Alterio v Bank of Am., N.A.

Supreme Court, Dutchess County

Decided on April 16, 2026

Index No. 2025-55404

Maria G. Rosa, J.

The following papers were read and considered on Defendants' motion to dismiss (Motion Seq. #1) and Plaintiff's motion to enjoin eviction proceedings against him (Motion Seq. #2):

Document: NYSCEF Doc. No(s).:

NOTICE OF MOTION — Seq. #1 5

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT and EXHIBITS 1—8 6—14

MEMORANDUM OF LAW 15

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION 26

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE — Seq. #2 25

PLAINTIFF AFFIRMATIONS IN SUPPORT and EXHIBITS A—B 20—21, 23—24

MEMORANDUM OF LAW 22

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN OPPOSITION 32

BACKGROUND

This is an action seeking to quiet title to residential real property located at 192 Titusville Road, Poughkeepsie (Town of LaGrange), New York. On April 28, 2023, Defendant Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of America") commenced a foreclosure action against the property (Index No. 2023-51440, the "Foreclosure Action"), alleging that the then-owner of the property, Susan T. Monopoli ("Susan Monopoli"), had defaulted on a consolidated mortgage loan in the original amount of $525,000.00 by failing to make the payment due March 1, 2020 and all payments due thereafter. Prior to the commencement of the Foreclosure Action, Susan Monopoli had died on March 11, 2022, and the complaint named numerous known and unknown heirs as defendants. Plaintiff was not among the parties so named. Pursuant to an affidavit of service filed May 31, 2023, Bank of America's process server indicated that no one was able to be served at the property address, noting: "This address is vacant. Windows are broken. Neighbor confirmed this address is vacant." A judgment of foreclosure and sale was issued October 1, 2024 (Acker, J.), and the property was sold to Bank of America at auction on February 19, 2025 without surplus.

On February 26, 2025, Plaintiff commenced an action under Index No. 2025-50976 against the same Defendants in this action, seeking to quiet title to the property in his favor (the "Previous Quiet Title Action"). Plaintiff alleged that he was the record owner of the property based on a purported quitclaim deed executed by Susan Monopoli on February 24, 2021 (the "2021 Deed"). Plaintiff further alleged in that action that he "was in actual possession of the [property] and has resided at the property, maintained it, since December 1, of 2020." By Decision and Order dated August 27, 2025, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, holding that Plaintiff had failed to serve process on Defendants and further failed to state a claim against Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"). No notice of appeal was filed.

On September 16, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this action based upon the same claim of ownership alleged in the Previous Quiet Title Action. Plaintiff asserts causes of action for quiet title, declaratory judgment, fraudulent misrepresentation, equitable estoppel, and slander of title. On March 19, 2026, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based upon documentary evidence (CPLR 3211[a][1]), for failure to state a claim (CPLR 3211[a][7]), and failure to obtain personal jurisdiction (CPLR 3211[a][8]). Defendants' notice of motion set a return date of April 9, 2026. Plaintiff did not file opposition to the motion until April 14, 2026, without excuse for the untimely filing. However, under the unique circumstances of this case and considering Plaintiff's pro se status, the opposition will be considered.

On April 13, 2026, Plaintiff moved by Order to Show Cause for a temporary restraining order and, in effect, a preliminary injunction to stay an eviction proceeding brought against him by Bank of America in the Town of LaGrange Justice Court. Plaintiff asserted that absent such relief, a warrant of eviction would be executed against him on April 17, 2026. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on April 13, 2026, denying temporary injunctive relief and directing the parties to appear in person on April 16, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. At 8:13 a.m. that morning, Plaintiff e-filed a letter stating that his father had passed away, that he would not be appearing, and that his application should be decided on papers only. Counsel for Bank of America in this action, as well as its counsel in the eviction proceeding, appeared in Court to oppose Plaintiff's motion, and indicated that the eviction warrant was scheduled for execution on Monday, April 20, 2026. Defendants also filed written opposition to the motion that morning.

[*2]DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

As an initial matter, to the extent Plaintiff seeks a "stay" of the Justice Court proceeding pursuant to CPLR 2201, such relief is not available. Rather, a "stay" may only be granted as to the action pending before this Court (CPLR 2201; Siegel, NY Prac. § 255 (6th ed.)), and not as to any proceedings in any other Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion may only be considered as seeking a preliminary injunction.

"A preliminary injunction may be granted in any action where it appears that the defendant threatens or is about to do, or is doing or procuring or suffering to be done, an act in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual" (CPLR 6301). In general:

To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a movant must establish (1) a probability of success on the merits, (2) a danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, and (3) a balance of the equities in the movant's favor. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo and prevent the dissipation of property that could render a judgment ineffectual. As a general rule, the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court. . . . Moreover, where . . . the denial of a preliminary injunction would disturb the status quo and render the final judgment ineffectual, the degree of proof required to establish the element of likelihood of success on the merits should be reduced.

(Congregation Erech Shai Bais Yosef, Inc. v Werzberger, 189 AD3d 1165, 1166—1167 [2d Dept 2020] [internal quotations and citations omitted]). Although "the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a trial, the remedy is considered a drastic one, which should be used sparingly" (Sarker v Das, 203 AD3d 973 [2d Dept 2022], quoting Soundview Cinemas, Inc. v AC I Soundview, LLC, 149 AD3d 1121 [2d Dept 2017]).

Plaintiff argues that his claims are meritorious based on the 2021 Deed and his communications to Wells Fargo prior to the foreclosure sale asserting his ownership interest in the property. As to his first cause of action, "[t]o maintain an equitable quiet title claim, a plaintiff must allege actual or constructive possession of the property and the existence of a removable cloud on the property, which is an apparent title, such as a deed or other instrument, that is actually invalid or inoperative" (Carbone v Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 145 AD3d 848, 849 [2d Dept 2016]; RPAPL § 1515). A plaintiff must also "set forth facts showing [his] estate or interest in the real property, the particular nature of such estate or interest, and the source from or means by which the plaintiff's estate or interest immediately accrued to him" (RPAPL § 1515[1][a]).

In this action, unlike the Previous Quiet Title Action, Plaintiff alleges that the 2021 Deed "was recorded in the Dutchess County Clerk's Office, providing constructive notice to the world of [his] ownership interest." This statement is demonstrably false. A public search of records maintained by the Dutchess County Clerk does not show any deed recorded in Plaintiff's name regarding the property at any time since the 2021 Deed was purportedly executed. A copy of the purported deed filed with Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motion contains no recording [*3]cover page or other relevant information. While the document purports to be acknowledged by a notary public, there is no notary stamp or commission information, and there appear to be two entirely different signatures for the purported notary public. Moreover, nowhere does Plaintiff explain the circumstances for the purported conveyance of the property to him, whether he gave any consideration to Susan Monopoli, why the first page of the deed is dated two days after the signature page, or why the 2021 Deed appears to convey the property to him and Susan Monopoli as tenants in common, not joint tenants with rights of survivorship (Estates, Powers & Trusts Law § 6-2.2[a] ["A disposition of property to two or more persons creates in them a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy."]).FN1 Thus, even assuming the 2021 Deed has any legal validity, it would only convey a 50% interest in the property, contradicting Plaintiff's claim of sole ownership. As a result, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any likelihood of success on the merits of his quiet title claim.

As to Plaintiff's second cause of action for a declaratory judgment annulling the judgment of foreclosure and referee's deed to Bank of America, this represents an improper collateral attack on the judgment (CPLR 5015; see DeMartino v Lomonaco, 155 AD3d 686, 687 [2d Dept 2017]). The third cause of action for fraudulent inducement and fourth cause of action for "equitable estoppel" also improperly attack the judgment as procured through fraud (CPLR 5015[a][3]). Moreover, having failed to demonstrate a valid ownership interest in the property, and the property having appeared to be vacant at the time the Foreclosure Action was commenced, Bank of America was not required to join Plaintiff as a Defendant in that action or negotiate with him regarding the subject mortgage (RPAPL § 1311[1]). Accordingly, the second through fourth causes of action are procedurally and substantively infirm, and cannot be the basis for injunctive relief.

Finally, Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for slander of title is compensable by money damages, and therefore cannot support injunctive relief (Berman v Sosman, 243 AD3d 755, 758 [2d Dept 2025]).

Having failed to demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits of any applicable cause of action, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, and the Court need not consider whether he may suffer irreparable harm or the equities favor injunctive relief (Cushing v Sanford Equities Corp., 223 AD3d 870, 871 [2d Dept 2024] [affirming trial court's denial of injunction against eviction (holdover) proceeding based on plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits]).

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion is denied.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Defendants principally argue, as in the Previous Quiet Title Action, that they were not served with process, and this action should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction (CPLR 3211[a][8]). Plaintiff has not filed any proof of service of the summons and complaint, and he therefore fails to rebut Defendants' argument. While Plaintiff argues that he should be granted [*4]an extension of time to serve process "upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice" (CPLR 306-b), such an extension is not available unless a plaintiff can show prior diligent efforts at service and/or a potentially meritorious cause of action (e.g., Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v Campbell, 172 AD3d 1310, 1312 [2d Dept 2019]). Plaintiff has not submitted proof of any efforts to properly serve Defendants with process. As discussed above, Plaintiff also has not demonstrated that any of his causes of action potentially have merit. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to an extension of time to serve process, and the complaint must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction (Id.; Gooden v New York City Health and Hosps. Corp., 216 AD3d 1143, 1143 [2d Dept 2023]).

That said, the complaint must also be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7]) and based upon documentary evidence (CPLR 3211[a][1]). As to the first cause of action to quiet title, Plaintiff's own evidence, as well as the Dutchess County Clerk's records, demonstrate that Plaintiff did not possess a defensible claim of sole title to the property prior to the commencement of the Foreclosure Action. This claim is also barred by collateral estoppel from being asserted against Wells Fargo. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in fraud or other misconduct in the Foreclosure Action (second through fourth causes of action), those claims are not properly asserted here (CPLR 5015[a][3]; DeMartino, 155 AD3d at 687—688). Regarding Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for slander of title, Plaintiff does not allege any special damages (Irizarry v Rosselli, 229 AD3d 778, 780 [2d Dept 2024]). Accordingly, the complaint must be dismissed on the merits (CPLR 3211[a][1], [7]).

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants' motion is granted, and this action is dismissed.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: April 16, 2026

Poughkeepsie, New York

ENTER:

MARIA G. ROSA, J.S.C.