People v Garcia

Supreme Court, Kings County

Decided on April 13, 2026

Ind. No. 76386-2025

Heidi C. Cesare, J.

A grand jury indicted defendant for attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, and lesser offenses based on evidence that defendant stabbed the complainant in the nose with a knife. Defendant moves to dismiss or reduce the indictment upon inspection of the grand jury minutes and exhibits, to suppress statements that she allegedly made to police, and for a pretrial Sandoval hearing.

I. Motion to Dismiss or Reduce the Indictment

After an in camera review of the grand jury minutes and exhibits, this court grants the motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment to the extent that count 2 is dismissed on the ground that the prosecutor provided erroneous instructions on the elements of the charge for that count. The prosecution is granted leave to submit that count to another grand jury. The motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment is otherwise denied.

The indictment charges two counts of assault in the first degree. Count 2 charges assault in the first degree under the theory that defendant intentionally caused the complainant serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument (see Penal Law § 120.10 [1]). Count 3 charges assault in the first degree under the theory that defendant intentionally disfigured the complainant seriously and permanently (see Penal Law § 120.10 [2]).

In the initial instructions on the elements of count 2, the prosecutor tracked the statutory language. The prosecutor explained that this crime required evidence that "the defendant . . . with the intent to cause serious physical injury to [the complainant] caused such injury to [the complainant] by means of a dangerous instrument, namely: A knife" (grand jury transcript, dated December 11, 2025, at 16). Later, the grand jury asked the prosecutor to explain the difference [*2]between charges two and three. In answering that question, the prosecutor explained that charge two required them to find that "the defendant, intended to cause serious physical injury and/or caused such serious physical injury by means of [a] dangerous instrument" (id. at 26).

Under CPL 210.20 (1) (c), an indictment may be dismissed if the grand jury proceeding was defective within the meaning of CPL 210.35. A grand jury proceeding is defective under CPL 210.35 (5) when the proceeding does not conform to the requirements of CPL article 190 "to such [a] degree that the integrity thereof is impaired and prejudice to the defendant may result."

Under CPL 190.25 (6), the prosecutor serves as a legal advisor to the grand jury and must give legal instructions that are "necessary and appropriate." To fulfill that obligation, the prosecutor must "provide[] the Grand Jury with enough information to enable it intelligently to decide whether a crime has been committed and to determine whether there exists legally sufficient evidence to establish the material elements of the crime" (People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d 389, 394-395 [1980]). Ordinarily, the prosecutor can satisfy that standard "by reading to the Grand Jury from the appropriate sections of the Penal Law" (id. at 395 n 1). The prosecutor violates that standard by giving an instruction that omits a material element of the crime as contained in the Penal Law (see People v Wade, 260 AD2d 946, 948 [3d Dept 1999] [instruction on burglary was deficient because it implied that intent to commit a crime therein was not necessary to establish burglary]).

In this case, the prosecutor provided deficient instructions about the statutory elements for count 2. The prosecutor's initial instruction was correct, but the supplemental instruction was not. In the supplemental instruction, the prosecutor inexplicably stated that count 2 required the grand jury to find that defendant intended to cause serious physical injury "and/or" caused such injury. This instruction improperly allowed the grand jury to indict upon finding sufficient evidence of the element of intent or serious physical injury, but not both. Under this erroneous instruction, the grand jury could have indicted without finding that defendant caused serious physical injury or even upon finding that the injury inflicted did not establish serious physical injury. The supplemental instruction effectively omitted a statutory element of assault in the first degree under Penal Law § 120.10 (1).

The erroneous supplemental instruction impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceeding (see People v Caracciola, 78 NY2d 1021, 1022 [1991]; People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d at 396). The prosecutor did not correct the error or thereafter repeat the statutory elements correctly (see People v Wade, 260 AD2d at 948 [erroneous instruction on burglary omitting element of intent did not impair integrity of grand jury proceeding because the instruction "was made in the context of the prosecutor's overall discussion of burglary in the third degree during which he recited the Penal Law definition three times specifically referencing the element of intent"]). Moreover, the supplemental instruction, given in response to "questions raised by the jurors themselves" (People v Ciaccio, 47 NY2d 431, 436 [1979]), likely directed the grand jury's deliberation on count 2.

The grand jury's essential function is to consider the evidence presented as to each element of a charged crime, not most of the elements (see People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d at 395 ["It is well established that a citizen cannot be haled into court and tried for an infamous crime unless [s]he has first been indicted by a Grand Jury which has had the opportunity to consider the evidence against h[er]"]). Here, the instructions for assault in the first degree under count 2 were "too confusing" (People v Caracciola, 78 NY2d at 1022) to allow the grand jury to [*3]perform that essential function. Under the circumstances, the deficient instructions prejudiced defendant and require dismissal of count 2 (see CPL 210.35 [5]; People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d at 395 ["[W]e recognize that there may be situations in which the instructions to the Grand Jury are so misleading that the indictment could not be permitted to stand even though it is supported by legally sufficient evidence"]). Accordingly, count 2 is dismissed with leave to the prosecutor to submit this count to another grand jury (see CPL 210.20 [1] [c]; [4]; 210.35 [5])

The remaining counts of the indictment are supported by legally sufficient evidence (see CPL 190.65 [1]). As to those counts, the prosecutor's legal instructions were adequate and the grand jury proceeding was not defective (see People v Huston, 88 NY2d 400, 407 [1996]; People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d at 394-395). Release of the full grand jury minutes is denied (see CPL 210.30 [3]).

II. Motion to Suppress Statements

The motion to suppress evidence of a statement that defendant allegedly made to a police officer at 1:20 a.m. on August 26, 2025, in the vicinity of 516 New Lots Avenue, is granted to the extent of ordering a combined Huntley-Dunaway hearing (see People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]; Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]). The prosecutor opposes the Huntley branch of the motion on the ground that the defense motion made no "factual showing that the noticed statements were made in response to custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent" (memorandum of law for district attorney at 7). However, the statutory requirement to allege facts in support of a motion to suppress evidence (see CPL 710.60 [1]) does not apply to a motion to suppress statements on the ground that the statements were involuntary (see CPL 710.60 [3] [b]; People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 421-422 [1993]; People v Weaver, 49 NY2d 1012, 1013 [1980]; People v Taylor, 145 AD3d 555, 555 [1st Dept 2016]). A defendant is entitled to a hearing on such a motion merely by alleging that the statements were involuntary (see People v Weaver, 49 NY2d at 1013 [stating "there must be a hearing whenever defendant claims h[er] statement was involuntary no matter what facts [s]he puts forth in support of that claim"] [emphasis in original]). Defendant is, therefore, entitled to a hearing based on her allegation that she "disputes the 'voluntariness' of all statements being offered by the prosecution" and a citation to Criminal Procedure Law § 60.45 (2) (Wang aff in supp of motion at ¶ 18).

None of the authorities cited by the prosecutor support the contention that the motion be denied without conducting a hearing. The prosecutor cited several decisions of the Appellate Division, Second Department, for the proposition that a spontaneously made statement is not subject to suppression (see memorandum of law for district attorney at 6). But in each of those cases, the motion court made the finding that the statement was spontaneous after having conducted a hearing (see People v Alleyne, 193 AD3d 1069 [2d Dept 2021] ["The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and a statement he made to law enforcement officials"]; People v Ward, 183 AD3d 845 [2d Dept 2020] ["The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and a statement he made to law enforcement officials"]; People v Foster, 153 AD3d 853 [2d Dept 2017] [The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Braslow, J.), of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to [*4]suppress physical evidence and his statement to law enforcement officials"]; People v Powell, 125 AD3d 1010 [2d Dept 2015] ["The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials"]; People v Castro, 73 AD3d 800 [2d Dept 2010] ["The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (McGann, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statement to law enforcement officials"]; People v Webb, 224 AD2d 464 [2d Dept 1996] [The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress statements made by the defendant to law enforcement officials]).FN1 These cases do not provide authority for this court to summarily deny the motion based on the papers and attached exhibits.

The Court of Appeals has stated that "[i]t is for the court and not the parties to determine whether a statement is truly voluntary or is one in which the actions of the police are the functional equivalent of interrogation causing the statement to be made" (People v Chase, 85 NY2d 493, 500 [1985]). Contrary to the suggestion of the prosecutor, this court cannot make that determination summarily based upon a review of a police body-worn camera recording that depicts the alleged statement (see DiCapri aff in resp to mot, exh 1). As noted already, under CPL article 710, the defense allegation that the statement was involuntary mandates an evidentiary hearing.

III. Motion for Sandoval Hearing

The Sandoval motion is referred to the trial court (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]). The prosecutor is reminded of the supplemental discovery requirement for uncharged "misconduct and criminal acts of the defendant" to be used at trial "for impeachment" (CPL 245.20 [3]).

So ordered.

Dated: April 13, 2026

Brooklyn, NY

HEIDI C. CESARE, A.J.S.C.