People ex rel. Telesford v Warden, Robert N. Davoren Ctr.

Supreme Court, Queens County

Decided on March 19, 2026

Ind. No. 72246-25/001

Michael J. Hartofilis, J.

SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S DECISION

Defendant's petition for release by writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.

Defendant's application for release on speedy trial grounds is denied.

Defendant's application for more time in the jail library is granted.

DECISION AND ORDER

The instant indictment charges Defendant with numerous offenses including attempted murder and tampering with a witness as a result of a slashing attack on A.S. on November 14, 2024, and a conspiracy thereafter between November 17 and November 20, 2024 thereafter to intimidate and coerce A.S. and witness L.C.F., his girlfriend, to prevent them from testifying against him.

The instant petition is for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that Defendant be released from custody pursuant to CPL § 30.30 [2][a] because the People filed their certificate of discovery compliance ("COC") and declaration of trial readiness ("SOR") under the first, now-dismissed indictment number 74809-24, on the 90th day after his November 15, 2024 arraignment on the felony complaint.

Procedural Chronology

On November 15, 2024, Defendant was arraigned on the felony complaint charging attempted murder, assault in the first and second degrees, and criminal possession of a weapon for the attack. The arraignment court remanded Defendant based on his prior criminal history [*2]and the seriousness of the charges.FN1

Six days later, on November 20, 2024, A.S. and L.T.F. appeared pursuant to Grand Jury subpoena and refused to testify. The People conducted an extra-judicial pre-Grand Jury Sirois hearing with evidence of Defendant's conspiracy of threats and intimidation to prevent A.S. and L.T.F. from testifying. Indictment 74809-24, charging Defendant with crimes relating to the November 14 assault, was voted without their testimony. Defendant was arraigned on December 17, 2024. The People filed their COC and SOR on February 13, 2025, simultaneously filing a protective order application to restrict sensitive discovery. The order was issued by the court on February 19, 2025.

On May 29, 2025, Hon. Justice Jessica Earle-Gargan (hereinafter, "the motion court") issued an omnibus decision dismissing the indictment for insufficient evidentiary foundations, and granted the People leave to re-present. On June 3, 2025, the motion court heard Defendant's application for his release under CPL § 30.30 [2][a]. The court denied Defendant's application for release and, as required under CPL § 210.45 [9], issued a securing order continuing Defendant's remand status pending resubmission of the charges. The court also deemed the COC and SOR valid as of February 13, 2025, but declined to rule on any speedy trial issues.

The new felony complaint charged tampering with a witness in the third degree, criminal contempt in the first degree and related charges arising out of the alleged conspiracy by Telesford, and Eugene and Exondus Barnes, on or about and between November 14 and November 20, 2024, to intimidate, coerce, and prevent Sevens and L.T.F. from testifying. On July 3, 2025, Defendant was arraigned on indictment number 72246-25, charging all offenses from the dismissed indictment as well as the additional conspiracy and witness tampering offenses from the June 3 complaint. The People simultaneously filed their COC and SOR on the new indictment.

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

CPLR § 7002[c][4] sets forth the required contents of the instant petition. The court finds that the petition, while handwritten by this pro se defendant, conforms to the procedural requirements of CPLR § 7002[c][4]. Nonetheless, for the reasons set forth below, the court finds that Defendant has failed to demonstrate entitlement to habeas corpus relief or release pursuant to CPL § 30.30[2][a].

The instant situation is analogous to that of a defendant who seeks habeas corpus review of their bail conditions. While a defendant's bail status is non-appealable, (People ex rel. Rosenthal v Wolfson, 48 NY2d 230, 232 [1979]), a defendant who has made an application for bail or recognizance may obtain the collateral review of the bail conditions set on the ground that there was an abuse of discretion by the court which resulted in an unconstitutional deprivation of the defendant's liberty. (People ex rel. Klein v Krueger, 25 NY2d 497 [1969]).

It is settled law that a habeas corpus petition is the appropriate vehicle for reviewing whether a CPL § 30.30 [2][a] application was correctly decided. (People ex rel. Bullock v Barry, No. 02-403954, 2002 NY Slip Op 50463(U), at *1—2 [Sup Ct NY County 2002]["it is the [*3]adverse ruling on the CPL § 30.30(2) motion which gives rise to the claim that a petitioner is being illegally detained and the right to seek a habeas review of the issue"]). However, this court is not a "reviewing appellate court," and has limited authority only to determine whether the motion court's decision was supported by the record or violated any constitutional or statutory requisites. (People ex rel. Klein v Krueger, 25 NY2d 497 [1969] [habeas court's review is not that of an appellate court]; People ex rel. Payne v Fludd, 171 AD3d 776 [2d Dep't 2019], both cited in People ex rel. Pacheco v Brann, 69 Misc 3d 952, 956 [Sup Ct Richmond County 2020] and People ex rel Arogyaswamy v Brann, 68 Misc 3d 738, 743 [Sup Ct Queens County 2020]). "To receive new evidence would be both to frustrate the integrity of the review function and to undertake a de novo bail determination. This the habeas corpus court may not do." (People ex rel. Rosenthal on Behalf of Kolman v Wolfson, 48 NY2d 230, 232 [1979]). Thus, as in the bail review situation, the question is not whether this court would have reached a different conclusion than Justice Earle-Gargan; but whether Justice Earle-Gargan acted outside the bounds of the law in denying Defendant's release status. (see, People ex rel. Kaufmann on Behalf of Marongiu v Brann, 69 Misc 3d 506, 508 [Sup Ct NY County 2020]).

Although Defendant's omnibus motion had included a CPL § 30.30[2][a] application for release in conjunction with his challenge to the People's COC (on the presumption that the COC was filed on the 90th day after arraignment), the motion court's dismissal decision and securing order did not address the CPL § 30.30[2][a] release issue. Because Justice Earle-Gargan did not rule on the speedy trial question, the court finds that a habeas corpus petition to this court is appropriate. Thus, the writ is granted only to the extent that the court has conducted its limited review of the motion court's determination of the COC's validity and Defendant's remand; and the writ is further denied, as this court finds that the motion court's determination of the COC's validity on February 13, 2025 and her remand order are both supported by the record and do not violate any constitutional or statutory provisions.

Speedy Trial Motion/Custody Release Application

Notwithstanding the foregoing, as Justice Earle-Gargan made no determination regarding the CPL § 30.30 [2][a] application, this court will address the issue. Here, Defendant argues only that he must be released because the COC for the dismissed indictment was not timely filed. The court will address the additional arguments made by counsel in court on June 3: that the period from February 13 to February 19 should be chargeable to the People as well as all time after the May 29 dismissal, as the People could not be ready for trial with no indictment pending.

The first two arguments above are obviously unavailing. A declaration of trial readiness "within 90 days" after arraignment is proper. (CPL § 30.30 [2][a]). The operative word in the statute is "within," which permits the People to answer ready on the 90th day. (People v Boateng, 73 Misc 3d 1238(A) [Crim Ct Bronx County 2022] [internal citations omitted]; People v McLean, 77 Misc 3d 492, 497—98 [Crim Ct Kings County 2022]). Assuming here for the sake of argument that the COC was filed on the 90th day, it was timely to stop the speedy trial clock under CPL §§ 30.30 [1][a] and [2][a]. The court also rejects the argument that the six days following the COC filing during which the protective order application was pending should be charged to the People. It is well-settled that a protective order application constitutes a motion the filing of which temporarily tolls the speedy trial clock. (People v Whitney, 2025 NY Slip Op 25248 [Crim Ct Bronx County 2025]; People v Adams, 86 Misc 3d 472, 479—80 [Sup Ct Erie [*4]County 2025]; People v Erby, 68 Misc 3d 625 [Sup Ct Bronx County 2020]).FN2 The court confirms the finding of the motion court that the People's COC was valid as of February 13, 2025, and concludes that the period during which the protective order application was pending is not chargeable to the People.

The only branch of Defendant's CPL § 30.30 [2][a] argument that merits discussion is his assertion that because the COC presumably was filed on the 90th day after arraignment, the period after the May 29 dismissal of indictment 74809-24 should be chargeable to the People, and therefore he is entitled to release under § 30.30 [2][a]. In this case, that argument does not survive scrutiny.

There is only a single commencement date of a criminal action notwithstanding the issuance of successive indictments. (People v Lomax, 50 NY2d 351, 356 [1980], cited in People v Bantum, 133 AD2d 699, 701 [2d Dep't 1991]). In other words, successive indictments with the original charges relate back to the commencement date of the original felony complaint for the purpose of calculating the six-month readiness period of CPL § 30.30 [1][a]. (People v Sinistaj, 67 NY2d 236, 237 [1986]). This does not mean, however, that the entire period between the filing of the first felony complaint and the arraignment on the second indictment is always automatically chargeable to the People, even if the first indictment was dismissed. (People v Bantum, 133 AD2d 699 [2d Dep't 1987]).

Periods of delay occasioned by motion practice, maters involving the defendant, and exceptional circumstances are excludable from the 90—day calculation and can include the unavailability of evidence material to the people's case, when the district attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period. (CPL § 30.30[4][g][i]). Periods of excludable delay remain so even where they coincide with delays that might be attributable to the People. (People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523 [1985]; People v Torres, 60 NY2d 119 [1983], cited in People v Kanter, 173 AD2d 560, 561 [2d Dep't 1991]; People v Newton, 120 AD2d 751, 752 [2d Dep't 1986]).

Because the law will not "allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong," (People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 366, cited in People v Salazar, 180 Misc 2d 128, 130 [Sup Ct Kings County 1999] [addl internal citations omitted]), courts have consistently denied a defendant's speedy trial motion when his own acts or conduct caused the delay. (see, People v Butler, 148 AD3d 1540, 1541 [4th Dep't 2017] [defendant absent from court due to attempt to avoid apprehensions and prosecution]; People v Singletary, 54 AD2d 767 [2d Dep't 1976)] [defendant continually used tactics calculated to delay the proceedings]; People v Bowman, 79 Misc 3d 1203(A) [Crim Ct Kings County 2023] [defendant's disruptive and volatile behavior in court led to delay which was not charged to People]; People v Rupp, 75 Misc 2d 683 [Sup Ct Sullivan County 1973] [defendant's dilatory tactics played a principal role in delaying prosecution - [*5]obstructive conduct results in forfeiture of speedy trial rights]).

Even more powerful public policy considerations exist to prohibit an accused from benefitting from his own conduct if he obstructs or impedes a complainant from testifying against him; deterring litigants from acting to prevent the testimony of an adverse witness is necessary to protect the integrity of the adversary process. (People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 366 [1995], cited in People v Salazar, 180 Misc 2d 128, 130 [Sup Ct Kings County 1999] [addl internal citations omitted]). "Any other result would mock the system that these laws were designed to protect." (People v Ellis, 123 Misc 2d 544, 549 [Sup Ct Kings County] [defendant's conduct threatening and harassing the complaint to prevent his testimony resulted in forfeiture of his speedy trial right during that period]).

Here, the facts are well-documented throughout the court record - in the motion papers, discovery materials and Grand Jury transcripts — amply demonstrating that after Defendant's November 15, 2024 arraignment, he successfully acted to intimidate A.S. and L.T.F. to prevent their Grand Jury testimony. Almost immediately after his arraignment, Defendant began a course of conduct with his co-defendants to prevent A.S. and L.T.F. from testifying. There are recordings of Defendant's Rikers Island phone calls to Eugene and Exondus beginning on November 17, 2024 which contain his urgent exhortations to them to contact A.S. and L.T.F. to ensure that they did not testify before the Grand Jury. The Rikers phone records show extensive contact among the defendants for this purpose between November 17 and November 20, 2024. Defendant is heard on the recordings to say, "just make sure those motherfuckers don't come," and "make sure she stay put — you heard." On another call he says, "if the accusers don't come to court how can they not let me go." During another conversation, the caller states "tell her not to talk to the lawyer or any of that shit just don't come." Subpoenaed cell phone records of the defendants and the complainants showed multiple repeated calls and texts to A.S. and L.T.F. during the days preceding the scheduled Grand Jury presentation.

On November 20, 2024, the 180.80 day and the scheduled Grand Jury presentation, A.S. and L.T.F. appeared only after repeated efforts by the prosecutors and police - including subpoenas - to convince them to do so. A.S. and L.T.F. claimed they did not remember what happened and refused to testify. They wanted to drop the charges, and A.S. broke down in tears. A.S. and L.T.F. had already requested an emergency move to another residence because they were aware that Telesford had gang affiliations and they were afraid of his retaliation. As a result of the witnesses' unavailability, the prosecutors scrambled to conduct the extra-judicial pre-Grand Jury Sirois hearing FN3 and secured an indictment without their testimony.FN4 During the ensuing months, the prosecutor regularly contacted A.S. and L.T.F. to encourage them to cooperate with the prosecution. Finally, on or about May 28, 2025, A.S. agreed to cooperate; after that he testified in the Grand Jury for the second indictment. L.T.F. never changed her mind.

The court finds that the record provides clear and convincing evidence that Telesford's actions and misconduct to intimidate, coerce, and prevent the complainants from testifying induced the witnesses' unlawful refusal to testify in the Grand Jury and perpetuated A.S.' unavailability for months afterward, and L.T.F.'s seemingly permanent unavailability. (People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359 [1995]; Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 92 AD2d 405, 415 [2d Dep't 1983], citing United States v Mastrangelo, 662 F 2d 946, 952 []2d Cir 1982], and People v Sirois, 92 AD2d 618 [2d Dep't 1983]). The court also finds that the prosecutor exercised due diligence in attempting to secure the unavailable evidence during the absent period. As a result, the court finds that the period from the first recorded Riker's call on November 17, 2024 to the day when A.S. agreed to cooperate on May 28, 2025, is excludable from the People's six-month speedy trial period.

In this case, the People had 182 days to be ready for trial after Defendant's arraignment on the charges contained in the first felony complaint. The People filed their COC and SOR on the new indictment number 72466-25 on July 3, 2025. The People are charged with the following periods of delay: 2 days from arraignment to the first Riker's call (November 16 to November 17, 2024). The period from November 18, 2024 to May 28, 2025 is excludable as an exceptional circumstance due to Defendant's wrongdoing under CPL 30.30 [4][g]. Thus, when the People filed their COC and SOR on February 13 2025 for the first indictment, they had incurred only two days of delay, well within the CPL § 30.30[2][a] period. The People are charged with an additional 36 days from May 29, 2025 to July 3, 2025, a total of 38 days of delay in this prosecution. Defendant's application for § 30.30 [2][a] release from custody was properly denied.

Remand following dismissal

Even if Defendant's misconduct had not resulted in his forfeiture of his § 30.30 [2][a] rights from November 18 to May 28, the court would still find that Defendant was not entitled to release because of the May 29 dismissal of the first indictment.

CPL § 210.45 [9] authorizes the restraint of a defendant during the interim period between dismissal of an indictment and the authorized re-submission of the charges to another grand jury, by deeming the court's authorization to the People to re-present the charges as an order holding a defendant for the action of the Grand Jury. The court could find no case directly on point where a defendant urges a release from custody under CPL § 30.30[2] upon dismissal of an indictment with leave to re-present where the court remanded the defendant pursuant to CPL § 210.45[9]. But it has long been recognized that temporary detention of an accused pending grand jury action is an exception arising out of necessity where reasonable cause exists. (People v Klaff, 35 Misc 2d 859 [Dist Ct Nassau County 1962][addl history omitted]). Additionally, CPL article 180 contains analogous procedures which guide this court's conclusion.

CPL § 180.70 [1], provides that the defendant is held for the action of a grand jury after a preliminary hearing when the court found reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed a felony. In that event, the temporary detention period permitting Defendant to be held in custody under CPL § 180.80 [1] is "tolled" for a 45-day period for the case to be presented to the Grand Jury for indictment, and the court may issue a securing order continuing the defendant's custody status set at arraignment: remand, set bail, or release. CPL § 210.45 [9] mirrors the principle and standards of CPL180.70 [1]. Similar to CPL article 180's sanction of remand only after a finding of reasonable cause to believe the defendant has committed a felony, CPL § 210.45 [9] permits a remand securing order upon the court's dismissal of an indictment only when it has also granted [*6]the People leave to re-present the charges: by which the court acknowledges that there is no fatal flaw in the evidence which would prohibit a grand jury from once again finding reasonable cause to believe the defendant committed the dismissed offenses.

This process is independent of the speedy trial clock, which continues to run both after the preliminary hearing or the dismissal of the indictment. Had the legislature intended that the operation of CPL § 30.30[2][a] release would nullify the Court's authority under CPL § 210.45 [9], it would have specified so. In other words, a determination that CPL § 30.30 [2][a] required Defendant's release pending re-submission of original charges to the grand jury would contradict the court's authority under CPL § 210.45[9] to hold a defendant in custody for the action of the grand jury, rendering that section superfluous. This the court may not do.

Courts must afford statutes a "sensible and practical over-all construction, which is consistent with and furthers its scheme and purpose and which harmonizes all its interlocking provisions." Courts must also construe a statutory scheme as a whole to avoid objectionable, unreasonable, or absurd consequences and avoid rendering any of its language superfluous. (Monroe Cty. Pub. Sch. Districts v Zyra, 51 AD3d 125, 130 [4th Dep't 2008] [addl internal citations omitted]). In view of these principles, Defendant's remand pending re-submission of the dismissed charges was properly authorized under CPL § 210.45 [9].

Conclusion

Defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted in part and denied in part. The motion court properly remanded Defendant pending re-presentation of the charges and properly declared the COC under the dismissed indictment valid and timely filed. Defendant's application for release under CPL § 30.30 [2][a] was properly denied. The People have incurred 38 days of delay under CPL § 30.30 [1][a].

This is the decision and Order of the court.

MICHAEL J. HARTOFILIS

Acting Justice of the Supreme Court

Dated: March 19, 2026

Kew Gardens, New York