Fitch v Rensselaer County Regional Chamber of Commerce
2026 NY Slip Op 50489(U)
April 8, 2026
Supreme Court, Rensselaer County
Noel Mendez, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
Stephanie Fitch, Plaintiff,
v
Rensselaer County Regional Chamber of Commerce; NORRIS PEARSON, in his individual and professional capacity; BRIAN WILLIAMS, in his individual and professional capacity; KATHERINE DORAN, in his individual and professional capacity; MICHAEL HAMEL, in his individual and professional capacity; and CHRISTOPHER LOSZYNSKI, in his individual and professional capacity, Defendants.
Supreme Court, Rensselaer County
Decided on April 8, 2026
Index No. EF2024-278402
Law Office of Bhavleen Sabharwal, P.C.
Bhavleen Sabharwal, Esq., of counsel
Attorney for Plaintiff
Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP
Erin P. Cain, Esq., of counsel
Elior D. Shiloh, Esq., of counsel
Attorneys for Defendants
Noel Mendez, J.
[*1]In this action for employment discrimination, Plaintiff Stephanie Fitch ("Plaintiff") moves this Court for an order pursuant to the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") compelling certain discovery. Defendants Rensselaer County Regional Chamber of Commerce [*2]("Chamber"), Norris Pearson, Brian Williams, Katharine Doran, Michael Hamel, and Christopher Loszynski (collectively, "Defendants") oppose the motion. Upon consideration of the parties' motion papers, and for the reasons that follow, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion in part and otherwise denies the motion.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The facts of this case are set forth in this Court's Decision and Order, entered on November 7, 2025, granting Plaintiff permission to add additional defendants to the action (see Fitch v Rensselaer County Regional Chamber of Commerce, 87 Misc 3d 1235(A) [Sup Ct, Rensselaer County 2025]). The gravamen of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint is that the Chamber has allegedly engaged in various acts of discrimination, in violation of the Human Rights Law. Plaintiff now moves this Court for an order compelling Defendants to provide full and complete discovery demands. Plaintiff also seeks reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
As relevant here, Plaintiff served upon Defendants demands for discovery and interrogatories, seeking the following: (1) All documents relating to the hiring of employees, from five years before Plaintiff's hire date in 2000 (1995) to three years from after Pearson was hired in 2023 (2026), including job postings, applications, resumes, interview notes, offer letters, and employment contracts; and (2) information by way of an interrogatory of every person who has been employed by the Chamber from January 1, 2020, to the present, including their full name, current contact information, job titles, dates of employment, their age at the time of hire, their gender, salary and compensation, and reason—if any—for having been separated from the Chamber. Defendants refused in writing to provide the documents and information as requested, arguing that the requests were burdensome and were neither relevant to the claims averred nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The parties exchanged numerous letters prior to Plaintiff moving this Court for relief.
II. Parties' Arguments
Plaintiff maintains they are entitled to the discovery outlined above because it is relevant to the case and because they seek to prove discriminatory conduct by way of presenting direct, statistical, and circumstantial evidence. Plaintiff claims the documents and interrogatory requested pertain to Defendants' hiring practices and reasons behind personnel changes.
In opposition, Defendants claim they turned over approximately 250 pages' worth of responsive documents that include, inter alia, Plaintiff's personnel file, the employee handbook, emails, text messages, meeting notes, meeting minutes, and other documents. Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to the above-referenced demands because Plaintiff does not allege they were replaced by a younger person, but rather, a company, and because Plaintiff could not identify at a deposition any instances of age discrimination during their 23-year tenure with the Chamber, but for two alleged incidents between the date they were hired and the date they were terminated. According to Defendants, the discovery Plaintiff now seeks is neither material nor necessary for the action, and is palpably improper, overbroad, and burdensome.
In reply, Plaintiff reiterates they request documents spanning 31 years, but assert they merely seek, by way of their interrogatory, the employee information described above for a six-year period, from January 1, 2020, to the present.
III. Applicable Law and Analysis
Parties in a civil action are required to fully disclose all matter that is material and necessary to the action regardless of the relevant burden of proof in the case, and a party may seek redress by way of a motion to compel in the event of noncompliance by the party from [*3]whom discovery is sought (see CPLR §§ 3101 [a], 3124).
CPLR 3101 (a) "embodies the policy determination that liberal discovery encourages fair and effective resolution of disputes on the merits, minimizing the possibility for ambush and unfair surprise" (Forman v Henkin, 30 NY3d 656, 661 [2018], quoting Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v Chemical Bank, 78 NY2d 371, 376 [1991]). What is "material" and "necessary" under CPLR 3101 (a) must be interpreted liberally to ensure requested disclosure of any facts bearing on the controversy that will assist the parties in narrowing the issues in the case, reducing delay, and preparing for trial (see Matter of Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d 32, 38 [2014], quoting Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]). The party seeking discovery must show that the request is reasonably calculated to ensure disclosure of material and necessary information (see Cooke v Greenhouse Hudson, LLC, 230 AD3d 841, 844 [3d Dept 2024], quoting Harmon v Diocese of Albany, 204 AD3d 1270, 1271 [3d Dept 2022]; see also Catlyn & Derzee, Inc. v Amedore Land Developers, LLC, 166 AD3d 1137, 1141 [3d Dept 2018]).
Ultimately, the purpose of discovery is to determine whether material relevant to a claim or defense exists (see Forman, 30 NY3d at 664). In most cases, a party seeking disclosure will be unable to demonstrate the existence of certain items not yet obtained contain material evidence (see id.). However, the right to disclosure is not absolute (see id. at 661). The nisi prius court has broad discretion in supervising disclosure and in granting protective orders or otherwise limiting discovery (see Herbenson v Carrols Corp., 101 AD3d 1220, 1221 [3d Dept 2012], citing Matter of Andrews v Trustco Bank, Natl. Assn., 289 AD2d 910, 912—913 [2001] [internal citations omitted]).
Here, Plaintiff's request seeking 31 years' worth of documentary evidence is belied by their interrogatory requesting information for a more limited time frame. Given the need to balance discovery requests against any special burdens borne by the opposing party (see Forman, 30 NY3d at 662), the Court finds that Defendants shall provide Plaintiffs with the documents and interrogatory information requested, beginning from January 1, 2020, to the date of this Order.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART, to the extent of ordering Defendants to provide all requested discovery from January 1, 2020, to the date of this Order, within thirty (30) days of service of a copy of this Order with notice of entry; and it is further
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the motion is otherwise DENIED IN PART; and it is further
ORDERED, that the parties shall appear for a compliance conference on Thursday, April 30, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. via Microsoft Teams.
This shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court, which will be uploaded to the NYSCEF system for filing and entry by the Office of the County Clerk. The signing of this Decision and Order and uploading onto NYSCEF shall not constitute filing, entry, service, or notice of entry under CPLR 2220 and section 202.5-b (h) (2) of the Uniform Rules for the New York State Trial Courts. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable provisions of those Rules with respect to filing, entry, service, and notice of entry of the original Decision and Order.
Dated: April 8, 2026
Troy, New York
Hon. Noel Mendez
Acting Justice of the Supreme Court
Papers Considered:
1. Motion papers, with exhibits
2. Opposition papers, with exhibits
3. Reply