEF #370, p. 13-14].

Plaintiff's counsel avers that pursuant to NYCRR 202.16 (k)(3), no third person has promised to make payment of legal fees on behalf of the plaintiff and she is solely responsible for the payment of her own legal fees herein and that the plaintiff has received invoices regularly and consistently (approximately every 30 days) from plaintiff's counsel's offer pursuant to applicable rules [NYSCEF #370, p. 14].

Defendant Denies Holding Millions in Cryptocurrency and Alleges He Was Victim of a Scam on Facebook

When confronted with the subpoenaed discovery of his cryptocurrency holdings, defendant conceded that he had had cryptocurrency at the date of commencement that he had not disclosed but he averred that "[a]t no time have I had millions of dollars in a cryptocurrency account" and he asserted that after the commencement of this divorce action he lost what "minimal" cryptocurrency he had not disclosed as a victim of an online catfishing scam on Facebook [NYSCEF #393, p. 4].

Defendant averred that "on or about July 2024, after the commencement of this action, I was contacted on Facebook for what I thought was a romantic relationship but ultimately turned out to be a cryptocurrency scam. These individuals advised me on opening accounts and wiring money which I ultimately was either unable to withdraw or told I had lost the money" [NYSCEF #393, p. 4]. He asserts that "I quickly learned that this was a scam" and avers that he reported the event to the Kings County District Attorney's Office and to the FBI [NYSCEF #393, p. 4].

In support of his representation, defendant annexed e-mails from July 2025 that he allegedly sent to a contact at the Kings County District Attorney's office reporting the alleged scam [NYSCEF #396].

Timing of Reporting Alleged "Scam"

Defendant concedes that he did not report the alleged scam until after the court appearance on June 17, 2025 when plaintiff's counsel first stated on the record that plaintiff had discovered approximately $2,000,000.00 in cryptocurrency held by defendant.

Plaintiff contends that the "reasonable inference" is that defendant's contact with the assistant district attorney later on June 17, 2025 was only "because he believes it may serve an advantageous purpose in the instant divorce action" [NYSCEF #400, p. 5]. It is not disputed that defendant did not take any further action in reporting the alleged scam to the FBI until much later. Plaintiff's counsel contends [*9]that defendant did not file a claim with the IC3 FN3 until "October 27, 2025, four (4) days before his opposition papers were originally due on October 31, 2025" [NYSCEF #401, p. 5].

Plaintiff argues that Defendant "concocted" a story of being "defrauded" only after he was confronted with evidence of his cryptocurrency holdings in open Court on June 17, 2025].

Plaintiff contends:

Defendant's lack of credibility is further apparent through his own Exhibit B. For instance, the alleged wire transfers effectuated by Defendant resulting from purported fraud occurred from August 9, 2024 through November 7, 2024. Yet Defendant did not file his IC3 Complaint until October 27, 2025, after I filed my underlying Order to Show Cause, which brought to light the over $2 million in cryptocurrency Defendant owns. Defendant's Exhibit B further reflects that Defendant apparently first spoke with an assistant district attorney in the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office to report the alleged "crypto scam/fraud" on June 17, 2025. This is significant, as this is when my attorney first raised the issue of Defendant's $2 million in cryptocurrency at our status conference on June 17, 2025 at 9:30 am. Defendant concocted this alleged scam as he sat before Your Honor, and only then took steps to report the alleged scam, furthering the fraud he is committing on this Court. It simply defies credulity that Defendant would have been first defrauded on August 9, 2024; last defrauded on November 7, 2024; first reported it to the local prosecutor's office on June 17, 2025; and first filed a formal IC3 complaint with the FBI on October 27, 2025. The reasonable inference is that Defendant's contact with the assistant district attorney on June 17, 2025 and the filing of the IC3 Complaint on October 27, 2025 were done because he believes it may serve an advantageous purpose in the instant divorce action [NYSCEF #400, p. 5].

Plaintiff in her affirmation in reply [NYSCEF #400] notes that defendant's representations as to how much cryptocurrency he had and when he obtained it has changed numerous times during this litigation from initially not disclosing any cryptocurrency on this first Statement of Net Worth to admitting in his Updated Statement of Net Worth (after plaintiff subpoenaed discovery revealing he held at least some cryptocurrency) that he had purchased approximately $20,000.00 in cryptocurrency in 2017; however, subsequently, defendant appears to represent that he was "catfished" out of at least $178,000.00 through six (6) wire transfers between August 2024 and November 2024 [NYSCEF #396].

While asserting that he only held $20,000.00 in cryptocurrency, defendant averred that at some point in 2024 the person (or persons) he was communicating with online (either in a romantic capacity or alleged "crypto analysts") required him to pay "an additional $128,000 in tax in order for me to withdraw my money" — that "tax" far exceeded the sum defendant contends he held ($20,000.00) [Defendant's exhibit B]. Defendant offered no explanation for why he would pay $128,000.00 more to get back an alleged $20,000.00.

Plaintiff contends in her affirmation in reply [NYSCEF #400, p. 2] that:

A review of Defendant's sworn positions during the course of this litigation leads to the inescapable conclusion that Defendant has continuously and repeatedly lied about his cryptocurrency holdings, his ownership/control of other undisclosed assets, and his alleged [*10]income.

Defendant Asserts No Discovery Necessary Because Cryptocurrency Is Gone

Defendant requests that the Court deny the plaintiff's application asserting that "I am tired of trying this case by innuendo and conjecture while I pay all the monthly bills for Plaintiff and the children as well as her counsel fees" [NSYCEF #393, p. 5].

Defendant's counsel argues that plaintiff has paid "significantly less than the amount [of counsel fees] paid to Plaintiff's counsel" and, he argues, "[w]hile the purpose of counsel fees is to level the playing field, what has occurred here is to tip the playing field in Plaintiff's favor" [NYSCEF #394, p. 3]. He asserts that the counsel fees requested are "largely based upon Plaintiff's belief that Defendant has hidden various cryptocurrency accounts; however, Defendant denies that he has millions of dollars in these accounts. Instead, a review of Plaintiff's expert demonstrates that the basis for this theory is deposits of money into a wallet no one has established is owned by Defendant" [NYSCEF #394, p. 3-4].

Plaintiff argues, in effect, that defendant's representations regarding his cryptocurrency are not credible because of his conduct during this litigation and the weight of the subpoenaed discovery she uncovered and that:

. . . the investigation my counsel and experts need to undertake to locate and value the marital assets Defendant has hidden is solely necessitated by Defendant's nefarious conduct and his refusal to disclose assets. In fact, he has actively and successfully sought to transfer marital assets out of the marital estate, thereby circumventing the judicial process and endeavoring to constrain the court from equitably distributing the marital estate. It is Defendant's nefarious conduct which has caused, and will continue to cause, my counsel and expert fees to be far more substantial than they otherwise would be [NYSCEF #419, p. 1-2].

She avers that her attorneys are having to engage in extensive discovery and "pouring over tens of thousands of pages of subpoenaed records, which were necessitated by Defendant's refusal to disclose and provide these various accounts in discovery. My attorneys deserve to be paid on time for this work" [NYSCEF #400, p. 7-8]. She contends that she is entitled to full disclosure and because defendant has repeatedly not provided full disclosure that she is left with no alternative but to engage in due diligence in uncovering what else defendant is not disclosing especially when there is documented proof that defendant was not forthcoming that he held any cryptocurrency.

Plaintiff's Counsel's Reply in Support, Including Allegations of Newly Discovered Accounts and "Yxxxx LLC"

By the time plaintiff filed reply her allegations related to financial resources and accounts held by defendant had expanded. Plaintiff's counsel averred that "through receipt of updated subpoenaed records from [BANK], we have uncovered hundreds of thousands of dollars of additional funds Defendant is attempting to transfer out of the marital estate" through newly formed and registered LLCs in the State of Wyoming in the names of his mother and aunt [NYSCEF $401, p. 1-2]. Plaintiff's counsel contends that this [Yxxxx LLC] was established in November 2024 but that the articles of incorporation were filed with changes the spelling of the mother and aunt's names each by one letter; listing a principal office as the physical address of a friend of the Defendant [NYSCEF #401, p. 2].

Plaintiff's counsel contends that defendant "began to wire large sums of cash to a bank account [*11]tied to [Yxxxx LLC]. Defendant wired a total of $81,000 to [Yxxxx LLC] between December 17, 2024 and May 20, 2025 from his XX Dental checking account at Chase ending xxx87" [NYSCEF $401, p. 2]. Plaintiff's counsel also contends that additional subpoenaed records show that defendant transferred "another large wire transfer of $250,000 on October 29, 2024 to [another LLC]. It is not clear who controls this entity, or even what it is, but Defendant is clearly using this entity to secrete more funds" [NYSCEF #401, p. 2]. He avers:

. . . when one traces the source of these funds, it becomes even more convoluted and leads to more questions than answers. The origin of these funds came from a $1,686,603 wire from [BANK] account ending xxxx0 (for which we received no records from [BANK]) to an XX Dental XX account ending xxx55 on December 7, 2023. From there, $1.4 million was transferred to XX Dental [BANK] account ending xxx87 on December 28, 2023. From there, $604,1173.05 was transferred to another XX Dental [BANK] account ending xxx65 on December 28, 2023. $500,000 of this was transferred to yet another XX Dental [BANK] account ending xxx16 on February 265, 2024. $514,855 was then wired to Defendant's previously undisclosed personal [BANK] account ending xxx81 on October 28, 2024 (see Exhibit 20). Finally, from that same statement, $250,000 can be seen to be wired from this account to [REDACTED LLC] on October 29, 2024 [NYSCEF #401, p. 2-3].

Plaintiff's counsel avers:

What I would like the Court to understand from this illustration is the sheer complexity of what my firm is dealing with in representing [Plaintiff] in our attempt to trace money flowing through Defendant's various accounts which we have only discovered via the issuance of numerous subpoenas. [BANK] sent my office approximately 13,000 pages of documents in response to our duly issued Subpoena Duces Tecum. While my office has not yet had the opportunity to fully review these records, what the records do reveal is that Defendant is in control of 32 accounts at [BANK], the vast majority of which were not disclosed to this Court or the business valuators. Annexed as Exhibit 21 is the first five pages of the [BANK] Subpoena response, which contain an index of the documents produced. There is no telling what is buried in these records, and it is going to take my team and I what will likely amount to over 100 hours to finish reviewing this subpoena response alone [NYSCEF #401, p. 3].

Defendant's counsel argued that based on these extensive and serious allegations regarding newly discovered financial circumstances in the updated subpoenaed records that they needed an opportunity to confer with their client and to submit a sur-reply. The Court granted defendant's counsel's request for the right to submit a sur-reply and gave plaintiff the right to file a sur-sur reply.

Plaintiff's counsel argued that further delay of the pendente lite counsel fee application was prejudicial to the plaintiff and asserted that as of the end of October 2025 his firm was owed more than $137,000.00 in counsel fees. Plaintiff's counsel argued that had defendant been forthcoming the plaintiff would not have had to incur such extensive counsel fees, in effect, to "chase down" the truth.

Plaintiff's counsel made oral application that pending decision of the motion after sur-reply and sur-sur reply that the Court grant plaintiff $150,000.00 in interim counsel fees. The Court granted interim pendente lite counsel fees of $50,000.00 from defendant to plaintiff pending full submission of motion sequence #11.

The minutes of the oral argument on the record on November 20, 2025 must be read in conjunction with this interim decision [NYSCEF #423].

[*12]Defendant's Sur-Reply

In his sur-reply, defendant avers that Yxxxx LLC was:

. . . .created by my mother and aunt. I had absolutely no hand in creating the business and first learned of misspelled names on the Articles of Organization Plaintiff highlights from Plaintiff's Reply. My mother and aunt are well aware that I have been having difficulty generating income through my business due to my depression triggered by the events surrounding the divorce as well as the lack of time I have had with our children over the last two (2) years. In order to help me, my mother and aunt created a management company to manage my business and increase productivity" [NYSCEF #414, p. 1-2].

He concedes that in December 2024 he entered into a management agreement with Yxxxx LLC and that since then " . . . every month REDACTED Dental pays Yxxxx for it's [sic] services which has increased our revenue so that I can afford to continue to pay for my employees as well as 100% of Plaintiff and our children's daily expenses" [NYSCEF #414, p. 2]. Defendant offered no explanation for why his mother and his aunt would have misspelled their own names when forming Yxxxx LLC nor did he attach any affidavits from either his mother or the aunt. Plaintiff's counsel has represented that despite attempts to depose the mother and aunt they have retained counsel and have delayed those depositions.

Defendant in his affirmation contends in his sur-reply [NYSCEF #414] that plaintiff should not be awarded any further counsel fees because she has incurred more counsel fees than he has:

. . . Plaintiff's request be denied in that the amounts being requested of me are outrageous given Plaintiff has incurred at least four (4) times the legal fees that I have paid my attorney, has hired a cryptocurrency expert requesting $150,000.00 and I have paid her attorneys approximately $160,000.00 in legal fees and Court expenses while being ordered to pay 90% of all expert fees while Plaintiff continues to hide her true income from this Court [NYSCEF #414, p. 4].

Plaintiff's Sur-Sur Reply

Plaintiff contends that the misspelling of defendant's mother's name and his aunt's name to form Yxxxx LLC — when taken together with the defendant's other attempts to allegedly misguide the Court during this litigation — is not an innocent mistake and is evidence of "the cunning efforts undertaken by Defendant and his cohorts where they, for instance, seek to disguise their identities by purposely misspelling their names on a Limited Liability Company Articles of Organization" [NYSCEF #419, p. 2]. Plaintiff alleges that the misspells were intentional and "demonstrates a level of purposeful deceit" intended to make it more challenging for her counsel to uncover undisclosed assets [NYSCEF #419, p. 3]. She alleges that the defendant and his mother and aunt are working together to funnel money out of sight of the Court and that this latest discovery only creates more suspicion around the financial circumstances and is even more reason why the Court should allow her to conduct thorough discovery related to any transfers between them. It has yet to be explained why defendant transferred nearly $400,000.00 to this aunt within hours of being served with the summons.

Plaintiff argues that the alleged management agreement between Yxxxx LLC and defendant's dental business provides that the business "shall pay" Yxxxx "the sum of fifteen percent (%) of [dental business's] net monthly profits"] but that from February 2025 to May 2025 there were no payments made to Yxxxx LLC [NYSCEF #419, p. 3] but that defendant's dental business made the following transfers to Yxxxx LLC:

• $120,000 in June 2025

• $200,000 in July 2025

• $100,000 in August 2025

• $100,000 in September 2025

• $150,000 in October 2025

• $50,000 in November 2025 [NYSCEF #419, p. 4]

Plaintiff argues that:

The above payments to Yxxxx LLC, which supposedly represent 15% of [defendant's dental business's] net monthly profits, would equate to [defendant's dental business] earning the following monthly net profits:

• $800,000 in June 2025

• $1,333,333.33 in July 2025

• $666,666.67 in August 2025

• $666,666.67 in September 2025

• $1,000,000 in October 2025

• $333,333.33 in November 2025 [NYSCEF #419, p. 4]

Plaintiff contends that:

. . . [f]rom December 2024 through November 2025, [defendant's dental business] purportedly paid Yxxxx LLC a total of $781,000 (Defendant's Exhibit B), which would mean a net profit of $5,206,666.67 over that time period. This demonstrates the vast resources at Defendant's disposal, and further supports my entitlement to counsel fees [NYSCEF #419, p. 4].

She also asserts that defendant's dental business was invoiced $60,000.00 for "set up" of Yxxxx LLC — the management company that defendant alleges he was not involved in creating and that he only entered into a management agreement to use [NYSCEF #419, p. 5]. She questions why defendant's business would be required to pay for the "set-up" of a management company he avers he was not involved in creating.

Plaintiff alleges that:

It seems that the Yxxxx LLC Management Agreement may serve as an excuse for Defendant's mother and aunt to refuse to answer my counsel's questions during pretrial depositions and at trial. I suspect that this confidentiality clause may be the true reason why Yxxxx LLC was ever incorporated in the first place, in addition to its usefulness in diverting income and funds away from Defendant's business so that Defendant might disingenuously argue to the Court that his business is earning less income than it is, which would be relevant to the Court's future determinations of child support and/or spousal support [NYSCEF #419, p. 5]

Defendant's Transfers

Defendant asserts that the numerous transfers plaintiff's counsel uncovered in updated subpoenaed documents are all easily explained, and he criticizes plaintiff for, in effect, not asking him first [NSYCEF #414, p. 2-3]. He contends that "my childhood friend . . . desperately needed a loan" so he loaned him $250,000.00 in or about October 2024 for "three (3) years with no interest" [NYSCEF #414, p. [*13]2]. He annexed a promissory note in support [Defendant's C]. This promissory note is not notarized [NYSCEF #419, p. 6]. He contends that the source of these loan funds was payroll checks and a "payroll distribution of $604,173.05" after the date of commencement [NYSCEF #414, p. 3]. The record reflects that while defendant appears to have had $250,000.00 to provide an interest-free "loan" to his friend in October 2024 he chose not to pay the Court ordered pendente lite counsel fees to plaintiff's counsel as ordered in June 2024 decision and order and plaintiff's counsel had to file a judgment against defendant for the sum of $25,000.00 in July 2024 [NYSCEF #314]. Defendant offered no explanation for what appears to be his selective access to financial means: the Court notes that at the time defendant elected to make this $250,000.00 interest-free loan to his friend there was another pendente lite counsel fee application pending [mot. seq. #9].

The Parties' Financial Circumstances

This Court has detailed the parties' financial circumstances including detailed inquiry into their Statements of Net Worth in the prior written decisions references in the procedural history above.

Plaintiff avers in her affirmation in support that "I essentially have no money to my name, and I am entirely dependent on the $4,500 Defendant has been ordered to pay me in monthly child support to live, and does not come close to covering the children's expenses. I can attest that nothing has changed since the filing of my prior statement of net worth annexed hereto as Exhibit 2. My net worth is negative. I am in debt and continue to accrue debt. I do not have access to any marital funds or any other funds from which to pay my attorney or expert" [NYSCEF #72, p. 1]. She contends that "I continue to run my business at a loss, while Defendant continues to earn well in excess of a million dollars, and continues to try to hid [sic] it from me and from the reach of this Court [NYSCEF #372, p. 2]. She alleges that "it is clear [Defendant] plans to continue to drag out this matter, play dirty, hide assets, require me to dig to find every penny of marital assets, force me to litigate every issue, and use our disparate resources to force me to concede to his demands" [NYSCEF #372, p. 2].

Plaintiff's counsel argues that "Defendant earns over $1.4 million per year, at minimum, pursuant to his 2022 income tax returns, and is in control of many millions of dollars of liquid assets that we know of" and instead of disclosing these assets as required during full financial disclosure he has chosen to engage in a course of litigation conduct to obfuscate those assets in an attempt to avoid equitable distribution and awards of support to plaintiff and the parties' two (2) young children while plaintiff "remains entirely dependent on the monthly child support she receives to feed, clothe and entertain the children, and has borrowed money from her parents and brother on numerous occasions to take the children away for their birthday or do something fun with them" [NYSCEF #370, p. 9]. Plaintiff's counsel contends that:

For Defendant to think anyone associated with this litigation will believe he only made approximately $100,000 in 2024 demonstrates Defendant's depravity and lack of credibility. Annexed hereto is Defendant's 2023 tax return which shows $1,380,000 in W-2 income from REDACTED Dental PC (see Exhibit 22). Quite honestly, it is impossible to know what Defendant's actual income is, and we likely never will know, but considering his admission that he earned at least $1,380,000 in income in 2023, such sum is only the proverbial tip of the iceberg. This is also noteworthy because Defendant filed an updated statement of net worth on October 18, 2023 where he indicated his income was $203,864 [NYSCEF #401, p. 5]

Plaintiff contends that:

Meanwhile, Defendant continues to fight me over virtually every expense for the kids, most recently, refusing to pay an extra $10 dollars for an art class for our daughter. Additionally, upon [*14]information and belief, Defendant has informed Dr. [REDACTED] — the doctor we designated in our custody and parenting agreement to conduct therapeutic supervised visitation — that he essentially has a new family (presumably his current girlfriend and her two children) and one would also presume financially supporting them. A casual review of Defendant's updated statement of net worth seems to corroborate this theory, as I find it very hard to believe a single man spends $1,720 per month on groceries. I don't even spend that on myself and our two children — in fact, I only spend approximately $1,200 per month on groceries (see my Statement of Net Worth — NYSCEF Doc. No. 374) [NYSCEF #400, p. 7].

Defendant argues that he should not have to pay any counsel fees because the plaintiff is not being forthcoming about her finances and that there is no reason for her to continue her beauty services business if she can only operate the business at a loss year after year. He questions how plaintiff can meet her daily expenses which she contends exceed what she earns and what he pays in pendente lite child support without incurring debt but notes that plaintiff does not report any commensurate debt. He contends that plaintiff is not being truthful about her income so, in effect, he should not have to pay pendente lite counsel fees.

Plaintiff's Request for $150,000.00 in Expert Fees

Plaintiff's counsel avers:

As set forth in the affirmation of Richard Widmann, Esq. submitted herewith, the tracing of Defendant's vast cryptocurrency holdings could not be more complex and require the hiring of not only an expert that can conduct a tracing of the cryptocurrency across numerous blockchains, but also requires the services of Mr. Widmann who will be instrumental in interpreting the findings of the tracers, and assisting me in preparing motion papers, preparing for Defendant's deposition, and the cross examination of Defendant and presumably the cross examination of whomever Defendant hires to rebut our expert report. There perhaps has never been a greater need for an expert in a matrimonial matter, as the complexity of this cryptocurrency issue is a novel area of law that has not been dealt with by many matrimonial courts [NYSCEF #370, p. 15].

Defendant asserts that he retained his own cryptocurrency expert through a service called Nexasure. Defendant's counsel asserts that based upon defendant's own cryptocurrency expert, the affirmation of plaintiff's expert "is unsound and draws impossible conclusions" and that plaintiff's expert allegedly "significantly overcharge[d]" [NYSCEF #394, p. 12-13]. Defendant's cryptocurrency expert allegedly places the cost of the necessary analysis at $80,000.00 [Defendant's exhibit C]. He also contends that plaintiff's request for expert fees is for an "unknown expert" and that there is "no reasons or basis" for the assertion that it will cost $150,000.00 "other than Mr. Widmann's expertise" [NYSCEF #394, p. 4]. Defendant's counsel requests that plaintiff's expert fees request be denied.

Plaintiff argues that defendant's own expert acknowledges that more than a hundred (100) hours of time would be necessary to review the blockchain information which, she contends "expressly signifying that there is a significant amount of expert analysis to do on this matter in order to accurately discern Defendant's cryptocurrency holdings and related activity" [NYSCEF #400, p. 3].

Plaintiff's expert Mr. Widmann filed an affirmation in reply [NYSCEF #402] asserting that, in effect, for the Court to accept defendant's expert's position would be to believe that defendant was operating in good faith and self-disclosing his cryptocurrency holdings which, Mr. Widmann contends, the subpoenaed documents appear to belie [NYSCEF #402, p. 3].

[*15]Plaintiff's Request to Reallocate Parties' Pro Rata Share of Business Evaluation

Plaintiff's counsel seeks that the Court modify the existing pendente lite order that the parties' share the cost of the business evaluator from plaintiff ten percent (10%) and defendant ninety percent (90%) to that cost being paid entirely (100%) by the defendant pendente lite subject to reallocation at trial because "she does not have a penny to spare each month from the $4,500 she receives in child support" [NYSCEF #370, p. 5] and asserts that plaintiff "simply cannot afford to pay the balance she currently owes [business evaluator] of $2,221.71" [NYSCEF #370, p. 5]. Plaintiff's counsel contends that the fees due to the business evaluator reflect defendant's failure to cooperate with the business evaluator and that "[o]nce we receive the report, I will need to thoroughly review and discuss the report with my client. I will also likely discuss the report with my own trusted accountant/valuator" [NYSCEF #370, p. 12].

Plaintiff's counsel contends that "Defendant out-earns [plaintiff] approximately $1.4 million (at least) to essentially

" and that it has now allegedly been uncovered that defendant is "in possession and control of well over $4 million in liquid assets" that he did not disclose that the Court should order that defendant "front 100% of the remaining fees incurred by Empire for the remainder of this action, subject to reallocation" [NYSCEF #370, p. 16].

Defendant's counsel asserts that plaintiff has failed to show any change in circumstances that would warrant the Court adjusting the pendente lite apportionment of the cost of the business evaluator and contends that plaintiff's contention that the Court consider the alleged cryptocurrency held by defendant is not a basis for any change to the current apportionment because "Defendant denies that he has millions of dollars in cryptocurrency" [NYSCEF #394, p. 5]. Defendant's counsel avers that if the Court grants plaintiff's application for adjustment of the pendente lite allocation of fees to the business evaluator that the plaintiff will "continue this litigation without paying for the myriad of expenses in this matter, there will be no incentive to resolve the matter" and that "[p]laintiff should have some proverbial 'skin in the game'" [NYSCEF #394, p. 6].

Plaintiff's counsel argues that "[t]his divorce would have been resolved a long time ago if Defendant would only play fair and come clean regarding his assets and income. Instead he forces [Plaintiff] to spend enumerable attorney hours and the resulting costs chasing down hidden assets and income" [NYSCEF #401, p. 5].

Discussion

Counsel Fees

Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 (a) in pertinent part provides:

"There shall be a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. In exercising the court's discretion, the court shall seek to assure that each party shall be adequately represented and that where fees and expenses are to be awarded, they shall be awarded on a timely basis, pendente lite, so as to enable adequate representation from the commencement of the proceeding. Applications for the award of fees and expenses may be made at any time or times prior to final judgment. Both parties to the action or proceeding and their respective attorneys, shall file an affidavit with the court detailing the financial agreement between the party and the attorney. Such affidavit shall include the amount of any retainer, the amounts paid and still owing thereunder, the hourly amount charged by the attorney, the amounts paid, or to be paid, any experts, and any additional costs, disbursements or expenses." NY DOM REL § 237

"An award of counsel fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) is a matter within the [*16]sound discretion of the trial court, and the issue is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case" (Fugazy v Fugazy, 210 AD3d 653, 655 [2d Dept 2022]). It is well-established that the purpose of "[a]n award of interim counsel fees is designed to create parity in divorce litigation by enabling the nonmonied spouse to litigate the action on equal footing with the monied spouse" (Palmeri v. Palmeri, 87 AD3d 572, 572 [2d Dept 2011]). "[A]n award of interim counsel fees to the nonmonied spouse will generally be warranted where there is a significant disparity in the financial circumstances of the parties" (Id. quoting Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 65 [2d Dept 2008]). The court in Prichep v. Prichep recognized that "courts should not defer requests for interim counsel fees to the trial court, and should normally exercise their discretion to grant such a request made by the nonmonied spouse, in the absence of good cause—for example, where the requested fees are unsubstantiated or clearly disproportionate to the amount of legal work required in the case—articulated by the court in a written decision." Id. "[U]nlike a final award of counsel fees, a detailed inquiry or evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the award of interim counsel fees" (Isaacs v. Isaacs, 71 AD3d 951, 951 [2 Dept., 2010]; see also Prichep, 52 AD3d at 65; Singer v. Singer, 16 AD3d 666, 667 [2 Dept., 2005]; Flach v. Flach, 114 AD2d 929, 929 [2 Dept., 1985]).

"In Frankel v. Frankel, the Court of Appeals recognized that "the realities of contentious matrimonial litigation require a regular infusion of funds", and "that more frequent interim counsel fee awards would prevent accumulation of bills" (Frankel v. Frankel, 2 NY3d 601, 607, 605 n 1 [2004])." "[W]hen considering an application for interim counsel fees, the court must consider the relative financial circumstances of both parties"(Charpie v. Charpie, 271 AD2d 169, 171 [1st Dept 2000])."An appropriate award of attorney's fees should take into account the parties' ability to pay, the nature and extent of the services rendered, the complexity of the issues involved, and the reasonableness of the fees under all of the circumstances" (Grumet v. Grumet, 37 AD3d 534, 536 [2d Dept 2007]).

In addition, "[a] court may consider whether either party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in a delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation" (Rothman v Rothman, 243 AD3d 939 [2 Dept.,2025]; see also Nehlsen v Nehlsen, 241 AD3d 562 [2 Dept.,2025]; Jacobson v. Jacobson, 240 AD3d 676 [2 Dept.,2025]; Culen v Culen, 157 AD3d 930, 933 [2d Dept 2018] [The court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of counsel fee due to "the relative merits of the parties' positions and the defendant's obstructionist tactics, which unnecessarily prolonged the litigation." The court referenced tactics such as "unnecessarily [prolonging] the litigation by attempting to obstruct the plaintiff from obtaining discovery regarding an inheritance that the defendant was entitled to receive from his aunt's estate, even though it is well established that parties to a divorce action are entitled to liberal and broad discovery from one another, including with respect to separate property that is not subject to equitable distribution.")

The Second Department has repeatedly held that a party's "obstreperous conduct" in unnecessarily protracting the litigation is a factor Court's are entitled consider in awarding one party pendente lite counsel fees. In Guzzo v. Guzzo, 110 AD3d 765 (2d Dept, 2013), the court increased the wife's counsel fee award from $35,000 to $100,000, citing "plaintiff's egregious tactics unnecessarily prolonged the litigation and caused the defendant to incur additional legal fees" (see also Silvers v Silvers, 197 AD3d 1195 [2 Dept.,2021]; see also Marchese v. Marchese, 185 AD3d 571 [2 Dept.,2020]; Singer v. Singer, 16 AD3d 666 (2d Dept.,2005) (holding that the trial court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the wife an interim counsel fee in the sum of $100,000 based upon the husband's obstreperous conduct which unnecessarily protracted the litigation, and the quality of the representation afforded the wife by her counsel).

"In exercising judicial discretion to determine counsel fee applications, the courts must take into [*17]account not only the financial circumstances of the parties but the circumstances of the case as a whole, including the relative merits of the parties' positions and whether either party has delayed the proceedings unreasonably or engaged in unnecessary litigation" Kaufman v. Kaufman, 189 AD3d 31, 74-75 (2d Dep't 2020). The Second Department in Kaufman went on to state that "Where a party has asserted unreasonable positions or failed to cooperate in discovery, and thereby increased the cost of the litigation, the court may make a counsel fee award in favor of the offended party or not make, or make a lesser award, in favor of the offending party" Id. at 75.

In the case at bar, Plaintiff-Wife is seeking an award in pendente lite counsel fees in the amount of $500,000. Plaintiff's counsel assets that as of August 2025, plaintiff owed his firm over $95,000.00 in counsel fees. Plaintiff's counsel's billing records were attached [NYSCEF #409] showing that by the time this matter had been briefed but prior to the submission of the sur-reply and sur-sur reply, plaintiff's counsel was owed more than $137,000.00 in counsel fees.

Plaintiff's counsel avers that the prospective $400,000.00 in counsel fees "is justified given the extraordinary amount of work left to be done in this matter. As the Court is aware, this was already a highly complex financial matter which has been made infinitely more complex after the discovery of Defendant's multiple millions of USD worth of cryptocurrency, and quite literally thousands of transfers of cryptocurrency" [NYSCEF #370, p. 12].

This Court has previously found that the plaintiff to be the less-monied spouse in written decisions and orders dated June 6, 2024 [NYSCEF #285] and March 14, 2025 [NYSCEF #365]. In fact, plaintiff's counsel avers that since her last filed Statement of Net Worth, plaintiff's financial circumstances have "worsened as she has been forced to incur more debt in order to fund her modest lifestyle, which is much different than she and the children enjoyed during the marriage" [NYSCEF #370, p. 5]. Defendant has maintained that he has now, in effect, "fallen on hard times" because this divorce has caused him depression; however, it appears from his own sur-reply that defendant has ready access to financial means when and where he wants to. He is able to "loan" a quarter of a million dollars ($250,000.00) to a friend interest-free and he is paying an alleged management company in his mother and aunt's (misspelled) names hundreds of thousands of dollars which, according to the "management agreement" reflect just fifteen percent (15%) of his dental business's gross which, if accurate, would indicate that defendant's dental business grossed more than $4,800,000.00 between June 2025 and November 2025. It appears that defendant remains the monied-spouse.

Defendant appears unwilling or unable to acknowledge that the reason the plaintiff must now engage in extensive subpoena discovery and, in effect, go through these records with a "fine tooth comb" is because defendant chose not to disclose that he had any cryptocurrency at the beginning of the action. Defendant has engaged in conduct from the beginning of this litigation including on the day he was served that, when taken together, raise many questions regarding his ability to be transparent and forthcoming. This has forced the plaintiff to incur more counsel fees to subpoena discovery. When those subpoenas returned proof that defendant had not been forthcoming she was then forced to expend even more counsel fees to re-examine each and ever financial representation defendant has made. Repeatedly defendant appears to "leave something out" and then come up with a series of explanations or excuses for the omission. This behavior appears very similar to the defendant's conduct related to missed support payments throughout this litigation: each time the defendant asserted some excuse for why the support was not paid timely or why a shut-off notice was received.

What defendant seems unwilling to accept is that each time he chooses not to be forthcoming he forces the plaintiff to do more work which results in increased counsel fees. The Court rejects defendant's assertion that the Court should reject plaintiff's counsel fees application on the basis that her counsel fees exceed what he has paid his counsel: it is clear that plaintiff has been forced to incur a [*18]large portion of those fees because to subpoena financial information and to comb through it because defendant has at times clearly not been transparent about his financial circumstances. Defendant does not deny that or explain why he did not report owning any cryptocurrency on his initial Statement of Net Worth. It seems like defendant's recollection about his financial circumstances shift as soon as plaintiff uncovers something new and then defendant appears to recall a new explanation.

Defendant proffered numerous claims about who and how he was "defrauded" out of cryptocurrency but whether he was "catfished" or whether he transferred the money believing he was investing in a "get rich quick" scheme may be issues for trial but any explanation at this time is premature because the imminent issue before the Court is whether plaintiff is entitled to an award of counsel fees to engage in discovery about what cryptocurrency existed as part of the marital estate that defendant did not disclose. Only after the extent of cryptocurrency in the marital estate is determined may any arguments related to alleged marital waste or defense to any such claims be relevant.

Defendant's claim, in effect, that it should not matter that he did not disclose the full scope of his cryptocurrency holdings because he was, he claims, defrauded of those assets is misplaced. The basis for the award of counsel fees is defendant failure to disclose and plaintiff's need to fully pursue discovery related thereto due to defendant's litigation strategy. Certainly, if plaintiff establishes that cryptocurrency was part of the marital estate (whatever the sum), defendant will have an opportunity to explain what happened to those marital assets and then both parties will have an opportunity to make any relevant arguments about whether either party engaged in marital waste related to those marital assets. But defendant's various explanations of how he was allegedly "defrauded" of the marital asset he does not dispute that he did not disclose the cryptocurrency and does not address the issue before the Court or the reason plaintiff must expend counsel fees to find out the extent of the marital estate he did not disclose and whatever he may not have disclosed. Defendant concedes that he did not notify the District Attorney or the F.B.I. about allegedly being defrauded of the cryptocurrency until he was confronted by plaintiff's counsel about this previously undisclosed cryptocurrency and he steadfastly maintains that plaintiff should, in effect, take his word for what happened to the cryptocurrency and that the Court should not award plaintiff any counsel fees or expert fees to explore how much cryptocurrency existed and what may have happened to it.

Defendant's claim that plaintiff should not be awarded counsel fees to pursue discovery of his cryptocurrency holdings because she has not proven all of the connections that she believes may exist is belied by the fact that the defendant created this circumstance by his failure to disclose and his subsequent attempts to "explain away" his non-disclosure after the fact. Even once plaintiff subpoenaed records showing the defendant had cryptocurrency that he chose not to disclose his representation about how much cryptocurrency he had changed from $20,000.00 to conceding that he was "defrauded" out of at least $178,000.00 worth of cryptocurrency [NYSCEF #396]. Plaintiff is certainly not bound to accept defendant's representation regarding his access to cryptocurrency and certainly not under these facts and circumstance where it is conceded that defendant has not been forthcoming about his cryptocurrency holdings when he had the opportunity to do so previously during this litigation.

Defendant annexed no documents in support of his numerous and contradictory assertions regarding what happened to the cryptocurrency funds (whether it was the $20,000.00 he initially conceded or the more than $178,000.00 in funds he later conceded) that he contends he no longer has access to. He provided no proof of wire transfers, no production of any communications between him and any of the alleged defrauders ("catfishing" romances or "crypto analysts") or any proof of where these funds originated.

The Court established in its decision and order dated June 5, 2024 [NYSCEF #285] that defendant-husband is the monied spouse in the instant matter. Plaintiff's updated statement of net [*19]worth dated November 14, 2024, states that plaintiff-wife has no income, that she has a current balance of $6,004 in the checking accounts, a current balance of $752.00 in her savings account, and liabilities in totaling $118,652.00.

In support of his request for counsel fees, plaintiff's counsel submitted the retainer agreement dated December 1, 2023 [NYSCEF #337] which shows that his hourly rate for his services is $515.00 per hour, invoices for services provided from November 2024 through July 2025 [NYSCEF #375]. In plaintiff's counsel reply papers [NYSCEF #401] he averred that the outstanding balance owed by plaintiff was $137,932.31 [Plaintiff's Exhibit 23]. He argued that "my firm should not be put in the position of being forced to wait to be paid only every six to eight months, and only after spending thousands of additional dollars in legal fees on motion practice in order to be paid, when Defendant's attorneys are paid in full and on time" [NYSCEF #401, p. 6]

Plaintiff's counsel professional qualifications are outlined in his affirmation in support dated August 11, 2025 [NYSCEF #370]. Plaintiff's retained expert's qualifications are detailed in his affirmation dated August 11, 2025 [NYSCEF #371].

Defendant was previously found to be the monied-spouse and based on the plaintiff-wife's updated statement of net worth, it still appears that there is a vast disparity of income between the parties, where the defendant-husband's financial resources far exceed the plaintiff-wife's financial resources. Additionally, the defendant has engaged in delay tactics such as failing to comply with discovery which caused plaintiff to use subpoenas to uncover undisclosed accounts and assets, failed to comply with court orders causing plaintiff to obtain judgment and enforcement applications. The record of this litigation details the extraordinary effort and due diligence that plaintiff's counsel has had to make to obtain discovery related to defendant's income and financial assets which is reflected in plaintiff's counsel fees incurred so far. The Court notes that defendant's present counsel has attempted to facilitate the discovery process.

Defendant appears unable or unwilling to recognize how his choice not to disclose exacerbates plaintiff's need to do more discovery which forces her to incur counsel fees to uncover what else defendant may be failing to disclose. Simply: defendant has established a pattern of non-disclosure or, at minimum, a pattern of less than transparent disclosure that forces plaintiff to continue to incur counsel fees. The Court rejects defendant's contention that plaintiff should not be awarded any more pendente lite counsel fees because she should, in effect, accept his ex post facto explanations once she uncovers yet another circumstance where he has not been transparent in disclosure.

As outlined herein, there appears more cause for plaintiff to question the true nature and extent of defendant's financial circumstances based upon his failure either due to lapses in recollection or intentional lack of transparency: defendant has created more questions than answers related to his financial circumstances. Based upon defendant's pattern of behavior, it appears entirely appropriate for plaintiff to engage in extensive due diligence because the more plaintiff tests defendant's representations the more questions seem to come up. If there is an even heightened level of distrust in this litigation over what this Court often sees in contentious divorce litigation it appears a creation of defendant's unwillingness or inability to be forthright in his financial representations.

The Court finds that under the facts and circumstances presented here, including the nature and complexity of the issues raised, the parties' income and assets and liabilities, as sworn to in their respective affidavits of net worth, the retainer agreements, the qualifications of Plaintiff's counsel and the fact that Defendant is clearly the monied spouse as contemplated by DRL § 237(a) that an additional award of pendente lite counsel fees in the sum of $300,000.00 is just and appropriate. The plaintiff is the less monied spouse, and the award of interim counsel fees will permit her to carry on the litigation (Gonzalez-Furtado v Furtado, 221 AD3d 975, 977 [2d Dept 2023]). This award of pendente lite counsel [*20]fees in the sum of $300,000.00 will permit plaintiff to prepare for trial and/or resolve the outstanding financial and ancillary issues. This sum considers the Court's interim award of $50,000.00 in pendente lite counsel fees pending full submission dated November 20, 2025 [NYSCEF #412] so the total award for the application is $350,000.00 [$50,000 interim award + $300,000.00 awarded now].

This award to plaintiff-wife for pendente lite attorney's fees is without prejudice to future applications for additional counsel fees, as necessary at the time of trial or sooner, upon the requisite showing (see DRL § 237; Prichep v. Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667 [2nd Dept.2008]; Kesten v. Kesten, 234 AD2d 427, 650 N.Y.S.2d 807 [2nd Dept.1996]; Dodson, 46 AD3d at 305; Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 86 AD2d 861, 861 [2 Dept.,1982]).

The payment in this award of pendente lite counsel fees of $300,000.00 shall be made directly from the Defendant to the Plaintiff's counsel within thirty (30) days of service of notice of entry of this decision and order. If the Defendant fails to make the payment in compliance with this decision and order the Plaintiff's attorney may enter a judgment for the full amount due and owing, plus statutory costs and interest, retroactive to the date of application, with the Office of the County Clerk upon ten (10) days written notice by certified and regular mail to the plaintiff and without further application to this Court.

Award of Expert Fees to Plaintiff

This Court is authorized to award expert fees in matrimonial actions pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 (see Domestic Relations Law § 237[a]; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 590 [1985]; McGarrity v. McGarrity, 49 AD3d 824, 825-26 [2d Dept 2008]; Bluemer v. Bluemer, 47 AD3d 652, 653 [2 Dept., 2008]; Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 138 AD2d 43, 45—46 [1 Dept 1988].

The award of expert witness fees in a matrimonial action is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, however such awards should not be made routinely (see O'Donnell v O'Donnell, 2 AD3d 604, 605 [2d Dept 2003]). "They should be made upon a detailed showing of the services to be rendered and the estimated time involved" (Id.; see Greco v. Greco, 161 AD3d 950, 952 [2d Dept 2018]; Ahern v. Ahern, 94 AD2d 53, 58 [2d Dept 1983]). Absent affidavits from the expert witnesses at issue, the Supreme Court lacks a sufficient basis to grant a motion for the award of such fees (Id.; see Corrao v. Corrao, 209 AD2d 573, 574 [2d Dept 1994]; Avello v. Avello, 72 AD3d 850, 852 [2d Dept 2010]).

If there were ever a need demonstrated for legal expert fees, this is the case. Leveling the playing field does not only mean leveling the amount paid: it also means leveling the ability for one to seek the truth and discovery when faced with what has been described herein as a serious attempt to obfuscate, where credibility must be determined at trial (see Shah v Shad, 246 AD3d 983 [2 Dept.,2026]). The amount of additional work and time to disentangle defendant's actions in this emerging and complex field of cryptocurrency together with the other transfers and alleged actions with dubious contradictory assertions by the defendant warrant this award.

Previously, in this litigation, the Court denied the plaintiff's application for certain expert fees as "premature"; however, at this time, based on the record before the Court in toto, the Court finds that there is more than a sufficient basis to award the plaintiff expert fees related to her allegations surrounding the nature and extent of the defendant's cryptocurrency holdings and/or dissipation(s).

The payment in this award of pendente lite expert counsel fees of $125,000.00 shall be made directly from the defendant to the plaintiff's retained counsel within thirty (30) days of service of notice of entry of this decision and order. If the defendant fails to make the payment in compliance with this decision and order judgment may be entered for the full amount then due and owing, plus statutory costs and interest, retroactive to the date of the default, with the Office of the County Clerk upon ten (10) days written notice by certified and regular mail to the plaintiff and without further application to this Court.

[*21]Plaintiff's Application to Reapportion Future Forensic Accountant Fees

For the reasons detailed herein-above related to defendant's actions which have greatly increased the fees incurred herein, the Court also grants plaintiff's application to pendente lite reapportion future costs associated with the forensic accountant previously appointed to be paid (100%) by the defendant subject to further reallocation at time of trial.FN4

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's motion seq. #11 is granted to the extent.

Any relief requested but not granted above is denied.

This shall constitute the decision and order of the court.

ENTER:

HON. JEFFREY S. SUNSHINE

J. S. C.