People v Volmar

Supreme Court, Kings County

Decided on April 9, 2026

Ind. No. 74777-25

Dale Fong-Frederick, J.

The defendant, Frandy Volmar, is charged in this indictment with Burglary in the First Degree (PL §140.30[2]) and other related charges. The defendant moves to unseal the records pertaining to an accused person ("AP1") in the case of "People v D.L., docket number unknown" and a second accused person ("AP2") in the case of "People v J.V., unknown if docket number generated." On February 5, 2026, the People consented to the motion in open court but sought to redact any of the People's attorney work product from the unsealed records.FN1

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part.

The parties agree that the antecedent to the instant criminal action occurred on August 16, 2025, when AP1 was involved in a motor vehicle collision with AP2 and the defendant. AP1 is the complainant's father and AP2 is the defendant's nephew. After the collision, AP2 allegedly threatened to go to the home of AP1, and a fight ensued. AP1 was initially arrested for assaulting AP2 and given a Desk Appearance Ticket. Later, on August 16, 2025, the defendant is alleged to have acted in concert with another person to enter the complainant's residence, strike the complainant with a metal pipe while stating "eff your father," and damage the complainant's property.

AP1 was arraigned under Docket Number CR-040473-25KN, but that criminal action was dismissed. On August 21, 2025, AP2 was arrested under arrest number K25654486 for acting in concert with the defendant to assault the complainant. However, the People declined to prosecute AP2. As such, the records for AP1 and AP2 were both sealed pursuant to CPL [*2]§160.50. On September 9, 2025, the defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint and subsequently arraigned on this indictment for acting in concert to assault the complainant.

Although for different reasons, the parties agree that the motor vehicle collision is inextricably interwoven with the instant case and relevant material exists within the sealed records that may constitute Rosario as well as impeachment material. The People urge release of the sealed records to investigateFN2 and to disclose Rosario. The defendant urges release of the sealed records to aid in the exercise of the constitutional right to present a defense since there is no other means for the defendant to obtain the information contained in the sealed records.

THE LAW

CPL §160.50 requires the sealing of records when a criminal prosecution terminates in favor of an accused person. The purpose of sealing records of terminated prosecutions is to protect the interests of the accused person from the harmful impact of a failed prosecution (Katherine B v Cataldo, 5 NY3d 195 [2005]; Hynes v Karassik (47 NY2d 659 [1979]). However, unsealing is only authorized under certain circumstances enumerated in the statute, such as when the accused person or their designated agent moves to unseal the records (CPL §160.50[1][d]).

The New York State Legislature overhauled the discovery rules in 2019, and made subsequent amendments in 2020, 2022, and 2025. The discovery rules require the People to disclose evidence related to the subject matter of the case (CPL §245.20[1]). Notably, the Legislature neither required prosecutors to disclose materials from sealed criminal records as part of their discovery obligations under Article 245 of the Criminal Procedure Law, nor did they amend CPL §160.50 to authorize the prosecution to unseal records for the purposes of complying with their discovery obligations. A defendant is also without statutory authority to unseal the records of a third party whose records have been sealed pursuant to CPL §160.50, regardless of the constraints it may place on the constitutional right to present a defense.

Lacking in statutory authority, the defendant argues that Hynes v Karassik (47 NY2d 659 [1979]), authorizes a trial court to exercise its inherent authority to unseal records when appropriate. However, Hynes cautions that such power is to be used only in rare and extraordinary circumstances (id. at 664). The parties do not cite any binding authority on the issue of unsealing court records for the purpose of complying with discovery obligations, and this Court is unaware of any controlling appellate authority on this issue. However, several trial courts have addressed the issue of unsealing records in connection with CPL §240.20 discovery obligations.

In People v Alexander, (67 Misc 3d 620 [Sup Ct, Queens Co 2020]), the court held that unsealing records was an appropriate exercise of the court's inherent power over its own records to allow the People to meet their legal mandate to comply with discovery and because the circumstance of that case was extraordinary. In Alexander, the wrong person was initially arrested and charged for the same offense that defendant Alexander would later be charged with. When the wrongly charged person's case was sealed, evidence pertaining to defendant Alexander was also inadvertently sealed. The Alexander court exercised its inherent authority to unseal the [*3]records of the wrongly charged person in order to excise the erroneously sealed evidence and restore it to the correct case (see People ex rel Hirschberg v Orange County Court, 271 NY 151 [1936]).

In People v Taveras, (78 Misc 3d1221[A] [Crim Ct, Bx Co 2023]), the defendant moved to unseal records, arguing that the People were required to disclose sealed records to comply with their discovery obligations. While the court ultimately ruled that the records sought were not actually sealed, the argument and analysis in reaching the decision is instructive. The Taveras court rejected the defendant's contention and reasoned that in harmonizing CPL §§160.50 and 245.20, the Legislature did not intend for the People to seek unsealing orders to comply with their discovery obligations. The Taveras court explained that issuing an unsealing order for discovery purposes was an improper judicial expansion of the statutory unsealing authority of CPL §160.50 and improperly compelled the People to obtain discovery by court order (see also People v Schlesinger, 85 Misc 3d 1255[A] [Crim Ct, Bx Co 2025]). However, while the statutory scheme did not permit unsealing, the Taveras court reasoned that a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense exceeds the statutory privilege of confidentiality granted by CPL §160.50 and could trigger the court's inherent authority to unseal its own records where appropriate.

In People v Davis, (67 Misc 3d 391 [Crim Ct, Bx Co 2020]), the court held that the People were not under statutory obligation to obtain an unsealing order to comply with their discovery obligation. However, in light of the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense, the court ruled that an unsealing order for an in camera inspection was the proper balance between protecting an accused person's statutory privilege of privacy and the defendant's constitutional right to confront a witness.

ANALYSIS

Inasmuch as the parties both consent to the unsealing of the records, it is clear that the information sought is related to the subject matter of the case and, if unsealed, is likely discoverable. The underlying motor vehicle collision is at the heart of both the theory of prosecution and the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense and is inextricably interwoven with the charges in this indictment.

The Criminal Procedure Law does not authorize unsealing records to comply with discovery obligations even where the underlying facts of the sealed records are inextricably interwoven with the pending criminal action (Tavares, supra; Davis, supra). This court cannot create unsealing authority or discovery obligations by judicial fiat where the Legislature has declined to act.

Since the People believe that the sealed records are likely automatically discoverable, the People should have requested that AP1 and AP2 obtain the sealed records themselves, or request that AP1 and AP2 designate an individual at the Kings County District Attorney's Office as their agent (CPL §160.50[1][d]; New York Times Company v Kings County District Attorney, 179 AD3d 115, 124 [2d Dept 2019]). However, the Court is mindful that the People have diligently disclosed the information in their possession to the defendant, which allowed the defendant to make the instant motion. The Court is also mindful that while the sealed records of AP2, who is the defendant's nephew, were accessible to the defendant (CPL §160.50[1][d]), the defendant, through counsel, could not be the agent of AP1 since they would have conflicting interests. Therefore, although the defendant may be able to obtain the AP2's sealed records, the defendant has no means of obtaining AP1's sealed records.

CONCLUSION

WHEREAS judicial economy is not served by having the parties seek authority from both accused people and then, if refused, seek the same relief as the instant motion; and

WHEREAS the People concede that the sealed records are relevant and should be disclosed to the defendant with redactions of the People's work product; and

WHEREAS the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense would be impaired by the statutory privilege of confidentiality (Taveras, supra; see People v Rouse, 34 NY3d 269 [2019]); and

WHEREAS the specific rare and extraordinary facts of this case are uncontested and establish that the sealed records are inextricably interwoven with the subject matter of the case and the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense; and

WHEREAS the court has inherent power to unseal its own records (People v Anonymous, 34 NY3d 631 [2020]; Matter of Joseph M, 82 NY2d 128 [1993]).

It is hereby

ORDERED that the defendant's motion for an unsealing order is granted to the extent that this court will conduct an in camera inspection of the unsealed records (Davis, supra); and it is further

ORDERED that the People shall unseal the records related to CR-040473-25KN and arrest number K25654486; and it is further

ORDERED that the People shall deliver to the court the unsealed records, along with a copy of their proposed redactions, within 10 days of the date of this order for in camera inspection.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: April 9, 2026

Kings County, New York

Hon. Dale Fong-Frederick,

Acting Justice, Supreme Court