Seagate Ct. Homeowners Assn., Inc. v Gardyn

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on March 20, 2026

Index No. 151658/2024

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219 [a], of the papers considered in the review of Defendant Robert Gardyn's cross-motion and Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 001): Notice of Cross-Motion (Mot. Seq. 002); Affirmation of Robert Gardyn; Affirmation of Alfred Solvang; Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion; Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition; Defendant's Affirmation in Reply; supporting affidavits and exhibits; and all prior [*2]proceedings herein. Oral argument was conducted on the motions in person at the courthouse on March 18, 2026.

II. Findings of Fact

This action, sounding in the foreclosure of a homeowners' association lien for alleged unpaid common charges, arises from a dispute that is, in its genesis, modest in monetary dimension but profound in its procedural posture. The Plaintiff seeks the extraordinary remedy of foreclosure against real property admittedly owned outright by Defendant Robert Gardyn, predicated upon alleged arrears comprised of maintenance charges, late fees, and substantial attorneys' fees.

The record establishes that Defendant is the owner of the premises located at 149 Father Capodanno Boulevard, Staten Island, New York. The Property is fully paid and unencumbered by any mortgage lien. Defendant avers, without contradiction in the record, that for approximately three decades he paid all homeowners' association common charges, frequently remitting such payments in advance.

The present controversy arose when Plaintiff asserted that Defendant had fallen into arrears. Defendant contends that during the relevant period he did not receive customary billing statements or notices, a circumstance he attributes to changes in Plaintiff's management practices. Upon becoming aware of the alleged balance, Defendant undertook efforts to obtain an accounting and resolve the matter but instead was presented with a demand he characterizes as excessive and inflated, consisting of approximately $2,900 in common charges, $1,500 in penalties, and approximately $15,000 in attorneys' fees.

Notably, Defendant does not dispute the legitimacy of reasonable common charges per se; rather, he challenges the proportionality and legitimacy of the additional charges, particularly attorneys' fees that eclipse the underlying principal obligation.

The procedural history is of central importance. The action was commenced on August 15, 2024. Plaintiff thereafter filed two separate and materially divergent affidavits of service.

First, Plaintiff filed an affidavit of service dated September 9, 2024, alleging that on August 21, 2024, service was effected at 1522 Dolphin Avenue, Pleasantville, New Jersey, by delivery to Alfred Solvang, purportedly a co-resident or person of suitable age and discretion, followed by a mailing. The affidavit further asserts that the process server confirmed that the address constituted Defendant's abode.

Second, Plaintiff filed a separate affirmation of service asserting that after alleged attempts at personal delivery, service was effectuated by conspicuous means ("nail and mail") on September 3, 2024 at the Staten Island Property, which was described, without evidentiary elaboration, as Defendant's "last known residence" and "usual place of abode," followed by mailing.

Thus, on the face of Plaintiff's own submissions, service is predicated upon two different addresses in two different states, utilizing two distinct statutory methods, each of which presupposes that the respective location constitutes Defendant's dwelling place or usual place of abode.

Defendant squarely controverts both service narratives. He avers under oath that at the time of the purported service, and continuing thereafter, his residence was 512 Pelham Drive, Galloway, New Jersey, and not either of the locations utilized by Plaintiff. He further avers that [*3]he did not receive the summons and complaint in any manner sufficient to afford him actual notice, and that any failure to timely respond was not willful.

Crucially, Alfred Solvang, the individual identified in the substituted service affidavit, submits a sworn affirmation that is unequivocal and categorical. He denies being a co-resident of Defendant, denies receiving any legal papers, denies being served by any process server, and affirms that Defendant did not reside at the Pleasantville address during the relevant period. He further explains that he was merely a temporary summer visitor at that address and a resident of Florida.

The record also reflects that Plaintiff engaged in multiple mailings to disparate addresses, including the Staten Island Property, the Pleasantville address, and a post office box, underscoring uncertainty regarding Defendant's actual residence.

Plaintiff did not move for a default judgment until April 11, 2025, approximately seven months after the alleged service. This Court, by orders dated August 11, 2025 and December 10, 2025, declined to grant default relief and afforded Defendant an opportunity to appear. Defendant thereafter appeared, filed a Notice of Appearance, and interposed a Verified Answer and Amended Verified Answer asserting, inter alia, lack of personal jurisdiction and substantive defenses.

III. Conclusions of Law

The issues presented require careful adherence to first principles. The Court addresses, in turn, (I) personal jurisdiction and service, (II) the necessity of a traverse hearing versus dismissal, (III) Defendant's request for nunc pro tunc relief, and (IV) Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment.

A. Personal Jurisdiction and the Sufficiency of Notice

It is axiomatic that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction is not presumed." Rather, it must be affirmatively established through strict compliance with the statutory methods of service prescribed by the CPLR. The burden rests squarely upon the plaintiff.

Plaintiff relies upon CPLR §308 [2] and CPLR §308 [4]. Each requires, as a fundamental predicate, that service be made at the defendant's "dwelling place or usual place of abode."

The Court finds that Plaintiff's showing, while facially sufficient to establish prima facie evidence of service, is materially undermined by detailed and specific sworn denials. While an affidavit of service ordinarily gives rise to a presumption of proper service, that presumption is rebuttable by a sworn denial containing specific facts (see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Gaines, 104 AD3d 885 [2d Dept 2013]; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Horsfield, 227 AD3d 790 [2d Dept 2024]).

Here, Defendant's denial is not merely self-serving or conclusory. It is corroborated by the sworn affirmation of the alleged recipient of substituted service, who disavows receipt of any papers and denies co-residency. This dual-layered evidentiary contradiction is of substantial legal significance. It directly implicates the reliability of the process server's affidavit and raises a bona fide factual dispute.

Moreover, the two service attempts are predicated upon mutually inconsistent factual premises. One asserts that Defendant's dwelling was in Pleasantville, New Jersey; the other that it was at the Staten Island Property. The statute does not contemplate service predicated upon conjecture as to residence. Rather, it requires that the plaintiff identifies and serve the defendant at his actual dwelling place or usual place of abode.

The multiplicity of addresses and methods reflected in Plaintiff's own filings does not demonstrate diligence so much as uncertainty. As the record reveals, Plaintiff mailed process to multiple locations, further underscoring the absence of a definitive residence determination.

On this record, the Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that service was properly effectuated. Nor, however, can the Court conclude that service was definitively defective as a matter of law, given the prima facie evidentiary effect of the affidavits of service.

Accordingly, the issue of personal jurisdiction presents a classic factual dispute requiring resolution through a traverse hearing. The Court is without authority to resolve such a dispute on conflicting affidavits alone.

B. The Necessity of a Traverse Hearing

Where a defendant submits a sworn denial of service containing specific facts, and such denial is corroborated or otherwise substantiated, a traverse hearing is required (see Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Gaines, 104 AD3d 885 [2d Dept 2013]).

The present case exceeds the typical paradigm warranting a traverse. Here, the contradiction is not limited to Defendant's denial; it is reinforced by the alleged recipient's denial and compounded by inconsistencies within Plaintiff's own service narrative.

To grant dismissal at this juncture would improperly disregard the prima facie effect of the affidavits of service. Conversely, to uphold service without a hearing would disregard the substantial factual disputes raised by Defendant's submissions.

The only procedurally sound course is to order a traverse hearing at which the process servers, Defendant, and Mr. Solvang may be examined, and the Court may make credibility determinations.

C. Defendant's Request for Nunc Pro Tunc Relief

Even assuming arguendo that service were ultimately deemed proper, the Court finds that Defendant has demonstrated entitlement to relief in the alternative.

The record reflects that Defendant did not willfully default but rather lacked actual notice of the action in a manner sufficient to permit a timely response. Upon acquiring knowledge of the action, Defendant appeared and promptly interposed responsive pleadings.

No prejudice to Plaintiff has been demonstrated. The action remains in its infancy; no discovery has occurred; no default judgment was entered; and the Court itself previously declined to grant default relief.

Defendant has also demonstrated potentially meritorious defenses, including lack of personal jurisdiction and substantive challenges to the amount and propriety of the charges forming the basis of the foreclosure claim.

In view of these factors, and in light of the strong public policy favoring resolution on the merits, the Court finds it appropriate to deem Defendant's Amended Answer timely served nunc [*4]pro tunc.

D. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment

Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment must be denied. A default judgment under CPLR § 3215 requires proof of proper service, the defendant's default, and the facts constituting the claim. Here, Plaintiff cannot establish the threshold requirement of proper service in light of the unresolved jurisdictional dispute.

Moreover, Defendant has appeared and interposed an answer prior to the entry of any default judgment. Under such circumstances, default relief is disfavored, particularly where jurisdiction remains in question and substantive defenses have been raised.

Finally, the equitable considerations are compelling. Plaintiff seeks foreclosure, a remedy of the highest order, based upon disputed service and contested charges. The Court declines to grant such relief in the absence of clear jurisdiction and adjudicated liability.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant's cross-motion (Mot. Seq. 002) pursuant to CPLR § 3211 [A] [8] is GRANTED solely to the extent that a traverse hearing is ordered to determine the validity of service and the Court's personal jurisdiction over Defendant; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 001) for a default judgment, order of reference, and related relief is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's Amended Verified Answer is deemed timely filed and served nunc pro tunc; and it is further

ORDERED that the issue of service shall be set down for a traverse hearing, at which Plaintiff shall bear the burden of establishing proper service; and it is further

ORDERED that the remaining branches of the cross-motion are denied without prejudice to renewal following the determination of the traverse hearing, and it is further

ORDERED that counsel is to contact chambers forthwith to select dates for the traverse hearing.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: March 20, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT