Village of Head of Harbor v Ward Melville Heritage Org., Ltd.

Supreme Court, Suffolk County

Decided on April 14, 2026

Index No. 622865/2025

James F. Matthews, J.

Upon the following papers read on defendant The Ward Melville Heritage Organization, Ltd f/k/a The Stony Brook Community Fund's ("Ward Melville") motion to dismiss the complaint, NYSCEF e-filed documents numbered 10 through 31, and upon due deliberation and consideration given to the foregoing papers, and upon oral argument before this Court, the motion is decided as follows:

Defendants The Ward Melville Heritage Organization, Ltd. f/k/a The Stony Brook Community Fund ("Ward Melville") move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211(a)(3)(lack of standing) and (a)(7)(failure to state a cause of action). For the reasons set forth herein, the court grants defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in all respects.

Plaintiff Village of the Head of the Harbor ("the Village") seeks injunctive and declaratory relief and money damages, alleging the existence of public nuisances on Ward Melville's property which negatively affects Village residents (see NYSCEF No. 1). Specifically, the Village alleges two public nuisances: (1) inability of Village residents to use a private road on Ward Melville's property because of the failure of Ward Melville to repair the road damaged in a storm that rendered it unpassable; and (2) visual impacts of damage to Ward Melville's property from the storm that remain in disrepair.

Ward Melville is a not-for-profit corporation created to, inter alia, own and manage real property deeded to it by Ward and Dorothy Melville. These properties include an earthen dam which supported a section of Harbor Road, a small two-laned road which connects Stony Brook with the Village and crosses the border between the towns of Smithtown and Brookhaven. The entirety of Harbor Road and the earthen dam are on Ward Melville's property. As a result of severe storms in August of 2024, the earthen dam and a portion of the private road within the Town of Brookhaven were washed out, rendering Harbor Lane impassable by motor vehicles and thus no longer usable by Village Residents. For the purposes of this motion, the allegations in the complaint that the earthen dam and Harbor Road are owned by Ward Melville are deemed true. As noted, the public nuisance claims by the Village are (1) that the Village residents are harmed because Harbor Road is no longer usable; and (2) that the condition of the earthen dam and Harbor Road are unsightly. There is no question that the Village residents have alternate ways to travel in and out of the Village to all destinations. A public nuisance is claimed because Harbor Road is a shortcut and thus residents now must travel a longer distance to certain locations because Harbor Road is not usable. There is some evidence in the record that the Town of Brookhaven ("the Town") performed periodic maintenance of Harbor Road in the form of paving and snow removal. However, no claims for relief are alleged against the Town.

Under CPLR §3211(7), a complaint may be dismissed if "the pleading fails to state a cause of action" and analysis requires that the Court accept the allegations pled as true, give the pleading a liberal construction, and afford plaintiff every possible favorable inference of the law (see Chanko v Am. Broadcasting Cos. Inc. 27 NY3d 46, 49 NE3d 1171 [2016]; Miglino v Bally Total Fitness of Greater NY Inc., 20 NY3d 342, 985 NE2d 128 [2013]). A motion to dismiss will fail when "the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law" (see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275, 372 NE2d 17 [1977]; see EBCI, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]). Although the facts pled are presumed to be true and are to be accorded every favorable inference, bare legal conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by the record are not entitled to any such consideration, nor are legal conclusions or [*2]factual claims which are inherently incredible (Nasca v Sgro, 101 AD3d 963, 964 [2d Dept 2012]).

Under CPLR §3211(a)(3), a complaint may be dismissed if "the party asserting the cause of action has not legal capacity to sue." "Where a CPLR 3211(a)(3) motion is based upon an alleged lack of standing, the burden is on the moving defendant to establish, prima facie, the plaintiff's lack of standing as a matter of law [and] plaintiff has no burden of establishing standing as a matter of law, but must merely raise a question of fact as to the issue" (see Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy. FSB v Matamoro, 200 AD3d 79, 90 [2d Dept 2021]).

The first cause of action seeking a declaratory judgment is dismissed as the Village lacks standing to maintain this action, as there exists no justiciable controversy regarding title to the property between the Village and the reputed property owner (see Chanos v MADAC, LLC, 74 AD3d 1007 [2d Dept 2010]; Community Bd. 7 of Borough of Manhattan v Schaffer, 84 NY2d 148 [1994]). The Village's allegation that Ward Melville owns the subject property is simply an element of their causes of action stemming from the alleged public nuisances.

The Village relies upon common law to support the public nuisance claims (see, e.g., New York Trap Rock Corp. v Town of Clarkstown, 299 NY 77, 80, 83 [1949]). "A public nuisance has been defined as an act or omission which obstructs or causes damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all (citations omitted)" (ibid, at 80). In City of Yonkers v The Federal Sugar Refining Company (136 AD 701, 710 [2d Dept 1910]), the court held that: " in the absence of express statutory authority, a municipal corporation cannot maintain an action in equity to enjoin a public nuisance of this character which does not specially affect corporate property, or property in connection with which it occupies some relation of trust or responsibility, even though the private property of a considerable number of its citizens may be affected thereby." Distinguishing City of Yonkers, the Court of Appeals in New York Trap Rock Corp. held that a municipality " has the capacity and is a proper party to bring an action to restrain a public nuisance which allegedly has injured the health of its citizens" (see New York Trap Rock Corp., supra, at 83). The distinguishing factor between these two cases seems to be whether the public nuisance has injured public health, which is not claimed in this case and there is no injury to public health alleged. City of Yonkers is therefore controlling as it requires that the alleged public nuisance affect public property, or "property with which it [the municipality] occupies some relation of trust or responsibility" (City of Yonkers, supra, at 710).

Thus, an essential element of a public nuisance claim is the obstruction or damage to the public with respect to "rights common to all" (see New York Trap Rock, supra at 80). "A public nuisance exists for conduct that amounts to a substantial interference with the exercise of a common right of the public, thereby offending public morals, interfering with the use by the public of a public place or endangering or injuring the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable number of persons" (see 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods v Finlandia Ctr., 96 NY2d 280, 292 [2001]; Town of Riverhead v Kar-McVeigh, LLC, 229 AD3d 735, 738 [2d Dept 2024]).

Here, Harbor Road is a private road located entirely on privately owned land. There is no common right of the public to use that road. It has been used by the public in the past solely by permission of the owner. As the owner, Ward Melville owes no duty to Village residents or any member of the public to maintain the road or to continue to permit access to it and could withdraw permission of the public to use the road at any time. Likewise, Ward Melville has no duty to Village residents to repair the earthen dam, or any portion of their property, so long as [*3]there is no interference with the public's use of public property.

Simply stated, the Village has no right on any basis to compel a private property owner to maintain a private road for the benefit of its residents. It is even more astonishing that the Village would claim the right to compel Ward Melville to maintain a private road over the portion of its property that is located outside the territorial limits of the Village. Hypothetically, if Harbor Road was a public roadway owned by the Town of Brookhaven and/or the Village, the Town or Village could abandon the roadway and decline to repair or maintain it so long as it did not deprive any private property of access to a public road, as expressly held in La Briola v State of New York (36 NY2d 328, 331 [1975]). If the Village or Town as the owner of Harbor Road could not be compelled to repair and maintain the road, then surely Ward Melville as the owner of the road could not be so compelled. For these reasons, the court finds that the complaint fails to state a valid cause of action. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED , that defendant Ward Melville's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted in all respects.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: April 14, 2026

Riverhead, New York

E N T E R

Hon. James F. Matthews, JSC