Sapini v Ferrara

Supreme Court, New York County

Decided on January 14, 2026

Index No. 160000/2024

Christopher Chin, J.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY.

Upon the foregoing documents, submitted after oral argument, it is

ORDERED that this motion by defendants Anthony F. Ferrara and Metro North Commuter Railroad for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the basis that: (1) there is a prior action pending related to the same parties and the same facts; and (2) because plaintiff failed to timely file the summons and complaint within the applicable statute of limitations is denied, for the reasons stated below.

Plaintiff commenced this action alleging that on April 23, 2023, he was operating his motor vehicle when it was struck by a Ford F-250 utility truck bearing markings identifying it as owned and operated by "MTA Metro-North Railroad."

Prior Action Pending

Defendants maintain that the within action and the case of Justin Sapini v. Anthony F. Ferrara and Metro North Commuter Railroad, and Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Index No. 150940/2024 ("Action No. 1") involve the substantially the same parties, the same [*2]alleged facts regarding the same April 23, 2023 motor vehicle accident, and the relief sought in both complaints allege that defendants were negligent in causing serious injuries to plaintiff. Defendants therefore argue that dismissal of this action is warranted, based upon a prior action pending. Moreover, while defendants acknowledge that Action No. 1 was dismissed by order dated September 6, 2024 (Richard A. Tsai, J.), they nonetheless argue that since plaintiff filed an appeal of the September 2024 dismissal order, there is a possibility of reinstatement of Action No. 1 and a further possibility of two pending actions involving the same accident and same parties. Upon review of the submissions and procedural history of both cases, this court disagrees.

As stated, prior to the commencement of the within action, Action No. 1 was dismissed. Moreover, by order dated December 2, 2025, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the first action (see Sapini v. Ferrara, 244 AD3d 437 [1st Dept 2025]). In any event, even if the appeal of the dismissal of the first action was still pending, commencement of the second action would not have been improper (see Concepcion v Lessel Transp. Corp., 213 AD3d 449, 449 [1st Dept 2023]; L-3 Communications Corp. v SafeNet, Inc., 45 AD3d 1, 7-8 [1st Dept 2007]). Thus, this action is not barred by a prior action pending.

Statute of Limitations

As stated, Action No. 1 was dismissed by order dated September 6, 2024. The dismissal was based upon plaintiff's failure to comply with a condition precedent, and not on the merits.

CPLR 205 (a) expressly permits a new action to be commenced within six (6) moths of a prior action's termination, provided the earlier action was timely and not dismissed on the merits.FN1

Here, it is not disputed that Action No. 1 was timely commenced within the applicable statute of limitations but was dismissed for failure to plead compliance with Public Authorities Law section 1276 (1), which requires a 30-day pre-suit presentment of claims. Court have held that this requirement under the statute is a condition precedent to suit, not a jurisdictional bar (see Fleming v Long Island R.R. Co., 72 NY2d 998 [1988]). In Fleming v Long Island R.R. Co., the Court of Appeals specifically explained that the failure to comply with the provisions of Public Authorities Law 1276 (1) which resulted in a dismissal of an action, does not preclude commencement of a second action pursuant to CPLR 205 (a), within six (6) months of the dismissal (id. at 999). Thus, since the within action was commenced within six (6) months of the dismissal (on or about October 11, 2024), this action was timely commenced.

Conclusion

Thus, the within action is both procedurally proper and timely, and defendants' motion for summary judgment of dismissal is therefore denied.

DATE 1/14/2026

CHRISTOPHER CHIN, J.S.C.