Guillebeaux v Hernandez

Supreme Court, Queens County

Decided on April 9, 2026

Index No. 715693/2024

Karen Lin, J.

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT -SUMMARY.

Upon the foregoing documents, the motion and cross-motion are determined as follows:

This action arises from an April 4, 2023 motor vehicle accident at or near the intersection of Main Street and Union Turnpike in Queens County, New York, involving a vehicle operated by plaintiff Jazmin D. Guillebeaux (Guillebeaux) and a U Haul truck operated by defendant Jose O. Hernandez (Hernandez) and owned by defendant U-Haul Co of New York and Vermont Inc. It is uncontroverted that defendant Hernandez was employed and working for defendants E F Mechanical Enterprises Corp. and Nassau Door & Window (collectively, Nassau Door) during the time of the accident. Plaintiffs move for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as to all defendants, and to dismiss defendants' affirmative defense of comparative negligence. Defendants U Haul Co. of New York and Vermont, Inc. and U Haul Moving & Storage of Jericho NY (collectively U Haul) cross-move for summary judgment based on the Graves Amendment, 49 USC § 30106.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Liability

It is well established that the proponent of a summary judgment motion must establish a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, submitting sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Upon this showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce evidence, in admissible form, sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Where no genuine issue exists to be resolved at trial, the case should be summarily decided (see Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]).

In a motor vehicle accident, "[a] driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing [*2]conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle" (Catanzaro v Edery, 172 AD3d 995, 996 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Wilansky v New York City Tr. Auth., 145 AD3d 938, 939 [2d Dept 2016]; see Madrigal v Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 236 AD3d 885, 887 [2d Dept 2025]; Nsiah-Ababio v Hunter, 78 AD3d 672, 672 [2d Dept 2010]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129 [a]). This duty attaches to a rear vehicle which strikes a lead vehicle stopped at a red light (see Benyarko v Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 162 AD2d 572, 573 [2d Dept 1990]; see also Carter v Castle Elec. Contr. Co., 26 AD2d 83, 84 [2d Dept 1966] ["When an automobile is stopped before a red traffic light, there is a duty on the operators of vehicles traveling in the same direction behind it to obey the signal and likewise to stop."]). "A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision" (Diamond v Comins, 194 AD3d 784, 784 [2d Dept 2021]; see Toledo v Pascal, 2025 NY Slip Op 05716, *1 [2025]; Radosta v Caronia, 2025 NY Slip Op 06883, *1 [2025]).

A plaintiff is no longer required to show freedom from comparative negligence in order to establish a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Rodriguez v City of New York, 31 NY3d 312 [2018]). However, while "a plaintiff is not required to establish his or her freedom from comparative negligence to be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability, the issue of a plaintiff's comparative negligence may be decided in the context of a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff moves for summary judgment dismissing a defendant's affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence and culpable conduct on the part of plaintiff" (Merino v Ferrante, 241 AD3d 1449 [2d Dept 2025], quoting Sapienza v Harrison, 191 AD3d 1028, 1029 [2d Dept 2021]).

In support of their motion, plaintiffs submit, among other things, plaintiff Guillebeaux's affidavit, an attorney affirmation, and a photograph of a report of motor vehicle accident with redactions. Plaintiff Guillebeaux attests in her affidavit that at the time of the accident, she was "entirely in my lane of travel and was completely stopped due to a red light on Main Street for approximately one minute, at its intersection with Union Turnpike, when I was abruptly and without any warning rear ended with substantial impact by a 2021 UHAUL Truck." She further attests that the weather was clear; the road was dry, flat, straight, and free of debris; there was no construction or maintenance work at the place of the accident, nothing obstructed her view; her vehicle was in proper working order; and there was no warning or indication that the accident was about to occur. She attests that there was nothing she could have done, or not done, to avoid the accident. While plaintiffs submit a report of motor vehicle accident, it is uncertified, appears to be a photograph of the report, and is not accompanied by an affidavit or other sworn statement from someone with personal knowledge to establish its authenticity. As such, the report is inadmissible (see CPLR 4518 [c]; Yassin v Blackman, 188 AD3d 62, 68 [2d Dept 2020]; Peerless Ins. Co. v Milloul, 140 AD2d 346, 347 [2d Dept 1988]). Notwithstanding the report, plaintiff, through her sworn affidavit detailing the rear-end accident, has shown a prima facie case of negligence against defendants. The burden then shifts to defendants to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the accident and producing evidence, in admissible form, sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to liability.

In opposition, defendants Hernandez, Rosa Castellino (Castellino), and Nassau Door submit, among other things, defendant Hernandez's affidavit, defendant Castellino's affirmation, the U-Haul contract, and a damage estimate. Defendant Hernandez attests in his affidavit that he [*3]has worked for Nassau Door for approximately fifteen (15) years as of April 30, 2025, the date of the affidavit, and was involved in the accident on April 4, 2023, while working for Nassau Door and while operating a rented U-Haul Truck. He attests that he stopped at the stop sign on Charter Road for about one minute and was going to make a right turn onto the right lane of Main Street. He further attests that he noticed that there were vehicles stopped on Main Street in the right lane from the intersection with Union Turnpike to Charter Road. He attests that when the traffic light on Main Street changed from red to green, he saw the vehicles in the right lane proceed forward so he looked to the left and to the right and then made a wide right turn. He attests that as he started his turn, "it appeared that all of the vehicles that were stopped in the right lane of Main Street had proceeded forward due to the green light." As he was in the process of making his right turn, he heard a noise and had struck plaintiff's vehicle. He attests that plaintiff's vehicle was in the blind spot as he was in the process of making the right turn and he did not know why plaintiff's vehicle did not proceed forward like all the other vehicles. He attests that plaintiff's vehicle had damage to the driver's side rear tire and plaintiff's side rear bumper.

Defendant Castellino in her affirmation attests that she is an administrative assistant for Nassau Door, she is responsible for handling orders, scheduling deliveries, and renting trucks from outside companies if a truck is needed to perform a delivery. She attests that on or about April 3, 2023, during the course of her employment with Nassau Door, she contacted U-Haul Moving & Storage of Jericho to rent a truck because Nassau Door needed the truck to make a delivery to a customer. She attests that she did not personally pick up or return or operate the truck. She attests that while her contact includes her name, she was not renting the truck from U-Haul for personal use, and that it was rented for the use of Nassau Door, her employer. She also attests that she was not operating the truck or a passenger in the truck at the time of the accident. She attests that she has no personal knowledge about the accident and cannot be liable for plaintiffs' alleged accident, because she did not own the truck and was not operating the truck at time of the accident.

Upon review of the testimony and evidence, defendants have failed to provide a non-negligent explanation for the accident. Defendant Hernandez's testimony, even when viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, does not provide a non negligent explanation but instead corroborates plaintiff's showing that defendant failed to maintain a safe distance and proper lookout, and is therefore insufficient to defeat summary judgment on the issue of liability. While defendants rely on Grant v Carrasco (165 AD3d 631, 632 [2d Dept 2018]) to contend that a lead vehicle's sudden or unexplained stop at a green light can provide a non negligent explanation for a rear end or rear/side impact and preclude summary judgment, Grant is readily distinguishable where the issue was whether defendant stopped at the red light or made a sudden stop on green. Here, it is uncontroverted that plaintiff stopped at a red light, whereby defendant struck plaintiff under the mistaken belief that plaintiff had proceeded forward on green after a full stop on red. Plaintiffs have therefore established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on liability against Hernandez.

Defendants contend that the motion is premature under CPLR 3212 (f) because no depositions have been held and information about plaintiffs' observations remains in their exclusive control. A party opposing summary judgment on this ground must identify facts essential to justify opposition that are within the movant's knowledge and show that discovery may lead to relevant evidence, rather than rely on mere hope or speculation (see Walker v City of [*4]Newburgh, 222 AD3d 809 [2d Dept 2023]). Where, as here, defendants contend that depositions of all parties are necessary which may reveal a non-negligent explanation, defendants have failed to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence sufficient to defeat partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. Accordingly, defendants have failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to Hernandez's negligence or to demonstrate that plaintiffs' motion is premature.

The Court now turns to the liability of Nassau Door. "The doctrine of respondeat superior renders [an employer] vicariously liable for a tort committed by [its employee] within the scope of employment" (Bisono v Viva Viva Taqueria, 241 AD3d 484, 485 [2d Dept 2025], quoting Maldonado v Allum, 208 AD3d 470, 471 [2d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "An employee's actions fall within the scope of employment where the purpose in performing such actions is to further the employer's interest, or to carry out duties incumbent upon the employee in furthering the employer's business" (Ciccone v City of NY, 138 AD3d 910, 910 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Beauchamp v City of New York, 3 AD3d 465, 466 [2d Dept 2004]). Here, Nassau Door admits in its verified answer that Hernandez was its employee on the date of the accident, that it rented the U-Haul Truck, and that Hernandez was operating the U Haul Truck with its permission in the course of his employment. Hernandez further attests in his affidavit that he was employed by Nassau Door and the subject accident occurred while he was working for Nassau Door and operating the rented U-Haul Truck. Accordingly, Nassau Door is vicariously liable for the actions of Hernandez.

Turning to the liability of Castellino, Castellino's unrebutted affirmation attests that she served as an administrative assistant merely responsible for arranging rentals on behalf of Nassau Door. She attests that she did not personally pick up or return the U-Haul Truck, and that she was not operating it or present as a passenger on the date and time of the accident. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not made a prima facie showing of any negligent act or omission by Castellino that was a proximate cause of the accident.

U Haul's Cross motion for Summary Judgment on Graves Amendment

The Graves Amendment, 49 USC § 30106, provides, in pertinent part, that the owner of a motor vehicle who rents or leases the vehicle "shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle" during the rental period, if "the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles" and "there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner)" (see 49 USC § 30106; Pierrelouis v Kuten, 207 AD3d 485, 486 [2d Dept 2022]). Here, U-Haul has met its prima facie burden by establishing that it is engaged in the trade or business of renting motor vehicles through its affiliates, the subject vehicle was owned by its affiliate and rented pursuant to a rental agreement on the date and time of the accident, and that there is no evidence of negligence on the part of U-Haul or its affiliate. Plaintiffs, in opposition, failed to raise a triable issue of fact or demonstrate that summary judgment is premature (see White v U-Haul Co. of Arizona, 226 AD3d 851, 853 [2d Dept 2024]). Accordingly, U-Haul's cross-motion for summary judgment is granted, pursuant to the Graves Amendment.

Conclusion

Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted as against defendants Hernandez and Nassau Door, and denied as against defendants Castellino and [*5]U-Haul. U-Haul's cross-motion is granted. Any requested relief and/or remaining contentions not expressly addressed herein have nonetheless been considered and are hereby expressly rejected.

For all the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted as to defendants Hernandez and Nassau Door; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied as to defendants Castellino and U-Haul; and it is further

ORDERED that defendant U-Haul's cross-motion is granted, and the complaint and any cross-claims are dismissed as against U Haul Co. of New York and Vermont, Inc. and U Haul Moving & Storage of Jericho NY; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiffs shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry upon all parties within twenty (20) days from the date of entry.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: April 9, 2026

Jamaica, New York

Hon. Karen Lin

Justice of the Supreme Court