People v Silva

Justice Court of the Town of Rye, Westchester County

Decided on April 6, 2026

Case No. 24-090038

Jane E. Lippman, J.

Defendant Jose F. Silva is charged by uniform traffic tickets with two counts of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol (VTL §§ 1192[3], 1192[2]), and one count of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree (VTL § 511[1][a]), which are unclassified misdemeanors, and one count of Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle (VTL § 509[1]), a violation.

The Court held a Huntley/Mapp/Dunaway hearing on December 8, 2025. Defendant moved to suppress the standardized field sobriety test results, the DataMaster results, and all statements made to the police. At the hearing, the People called one witness, Rye Brook Police Sergeant David Cryeski. They also moved two exhibits into evidence. The People's first exhibit was a USB drive containing two MP4 files of Sergeant Cryeski's body-worn camera ("BWC") footage. One MP4 file contained Sergeant Cryeski's BWC of his roadside encounter with Defendant, and the other contained his BWC footage during his administration to Defendant of the field sobriety tests at the Rye Brook Police Station (People's Exhibit ["Ex."] 1).FN1 The People's second exhibit was a photocopy of Sergeant Cryeski's New York State Department of Health permit as a Breath Analysis Operator certified in NPAS DataMaster DMT from 01/01/2024 to 01/01/2026 (People's Ex. 2). The People played a portion of Sergeant Cryeski's BWC footage during the hearing. Defendant did not call any witnesses but moved the DataMaster DMT Operational CheckList into evidence (Defendant's Ex. A). All exhibits were [*2]admitted into evidence.

The Court reserved decision and requested post-hearing briefing from the parties.FN2 Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the submissions from the parties, the Court file, and relevant legal authority, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

Sergeant Cryeski's Employment Background and Training

The Court finds Sergeant Cryeski to be credible and credits his testimony. He testified forthrightly about the events at issue and was candid when he could not recall an answer. His testimony was also consistent with the BWC footage admitted into evidence.

Sergeant Cryeski currently works for the Rye Brook Police Department, where he has held the title of sergeant since January 2025 (Transcript ["Tr."] at 7:1-3). Between June 2011 and January 2025, Sergeant Cryeski held the title of police officer at the Rye Brook Police Department (Tr. at 7:4-8). As a police officer, Sergeant Cryeski was assigned to patrol division and midnight tour (Tr. at 7:11). Before working for the Rye Brook Police Department, Sergeant Cryeski worked for the City of Newburgh Police Department for about three years, and prior to that employment, he worked for the State University of New York Police at Purchase College (Tr. at 7:12-21).

In January 2007, before his employment as a police officer, Sergeant Cryeski attended and completed the five month Policy Academy that all police officers must attend (Tr. at 7:22-8:3). As part of his police officer training, Sergeant Cryeski learned how to identify intoxicated persons (Tr. at 8:4-6). At the Police Academy, the students were taught about the standardized field sobriety tests, as well as the indicia of an intoxicated driver, such as, "Odor of alcoholic beverage, blood shot eyes, difficulty in performing tasks. For example, if you ask him to get his license out he might have difficulty in retrieving his license." (Tr. at 8:4-16).

Sergeant Cryeski is also DataMaster certified (People's Ex. 2; Tr. at 8:17-19, 25:16-26:21). DataMaster is a machine used to test the blood alcohol content of a person who is suspected of being intoxicated while driving (Tr. at 8:20-23). Sergeant Cryeski's DataMaster training lasted about one week (Tr. at 8:24-25).

During his tenure with the Rye Brook Police Department, Sergeant Cryeski has made approximately nine Driving While Intoxicated ("DWI") arrests (Tr. at 9:3-6). As of August 31, 2024, Sergeant Cryeski had made eight DWI arrests (Tr. at 9:7-9). Sergeant Cryeski has observed people in social situations consume alcohol who become intoxicated and also remain sober (Tr. at 9:14-19).

Sergeant Cryeski's Roadside Encounter With Defendant On The Morning Of August 31, 2024

On August 31, 2024, at approximately 4:20 a.m., Sergeant Cryeski was working as a patrol officer with the Rye Brook Police Department (Tr. at 9:20-24). His shift was from 10:30 p.m. to 8:30 a.m., and he was on patrol in an unmarked vehicle (Tr. at 9:25-10:8). Sergeant [*3]Cryeski was driving north on Lincoln Avenue, when he observed a car parked, facing westbound, in the middle of Sunset Road, in Rye Brook, Westchester County, New York. Sergeant Cryeski swung around on Lincoln Avenue and pulled up behind the car. Sunset Road is hilly, and the car was parked on a hill (Tr. at 10:9-11:2).

Sergeant Cryeski then turned his lights on, exited his vehicle, "called out my stop," and noticed that the driver's side door of the car was slightly ajar (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 1:07-2:18; Tr. at 11:3-7).FN3 Defendant was inside the vehicle, asleep at the wheel (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 2:35-3:12; Tr. at 11:8-23). Sergeant Cryeski opened the driver's side door and observed that car was in park, the keys were in the ignition, and the engine was running (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 3:22-4:20; Tr. at 11:24-12:19). During his encounter with Defendant, Sergeant Cryeski wore his police uniform, and his BWC was activated (Tr. at 12:20-13:3).

Sergeant Cryeski tried to wake up Defendant by shaking his shoulder several times and stating, "Sir," and then, "Hi." (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 4:38-5:10). At this point, Defendant woke up and reached for the car door as if to close it — but Sergeant Cryeski stated, "No no no no no, I need to, no no no no no, I need to see your license." (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 5:10-5:18). Sergeant Cryeski asked, "What's going on?" Defendant again reached for the car door as if to close it, and Sergeant Cryeski stated, "No no no no. Can I see your license?" (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 5:19-5:25).

Defendant nodded his head and Sergeant Cryeski asked, "Where are you coming from?" Defendant once again reached for the car door as if to close it, and Sergeant Cryeski stated, "No no, you can't close the door. Let me see your license." (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 5:26-5:35). Defendant reached into his pants' pocket, pulled out an item that appeared to be a pack of cigarettes, then reached into his other pocket, and stated, "One second." Sergeant Cryeski responded, "Okay. You okay?" Defendant responded, I'm okay, yeah." Sergeant Cryeski asked, "Where you coming from?" Defendant responded, "Down here." Sergeant Cryeski responded, "Okay. Where are you going to?" Defendant answered, "I'm going to, back to where I was." (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 5:35-6:04).

Sergeant Cryeski again asked Defendant, "Do you have your license on you?" Defendant asked, "License for what?" Sergeant Cryeski responded, "To drive." Defendant asked, "Drive what," and Sergeant Cryeski stated, "The car." Defendant laughed. Sergeant Cryeski explained to Defendant, "You're asleep in the middle of the road there, buddy," to which Defendant responded, "Huh?" Sergeant Cryeski repeated himself. Defendant made some unintelligible statements (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 6:05-6:40).

Sergeant Cryeski again asked Defendant, "Okay, where are you coming from?" Defendant repeated, "Where am I coming from," and shrugged his shoulders but did not respond to the question. Sergeant Cryeski asked, "Do you have your license on you? Licensia?" (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 6:40-6:55).

At this point, Defendant retrieved his wallet from his pants' pocket. Sergeant Cryeski asked Defendant, "Do you know where you are right now?" When Defendant answered, "Yeah," Sergeant Cryeski followed up, "Where are you?" Defendant did not respond. Sergeant Cryeski stated, "I just need your photo ID." Defendant, however, stated that he did not have a [*4]photo ID, and Sergeant Cryeski responded, "Well, then that's an issue there." Defendant stated, "I don't have a license." (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 6:56-7:55).

Sergeant Cryeski asked Defendant his name, which Defendant provided. Defendant produced a driver's license, which he said was his brother's, and a credit card, and stated his date of birth when asked to do so.FN4 Sergeant Cryeski asked Defendant if he had had anything to drink that night, and Defendant responded no. Sergeant Cryeski asked Defendant to turn off the car and hand him the keys, which Sergeant Cryeski placed on top of the vehicle. Sergeant Cryeski asked Defendant to step out of the car and lean against the vehicle. (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 8:20-10:15).

During this period of Sergeant Cryeski's interactions with Defendant, Defendant was not placed in handcuffs, and Sergeant Cryeski's gun was not drawn. Sergeant Cryeski observed that "there was an odor of alcohol emanating from [Defendant] as [he] was speaking to [Defendant]. [Defendant] had, he could offer no reason as to why he was there, where he was coming from or where he was going to and he also did not know where he was at that time." In addition, "[Defendant] had difficulty in following simple instructions, for example, getting his driver's license out and producing it." (Tr. at 14:18-15:3).

Sergeant Cryeski further noticed that Defendant's speech was slurred, and his face "seemed to be a little flushed, a little bit. Mainly the thing [Sergeant Cryeski] was concentrating on was [Defendant's] inability to follow simple instructions." Defendant's eyes also "appeared a little blood shot." (Tr. at 15:11-21). Despite these indicia of intoxication, Sergeant Cryeski did not perform any field sobriety tests because Defendant was parked on a hilly part of Sunset Road, which "would have made doing the test impractical and possibly dangerous" for Defendant (Tr. at 17:24-18:4).

Sergeant Cryeski contacted police headquarters to "run" Defendant's driver's license (People's Ex. 1 at 10:16-55; Tr. at 16:13-18). Sergeant Cryeski again inquired whether Defendant had had anything to drink that night, or if he was under the influence of drugs or narcotics. Defendant answered no (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 10:56-11:09). Defendant confirmed for Sergeant Cryeski that he speaks English very well and when asked, denied that he had been previously arrested for driving while intoxicated. Sergeant Cryeski once again asked Defendant where he was coming from because he "never gave [Sergeant Cryeski] a direct answer." Defendant's response was cut off by a communication from headquarters, who stated that Defendant had a suspended license (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 11:09-11:55).

Defendant then continued to answer Sergeant Cryeski's question about where he was coming from, stating:

[Unintelligible] I was just going to meet my friend that was way worse than what I was and he told me, you know what, I'm not going to let you go outside the fucking road, go, go, go, by myself [unintelligible] I'm going to have a good night, [unintelligible] I saw that's how he was, I'm not going to let him, so I decided, you know what, I don't care what you guys say, I'm going to take him home, cause I'm not going to have him, I'm not, obviously I'm not impaired as fucking bad, so I'm going to take him home, that's just the way I am, I'm not going to have nobody go, oh, you left me behind, not behind my watch at least, if I can, I'm going to stand up for someone, you know what, I can take him.

(People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 12:00-13:05).

After inquiring if Defendant had any weapons in his pockets (Defendant did not), Sergeant Cryeski informed Defendant that his license was suspended, he was arresting him for driving with a suspended license, taking him to police headquarters, and impounding his car (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 13:14-13:40; Tr. at 16:19-25, 18:5-7). Sergeant Cryeski explained:

You have a suspended license, you're not supposed to be driving. I pull up behind you, you're sound asleep at the wheel. You don't really seem to know where you are and where you're going. So what's going to happen is we're going to impound the car, tow it, and you're going to be brought to police headquarters. You're going to get a couple of tickets, and then you're going to go home. Simple as that, okay? Any questions?FN5

Defendant responded, "Me, as far as I'm concerned, no." (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 13:12-14:15).

Several minutes later, Sergeant Cryeski stated, "The car's going to get towed, you're going to come up to police headquarters, you're in the Village of Rye Brook, we'll give you a ticket, or two, and then you're going to go home for the evening." When Defendant asked, 'What's my main ticket," Sergeant Cryeski responded, "Well, you have a suspended license. I also have a suspicion that you're under the influence of some sort of intoxicating substance, you smell like alcohol. But right now, here and now, we're going to deal with the suspended license, you're not supposed to be driving in the State of New York." (People's Ex. 1 Roadside 16:05-16:45).

Sergeant Cryeski's Drive With Defendant To The Rye Brook Police StationFN6

Defendant was frisked, handcuffed, and transported in the back of a police vehicle to the Rye Brook Police Station located at 938 King Street. However, Defendant was not read his Miranda rights, either at the time of his arrest or upon his arrival at the Rye Brook Police Station (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 14:18-32:10; Tr. at 18:8-14, 30:3-6, 49:18-50:20). Sergeant Cryeski estimates that he was present at the scene on Sunset Road with Defendant for approximately 20 minutes (Tr. at 29:22-24).FN7 The drive from Sunset Road to the Rye Brook Police Station took about 10 minutes and is a distance of approximately two miles (Tr. at 30:3-8; 51:10-16).

During the drive to the Rye Brook Police Station, Sergeant Cryeski asked Defendant his brother's name and asked Defendant to confirm his name. Defendant responded. Sergeant Cryeski asked Defendant if he had ever been arrested, and Defendant responded. Sergeant Cryeski then asked, "What happened with that case if you don't mind me asking," and Defendant [*5]responded. Sergeant Cryeski inquired, "Where did that take place," and Defendant responded. Sergeant Cryeski inquired, "Did you go to Port Chester High School," and Defendant responded. Sergeant Cryeski told Defendant that he "looked like a big guy" who "played football" [in high school] and Defendant responded. Sergeant Cryeski reiterated that Defendant did not have a license, he had his brother's license, and he "wanted to make sure he had the right person." Defendant then made various statements (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 23:14-25:55).

Upon his arrival at the Rye Brook Police Station, Defendant's belongings were removed from his pockets, and he was re-handcuffed so that his hands were in front of his body (People's Ex. 1 Roadside at 29:18-32:10).

Sergeant Cryeski's Administration To Defendant Of The Field Sobriety Tests And The DataMaster

Soon after arriving at the Rye Brook Police Station, based upon his suspicion that Defendant "might be intoxicated," Sergeant Cryeski, with the assistance of Sergeant Ruhe, administered three standardized field sobriety tests to Defendant (Tr. at 18:15-19, 30:22-31:1). These are "divided attention tests," which are relevant to a person's ability to drive because "when you are driving. . . you have to be able to do multiple tasks at one time." (Tr. at 19:2-8). Sergeant Cryeski performed these standardized field sobriety tests on August 31, 2024, in the same manner in which he was taught at the Police Academy, on a dry, flat floor (Tr. at 19:9-15). Defendant was not handcuffed for the tests (Tr. at 42:13-21).

Sergeant Cryeski asked Defendant to perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk and turn test, and the one leg stand test (Tr. at 18:24-19:1, 19:16-20). With respect to the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Sergeant Cryeski used a pen, held it up in front of Defendant's face, and moved it back and forth to observe the involuntary jerking of Defendant's eyes (People's Ex. 1 HQ at .29-3:07; Tr. at 19:21-20:1). Sergeant Cryeski believes that he made six passes with the stimulus, which was 12 to 16 inches from Defendant (Tr. at 31:8-21). Defendant failed this test and exhibited the "clues of being intoxicated": "The equal tracking, lack of smooth pursuit. He had prior to 45 degrees, he did have distinct nystagmus and he had also had a distinct nystagmus at max deviation."FN8 (Tr. at 21:20-22:3).

Sergeant Cryeski next asked Defendant to perform the walk and turn test, which required Defendant to:

put his left foot on a line and put his right foot in front of it and explain how to do the test. He has to keep his hands at his side. He can not [sic] -- he is going to take nine steps forward on a line. What we have him do is we have him do it on a flat surface and we have the defendant visualize a line, straight line. He has to take nine heel to toe steps forward, make a special turn which we instruct him how to do and take nine heel toe steps back.

(People's Ex. 1 HQ at 3:07-7:31; Tr. at 22:7-16).

The line for the walk and turn test was an imaginary line (People's Ex. 1 HQ at 3:07-7:31; Tr. at 22:17-18). Prior to administering this test, Sergeant Cryeski instructed Defendant [*6]"to look at [him], pay attention, keep your hands at your side, put your left foot on the line, put your right foot in front of it, take nine heel to toe steps, [Sergeant Cryeski] demonstrated three [steps] and [Sergeant Cryeski] demonstrated the turn." (People's Ex. 1 HQ at 3:07-7:31; Tr. at 22:19-24). When he administers this test, Sergeant Cryeski is "looking for does he count out loud, does he do the required amount of steps and can he do the turn." (Tr. at 22:25-23:3). Defendant did not pass the walk and turn test because he did not keep his hands at his side, he did not count out loud, he took too many steps going and coming back, and he did not perform the turn correctly (People's Ex. 1 HQ at 3:07-7:31; Tr. at 23:12-18; 32:8-12). Sergeant Cryeski characterized these defects as a failure to follow instructions (Tr. at 32:13-15).

Sergeant Cryeski then administered the one leg stand test, which required Defendant to take either leg, lift it off the ground, and hold it parallel to the ground six inches up and count out loud (People's Ex. 1 HQ at 7:31-9:47; Tr. at 23:19-24:-4). Before beginning the test, Sergeant Cryeski told Defendant to keep his hands at his sides, lift whichever foot he chose off the ground six inches, hold it flat, count out loud, and do not start the test until told to do so (People's Ex. 1 HQ at 7:31-9:47; Tr. at 24:9-14). The test was concluded after 30 seconds (People's Ex. 1 HQ at 7:3; 1-9:47; Tr. at 24:2-4). With this test, Sergeant Cryeski was looking for Defendant's ability to hold his feet up, to hold his hands down at his side, to count out loud, and to keep his balance (Tr. at 24:5-8). Defendant did not pass the one leg stand test. He started to count out loud but then stopped, he could not keep his foot elevated for the entire test, and his arms moved from his sides (People's Ex. 1 HQ at 7:31-9:47; Tr. at 24:22-25:3).

The field sobriety tests took Sergeant Cryeski approximately ten to fifteen minutes to conduct (People's Ex. 1 HQ .29-11:08; Tr. at 34:4-7). When Defendant finished the field sobriety tests, he was standing in a small area near the DataMaster (Tr. at 41:18-43:7). There is a required twenty minute observation period of a subject prior to administration of the DataMaster (Tr. at 39:13-19). For Defendant, that period began at 4:46 a.m. on Sunset Road, according to the DataMaster Operational Checklist (Tr. at 39:20-40:24; Defendant's Ex. A).

Sergeant Cryeski read Defendant a form, which asked if Defendant would take the DataMaster test, indicated that the results could be used in evidence against him at a criminal proceeding, and that a refusal would result in a "revocation."FN9 (Tr. at 34:21-36:10). At this point, Sergeant Cryeski still had not read Defendant the Miranda warnings because, "We read him the DWI warnings and if he blows after that we read him the Miranda warnings." (Tr. at 35:13-18).

Defendant consented to provide a breath sample. While Sergeant Cryeski prepared the DataMaster for the test, Sergeant Ruhe observed Defendant (Tr. at 43:8-44:22). Sergeant Cryeski provided instructions to Defendant as to use of the DataMaster, Defendant indicated that he understood, and at 5:51 a.m., Defendant blew a 0.15 (Tr. at 27:11-17; 37:17-18). Sergeant Cryeski then informed Defendant that he had blown a 0.15 and that he was under arrest for DWI. Defendant's arrest was based on, "The Datamaster read out, the failure of the SFSTs [Standardized Field Sobriety Tests] and my observations of him prior to bringing him back to headquarters." (Tr. at 28:3-13). By "observations of [Defendant]," Sergeant Cryeski was referring to, "Slurred speech, inability to provide any sort of reason as to why he was parked in [*7]the middle of the road at four something in the morning." (Tr. at 28:14-18).

After Defendant was placed under arrest for DWI, Sergeant Cryeski read Defendant the Miranda warnings (Tr. at 28:19-29:1). Sergeant Cryeski then "completed our alcohol influence report form and the paperwork over there, asked him some more questions about where he had been prior to being brought in this evening." (Tr. at 29:2-6).

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel presented oral arguments to the Court. The Court opined that, in light of the evidence presented during the hearing, there was probable cause for Defendant's arrest (Tr. at 56:14-24). The Court further noted that under People v. DeBour, 40 NY2d 210 (1976), Sergeant Cryeski was permitted to detain and question Defendant. However, the Court asked the parties to address in written submissions what effect the failure to administer Miranda warnings to Defendant might have on Sergeant Cryeski's further interactions with Defendant (Tr. at 56:25-57:17). The People also clarified that, "The statements that the People would be eliciting at trial are all of the statements that were made pre-arrest," although given that Sergeant Cryeski formally arrested Defendant initially for Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle and then significantly later for DWI, this statement is somewhat ambiguous (Tr. at 58:14-16).

A. The Parties' Contentions

Defendant first clarifies that he "does not seek to suppress the pre-AUO [Aggravated Unlicensed Operation] statements made on Sunset Drive, where the initial encounter took place." (Defendant 1/28/2026 Letter).FN10 Instead, "It is what transpired thereafter that gives rise to grounds to suppress any additional statements, as well as the field tests and the breath test." (Id.).

After his initial encounter with Sergeant Cryeski, which Defendant concedes was not "violative of [D]endant's right to privacy," the encounter then escalated to a higher level of intrusion under DeBour (id.). Defendant was handcuffed and placed under arrest for Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle (see id.). However, Miranda warnings were not administered to Defendant (see id.).

At this point, Defendant argues, "he was under arrest on another misdemeanor" and "unquestionably was in custody[.]" (Id.). According to Defendant, in administering the standard field sobriety tests and the DataMaster to Defendant, "the police were seeking to secure incriminating evidence to be used in a prosecution for DWI. It is the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation." (Id.).

Defendant contends, "This set of facts can be distinguished from other typical cases wherein the accused is not under arrest but is asked to perform SFSTs [standard field sobriety tests]. Courts have long held that such [sic] does not require Mirandas [sic] to be administered." (Id.). Here, however, Defendant notes that he was under arrest for Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree "well before" he was asked to perform the standard field sobriety tests and take the "breath test." (Id.). Defendant was not advised that "the consequence of taking said tests could be the use of results in evidence in a criminal proceeding," and he was "never told that he had the right to have an attorney present during questioning until all [*8]procedures were finished and the rights read." (Id.). The only warning he was given was the "usual DWI warning," and not a Miranda warning (see id.).

According to Defendant, this sequence of events violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Defendant claims he should have been warned that "the two tests were for the purpose of securing evidence to be used against him and that he had a right to refuse the SFSTs and also the breath test." (Id.). Defendant also contends that he should have been advised of his right to counsel (see id.). Based on these alleged violations of his rights, Defendant seeks to suppress "all the evidence that came after arriving at the police station," the standard field sobriety tests and the breath test, along with Defendant's oral statements (id.).

In response, the People first argue that "ample probable cause was present to justify the arrest of defendant for Driving While Intoxicated." (People Mem., at 6). The People emphasize the circumstances leading to Sergeant Cryeski's encounter with Defendant on Sunset Road and the indicia of Defendant's intoxication (see id. at 6-7). The People further note Sergeant Cryeski's testimony that he was unable to conduct the standardized field sobriety tests at the scene "because the part of Sunset Road they were on was a hill, making the tests both impractical and dangerous for the defendant to perform." (Id. at 6). Defendant was transported to the Rye Brook Police headquarters, where he was "detained for further DWI investigation." (Id.). Based on Officer Cryeski's observations of Defendant and Defendant's performance on the field sobriety tests, "Sergeant Cryeski had probable cause to believe defendant was driving while intoxicated and lawfully arrested him at headquarters." (Id.).

With respect to Defendant's statements, the People note that Defendant "was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda when he was stopped on the roadside and answering Sergeant Cryeski's initial questions." (Id. at 8). Defendant's statements were also voluntarily made (see id. at 9).

Responding to Defendant's argument that the failure to administer Miranda warnings after his arrest for Unlicensed Operation of Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree requires suppression of his performance on the field sobriety tests, the People cite case law to the contrary. "The New York Court of Appeals has long held that submission to physical coordination tests during driving while intoxicated traffic stops are non-testimonial acts and, therefore, do not require Miranda to be given prior to their administration (People v. Hager, 69 NY2d 141, 142 [1987])." (People Mem., at 10). The People explain that Defendant was not yet placed under arrest for DWI, such that Miranda warnings were not yet required (see id.). The People also state that they are "not seeking to introduce any post-AUO [Aggravated Unlicensed Operation] statements made to RBPD [Rye Brook Police Department] officers." (Id. at 10).

As for Defendant's breath test results, the People emphasize that, "Under People v. Rosario, 'neither the act of blowing into the breathalyzer itself — not defendant's verbal assent to take the test — is a testimonial communication protected by the federal and state constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination.' (People v. Rosario, 136 Misc 2d 445, 449 [1987] [citiations])." (People Mem., at 10). Because the standardized field sobriety tests and the breath test are non-testimonial acts and do not require Miranda warnings, Defendant's performance on these tests and the results are admissible (see id. at 11).

B. Analysis

1. Mapp /Dunaway

At a Mapp/Dunaway hearing, the prosecution has the initial burden of going forward to [*9]show, by credible evidence, the lawfulness of the police conduct, i.e., the "burden of production" (People v Hernandez, 40 AD3d 777 [2007]); (see also People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361 [1971]); (People v. Dodt, 61 NY2d 408, 415 [1984]). To evaluate the police conduct, the Court must determine whether it was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances at the time (see DeBour, 40 NY2d at 215). If the prosecution satisfies the initial burden of going forward, the defendant "bears the ultimate burden of proving that the evidence should not be used against him," i.e., the "burden of persuasion" (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d at 367). A police officer may arrest a person for a crime without a warrant "when he or she has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such crime, whether in his or her presence or otherwise." (CPL § 140.10[1][b]). Reasonable cause, which means probable cause, "exists when an officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances 'sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed.'" (State v. Maldonado, 86 NY2d 631, 635 [1995]).

For probable cause to exist for an arrest, "[T]he basis for such a belief must not only be reasonable, but it must appear to be at least more probable than not that a crime has taken place and that the one arrested is its perpetrator, for conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not suffice." (People v. Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981]); (see also DeBour, 40 NY2d at 216) ("We have frequently rejected the notion that behavior which is susceptible of innocent as well as culpable interpretation, will constitute probable cause[.]"). Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest or otherwise unlawful police intrusion is inadmissible at trial and must be suppressed (see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643, 654 [1961]).

"The decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable where the police have (1) probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction has occurred (see People v. Ingle, 36 NY2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 330 N.E.2d 39; People v. Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147, 767 N.E.2d 638); (2) reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime (see People v. Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993, 373 N.E.2d 1218) or (3) a public safety concern prompted by the manner in which the vehicle was being operated by the driver (see People v. Ingle, supra)." (People v. Benoit, 66 Misc 3d 218, 225 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2019]).

Here, Sergeant Cryeski had objective, credible reasons to approach Defendant in his vehicle on Sunset Road and request information from him, escalating to a founded suspicion that criminal activity was "afoot," reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant, and reasonable or probable cause to arrest him for having a suspended license (DeBour, 40 NY2d at 223). As discussed in the Court's Findings of Fact, Sergeant Cryeski encountered Defendant parked on a hill in the middle of Sunset Road, at approximately 4:20 a.m., with the car running and the keys in the ignition, asleep at the wheel. When Sergeant Cryeski tried to communicate with him, Defendant demonstrated numerous signs of intoxication and was unable to produce his driver's license. The Rye Brook Police Department then determined that Defendant's driver's license had been suspended.

Thus, Sergeant Cryeski had probable cause to believe that Defendant had violated the law. Defendant was sleeping in his car with the keys in the ignition and the engine running, and when Sergeant Cryeski finally managed to wake him up, Defendant appeared intoxicated. In the Court's view of the record, Sergeant Cryeski had probable cause at that time to arrest Defendant for both DWI and Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree.

With respect to the fruits of Defendant's arrest, Court of Appeals case law contradicts [*10]Defendant's assertion that the failure to administer Miranda warnings to Defendant requires suppression of the field sobriety tests:

Results of field sobriety tests such as the horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and turn and one-leg stand are not deemed testimonial or communicative because they 'do not reveal a person's subjective knowledge or thought processes but, rather, exhibit a person's degree of physical coordination for observation by police officers' [Citations]. Responses to such tests incriminate an intoxicated suspect 'not because the tests [reveal] defendant's thoughts, but because [defendant's] body's responses [differ] from those of a sober person' [Citations.]

(People v. Berg, 92 NY2d 701, 705 [1999]). The results of field sobriety tests may therefore be introduced into evidence even when the police fail to administer Miranda warnings (see id).

Nor are Miranda warnings required to be given prior to the administration of a breathalyzer test (see Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757, 761 [1966]). Furthermore, both parties neglect to mention — let alone discuss — that pursuant to VTL § 1194(2)(a):

Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test . . . provided that . . . [there are] reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been operating in violation of any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article and [the test is administered] within two hours after such person has been placed under arrest for any such violation . . . .

Accordingly, when a breathalyzer test is administered in compliance with this "two-hour" rule:

an express, intelligent, knowing consent is not required in order for the results of a BAC [blood-alcohol content] test to be admitted into evidence at trial. All that is needed is that the defendant did not expressly refuse to submit to the test if the test is administered during the "deemed consent" period of two hours from arrest . . . .

(People v. Victory, 166 Misc 2d 549, 562 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1995], overruled in part on other grounds by People v. Rosa, 112 AD3d 551, 552 [1st Dept 2013]). Defendant does not contend that a violation of the two-hour rule occurred in his case. Accordingly, Defendant is deemed to have consented to administration of the DataMaster.

For all these reasons, Defendant's motion to suppress the results of the standardized field sobriety tests and the DataMaster is DENIED.

2. Huntley/Dunaway

"At a hearing to suppress statements made to law enforcement officials, the People have the burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's statements were voluntary [citations] and, if applicable, that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights [citations]." (People v. Loucks, 125 AD3d 890, 890 [2d Dept 2015]).

"'In deciding whether a defendant was in custody ... the subjective beliefs of defendant are not to be the determinative factor. The test is not what the defendant thought, but rather what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the defendant's position[.]' [Citations]. In making such assessment, the court must again consider the 'totality of the circumstances[.]' [Citations.]" (Benoit, 66 Misc 3d at 228).

A person is subjected to "interrogation" when he is confronted with "express questioning or its functional equivalent." (Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US 291, 300 [1980]). "Functional equivalent" refers to "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." (Id.).

Defendant's statements concerning this incident can logically be divided into three separate categories, each of which warrants a separate analysis, as follows.

a. Defendant's Statements Made During His Roadside Encounter With Sergeant Cryeski

"[A] temporary roadside detention pursuant to a routine traffic stop is not custodial within the meaning of Miranda (see People v Hasenflue, 252 AD2d 829 [1998]; People v Mathis, 136 AD2d 746 [1988]). Moreover, Miranda warnings are not required before the administration of [sobriety] performance tests (see People v Hager, 69 NY2d 141 [1987])." (People v. Myers, 1 AD3d 382, 383 [2d Dept 2003]).

Sergeant Cryeski was therefore not required to administer Miranda warnings before conducting his roadside investigation of Defendant. Defendant's statements to Sergeant Cryeski during their encounter on Sunset Road, made before Defendant's arrest for Aggravated Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree, were therefore voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt and admissible at trial.

b. Defendant's Statements Made During His Drive To The Rye Brook Police Station With Sergeant Cryeski

It is unclear to the Court whether the People might seek to admit into evidence the statements Defendant made to Sergeant Cryeski during the drive to the Rye Brook Police Station. As noted above, the People stated during the hearing that they are seeking to elicit at trial all Defendant's pre-arrest statements — and Defendant's statements made during the drive to the Rye Brook Police Station preceded his second, formal arrest for DWI by Sergeant Cryeski. In any event, the Court will address these statements because they were the result of an improper custodial interrogation and must be suppressed.

Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and placed in the back of Sergeant Cryeski's police vehicle for transport to the Rye Brook Police Station. At this point, Defendant was obviously in custody. Moreover, Defendant's statements were made in response to Sergeant Cryeski's interrogation and were not made spontaneously (cf. People v. Grant, 96 AD3d 779, 780 [2d Dept 2012] ["The first part of the statement that the defendant made when he was in the back seat of a police car, denominated as Statement No. 3 by the Supreme Court, was uttered by the defendant spontaneously and voluntarily, and was not the result of an interrogation."]).

Thus, the questioning of Defendant in the police car during the ride to the Rye Brook Police Station implicated Defendant's Miranda rights, which were not administered prior to questioning. This conduct requires suppression of Defendant's statements made to Sergeant Cryeski in the police car during Defendant's transport to the Rye Brook Police Station.

c. Defendant's Statements Made At The Rye Brook Police Station

As discussed above:

It is settled that Miranda warnings are not required to allow the results of field sobriety tests into evidence (People v Hager, 69 NY2d 141, 142; People v Jacquin, 71 NY2d 825, 826). It is also settled that Miranda warnings are not required in order to admit the results of chemical analysis tests, or a defendant's refusal to take such tests (Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 761; South Dakota v Neville, 459 US 553, 564; People v Thomas, 46 NY2d 100, 103, appeal dismissed 444 US 891).

(People v. Berg, 92 NY2d 701, 703 [1999]).

Accordingly, Defendant's statements made during the administration of the field sobriety tests were not made during a custodial interrogation and are admissible at trial. The tests themselves are admissible, as are Defendant's DataMaster results (see VTL § 1194[2][a]).FN11

Defendant's motion to suppress pursuant to Huntley is therefore DENIED as to his statements prior to his arrest for Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree, and DENIED as to his statements made after his arrival at the Rye Brook Police Station. Defendant's motion to suppress his statements made as a result of an improper custodial interrogation during his transport to the Rye Brook Police Station is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

In sum, Defendant's motion to suppress the results of the standardized field sobriety tests and the DataMaster is DENIED. Defendant's motions to suppress his statements to Sergeant Cryeski during their encounter on Sunset Road and to suppress his statements made at the Rye Brook Police Station are DENIED. However, Defendant's statements made during his drive to the Rye Brook Police Statement were the result of an unlawful custodial interrogation, and Defendant's motion to suppress these statements is therefore GRANTED.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.

Dated: April 6, 2026

Port Chester, New York

JANE E. LIPPMAN, TOWN JUSTICE