Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on April 17, 2026

CR-005945-25NY

Ilona B. Coleman, J.

[*1]

The defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to CPL §§ 30.30 (1) (b) and 170.30 (1) (e). The defense previously moved to invalidate the People's March 24, 2025, certificate of compliance (COC) and July 16, 2025, supplemental certificate of compliance (SCOC). On September 29, 2025, defense's motion was granted (Decision and Order, September 29, 2025, CR-005945-25NY [Haniff, J.]). The parties agree that the People did not validly answer ready for trial until October 23, 2025, which was 213 days after the commencement of the criminal action. Now, this court must determine whether the People have established sufficient excludable time to bring their prosecution of this case within the speedy trial limit (see CPL 30.30 [1] [b], [4]).

I. Relevant Facts

On February 24, 2025, the People filed a criminal complaint charging the defendant with forcible touching, a class A misdemeanor (PL § 130.52), and sexual abuse in the third degree, a class B misdemeanor (PL § 130.55). The defendant was arraigned the next day in criminal court, and the arraignment court set bail. The court adjourned the case to February 28, 2025, for conversion of the misdemeanor complaint.

On February 28, 2025, the People filed a supporting deposition, converting the criminal complaint to an information. The defendant was arraigned on the information, and the case was adjourned to March 27, 2025, for trial.

On March 24, 2025, the People filed an off-calendar COC and a certificate of readiness (COR).

On March 27, 2025, the People answered ready for trial. The defense did not object to the People's discovery compliance or trial readiness but stated that they were not ready for trial. The court adjourned the case to May 27, 2025, for trial.

On April 22, 2025, at 3:30 p.m., defense counsel filed an omnibus motion. At 3:34 p.m., the People responded, via email, inquiring whether the defense had any "questions or concerns about discovery." On April 23, 2025, defense counsel replied via email with a list of six categories of potentially missing discovery. On April 24, 2025, the People responded, [*2]specifically addressing each objection and concluding that "the records you are requesting are either (1) sealed and not subject to automatic discovery, (2) never created / don't exist, or (3) already in your possession." Defense counsel did not respond to this email.

On May 27, 2025, the court issued a decision on the defense's omnibus motion, and the case was adjourned to June 17, 2025, for hearings and trial. Defense counsel did not raise any objection to the People's discovery compliance.

On June 17, 2025, the defendant was not present in court because he was in a residential treatment program, and the presiding judge excused his appearance. The People were not ready for hearings and trial because the assigned ADA was out of the office, and they requested an adjournment to June 23, 2025, for trial. With input from defense counsel, the court adjourned the case instead to July 17, 2025, for hearings and trial. Again, defense counsel did not raise any objection to the People's discovery compliance.

On June 26, 2025, the People informed defense counsel that they would not amend their plea offer despite the written mitigation submission on the defendant's behalf. Defense counsel then began "deep diving into the discovery again" (defense reply, p. 8), and on July 2, 2025, counsel sent an email to the People with a new list of allegedly outstanding discovery. On July 7, 2025, the People responded as to each objection, arguing that several of the items were administrative documents unrelated to the subject matter of the case; explaining that one of the items did not exist; and, most significantly, contesting the scope of required law enforcement disciplinary discovery. The parties continued to confer through July 16, 2025.

On July 16, 2025, the People produced additional discovery — not including the contested law enforcement disciplinary materials — and filed an SCOC. That same day, defense counsel filed a motion challenging the People's COC.

On July 17, 2025, the court adjourned the case to September 29, 2025, for decision.

On September 29, 2025, the court issued its decision, granting the defense motion and invalidating both the COC and the SCOC (Decision and Order, September 29, 2025, CR-005945-25NY [Haniff, J.]). The court found that the People had not exercised due diligence because of their incomplete production of law enforcement disciplinary records. The case was adjourned to October 30, 2025, for trial.

On October 17, 2025, the People sought a protective order for parts of the disciplinary records deemed discoverable. Thereafter, on October 23, 2025, the People filed a second SCOC, which the defense has not challenged.

On October 30, 2025, the court granted the People's motion for a protective order, and the People answered ready for trial. The court adjourned the matter to January 6, 2026, for trial.

On January 6, 2026, defense counsel advised the court that they would be filing a CPL § 30.30 motion to dismiss, and the court set a motion schedule. On January 20, 2026, defense counsel filed their motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the People filed their opposition on February 4, 2026, and the defense filed a reply on February 10, 2026. On March 13, 2026, the court heard oral argument on the motion and adjourned for decision to April 17, 2026.

II. CPL § 30.30

In this case, in which the defendant is charged with a class A misdemeanor and no felonies, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]). Once the defense has met their initial burden of alleging that the People have exceeded their allotted speedy trial time, "the burden of proving that certain periods within that time should be excluded falls upon the People" (People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, [*3]349 [1980]). The defense has alleged that 125 days are chargeable from the commencement of the criminal action through the People's first valid statement of readiness on October 23, 2025, and has therefore satisfied their initial burden. The question now is whether the People have established their entitlement to sufficient exclusions pursuant to CPL § 30.30 (4) to avoid dismissal.

1. February 24 to February 25, 2025

The parties dispute whether the day between the filing of the criminal complaint and the defendant's arraignment is chargeable to the People. On this point, the CPL is clear. Speedy trial time begins to run upon "the commencement of a criminal action" (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]), and "[a] criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court" (CPL 1.20 [17]). Because the People have not established that any statutory exclusion applies, this one day is chargeable (see People v Smietana, 98 NY2d 336, 341 [2002] [pre-arraignment time charged where People did not establish that exclusion applied]).

2. February 25 to April 22, 2025

The parties agree that the People must be charged for the time from the defendant's arraignment through the April 22, 2025, filing of the defendant's omnibus motion. The People correctly concede that, because their March 24, 2025 COC was invalid, their COR filed that same day and their in-court statement of readiness on March 27, 2025, were illusory (People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 204 [2023]). The People have not attempted to establish that any statutory exclusion applies to the adjournment that followed.FN1 For this period, 56 days are charged to the People.

3. April 22 to May 27, 2025

The parties agree that this period is excludable under CPL § 30.30 (4) (a) as "delay resulting from [. . .] pre-trial motions." This time is excludable.

4. May 27 to June 17, 2025

The People, citing People v Green, 90 AD2d 705 (1st Dept 1982), argue that the CPL § 30.30 (4) (a) motion practice exclusion extends from the decision date of May 27, 2025, to the first scheduled date for hearings and trial on June 17, 2025. The court disagrees. Neither the holding nor the logic of Green applies where, as here, the People were in a pre-readiness posture and made no record that they needed additional time "to be ready" as a result of the hearings ordered (see Green, 90 AD2d at 706). In these circumstances, the People have not provided a factual basis for their contention that the post-decision adjournment constitutes "delay resulting from" the defendant's motion. In fact, in this case, the People's discovery filings suggest that they anticipated that suppression hearings would be ordered and prepared accordingly. Mechanically applying the Green holding to every adjournment following a decision granting pretrial hearings is contrary to the statute, which, the Court of Appeals has explained, typically excludes only "the period of delay, if any, which in the individual case may be actually ascribed to consideration and determination of the particular motion" (People v Torres, 60 NY2d 119, 128 [1983]).

The People also argue that the adjournment should be excluded under CPL § 30.30 (4) [*4](g) as a "period of delay[] occasioned by exceptional circumstances" because the defense failed to notify the prosecution or file their COC challenge "as soon as practicable" as required under the prior version of CPL § 245.50 (4) (b) and (c).FN2 Several trial courts have held that time should be excluded from the speedy trial calculation when the defense failed to raise their objections as soon as practicable, though not always under the same legal theory (see, e.g., People v Soto, 80 Misc 3d 473, 480-481 [Crim Ct, NY County 2023] [applying CPL 30.30 (4) (g)]; People v Malone, CR-001971-23NY [Crim Ct, NY County] [same]; People v Bradford, 80 Misc 3d 1221[A] [Sup Ct, NY County 2023] [applying CPL 30.30 (4) (a)]; People v Smith, 79 Misc 3d 649, 657 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2023] [concluding that, as the result of two-year delay in notification, "defendant forfeited the statutory claim" that People's statement of readiness was invalid]). This court agrees with the Soto and Malone courts that defense delay in raising a COC challenge will support a (4) (g) exclusion. This determination, however, must be made on a case-by-case basis with reference to the language and purpose of the statute. In People v Price, 14 NY3d 61, 64 (2010), the Court of Appeals explained that the application of (4) (g) is "limited by the dominant legislative intent informing CPL 30.30, namely, to discourage prosecutorial inaction." The Court held that the exclusion applies "only when the People for practical reasons beyond their control cannot proceed with a legally viable prosecution" (id.). Thus, to invoke a (4) (g) exception in this case, the People must demonstrate that the continued delay was the result of the defense's failure to comply with CPL § 245.50 (4) and not the result of prosecutorial inaction.

Here, the People have shown that the defense failed to raise their discovery objections "as soon as practicable" (CPL 245.50 [4] [b], [c]). This case is not especially complex, and the amount of discovery involved is moderate. The materials that ultimately resulted in the COC's invalidation — law enforcement disciplinary records — are perhaps the most common subject of COC litigation and thus something defense counsel should know to check as part of even a cursory discovery review. Further, the People's COC listed the materials produced and specifically indicated that many of the disciplinary records were redacted. Despite all of that, defense counsel did not notify the People of the outstanding law enforcement disciplinary records or object to the People's redactions until July 2, 2025, over three months after the COC was filed. Given the obviousness of the relevant nondisclosures and the limited amount of discovery involved, the defense could have notified the People of any discovery objections within a few weeks, certainly well before May 27, 2025.

Defense counsel essentially admits as much. In their reply memorandum, the defense concedes that, after an initial review of the discovery and an initial conferral with the People, defense counsel stopped reviewing the discovery from approximately April 23 through June 26, 2025, and focused instead on providing mitigation material to the People. Once defense counsel began reviewing the discovery again, it took less than a week to complete the review. The court recognizes defense counsel's competing obligations and does not question the decision to prioritize plea negotiations over discovery review and trial preparation in this case. But the fact that defense counsel's delay was arguably reasonable is irrelevant to the legal question, which is [*5]whether the defense raised their COC challenge "as soon as practicable" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]).FN3 Even on the facts put forward in defense counsel's affirmation, the defense did not meet that requirement.

Nevertheless, the defense argues that their own delay is irrelevant because CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) only applies "where the People are truly unable to take necessary steps to prepare for trial and announce readiness due to circumstances which are beyond their control" (People v Smietana, 98 NY2d 336, 341 [2002]). Because the People could have self-corrected the COC defect without notification from the defense, the defense contends that their ongoing unreadiness is not "due to circumstances which are beyond their control" (id.). However, the facts of Smietana suggest that the defense's interpretation of this language is overly broad. In Smietana, the Court of Appeals held that CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) applied to a pre-arraignment period of time after a police officer filed an accusatory instrument and during which the prosecution was unaware of the filing (id.). As the defense argued and the dissent highlighted, the prosecution could have taken steps to learn when such cases were filed without their involvement (see id., 342-344). However, the majority rejected this argument, both because "[t]he [CPL] does not impose any obligation on the District Attorney to monitor filings in local criminal courts" (id. at 342), and because the costs of imposing such an obligation outweighed its benefits (see id., fn. 3).

Thus, the question is not whether the People could have theoretically taken some action to become ready, but whether they are required by statute, either explicitly or implicitly, to take such an action (see Smietana, 98 NY2d at 342-344). Once the People have filed a COC in good faith,FN4 the CPL does not explicitly impose any burden on them to revisit their initial discovery compliance, absent a defense objection (see generally CPL 245.10, 245.20, 245.50). While the People have a continuing obligation to disclose belatedly discovered materials (CPL 245.60), the defense bears the primary burden of identifying defects in initial discovery production (see CPL 245.50 [4] [b], [c]). Prosecutors may not always recognize potential gaps in their initial production, so requiring continual reassessment of initial disclosures would impose a substantial burden with limited corresponding benefit. By contrast, the statutory scheme contemplates that the defense, with its focused review, is well positioned to identify potential deficiencies in the People's discovery compliance (see id.; cf. People v Perez, 65 NY2d 154, 160 [1985] [noting that judicial review of Rosario material is "no substitute for the single-minded devotion of counsel for the accused"]).

Given this allocation of burdens, this court concludes that during this adjournment, the [*6]People were "unable to take necessary steps to prepare for trial and announce readiness due to circumstances which are beyond their control" (Smietana, 98 NY2d at 341). After filing their COC, the People were not aware that they had failed to produce discoverable material. They had filed their COC in good faith, with a sincere but mistaken belief that the outstanding law enforcement disciplinary records were not discoverable. Further, under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the People to conclude that the defense had acquiesced to the COC's validity. After the People inquired whether the defense had any discovery objections on April 23, 2025, defense counsel sent a list of allegedly missing discovery, which did not include the law enforcement disciplinary materials. The People responded promptly and comprehensively, and defense counsel, apparently satisfied, did not follow up. When the parties appeared in court a month later and defense counsel again raised no discovery issues, the People formed a reasonable belief that the defense had no further objections.

The People have therefore met their burden of demonstrating that CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) applies to this adjournment. The record indicates that the delay is best attributed to the "exceptional circumstance" of defense counsel's noncompliance with CPL § 245.50 (4) (c), rather than prosecutorial inaction (CPL 30.30 [4] [g]). This period is excluded.

5. June 17 to July 17, 2025

The People first argue that this adjournment is excludable pursuant to CPL § 30.30 (4) (c) because the defendant was not present in court on June 17, 2025. However, the defendant was not present because he was in a residential substance abuse treatment program, and the presiding judge explicitly excused his appearance. Further, there is nothing in the record to suggest that, had the People answered ready for trial, the defendant could not have left treatment to attend trial. The case was adjourned due to the People's stated unreadiness. In such circumstances, CPL § 30.30 (4) (c) does not apply.

Next, the People argue that defense consented to the part of the adjournment from June 23 through July 17, 2025 (CPL 30.30 [4] [b]). However, the court minutes show that the court could not accommodate the People's requested trial date and proposed a week in July. Defense counsel merely suggested convenient dates that week in response. Because defense counsel did not clearly express consent to the delay, CPL § 30.30 (4) (b) does not apply (People v Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843 [1992]).

However, the same "exceptional circumstances" that merited a CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) exclusion from May 27 to June 17, 2025, continued into this adjournment. The People were unaware of the COC defect until July 2, 2025, and defense counsel remained out of compliance with the requirements of CPL § 245.50 (4) until they filed their COC challenge. However, the precise contours of the CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) exclusion require closer examination.

First, there is a question as to whether the exclusion should apply to part of the adjournment explicitly requested by the People (June 17 through June 23, 2025) during which time the assigned prosecutor was on vacation. Defense argues that, because the prosecutor's absence prevented the People from stating ready for trial, the court should not find that the delay was "occasioned by" the exceptional circumstances of defense counsel's CPL § 245.50 (4) noncompliance. The court disagrees. Defense counsel's noncompliance both pre- and post-dated the prosecutor's absence, which was a finite and non-jurisdictional impediment to the People's readiness. In these circumstances, the defense's conduct was "the principal factor in the People's inability to advance the criminal proceeding" (People v Williams, 78 AD3d 160, 166 [1st Dept 2010]). In fact, such precise causal analysis is probably unnecessary. The defense did [*7]not comply with CPL § 245.50 (4) because they prioritized plea-bargaining efforts over discovery review and, accordingly, trial preparation. Because this delay was "caused by the defendant for his own benefit," the defense arguably "impliedly consent[ed]" to the delay, and therefore the People did not need to prove that the defense's actions were the cause of their unreadiness (People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523, 527-528 [1985]). The court need not reach this issue, though, because the court has found that the defense delay was in fact the primary cause of the People's unreadiness. The CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) exclusion therefore applies to this period.FN5

However, the CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) exclusion concludes on July 2, 2025, when defense counsel notified the People that discoverable law enforcement disciplinary records were outstanding. Once notified, the People had a realistic ability and thus a legal duty to correct the COC defect. Notably, in its decision invalidating the People's COC and SCOC, the prior court held that these omissions undermined a finding of due diligence — a holding that binds this court under law of the case doctrine (People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499, 504 [2000]). Once notified, the People were obligated to act; thus, the "dominant legislative intent" of "discourag[ing] prosecutorial inaction" is implicated, and the CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) exclusion no longer applies (Price, 14 NY3d at 64).

The People argue that, had defense counsel timely notified them of the COC defect, the conferral period would have coincided with the pendency of the defense's omnibus motion — an otherwise excludable period — and thus should be excluded "to prevent the Defendant from benefiting from their own inaction" (People's affirmation at 9). However, nothing in CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) suggests that the court may use the statute as a discretionary mechanism for promoting equitable considerations. Rather, its purpose is to evaluate the People's responsibility for delays as they actually occurred.

Finally, the parties agree that the remaining day (July 16 to July 17, 2025) is excludable under CPL § 30.30 (4) (a) for motion practice.

Overall, the 14 days from July 2 through July 16, 2025, are charged for this adjournment, and the remainder of the adjournment is excluded.

6. July 17 to September 29, 2025

This period is excluded under CPL § 30.30 (4) (a) for motion practice.

7. September 29 to October 30, 2025

On September 29, 2025, the prior court issued its decision invalidating the People's March 24, 2025, COC and July 16, 2025, SCOC, and the People reverted to a state of pre-readiness. For the adjournment that followed, the People argued that the court should apply a CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) exclusion "to prevent the Defendant from benefiting from their own [*8]inaction" (People's affirmation, p. 9). As discussed above, the court disagrees that CPL § 30.30 (4) (g) can be used as a mechanism for sanctions. Further, the People's counterfactual — that the defense should have filed their COC challenge with its omnibus motion, such that any new COC would align with an excludable adjournment under People v Green, 90 AD2d 705 (1st Dept 1982) — is both factually tenuous and legally incorrect. This court has already rejected the People's argument that the adjournment from May 27 through June 17, 2025, should be excluded under Green (see section II, part 4, supra).

The parties agree that the remainder of the adjournment must be excluded under CPL § 30.30 (4) (a) for motion practice.

Eighteen days are charged for this adjournment.

8. Conclusion

The defense does not allege that any additional time is excludable. Based on the analysis above, the People are charged with a total of 89 days. They have not exceeded their 90-day limit in this case (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]), and the defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED.

This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

Dated: April 17, 2026

New York, NY

Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.