People v Rene
2026 NY Slip Op 50540(U) [88 Misc 3d 1254(A)]
April 14, 2026
Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County
Ilona B. Coleman, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.
The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff,
v
Joseph Rene, Defendant.
Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County
Decided on April 14, 2026
CR-036487-25NY
Alvin L. Bragg, Jr., District Attorney, New York County (Jacqueline Ali of counsel), for plaintiff.
New York County Defender Services, New York City (Paul J. Lee of counsel), for defendant.
Ilona B. Coleman, J.
[*1]In his omnibus motion, Mr. Rene moves for an order dismissing the charge of aggravated harassment in the second degree as facially insufficient; suppressing a statement he allegedly made to law enforcement (Dunaway v New York, 422 US 200 [1979]); suppressing evidence of a prior identification procedure (U.S. v Wade, 388 US 218 [1967]); precluding the People from conducting a first-time, in-court identification (People v Perdue, 41 NY3d 245 [2023]); and precluding the People from introducing evidence of prior bad acts at trial (People v Sandoval, 43 NY2d 371 [1974]).
First, the motion to dismiss is denied. Mr. Rene's sole argument is that the charge of PL § 240.30 (4) is facially insufficient because it does not allege that Mr. Rene and the complainant have "a family or household member relationship as defined by CPL § 530.11." However, that is not an element of the charge in this case (PL 240.30 [4]; see also People v Thorpe, 218 AD3d 1124 [4th Dept 2023]). PL § 240.30 (4) provides that a person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, "[w]ith the intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects another person to physical contact thereby causing physical injury to such person or to a family or household member of such person" (emphasis added). Contrary to the defense's argument, "the person who suffers the physical injury need not be a 'family or household member' of the offender" (William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, PL § 240.30). A family relationship is only an element of the offense when the person who suffers a physical injury is someone other than the intended target (see PL 240.30 [4]), which is not alleged here.
Second, the motions to suppress are granted to the extent that a combined Huntley/Wade/Dunaway hearing is ordered. The parties' allegations create factual disputes that must be resolved at an evidentiary hearing (see CPL 710.60 [4]). Further, the motion to preclude a first-time, in-court identification testimony is granted to the extent that a pretrial Perdue hearing is ordered. The defendant's requests to mandate the attendance of certain witnesses at the pre-trial hearing and employ "alternative identification procedures" are referred to the trial [*2]court.
Finally, the motion to preclude evidence of prior bad acts is referred to the trial court. The People are directed to provide supplemental discovery to the defense as soon as practicable and at least fifteen calendar days prior to the first scheduled trial date (CPL 245.20 [3]; CPL 245.10 [1] [b]).
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
Dated: April 14, 2026
New York, NY
Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.