Anonymous C-1 v Anonymous D-1

Supreme Court, Bronx County

Decided on April 10, 2026

Index No. XXXX/2025E

Wanda Y. Negrón, J.

The Defendant moves pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) and/or (8) to dismiss the instant [*2]divorce action, or, in the alternative, pursuant to CPLR 602 (b), to consolidate this action with a pending divorce action in Queens County Supreme Court between the parties, which had been filed three days prior to this action, so that the divorce action is tried in Queens County. The Plaintiff opposes the Defendant's motion and cross-moves, pursuant to CPLR 602 (b) to consolidate the pending divorce action in Queens County Supreme Court with the instant action, so that the divorce action can be tried in this county, given the lack of proper service in the Queens County Supreme Court action or, in the alternative, given the existence of special circumstances. The parties have also filed cross-applications for the issuance of sanctions against the other in the form of the reimbursement of counsel fees incurred, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1.

For the reasons set forth hereinbelow, the Court denies the Defendant's motion for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8) as he fails to make a prima facie case for same. The Defendant's motion for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) also fails as he does not establish that the divorce action in Queens County Supreme Court is "pending" within the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4); however, for purposes of consolidation and/or joinder, the Queens Action is otherwise viable and pending, and the Court otherwise grants the Plaintiff's cross-application to the extent that the Queens County Supreme Court action shall be tried jointly with the instant action, and otherwise denies the Defendant's alternative application for opposite relief. The Court otherwise denies the parties' respective applications for the issuance of sanctions and denies the Defendant's motion in its entirety.

The parties and counsel shall appear before this Court on XXXXXX, 2026, at 10:00 A.M. for the Preliminary Conference in this divorce action (but not the joined action), and the parties shall file their respective statements of net worth within the instant action by the deadline set forth hereinbelow.

Facts

On XXXXXX, 2025, the Defendant in this action, ANONYMOUS D-1, filed an action for divorce by way of a Summons and Verified Complaint against the Plaintiff, ANONYMOUS C-1, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, under Index Number XXXXXX/2025, seeking a judgment of divorce pursuant to DRL § 170 (7) (hereinafter "Queens Action").

Three days later, on XXXXXX, 2025, to the Plaintiff, ANONYMOUS C-1, filed the instant action for divorce by way of a Summons a Verified Complaint against the Defendant, ANONYMOUS D-1, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Bronx, also seeking a judgment of divorce pursuant to DRL § 170 (7) (hereinafter "Bronx Action").

The Defendant does not contest that on XXXXXX, 2025, at XX:XX P.M., he was served with the above-stated pleadings and the attendant notices in the Bronx Action.

On XXXXXX, 2025, by way of Ex Parte Order, the Honorable XXXXXX in the Queens Action granted the Defendant leave to serve the Summons and Verified Complaint upon the Plaintiff pursuant to CPLR 308 (4). Specifically, the Ex Parte Order instructs that it was:

"ORDERED, that service of the Summons and Verified Complaint along with required matrimonial notices in the above-entitled action be directed by 'nail and mail' pursuant to CPLR §308(4). More specifically, pursuant to the provisions set forth in CPLR §308(4) that the service of the Summons and Verified Complaint along with required matrimonial notices be directed by affixing said Summons with Notice along with required matrimonial notices to the door of defendant's address, located at XXXX XXXXXX [*3]Avenue, Bronx, New York XXXXX and then mailing the same required documents to the same address by regular mail. Such affixing and mailing shall be effectuated within twenty days of each other. All documents shall be placed in an envelope bearing the legend 'personal and confidential' and not indicating on the outside thereof, by return address or otherwise, that the communication is from an attorney or concerns an action against the person to be served. Proof of such service shall be filed with the Queens County Clerk within twenty days of either such affixing or mailing, whichever is effectuated later . . ."

The Affidavit of Service provided to the Court reveals that service was effectuated upon the Plaintiff in this action by "nailing" on Friday, XXXXXX, 2025, at 8:10 P.M., and by "mailing" on XXXXXX, 2025. However, such proof of service was not filed in the Queens Action until months later as set forth hereinbelow.

On XXXXXX, 2025, the Defendant, through his former attorneys, XXXXXX, Esq., appeared by way of a "Notice of Limited Appearance" for the purposes of "preparing and arguing a pre-answer motion to dismiss . . .," and filed the underlying Notice of Motion, seeking an Order (A) pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) and (8), dismissing the Bronx Action; (B) pursuant to CPLR 602 (b), consolidating the Bronx Action into the Queens Action; (C) pursuant to CPLR 2201, staying the Bronx Action until the Queens Action is resolved; (D) pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1, awarding the Defendant's counsel fees in the form of sanctions; and (E) granting the Defendant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. The motion was made returnable on XXXXXX, 2025.

The Plaintiff opposes such motion and moved by Notice of Cross-Motion, seeking an Order (1) pursuant to CPLR 602 (b), consolidating the Queens Action into the Bronx Action; (2) pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1, awarding the Plaintiff counsel fees in the form of sanctions; (3) denying the Defendant's Notice of Motion in its entirety; and (4) awarding the Plaintiff such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

By way of Stipulation, the parties, through Counsel, agreed to adjourn the motion to XXXXXX, 2025, with a revised briefing schedule, and, based upon the Court's availability, agreed to appear before the Court for oral argument on XXXXXX, 2025.

On XXXXXX, 2025, the Court heard oral argument on the parties' respective motions, and a transcript of same is made part of this record. As alluded to hereinabove, the Defendant filed proof of service regarding the Ex Parte Order issued by the XXXXXX in the Queens Action on this date.

The underlying motion was submitted for a written decision on XXXXXX, 2026, the date of the filing of the transcript of oral argument.

The Court notes that after the submission of the underlying motion, the Defendant consented to be represented by incoming counsel, XXXXXX.

Analysis

Initially, the Court denies the Defendant's application pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8), as he fails to argue anywhere within the motion papers that service upon him was not otherwise made in compliance with DRL § 232 (a) and CPLR 308 (1) in the manner provided within the filed Affirmation of Service.

I. The Defendant's application for an Order dismissing the instant divorce action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) is DENIED, as the Defendant fails to establish that the Queens Action [*4]is otherwise "pending" within the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to this statute.

CPLR 3211 (a) (4) instructs that:

"[a] party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that . . . there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States; the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice requires . . ."

Procedurally, any objection or defense based upon CPLR 3211 (a) (4) is deemed waived unless raised by either a pre-answer motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense (CPLR 3211 [e]).

Once the motion is made properly and the objection or defense otherwise preserved, the movant is tasked with establishing that there is, in fact, "another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state of the United States" (CPLR 3211 [a] [4]). The first prong, to establish that there is "another action pending," requires establishing that a complaint—and not just a summons with notice—in the other action was served (Wharton v Wharton, 244 AD2d 404, 405 [2d Dept 1997]). The rationale is straightforward: it is the complaint, and not the summons with notice, that allows the court to gauge whether the actions involve the same parties and the same cause of action (see Graev v Graev, 219 AD2d 535 [1st Dept 1995]).

In matrimonial actions, service must be conducted in compliance with DRL § 232 (a), which instructs that service of the summons with notice or the summons and verified complaint must be either delivered personally to the defendant or otherwise effectuated pursuant to court order directing service by other means within CPLR 308 or 315 (see e.g. Rae v Marciano, 227 AD3d 738 [2d Dept 2024] [service upon the defendant by email without prior court leave or express consent of the Defendant was deemed ineffective]). As to service effectuated pursuant to court order other than in-hand delivery, DRL § 232 (a) charges a plaintiff with strictly complying with its four corners as to the method of service permitted (see also O'Heaney v O'Heaney, 80 AD2d 46 [4th Dept 1981], lv dismissed 54 NY2d 641, appeal dismissed 53 NY2d 1055).

Once it is established that there is another action pending that was otherwise properly served, where the two actions otherwise involve identical issues pending in different counties, "the actions should be consolidated pursuant to CPLR 602 in the county where the first action was commenced absent special circumstances" (Harrison v Harrison, 16 AD3d 206, 207 [1st Dept 2005] [internal citation omitted]; Moor v Moor, 39 AD3d 507, 507 [2d Dept 2007]). Ultimately, the trial court is vested with broad discretion in considering whether to dismiss an action on the ground that another action is pending between the same parties on the same cause of action (Whitney v Whitney, 57 NY2d 731 [1982], revg 88 AD2d 659 [2d Dept 1982]).

Here, the Defendant files a timely pre-answer motion to dismiss expressly citing CPLR 3211 (a) (4) as the basis for dismissal. As such, the Defendant is next charged with establishing that the Queens Action is "pending" within the context of a dismissal motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4). In this Court's opinion, the Defendant fails in this endeavor.

The Plaintiff does not establish full compliance with Justice XXXXXX's Ex Parte Order, dated XXXXXX, 2025, as he did not file proof of service "with the Queens County Clerk within twenty days of either such affixing or mailing, whichever is effectuated later . . ." In fact, proof of service in the Queens Action was not filed until XXXXXX, 2025—during the in-person oral argument of the underlying motions before this Court and over three months from the date proof [*5]of service had to be filed, on XXXXXX, 2025.

While it is true that the failure to file proof of service pursuant to CPLR 308 (4) is not jurisdictionally fatal, but goes to whether service was complete—essentially extending the time by which a defendant may appear in the action (see Conde v Zaganjor, 66 AD3d 947 [2d Dept 2009])—this "procedural irregularity" may be cured only by motion or sua sponte by the court in its discretion, pursuant to CPLR 2004, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant. Zheleznyak v Gordon & Gordon, P.C., 175 AD3d 1360, 1361 (2d Dept 2019). In the absence of an order curing this defect, service is deemed ineffective (id.).

Here, this Court, a court of concurrent (and not appellate) jurisdiction, is unable to rule on whether such "procedural irregularity" can be cured, as such an application must have been made before Justice XXXXXX. In other words, the Defendant's failure to strictly comply with the Ex Parte Order of Justice XXXXXX by filing proof of service within the timeframe set forth therein, and the lack of an Order expressly curing such defect, result in the Defendant's ultimate failure in demonstrating to this Court that proper service was effectuated in the Queens Action to otherwise establish that such action is "pending" within the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4).

Additionally, while the Plaintiff in this action was served in the Queens Action on Friday, XXXXXX, 2025, at 8:10 P.M., by "affixing," and thereafter on XXXXXX, 2025, by "mailing," otherwise in ostensible, partial compliance with Justice XXXXXX's Ex Parte Order, as otherwise raised by the Defendant within the underlying motion sequence, there is a question as to whether the "affixing" was effectuated during the Jewish Sabbath—a finding that might otherwise render service as performed ineffective (see JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass'n v Lilker, 153 AD3d 1243, 1244-1245 [2d Dept 2017]; Cieri v Halton, 209 AD3d 461 [1st Dept 2022]).

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Defendant fails to establish his burden on this motion record that the Summons and Verified Complaint had been properly served upon the Plaintiff in the Queens Action, and, consequently, does not succeed in establishing that the Queens Action was "pending" within the context of CPLR 3211 (a) (4) motion to dismiss (Quinones v Z & B Trucking, Inc., 220 AD3d 901 [2d Dept 2023]).

Consequently, the Court need not engage in an analysis regarding whether special circumstances exist, as the Bronx Action is the only action pending at this time within the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4).

Therefore, the Defendant's application for dismissal of this Bronx Action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) is hereby DENIED.

II. The Plaintiff's cross-application to consolidate the Queens Action into the instant Bronx Action is GRANTED to the extent that the Queens Action shall be tried jointly with the instant Bronx Action in the Bronx County, while the Defendant's application for the instant Bronx Action to be consolidated into the Queens Action is DENIED.

CPLR 602 instructs that:

"(a) Generally. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before a court, the court, upon motion, may order a joint trial of any or all the matters in issue, may order the actions consolidated, and may make such other orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

(b) Cases pending in different courts. Where an action is pending in the supreme court it [*6]may, upon motion, remove to itself an action pending in another court and consolidate it or have it tried together with that in the supreme court. Where an action is pending in the county court, it may, upon motion, remove to itself an action pending in a city, municipal, district or justice court in the county and consolidate it or have it tried together with that in the county court."

As set forth by the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department,

"CPLR 602(a) gives the trial court discretion to consolidate actions involving common questions of law or fact. Although great deference is to be accorded to the motion court's discretion . . ., there is a preference for consolidation in the interest of judicial economy and ease of decision-making where there are common questions of law and fact, unless the party opposing the motion demonstrates that consolidation will prejudice a substantial right . . ." (Progressive Ins. Co. v Vasquez, 10 AD3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2002] [internal citations omitted]).

Moreover, "[e]ven where there are common questions of law or fact, consolidation is properly denied if the actions are at markedly different procedural stages and consolidation would result in undue delay in the resolution of either matter" (Ahmed v C.D. Kobsons, Inc., 73 AD3d 440, 441 [1st Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

Of course, a court cannot consolidate another action or proceeding if the plaintiff or petitioner in the action or proceeding that is sought to be consolidated has otherwise withdrawn or discontinued same (see e.g. Matter of Ryan v Nolan, 134 AD3d 1259, 1261-1262 [3d Dept 2015]). In that vein, ". . . a precondition for merging two or more actions is that each action should itself be viable, meaning that neither is confronted with a pending—and apparently meritorious—motion to dismiss" (HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Francis, 214 AD3d 58, 63 [2d Dept 2023]).

In the instant matter, the two divorce actions involve the same parties and causes of action for divorce—otherwise, they are on opposite sides of the "v." in each caption. The parties were represented by the same attorneys in both divorce actions. Moreover, both cases were commenced three days apart and the parties and their respective attorneys have not otherwise participated in a Preliminary Conference. The Court takes judicial notice that, as of the date of this Decision and Order on Motion and Cross-Motion, neither a notice or stipulation of discontinuance nor a motion to dismiss have been filed in the Queens Action. In other words, while the Queens Action is not "pending" within the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4), it is viable—even with the risk of ineffective personal service, as alluded to hereinabove—and pending for purposes of allowing this Court to discern whether consolidation and/or joinder pursuant to CPLR 602 is proper. In fact, trying these matters in two different venues before two separate jurists might yield different and contradictory results.

However, given the risk of improper service in the Queens Action for the reasons set forth hereinabove—a matter of personal jurisdiction—the Court finds that joint trial of the two actions for divorce venued in Bronx County to be more appropriate than consolidation at this time (CPLR 602 [b]). With a joint trial, the joined Queens Action does not lose its identity as a separate action wherein the Defendant in that action, who is the Plaintiff in the instant action, preserves her right to contest service in the joined Queens Action. Lastly, each party's cause of action for divorce remains preserved, as there is nothing prohibiting this Court from issuing dual judgments of divorce pursuant to DRL § 170 (7), so long as each of the parties states within their respective pleadings under oath that the marriage was irretrievably broken down for a period of [*7]six months (see generally Hoffer-Adou v Adou, 121 AD3d 618, 619 [1st Dept 2014]).

Upon reviewing the transferred file from the Queens Action and the assignment thereto of a new index number by the Bronx County Clerk's Office, the Court shall issue further orders under the transferred Queens Action regarding service deadlines for a responsive pleading. However, should the Plaintiff waive any defects in service in the Queens Action, now joined with this action for divorce, the Court shall consolidate the joined Queens Action into the instant Bronx Action.

Until such time that the issue of service is adjudicated in the joined Queens Action or the parties otherwise agree to consolidate the joined Queens Action and the instant Bronx Action, the caption for these matrimonial actions shall be as follows:

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF BRONX

ANONYMOUS C-1,

Plaintiff, Index No.: XXXX/2025E

against Action No. 01

ANONYMOUS D-1,

Defendant.

ANONYMOUS D-1,

Plaintiff, Index No.: [TBD]

against Action No. 02

ANONYMOUS C-1,

Defendant.

Therefore, the Plaintiff's cross-application to consolidate the Queens Action into the instant Bronx Action is GRANTED to extent that these actions shall be tried jointly in this venue at this time, and otherwise finds that the Defendant's opposite application for consolidation of the instant Bronx Action into the Queens Action is hereby DENIED.

III. The parties' respective cross-applications for the issuance of sanctions in the form of the reimbursement of reasonable counsel fees incurred against the other party are hereby DENIED.

22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (a) instructs, in pertinent part, that:

"[t]he court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from frivolous conduct as defined in [22 NYCRR Part 130]. In addition to or in [*8]lieu of awarding costs, the court, in its discretion may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct as defined in this Part, which shall be payable as provided in section 130-1.3 of this Subpart."

22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (b) further instructs, in pertinent part, that "[t]he court, as appropriate, may make such award of costs or impose such financial sanctions against either an attorney or a party to the litigation or against both." 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (c) defines "frivolous" conduct as:

"(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;

(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or

(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false."

22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (c) further instructs that:

"[f]rivolous conduct shall include the making of a frivolous motion for costs or sanctions under this section. In determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous, the court shall consider, among other issues the circumstances under which the conduct took place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct, and whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party."

"A party seeking the imposition of a sanction or an award of attorney's fee pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-l.1 (c) has the burden of proof" (Matter of Lebron v Lebron, 101 AD3d 1009, 1010-1011 [2d Dept 2012] [internal citation omitted]).

When a party expressly seeks sanctions against a party within the moving motion papers, a hearing is not necessary as the respondent is given an opportunity to respond (22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 [d]; see e.g. Zappin v Comfort, 146 AD3d 575 [1st Dept 2017], appeal dismissed 31 NY3d 1077 [2018]; see also Coward v Biddle, 210 AD3d 1083, 1084 [2d Dept 2022]; Dellafiora v Dellafiora, 172 AD2d 715 [2d Dept 1991]; cf. Landes v Landes, 248 AD2d 268 [1st Dept 1998]).

Moreover, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion by a trial court, an appellate court will defer to its findings (see e.g. Grozea v Lagoutova, 67 AD3d 611 [1st Dept 2009]; Parker v Parker, 216 AD3d 433 [1st Dept 2023]).

In the instant matter, while the Court questions Attorney XXXXXX's alleged inability to find the Queens Action online after XXXXXX, 2025, as a search on NYSCEF (and not necessarily on eCourts) could have presumably revealed such filing upon a diligent spelling of the parties' names within the appropriate search fields, the Court, nevertheless, does not discern any conduct by the Plaintiff or her attorney that is "frivolous" as otherwise defined in 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (c), as demonstrated by her partial success on her underlying cross-motion.

Conversely, the Court does not discern any conduct by the Defendant or his former attorney, XXXXXX, Esq., that is "frivolous" as otherwise defined in 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (c) (Parker, 215 AD3d at 435-436).

Conclusion

Therefore, based upon the foregoing findings, the Defendant's Notice of Motion is DENIED, and the Plaintiff's Notice of Cross-Motion is GRANTED IN PART as follows: it is [*9]hereby:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's application for an Order dismissing the Bronx Action in its entirety, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (8), is hereby DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's application for an Order pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4), dismissing the instant Bronx Action in its entirety, is hereby DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's application for an Order, pursuant to CPLR 602 (b), consolidating and removing the Bronx Action to the Queens Action is hereby DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's application for an Order, pursuant to CPLR 2201, staying the Bronx Action until the Queens Action is resolved is hereby DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff's cross-application for an Order, pursuant to CPLR 602 (b), consolidating and removing the Queens Action into the Bronx Action is hereby GRANTED to the extent that, upon the pleadings and other proceedings in the actions, and it appearing to the court's satisfaction that the Queens Action and the instant Bronx Action grew out of the same set of facts and involve common questions of law, and that the actions can be tried together without consolidation, without prejudice to a substantial right, the Queens Action and the instant Bronx Action shall be tried jointly in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Bronx; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that on the trial of the action, the Plaintiff in the Bronx Action shall have the right to open and close; and it is further

ORDERED that, upon the payment of the appropriate fee, if any, and upon receipt of a certified copy of this Decision and Order on Motion and Cross-Motion, the Queens County Clerk's Office is hereby directed and authorized to transfer the files of the pending Queens Action to the Bronx County Clerk's Office; and it is further

ORDERED that the caption of the pending matters shall be as follows during the pendency of the actions:

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF BRONX

ANONYMOUS C-1,

Plaintiff, Index No.: XXXX/2025E

against Action No. 01

ANONYMOUS D-1,

Defendant.

ANONYMOUS D-1,

Plaintiff, Index No.: [TBD]

against Action No. 02

ANONYMOUS C-1,

Defendant.

and it is further

ORDERED that the Bronx County Clerk shall assign a new index number to the Queens Action that is now being transferred to this County and tried jointly in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Bronx and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's application for an Order, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1, issuing sanctions against the Plaintiff in the form of counsel fees payable to the Defendant's Counsel is hereby DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff's cross-application for an Order, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1, issuing sanctions against the Defendant in the form of counsel fees payable to the Plaintiff's Counsel is hereby DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiff's cross-application for an Order denying the Defendant's motion in its entirety is hereby GRANTED; and is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that any and all relief not otherwise addressed in the underlying Decision and Order on Motion and Cross-Motion is hereby DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties and counsel shall appear in person before this Court, located at 851 Grand Concourse, Courtroom Number 602, Bronx, New York 10451, on XXXXXX, 2026, at 10:00 A.M. for a Preliminary Conference, within Action Number 01; and it is further

ORDERED that statements of net worth, together with all required supporting documentation, which must include tax returns, attendant schedules, 1099s, and W-2s, for the tax years 2023 through 2025, and copies of the last three (3) pay stubs, shall be filed on NYSCEF within Action Number 01 on or before XXXXXX, 2026.

This constitutes the Decision and Order on Motion and Cross-Motion of this Court.

Dated: April 10, 2026

Bronx, New York

E N T E R :

HON. WANDA Y. NEGRÓN, A.J.S.C.