Matter of T.D. v Byram Hills Cent. Sch. Dist.

Supreme Court, Westchester County

Decided on April 9, 2026

Index No. 56002/2026

Sheralyn Pulver, J.

Petitioners, identified in the caption as T.D. and L.D., on behalf of their minor son, L.D. ("Petitioners"), move for relief pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") Article 78 seeking to annul and vacate a determination, made by Byram Hills Central School District, Jen Lamia, and Kim Lapple (collectively, "Respondents"), to deny a child's medical exemption from mandatory vaccinations. Petitioners further seek declarations that Petitioners have satisfied the legal requirements for a medical exemption and that the child is exempt from further vaccination for measles, as well as an order compelling Respondents to immediately admit the child to school. Additionally, Petitioners sought interim relief, which the Court declined to grant (see Order to Show Cause, NYSCEF Doc. No. 31).FN1 Respondents have submitted opposition to the petition, and Petitioners have replied. Respondents have also moved to dismiss the petition, pursuant to CPLR § 7804(f) and CPLR § 3211(a), on the grounds that Petitioners failed to exhaust all administrative remedies and failed to establish their entitlement to relief.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court now grants Respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.

The Court read and considered the following papers electronically filed via NYSCEF in [*2]making its decision:

• Verified Petition, Affirmation of Chad A. Davenport, Esq. in Support of Petition, Exhibits A-R, Affirmation of Petitioner T.D., Memorandum of Law, Request for Judicial Intervention, and Proposed Order to Show Cause (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1-25).

• Affirmation of Emily A. Fallon, Esq. in Opposition to Petition with Exhibits A-E, and Memorandum of Law (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 28-29).

• Reply Affirmation in Further Support of Petition, Exhibits A-E, Reply Affirmation of Petitioner T.D., and Reply Memorandum of Law (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 32-39).

• Notice of Motion to Dismiss, and Memorandum of Law (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 42-43).

• Affirmation in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (NYSCEF Doc. No. 44).

At issue in this proceeding is Respondents' denial of Petitioners' request for a medical exemption for their child, L.D., from certain mandatory vaccinations for the 2025-2026 academic year and the resultant exclusion of L.D. from attending school (see Petition [NYSCEF Doc. No. 1], ¶ 1 et seq.). On or about September 29, 2025, Petitioners submitted to Respondents a physician's medical exemption form seeking exemption from the tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis (DTaP) and meningococcal disease vaccines (see Affirmation of T.D. ["T.D. Aff."] [NYSCEF Doc. No. 22], ¶ 7; Ex. A [NYSCEF Doc. No. 3]). The District denied the request because additional information from L.D.'s pediatrician was required and because the physician who completed the exemption form was named on the New York State Department of Health's ("DOH") School Vaccination Fraud Awareness website as having been suspended from using the New York State Immunization Information System (see T.D. Aff., ¶ 19; Ex. E [NYSCEF Doc. No. 7]).

Between November 2025 and January 2026, Petitioners and Respondents engaged in substantial correspondence concerning the exemption request. Petitioners also submitted a new medical exemption form from a different physician, which, following submission by the District to DOH for review, was found to be insufficient (see T.D. Aff., ¶¶ 23, 27; Ex. H [NYSCEF Doc. No. 10]; Ex. I [NYSCEF Doc. No. 11]). By letter dated December 4, 2025, Petitioner's counsel demanded that Respondents immediately accept the medical exemption from vaccinations and permit L.D. to continue attending school (see T.D. Aff., ¶ 30; Ex. J [NYSCEF Doc. No. 12]). By letter dated January 14, 2026, Respondent Lamia, the District Superintendent, denied the request, advised Petitioners that L.D. would be excluded from school as of January 20, 2026, and provided instructions to arrange for home schooling (see T.D. Aff., ¶ 35; Ex. L [NYSCEF Doc. No. 14]).

Discussion

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that one first exhaust all available administrative channels before seeking relief from the courts in an Article 78 proceeding (see Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57 [1978]; Stoll v County of Nassau, 227 AD3d 1085, 1086 [2d Dept. 2024]; CPLR § 7801[1]).

The administrative remedy available to challenge a school district's denial of a medical exemption and exclusion of a student is an appeal to the Commissioner of Education (see Public Health Law ["PHL"] § 2164[7][b]; Walker v New York State Dept. of Health, 788 F Supp 3d 427, 455-456 [ED NY 2025]). An Article 78 proceeding could then be commenced in the event [*3]the Commissioner of Education denies such an administrative appeal (see A.A.C. v Starpoint Cent. Sch. Dist., 2026 WL 125401, *3, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1304, *7 [2d Cir, Jan. 16, 2026, No. 25-1316-cv]).

A parent challenging a school district's denial of a medical exemption must exhaust their administrative remedies by appealing to the Commissioner of Education or must establish that an exception to the exhaustion requirement applies (see Matter of Coritsidis v New York City Dept. of Educ., 242 AD3d 886, 888 [2d Dept 2025]. But see Matter of Lynch v Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 155 Misc 2d 846, 849 [Sup Ct, Rockland County 1992]). The exceptions to the exhaustion requirement include "when an agency's action is challenged as either unconstitutional or wholly beyond its grant of power, or when resort to an administrative remedy would be futile or when its pursuit would cause irreparable injury" (Matter of Mirenberg v Lynbrook Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 63 AD3d 943, 943 [2d Dept 2009], quoting Watergate II Apts., 46 NY2d at 57). Additionally, where the issue is one of pure statutory interpretation that can be decided as a matter of law, the exhaustion requirement will not apply (see Matter of Dobbs Ferry Hosp. Assn. v Whalen, 62 AD2d 999, 999 [2d Dept 1978]; Matter of Lezette v Board of Educ., Hudson City Sch. Dist., 43 AD2d 755, 755-756 [3d Dept 1973]).

The exhaustion requirement applies notwithstanding the permissive, as opposed to mandatory, language used in PHL § 2164(7)(b) and in Education Law § 310 (stating that a parent or other aggrieved party may appeal by petition to the Commissioner of Education). The use of the word "may" simply means that a parent has the option to seek further review by the Commissioner of Education or to accept the school district's decision; it does not excuse the parent from exhausting administrative remedies before commencing an Article 78 proceeding (see Matter of Courtenay v Graziano, 173 AD3d 1016, 1019 [2d Dept 2019]; Matter of Podolsky v Daniels, 21 AD3d 559, 560 [2d Dept 2005]).

Here, it is undisputed that Petitioners did not pursue an administrative appeal to the Commissioner of Education before commencing this proceeding. Petitioners contend, though, that exhaustion is not required because the issue raised is one of law and pure statutory interpretation—that is, whether Respondents acted wholly beyond their statutory authority by "substitut[ing] their own judgment (and that of anonymous DOH officials)" for that of L.D.'s treating physician and by requiring additional documentation (see Memorandum of Law [NYSCEF Doc. No. 21], p. 12). Petitioners further contend that an administrative appeal would have been inadequate and futile.

The Court disagrees with the premise of Petitioners' primary contention because a school district is authorized to require additional information to determine whether a physician's medical exemption form is facially valid. Initially, exemption to the mandatory vaccination requirements is provided for in Public Health Law § 2164(8): "If any physician licensed to practice medicine in this state certifies that such immunization may be detrimental to a child's health, the requirements of this section shall be inapplicable until such immunization is found no longer to be detrimental to the child's health." While PHL § 2164 does not contain any additional guidance or restrictions to aid in interpreting the PHL § 2164(8) exemption provision, the Commissioner of DOH is expressly authorized to adopt rules and regulations to effectuate the provisions and purposes of this statute (see PHL § 2164[10]). Accordingly, DOH regulations set forth additional requirements for a physician's certification for exemption, which must be provided before a child may be admitted to school:

A signed, completed medical exemption form approved by the NYSDOH or NYC Department of Education from a physician licensed to practice medicine in New York State certifying that immunization may be detrimental to the child's health, containing sufficient information to identify a medical contraindication to a specific immunization and specifying the length of time the immunization is medically contraindicated. The medical exemption must be reissued annually. The principal or person in charge of the school may require additional information supporting the exemption.

(10 NYCRR § 66-1.3[c] [emphasis added]).

Additionally, the phrase "may be detrimental to the child's health," as used in the above provision, is defined to mean "that a physician has determined that a child has a medical contraindication or precaution to a specific immunization consistent with ACIP [Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices] guidance or other nationally recognized evidence-based standard of care" (10 NYCRR § 66-1.1[l]).

Thus, for a medical exemption to be facially valid, the physician must certify that the child has a contraindication or precaution to a specific immunization that is in accord with ACIP guidance or other nationally recognized evidence-based standards of care (see id.). And, moreover, school officials are expressly authorized to require additional information supporting the exemption (see 10 NYCRR § 66-1.3[c]).

Accordingly, Respondents did not act in a manner wholly beyond their statutory authority by requiring additional documentation from Petitioners (see id.). Whether Respondents demanded burdensome documentation, beyond that which is reasonably necessary, would be the kind of factual question that should properly be addressed by the Commissioner of Education before the Court gets involved.

Nor does the Court find that Respondents acted wholly beyond their authority by sending the subject medical exemption form for DOH review to aid in determining whether the exemption form is facially valid—that is, whether the stated contraindication or precaution comports with ACIP guidance or other nationally recognized evidence-based standards of care (see 10 NYCRR § 66-1.1[l]). The DOH's letter expressly stated that, while DOH was making a recommendation at Respondents' request, the final determination, after appropriate medical consultation, lies with the school official (see Ex. I [NYSCEF Doc. No. 11]). That is consistent with the DOH regulations (see 10 NYCRR § 66-1.3). And the evidence in the record before the Court does not show that Respondents relinquished their decision-making to the DOH.

Lastly, Petitioners have failed to establish that an administrative appeal to the Commissioner of Education would have been futile or would have necessarily been an inadequate remedy.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and failed to establish that an exception to the exhaustion requirement applies. Therefore, Respondents' motion to dismiss the petition should be granted (see Matter of Carnelian Farms, LLC v Village of Muttontown Bldg. Dept., 151 AD3d 845, 846-847 [2d Dept 2017]).

The parties' remaining contentions, to the extent not rendered academic or explicitly addressed herein, have been considered and found to be unavailing.

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Respondents' motion to dismiss (motion sequence #2) is granted to the extent noted above, and the petition (motion sequence #1) is hereby dismissed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

This constitutes the Decision, Order and Judgment of the Court.

Dated: April 9, 2026

White Plains, New York

HON. SHERALYN PULVER

Acting Supreme Court Justice