People v Sabater

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

Decided on April 9, 2026

Docket No. CR-020250-25BX

Yadhira González-Taylor, J.

Defendant Ashley Sabater moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument based upon the purported facial insufficiency of count one of the complaint, Penal Law ("PL") § 120.00 (1), pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") §§ 100.40, 170.30 (1) (a), and 170.35 (1) (a); or in the alternative, for an order suppressing identification and physical evidence, or a Wade/Dunaway hearing; granting a pre-trial voluntariness hearing for statements sought to be used on cross-examination and statements made to civilians pursuant to CPL §§ 60.45, 710.20 (3), and 710.40 (3); precluding evidence pursuant to CPL § 710.30; requiring the prosecution to serve a Bill of Particulars pursuant to CPL §§ 200.95 (2) and (5); granting a Sandoval hearing; requiring the prosecution to disclose Brady/Vilardi exculpatory evidence; directing the prosecution to timely comply preserve and disclose police recordings pursuant to CPL § 245.55 (3); and granting defendant's reservation of right to file additional motions.

Upon review and consideration of the submissions, court file and relevant legal authority, the Court DENIES defendant's motion for dismissal of the accusatory instrument; and further:

The prosecution pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30 (1) (e) and 30.30 (1) (b) was TIMELY; and defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument is DENIED; and

Defendant's request for pre-trial hearings pursuant to Wade/Dunaway and Grillo, and the right to make further motions to the extent provided by CPL § 255.20 (3), is GRANTED; and

The People are DIRECTED to comply with their continuing discovery obligations pursuant to CPL § 245, including Brady/Vilardi disclosures; and

Defense counsel is DIRECTED to certify discovery compliance within 30 days of the date of this Decision and Order pursuant to CPL §§ 245.20 (4) and 245.50 (2); and

There are NO unresolved issues that warrant a hearing on the underlying facts pursuant [*2]to People v Allard; and

Suppression of evidence pursuant to CPL § 710.30 is DENIED, and Sandoval issues are REFERRED to the trial court.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 8, 2025, defendant Ashley Sabater was arrested and charged with violating PL §§ 120.00 (1) (assault in the third degree) and 240.26 (1) (harassment in the second degree), a misdemeanor and a violation, respectively. Defendant was arraigned on July 24, 2025, and released on her own recognizance.

The People filed and served their automatic disclosures, Certificate of Compliance ("CoC") and Statement of Readiness ("SoR") off-calendar on October 16, 2025. At the appearance held on October 28, 2025, the court noted that the People had filed their supporting deposition and on November 5, 2025, defendant was rearraigned. The People opposed the motion on January 27, 2026, to which defense counsel replied on February 2, 2026.

DISCUSSION

The Accusatory Instrument

In pertinent part, the Criminal Complaint, dated July 10, 2025, provides:

PO JEFFREY MEDINADELOSSANT of 52 PCT, Shield# 4000, states that on or about June 8, 2025 at approximately 7:20 AM inside of 3313 PARKSLIDE PL, County of the Bronx, State of New York, [ . . . ]

IN THAT DEFENDANT DID: intentionally cause physical injury and with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person struck, shoved, kicked or otherwise subjected such other person to physical contact, or attempted or threatened to do the same.

Deponent is informed by YHS,FN1 that at the above time and place, the defendant did strike the informant multiple times about the informant's face and head. Deponent is further informed by informant that the defendant did also kick the informant's head, pulled the informant's hair, scratch and bit the informant.

Deponent is further informed by informant that informant suffered bleeding to the lip, as well as redness and bruising to the informant's face and neck, a minor laceration to the neck and a bite mark to the ear, as a result of the defendant's aforementioned conduct.

Deponent is further informed by informant that as a result of the defendant's conduct, the informant experienced annoyance, alarm, and fear for her physical safety.

I. Applicable Standard for Facial Sufficiency Challenge

To meet the jurisdictional standard for facial sufficiency, an information "need only set forth facts that establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the charged offense" (see People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 [2015]; see also CPL § 100.40 [1] [b]; § [*3]70.10). The accusatory instrument must set forth non-hearsay facts of an evidentiary nature which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged (see People v Suber, 19 NY3d 247 [2012]; People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729 [1986]). It is well-settled that "mere conclusory allegations are insufficient [ ] and a purported information which fails to meet these requirements is fatally defective" (see People v Pamulo, 48 Misc 3d 1227 [A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51286 [U], **2 (Crim Ct, New York County 2015] [citations omitted] citing People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 136 [1987]).

II. The Parties' Arguments

Defendant

Defense counsel asserts that the accusatory instrument fails to provide factual allegations that defendant's actions caused the deponent physical injury (affirmation of defense counsel at 5). Specifically, counsel asserts that there are no allegations at bar that the deponent suffered impairment of physical condition or substantial pain (affirmation of defense counsel at 6). Moreover, defendant avers that mere reference to "redness and bruising," "minor laceration to the neck," and "bite mark to the ear," without further elaboration concerning the extent of the complainant's "lasting ill effects" and the "amount of pain experienced" fails to establish the prima facie elements of the charge (affirmation of defense counsel at 6). Counsel also contends that where one of the two counts at bar is defective, this Court may dismiss the accusatory instrument in its entirety based upon recent guidance from the Court of Appeals in People v Williams, which does not constrain lower courts from exercising their discretion to do so (affirmation of defense counsel at 8).

Next, defense counsel's reply maintains that the allegations at bar do not create a reasonable inference that the complainant suffered an impairment of physical injuries nor is there any claim that the complainant sought medical treatment (reply affirmation of defense counsel at ¶¶ 7, 9). Defendant also argues, citing to the dissent in Williams, that piecemeal dismissal of facially insufficient counts only causes further delays and excuses prosecutorial noncompliance (reply affirmation of defense counsel at ¶ 14). Lastly, defendant moves for omnibus relief, including suppression and preclusion of evidence, or alternatively, hearings pursuant to Wade/Dunaway, Grillo and Sandoval, for disclosures pursuant to Brady/Vilardi, and to reserve the right to make further motions as necessary (reply affirmation of defense counsel at 10-19).

The People

The People aver that the allegations that the complaining witness suffered redness, bruising, a bleeding lip and a bite mark to the ear, sustain their prima facie burden and, thus, defendant's motion for dismissal based upon facial insufficiency should be denied (People's affirmation at 5-6). The People further argue that defendant's motion for suppression should also be denied and they: oppose the preclusion of any statements for which notice pursuant to CPL § 710.30 (1) is not required; complain that the first notice of defendant's demand for a Bill of Particulars was from the instant motion but, nonetheless, provide responses in their opposition; oppose as moot defense counsel's demand for 911 calls and other electronic surveillance recordings because the items have already been disclosed; oppose defendant's request for a Sandoval hearing; oppose defendant's demand for a further CoC as well as defendant's reservation of rights; and acknowledge their continuing Brady/Vilardi obligations (People's [*4]affirmation at 9-17).

III. The Court's Analysis

Facial Sufficiency of Count One: Assault in the Third Degree

Penal Law § 120.00 (1) provides that "[a] person is guilty of assault in the third degree when, [w]ith the intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person" (see PL § 120.00 [1]). New York Criminal Jury Instructions ("CJI") further provides, in pertinent part, that "PHYSICAL INJURY means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" and "INTENT means conscious objective or purpose. Thus, a person acts with intent to cause physical injury to another when that person's conscious objective or purpose is to cause physical injury to another" (see (CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 120.00 [1], https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/2-PenalLaw/120/120-00(1).pdf [last accessed April 9, 2026]).

The accusatory instrument alleges that the complaining witness suffered bleeding to the lip, as well as redness and bruising to the informant's face and neck, a minor laceration to the neck and a bite mark to the ear because of defendant's purported conduct. Defense counsel posits that these allegations do not sustain the prosecution's burden because the People have failed to assert any allegations concerning the extent of the informant's injuries nor any indication of lasting ill effects (defendant's affirmation at 6).

However, as the Court of Appeals recognized in People v Henderson, "[a] victim would not necessarily know with any certainty, shortly after an attack, what its lasting effects will be" (see Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 681 [1999]). Additionally, in Henderson, where the complainant was allegedly caused to suffer contusions and swelling after being pulled from his motor scooter and kicked in the legs, the Court noted that to establish a prima facie case of assault in the third degree, the accusatory instrument must set forth allegations sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the victim suffered an impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" (compare Henderson at 680, with People v Lugo, 47 Misc 3d 1222[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50745[U], * 3 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2023] ["(a)bsent any allegations of objective facts indicating an injury or the symptoms of an injury, such as redness or swelling, the accusatory instrument fails to establish the physical injury element of the assault charge"] [internal quotations omitted]).

Here, although the information does not allege that the informant experienced substantial pain, the complainant was allegedly caused to suffer bleeding, redness, bruising, a bite mark and a minor laceration, none of which is suggestive of mere battery (see Henderson at 680, see also People v Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 448 [2007] ["(p)etty slaps, shoves, kicks and the like delivered out of hostility, meanness and similar motives constitute only harassment and not assault because they do not inflict physical injury"]). As such, this Court finds that it strains credulity to argue, as defense counsel does, that the accusatory instrument is devoid of any indication that the complainant sustained physical injury.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the factual allegations that defendant repeatedly struck the complainant multiple times in the face and struck and kicked the [*5]complainant in the head, which caused her to experience physical injury including bleeding, redness, a bite mark and bruising, suffice to establish probable cause to believe that defendant acted intentionally to injure the complainant and that she suffered physical harm as a consequence of defendant's behavior (see People v Calixto, 908 NYS2d 339, 343 [Crim Ct, New York County 2010] [holding that the specific allegations, including discoloration of the victim's face, were sufficient at the pleading stage to support the element of physical injury for assault in the third degree] but see People v Chavez, 972 NYS2d 858, 864 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2013] ["Defendant's act of pushing the arresting officer away from him, without more, does not demonstrate an intent to injure"]).

Additionally, although the issue is moot, because count one of the accusatory instrument at bar is facially sufficient, the Court of Appeals holds that CPL § 30.30 (5-a) provides no "readiness-related consequence for a mistaken or incorrect certification" and that the appropriate remedy where a count is held to be facially insufficient is dismissal of the count rather than invalidation of the People's SoR (see People v Williams, — NE3d —, 2025 NY Slip Op 06535, *2-3 [2025] [internal citation omitted]).

The CPL § 30.30 Calculation

Generally, a criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant, and it is settled law that the date on which the action is commenced is excluded from the CPL § 30.30 computation (see CPL § 1.20 [17]; see also People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765, 767 [1987]). Accordingly, the People's speedy trial time began to accrue on October 16, 2025, the day following defendant's arraignment. The People validly declared readiness for trial by filing their CoC and SoR on October 16, 2025 (July 25, 2025— October 16, 2025= 83 days), within their statutorily allotted time (see CPL § 30.30 [1] [b]). Defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument is denied.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the People's CoC dated October 16, 2025, was VALID; and further;

The prosecution pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30 (1) (e) and 30.30 (1) (b) was TIMELY; and defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument is DENIED; and

Defendant's request for pre-trial hearings pursuant to Wade/Dunaway and Grillo, and the right to make further motions to the extent provided by CPL § 255.20 (3), is GRANTED; and

The People are DIRECTED to comply with their continuing discovery obligations pursuant to CPL § 245, including Brady/Vilardi disclosures; and

Defense counsel is DIRECTED to certify discovery compliance within 30 days of the date of this Decision and Order pursuant to CPL §§ 245.20 (4) and 245.50 (2); and

There are NO unresolved issues that warrant a hearing on the underlying facts pursuant to People v Allard; and

Suppression of evidence pursuant to CPL § 710.30 is DENIED, and Sandoval issues are REFERRED to the trial court.

This constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.

Dated: April 9, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. YADHIRA GONZÁLEZ-TAYLOR, A.J.S.C.