C.T. v Little Flower Children & Family Servs. of N.Y.

Supreme Court, Suffolk County

Decided on March 25, 2026

Index No. 624375/2025

Denis Reo, J.

Upon the following papers read on these motions to dismiss: NYSCEF document numbers 7-33; motion sequences 1 and 2 are decided as follows:

In this action brought under the Child Victims Act ("CVA") defendant Little Flower Children and Family Services of New York f/k/a Little Flower Children's Services ("Little Flower") moves in Motion Seq. 001 to dismiss plaintiff C.T.'s ("plaintiff") complaint on the ground that is time barred by the statute of limitations. For the reasons set forth below, Little [*2]Flower's motion is DENIED.

In Motion Seq. No. 002, defendant Suffolk County i/s/h/a Suffolk County Department of Social Services ("Suffolk County") also moves to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it is time barred and for failure to serve a notice of claim. For the reasons set forth below, Suffolk County's motion is DENIED.

Plaintiff was born in April of 2001 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16, ¶6). When plaintiff was a toddler, her biological father placed her in the custody of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16, ¶2). In approximately May 2013, when she was 12 years old, plaintiff was placed by the Suffolk County Department of Social Services within the foster care of Little Flower. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16, ¶80). Little Flower operated a group foster care facility and/or youth residential treatment center in Wading River New York (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16, ¶15). While at Little Flower, plaintiff was allegedly sexually abused by a staff member named "Vincent" (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16, ¶81). The complaint does not state the dates of the alleged abuse, however, it notes that plaintiff left the facility in January of 2018 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16, ¶89). When Plaintiff left Little Flower in January 2018 she was 16 years old.

As a result of the alleged abuse, on September 11, 2025, plaintiff commenced a claim against Little Flower and Suffolk County (collectively referred to as "Defendants") for negligence and failure to report abuse under Social Services Law §§ 413 and 420. In addition, plaintiff brought a claim against Little Flower for negligent, hiring, training, supervision and retention.

Motion Sequences 1 and 2 - Statute of Limitations

Defendants contend that plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because it is untimely pursuant to the statute of limitations that was in effect prior to the enactment of the CVA. Defendants argue that neither CPLR §§ 214-g nor 208 (b) apply to plaintiff's claims and, therefore, that the prior statute of limitations is controlling. Specifically, defendants argue that CPLR § 214-g does not apply because plaintiff's claims were not time barred when the CVA was enacted and, therefore, did not need to be revived. Relying on the term "prospectively" as used in the CVA's legislative history, defendants also argue that CPLR § 208 (b) only applies to sexual abuse that occurred after February 14, 2019, the date the CVA was enacted. Since plaintiff alleges that her abuse at Little Flower occurred, at the latest, in May 2018, prior to the enactment of the CVA, defendants argue that plaintiff cannot rely on CPLR § 208 (b) and that her complaint is time barred.

Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that her claims are timely because she was a minor when the CVA went into effect and CPLR § 208 (b) permits her to bring a cause of action arising from sexual abuse until the age of fifty five (55). Plaintiff makes no argument regarding the applicability of CPLR § 214-g.

"A defendant who seeks dismissal of a complaint on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations bears the initial burden of proving, prima facie, that the time in which to commence an action has expired. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the action falls within an exception to the statute of limitations or whether the statute of limitations has been tolled" (Cammarato v 16 Admiral Perry Plaza, LLC, 216 AD3d 903, 904 [2d Dept 2023]; quoting Osborn v DeChiara, 165 AD3d 1270, 1271 [2d Dept 2018]; see Schulman v Schulman Family Enters., 222 AD3d 898, 899 [2d Dept [*3]2023]) (internal quotes removed). "In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(5) on the ground that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, the court must accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference" (Bank of NY Mellon v Bissessar, 172 AD3d 983, 984 [2d Dept 2019]). Because plaintiff's claims were tolled by her infancy when the CVA was enacted, plaintiff's claims were not expired and did not need to be revived pursuant to CPLR § 214-g. The issue to be resolved on these motions, then, is whether CPLR § 208 (b) applies to plaintiff's claims.

When interpreting a statute "[i]t is fundamental that a court should attempt to effectuate the intent of the [l]egislature" (Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of NY v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205, 208 [1976]; see Samiento v World Yacht Inc., 10 NY3d 70, 77-78 [2008]). When interpreting statutes, courts "look first to the statutory text, which is the clearest indicator of legislative intent" (Matter of New York County Lawyers' Assn. v Bloomberg, 19 NY3d 712, 721 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]). "[W]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning" (State of New York v Patricia II., 6 NY3d 160, 162 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Anonymous v Molik, 32 NY3d 30, 37 [2018]). "In construing statutes, it is a well-established rule that resort must be had to the natural signification of the words employed, and if they have a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add or take away from that meaning" (Majewski v Broadalbin—Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[C]ourts are not to legislate under the guise of interpretation" (People v Finnegan, 85 NY2d 53, 58 [1995]). "If the wording of [a] statute has caused an unintended consequence, it is up to the legislature to correct it" (People v Golo, 26 NY3d 358, 362 [2015]). When interpreting a statute, the statute "must be construed as a whole," and "its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other" (Town of Aurora v Village of E. Aurora, 32 NY3d 366, 372 [2018]). Further, the court may "inquire into the ... purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history" (id.).

The CVA "among other things, provides for amendments with regard to certain statutes of limitations with respect to sex crimes committed against children less than 18 years of age. The CVA provides, inter alia, that civil actions brought by any person for physical, psychological, or other injury suffered as a result of conduct that would constitute a sex crime, that was committed against such person when they were less than 18 years of age, may now be commenced against any party 'whose intentional or negligent acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in the commission of [such] conduct' up until the date the plaintiff reaches the age of 55 (CPLR 208 [b]). Prior to the enactment of the CVA, the applicable statute of limitations for such actions typically would begin to run when the victim reached the age of 18" (S.H. v Diocese of Brooklyn, 205 AD3d 180, 184 [2d Dept 2022] [internal citations omitted]).

The CVA "was intended primarily to revive civil claims by persons subjected to [child] sexual abuse . . . but whose claims have become time-barred, and also to provide a more generous toll for such claims in the future. The first of these goals was achieved by CPLR 214-g, and the second by amendments to CPLR 208" (Vincent C. Alexander, Prac Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, CPLR 214-g). "In other words, the CVA amended CPLR 208 (b) to prospectively and permanently allow all victims of child sexual abuse to pursue those [*4]claims until age 55, whereas CPLR 214-g was enacted to provide temporary retrospective relief for all claims—regardless of age—for a limited and discrete period of time" (DiSalvo v Wayland-Cohocton Cent. Sch. Dist., 218 AD3d 1169, 1171 [4th Dept 2023]).

CPLR § 208 (b) does not state that it applies only to claims that accrue after February 14, 2019 but plainly states that it applies to "all civil claims or causes of action" (CPLR § 208 [b]). Since CPLR § 214-g applied retrospectively to revive time barred sexual abuse claims, the prospective nature of CPLR § 208 (b) means that it applies to all claims that were not time barred as the effective date of the CVA (see Doe v Kimmel, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 17170 [SDNY 2025]; Friedman v Bartell, 2024 US Dist LEXIS 43255 [SDNY 2024] ["Section 214-g was for claims already time-barred as of February 14, 2019, and Section 208(b) is for claims that were not time-barred as of that date."]). To hold otherwise would create an artificial or unfair time limit and deny the plaintiff her day in court, which is inconsistent with the clear legislative intent behind the CVA (see Robert S. v New York Archdiocese, 86 Misc 3d 1256(A) [Sup Ct, NY County 2025] [Kingo, J.]). Since it is undisputed that plaintiff's claim was tolled as of February 14, 2019 and, therefore, not time barred, and plaintiff has not yet reached the age of fifty five (55), plaintiff's claims are timely pursuant to CPLR § 208 (b). Accordingly, defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as time barred by the statute of limitations are DENIED.

Motion Sequence 2 - Notice of Claim

Suffolk County also seeks dismissal of plaintiff's complaint on the ground that plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim. General Municipal Law §50-e[8][b], which also became effective on February 14, 2019, states that a notice of claim:

"shall not apply to: (i) any claim made for physical, psychological, or other injury or condition suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute a sexual offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, incest as defined in section 255.27, 255.26 or 255.25 of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age, or the use of a child in a sexual performance as defined in section 263.05 of the penal law committed against a child less than eighteen years of age; or (ii) any civil claim or cause of action revived pursuant to section two hundred fourteen-j of the civil practice law and rules."

Since the CVA amended the General Municipal Law, the Court of Claims Act and the Education Law to dispense with notices of claim (Doe v Wilhelmina, 229 AD3d 128, 130 [2d Dept 2024]), Suffolk County's motion to dismiss based upon plaintiff's failure to file a notice of claim is DENIED.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Motion Sequence Numbers 1 & 2 are DENIED in their entirety.

Dated: March 25, 2026

Hon. Denis Reo

A.J.S.C.