Supreme Court, Dutchess County

Decided on April 1, 2026

Index No. 2023-53414

Maria G. Rosa, J.

[*1]

The following papers were read and considered on:

Motion Sequence #4: Motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant George Gorich, M.D. ("Defendant Gorich") seeking dismissal of the complaint as asserted against him;

Motion Sequence #5: Motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Lawrence Hyun Kwon, M.D. ("Defendant Kwon"), Crystal Hoskins s/h/a Crystal Hodgkins RN ("Defendant Hoskins"), Laurie Wilson, RN ("Defendant Wilson"), Sara Beliveau LCSW ("Defendant Beliveau"), Westchester County Health Care Corporation d/b/a Mid-Hudson Regional Hospital ("Defendant MHRH" or the "Hospital"), Sonal Parmar M.D. ("Defendant Parmar"), and the Bon Secours Charity Health System Medical Group P.C. ("Defendant Bon Secours") (collectively, the "MHRH Defendants") seeking dismissal of the complaint as asserted against them;

Motion Sequence #6: Motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Jeanne Hubner, N.P. s/h/a Jeanne Hubner C.N.P. ("Defendant Hubner") and Atlanticare Management LLC d/b/a Putnam Ridge ("Defendant Putnam Ridge" or "Putnam Ridge") seeking dismissal of the complaint as asserted against them; and

Motion Sequence #7: Cross-motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff seeking to fix the liability of Defendants Hoskins, Wilson, Beliveau, and MHRH:

Document: NYSCEF Doc. No(s).:

NOTICE OF MOTION — Seq. #4 123

MEMORANDUM OF LAW 124

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT and EXHIBITS B—H 125, 129—146

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 126

EXPERT AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT (EXHIBITS A & A1) 127—128

NOTICE OF MOTION — Seq. #5 154

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 155

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT and EXHIBITS A—R, U 156—192, 195

EXPERT AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT (EXHIBITS S—T) 193—194

MEMORANDUM OF LAW 196

NOTICE OF MOTION — Seq. #6 197

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT and EXHIBITS B—Z 199, 202—230

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 200

EXPERT AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT (EXHIBIT A) 201

NOTICE OF CROSS-MOTION — Seq. #7 238

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS

AND IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-MOTION and EXHIBIT A 239, 242

EXPERT AFFIRMATIONS 240—241

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION IN OPPOSITION TO CROSS-MOTION

AND IN REPLY ON MOTION — Seqs. #5, 7 245, 246

ATTORNEY REPLY AFFIRMATION — Seq. #6 247

[*2]BACKGROUND

This is an action for medical malpractice and wrongful death. On July 13, 2022, Plaintiff's Decedent, Clement R. Landanno ("Mr. Landanno" or "Decedent"), was admitted to Defendant MHRH to undergo several surgical procedures related to bladder cancer, including bladder removal (radical cystectomy) performed by former defendant Scott A. Kahn, M.D. Following the surgery, Mr. Landanno suffered complications including acute tubular necrosis of the kidneys leading to end-stage renal disease, i.e., kidney failure. As a result, he was put on hemodialysis (i.e., dialysis) three days per week, on a schedule of Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. On the late evening of Thursday, August 18, 2022, Mr. Landanno was discharged to Putnam Ridge, (a nursing home in Brewster, New York) where it was arranged that he would receive hemodialysis each weekday, Monday through Friday. He did not receive hemodialysis on Friday, August 19, 2022, or at any time thereafter.

Mr. Landanno was examined on Monday morning, August 22, 2022, at approximately 7:00 a.m., by Defendant Gorich, who was an attending physician at Putnam Ridge. Defendant Gorich found Mr. Landanno to be medically stable. Less than three hours later, at approximately 9:44 a.m., Putnam Ridge nursing staff found Mr. Landanno to have reduced diastolic blood pressure, pulse and blood oxygen. The staff called Defendant Gorich to report these conditions, and Defendant Gorich ordered that he be sent to a hospital emergency department. During the ambulance trip to Danbury Hospital, Mr. Landanno suffered cardiac arrest. Because he had a written "do not resuscitate" advance directive in place, no resuscitation procedures were performed. He was pronounced dead upon his arrival at the hospital at approximately 11:03 a.m. An emergency department physician there noted that, although the cause of the cardiac arrest was "not definitively known," "if the report that [Decedent's] daily hemodialysis was not performed for the past 4 days is indeed correct, this very likely contributed" to his death.

Plaintiff, who is Decedent's wife, was appointed his personal representative on December 6, 2022. She commenced this action on August 10, 2023, originally against only Defendants Kwon, Gorich, Huber, Hoskins, Wilson, Beliveau, MHRH, Putnam Ridge, and Defendant Muhammad A. Khan M.D. ("Defendant Khan"), and former defendants Jennifer Griffiths M.D. and Scott A. Kahn M.D. On August 14, 2024, Plaintiff commenced a related action against Defendants Parmar and Bon Secours under Index No. 2024-53818. At a conference held December 3, 2024, the parties stipulated to consolidate the latter-filed action into this action. By Decision and Order dated August 7, 2025, the Court granted the respective motions of Dr. Griffiths and Dr. Kahn to discontinue this action as asserted against them. Following the close of discovery, all remaining Defendants except Defendant Khan move for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff opposes such dismissal except as to Defendant Gorich, and cross-moves for summary judgment on liability against Defendants Hoskins, Wilson, Beliveau, and MHRH.

DISCUSSION

On a motion for summary judgment "[t]he movant 'must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient admissible evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact'" (Bazdaric v Almah Partners LLC, 41 NY3d 310, 316 [2024], quoting Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). If the movant has met this threshold burden, to defeat the motion the opposing party must "produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial of the action" (Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 320; CPLR 3212[b]; see also [*3]Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the trial court must afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may be properly drawn from the facts presented, and the facts must be considered favorable to the nonmovant" (Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553 [1997]). The function of the Court on such a motion is issue finding, rather than issue determination (Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]). Where there is any doubt about the existence of a material and triable issue of fact, summary judgment must not be granted (Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]). Since it deprives litigants of their day in court, summary judgment is considered a drastic remedy which should only be employed when there is no doubt as to the absence of triable issues (Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]). "It is not the function of a court deciding a summary judgment motion to make credibility determinations or findings of fact, but rather to identify material triable issues of fact (or point to the lack thereof)" (Vega v Restani Const. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 505 [2012]).

"A defendant seeking summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must make a prima facie showing either that he or she did not depart from the accepted standard of care or that any departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries" (M.C. v Huntington Hosp., 175 AD3d 578, 579 [2d Dept 2019]; see Palmeiro v Luchs, 202 AD3d 989, 990 [2d Dept 2022]). "In order to sustain this prima facie burden, the defendant must address and rebut any specific allegations of malpractice set forth in the plaintiff's complaint and bill of particulars" (Campbell v Ditmas Park Rehabilitation & Care Ctr., LLC, 225 AD3d 835, 836 [2d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff, in opposition, must demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to the elements on which the defendant has met his or her initial burden, including by rebutting the specific assertions of the defendant's expert" (Id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). However, "expert opinions that are conclusory, speculative, or unsupported by the record are insufficient to raise triable issues of fact" (Kaur v Jamaica Hospital Medical Center, 237 AD3d 1178, 1178 [2d Dept 2025]). "In order not to be considered speculative or conclusory, expert opinions in opposition should address specific assertions made by the movant's experts, setting forth an explanation of the reasoning and relying on specifically cited evidence in the record" (Id.).

Defendant Kwon

In support of his motion, Defendant Kwon submits an affirmation of a physician board-certified in nephrology and internal medicine, who reviewed the medical records, pleadings, and several of Defendants' deposition transcripts. The expert states, in relevant part, that Defendant Kwon saw Decedent for kidney-failure-related care on July 25 through 29, 2022, and August 8 through 14, 2022. At the last visit on August 14, 2022, Defendant Kwon reported that Decedent suffered from end-stage renal disease, and was to continue dialysis three days per week. The expert further states that Defendant Kwon did not participate in Decedent's discharge planning four days later, and opines that he "had no input or responsibility" for the discharge. Based on these facts and the expert's opinion, Defendant Kwon has established, prima facie, that he did not breach any standard of care as alleged by Plaintiff in her bill of particulars.

In opposition, Plaintiff submits two expert affirmations that do not mention Defendant Kwon. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to rebut Defendant Kwon's prima facie showing, and he is entitled to dismissal of the complaint as asserted against him.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that branch of the MHRH Defendant's motion for summary judgment as [*4]seeks dismissal on behalf of Defendant Kwon is granted, and the complaint is dismissed as asserted against him, with prejudice.

Defendant Muhammad A. Khan M.D.

Defendant Khan did not appear in this action or answer the complaint. Plaintiff has not moved for a default judgment against this Defendant. Accordingly, on the Court's own motion (CPLR 3215[c]), it is hereby

ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed as abandoned insofar as asserted against Defendant Khan.

Defendant Gorich

Defendant Gorich submitted an expert's affirmation and other supporting evidence, sufficient to entitle him to summary judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff does not oppose the motion, and consents to discontinuing her claims against him. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant Gorich's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed as asserted against him, with prejudice.

Defendants Hoskins, Wilson, Beliveau, and MHRH

Defendants Hoskins, Wilson, and Beliveau are alleged to have been involved in Decedent's discharge planning at MHRH. Defendant MHRH is alleged to be vicariously liable for their negligence. In her bill of particulars, Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants were collectively negligent by:

1. authorizing or permitting the premature discharge of [Decedent] from the hospital;

2. discharging [Decedent] from the hospital without a sufficient plan for his continuing dialysis outside the hospital;

3. failing to provide necessary dialysis to the decedent;

4. failing to monitor and ensure that [Decedent] was receiving necessary [d]ialysis;

5. discharging [Decedent] to a facility that was not equipped to provide [d]ialysis in accordance with the timetable that was required by [Decedent];

6. failing to abide with physician orders;

7. causing or permitting over-administration of fluids;

8. failing to promulgate or enforce necessary protocols for the discharge of a dialysis patient;

9. failing to abide with accepted protocols for the discharge of a dialysis patient;

10. failing to examine and monitor [Decedent] for pressure wounds;

11. failing to provide necessary wound care and pressure relieving measures to [Decedent];

12. failing to regularly examine and monitor [Decedent's] pressure wounds.

Defendants Hoskins, Wilson, Beliveau, and MHRH rely upon the same evidence submitted in support of Defendant Kwon's motion. Their expert opines, in relevant part:

The records of the [MHRH] social workers and case manager reflected numerous communications with Putnam Ridge regarding the transfer of the decedent and specifically his need for dialysis. The nurse manager completed the patient review instrument (PRI). Included in the information provided was the fact that [Decedent] [*5]required dialysis three days a week, along with the dialysis schedule at [MHRH].

The social worker, Ms. Beliveau, had discussions with the admissions liaison at Putnam Ridge. Decedent's medical needs, including the need for dialysis, were discussed. In addition to the PRI, she sent dialysis flow sheets, nephrology notes, history and physical, and progress notes to Putnam Ridge. The receipt of these documents by Putnam Ridge was confirmed by Putnam Ridge's admissions director.

. . .

The progress notes of Dr. Nishant Parmar FN2 on August 17 and Dr. Griffiths on August 18 confirm that [Decedent] was stable enough for safe transfer to a subacute facility. On August 17, [Decedent] was afebrile with the other vital signs within normal limits. Review of systems revealed he was alert, in no acute distress, and cardiovascular, respiratory, and neurological were within normal limits. He had just received dialysis on August 18. The potassium was within normal range[.]

Dr. Griffiths' note of August 18 . . . states [Decedent] had no new complaints and felt better [that day]. Vital signs were within normal limits. Physical examination found [Decedent] to be alert and in no acute distress, with lungs clear, a normal heart rhythm, and no joint swelling or erythema. [Decedent] received [dialysis] earlier that day, on August 18, the day of discharge.

It is my opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that it was within the standard of care and good and accepted practice for the physicians at [MHRH] to discharge [Decedent] on August 18. A catheter was placed for [dialysis]; potassium was within normal limits, as were his temperature and other vital signs. [Putnam Ridge] was aware that [Decedent] required dialysis and was advised of the hospital schedule on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday. [Decedent] received dialysis on the day of discharge, on Thursday [August 18].

. . .

Once Putnam Ridge accepted [Decedent], and [Decedent] was received by Putnam Ridge, [MHRH's] responsibility for [Decedent's] dialysis care ended. There is no obligation or responsibility for [MHRH] to monitor the provision of dialysis at Putnam Ridge. [MHRH] had the right to assume, since it was not advised otherwise, that Putnam Ridge would perform the dialysis in accordance with the schedule contained in the PRI or with an equivalent schedule.

The [MHRH] [D]efendants acted within the standard of care for the discharge and transfer of the decedent, including providing the information necessary for Putnam Ridge to continue the dialysis treatment the patient required. The standard of care does not require [MHRH] to follow up with Putnam Ridge to ensure it is following the treatment plan.

. . .

There is no explanation in the Putnam Ridge record or in the deposition testimony of Putnam Ridge witnesses as to why [Decedent] did not receive dialysis at all at Putnam Ridge. . . . There was no reason for [MHRH] to anticipate that Putnam Ridge would not perform dialysis. It was the [Putnam Ridge] admissions director's responsibility to notify [*6][MHRH] that [Decedent] would not receive dialysis.

Based on these facts and opinions, the expert concludes that "the decision to discharge [Decedent] on August 18 was pursuant to the standard of care and constituted good and accepted practice," and that "the transfer of [Decedent] to [Putnam Ridge] was performed as customary for dialysis patients." The expert further opines that any alleged act or omission by Defendants Hoskins, Wilson or Beliveau did not proximately cause Decedent's death four days after discharge from MHRH. These Defendants have thereby demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against them regarding the circumstances surrounding Decedent's discharge to Putnam Ridge (allegations #1—6, 8, 9 above).

As to the remaining allegations against Defendants Hoskins, Wilson and Beliveau, there is no evidence in the medical records that they were involved in the administration of fluids to Decedent at any time, or involved in any wound care. Plaintiff's counsel did not pursue any inquiry as to these allegations during the depositions of Defendants Wilson and Beliveau. It does not appear from the extensive record on the pending motions that Defendant Hoskins was deposed. Accordingly, upon searching the record, the remaining allegations in the bill of particulars related to over-administration of fluids (allegation #7) and pressure wound care (allegations #10—#12) must be dismissed as asserted against Defendants Hoskins, Wilson and Beliveau.

In opposition to the MHRH Defendants' motion, Plaintiff submits an affirmation of a board-certified nephrologist and an affirmation of a social worker expert in hospital case management. Generally, these experts opine that the MHRH Defendants collectively failed to meet the standard of care in planning and arranging for Decedent's discharge to Putnam Ridge. However, their opinions fail to specify any alleged negligence by Defendants Hoskins or Wilson regarding Decedent's discharge planning. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to raise any triable issue of fact as to these Defendants.

As to Defendant Beliveau, Plaintiff's social worker expert refers to her once, opining that "it was a departure from accepted standards of care for [her] . . . not to ascertain whether or not Putnam Ridge could provide dialysis to [Decedent] by Saturday as scheduled." Based on Defendant Beliveau's deposition testimony and the MHRH medical records, it is undisputed that Defendant Beliveau did not seek to ascertain whether Decedent would be able to receive dialysis on Saturday, August 20, 2022 at Putnam Ridge. Based on these facts and the divergent expert opinions, Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant Beliveau departed from the appropriate standard of care by "discharging [Decedent] from the hospital without a sufficient plan for his continuing dialysis outside the hospital" (allegation #2 above), "discharging [Decedent] to a facility that was not equipped to provide [d]ialysis in accordance with the timetable that was required by [Decedent]" (allegation #5), and "failing to abide with accepted protocols for the discharge of a dialysis patient" (allegation #8) (cf. 10 NYCRR § 405.9[h][1] ("No patient who requires continuing health care services . . . may be discharged until such services are secured or determined by the hospital to be reasonably available to the patient."). The remaining allegations must, however, be dismissed as against Defendant Beliveau, as Plaintiff's experts fail to address them (Tsitrin v New York Community Hosp., 154 AD3d 994, 996 [2d Dept 2017]).

The MHRH Defendants' expert also opines that no acts or omissions by these Defendants proximately caused Decedent's death, as their responsibility for providing dialysis services to [*7]Decedent ceased upon his discharge. However, Plaintiff's expert raises a triable issue of fact by opining that Defendant Beliveau was obliged to ascertain whether Decedent would receive dialysis per his Hospital schedule and secure such services prior to discharge, and that the failure to secure such dialysis services "resulted in accumulated waste, systemic toxicity and substantially contributed to [Decedent's] death." Accordingly, regardless of what transpired at Putnam Ridge after August 18, 2022, whether Defendant Beliveau's alleged omissions were a proximate cause of Decedent's death is a question for the jury (Hain v Jamison, 28 NY3d 524, 529 [2016]).

Finally, the MHRH Defendants' expert does not address Plaintiff's allegations in the bill of particulars related to over-administration of fluids (allegation #7) and pressure wound care (allegations #10—#12), to the extent these allegations are directed to Defendant MHRH directly and not vicariously. As a result, the MHRH Defendants fail to demonstrate their entitlement to dismissal of these allegations as against Defendant MHRH, regardless of the sufficiency of Plaintiff's opposition papers (Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 320).

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the branch of the MHRH Defendants' motion for summary judgment as seeks dismissal on behalf of Defendants Hoskins, Wilson, Beliveau and MHRH is granted to the extent set forth above, the complaint is dismissed as asserted against Defendants Hoskins and Wilson, and the motion is otherwise denied.

Defendants Parmar and Bon Secours

Defendant Parmar was a hospitalist who saw Decedent on July 25, 28, 30, and 31, 2022. She testified that she was employed by Westchester County Health Care Corporation Physicians Group APS at that time, not by Bon Secours. The allegations against her in Plaintiff's bill of particulars are substantially the same as those alleged against Dr. Kwon, pertaining solely to Decedent's discharge planning and arrangements. Based on her deposition testimony and the affirmation of the MHRH Defendants' expert, Defendant Parmar established, prima facie, that she was not involved in Decedent's discharge to Putnam Ridge and is therefore entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff does not submit any relevant opposition.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the branch of the MHRH Defendants' motion for summary judgment as seeks dismissal on behalf of Defendants Parmar and Bon Secours is granted, and the Complaint is dismissed as asserted against them.

Defendants Hubner and Putnam Ridge

Defendant Hubner was a nurse practitioner at Putnam Ridge who examined Decedent one time on August 19, 2022, the day after his admission to that facility. In her bill of particulars, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hubner was negligent by:

1. failing to provide [Decedent] with necessary dialysis;

2. failing to accurately determine [Decedent's] dialysis needs;

3. failing to comply with physician orders for dialysis;

4. failing to arrange for or provide emergent dialysis;

5. failing to adequately monitor [Decedent's] signs and symptoms of [p]rogressive kidney, liver and multiorgan failure, including fluid retention, [s]hortness of breath, fatigue, confusion, weakness, irregular heart beat, chest [p]ain or pressure;

6. failing to timely arrange for emergent transfer to hospital;

7. failing to obtain or properly interpret necessary lab work;

8. failing to timely obtain necessary medical and nephrology consult[s];

9. failing to timely obtain necessary pulmonary and cardiology consult[s]; and

10. failing to provide necessary respiratory support.

In a separate bill of particulars as to Putnam Ridge, Plaintiff alleges that the facility is vicariously liable for Defendant Hubner's negligence, and that it was independently negligent by:

1. failing to provide [Decedent] with necessary dialysis;

2. failing to promulgate or enforce appropriate admission protocols;

3. failing to establish necessary protocols and procedures for the acceptance of residents requiring dialysis;

4. failing to promulgate or to enforce necessary protocols to assure administration of dialysis to residents in accordance with their needs;

5. failing to accurately ascertain [Decedent's] dialysis needs before admission;

6. falsely or inaccurately representing that it could provide the necessary dialysis that was required by [Decedent];

7. accepting a resident for whom it could not provide necessary care;

8. failing to comply with physician orders for dialysis;

9. failing to make the arrangements necessary to provide [Decedent] with dialysis as required or in accordance with his physician's orders;

10. failing to provide emergent dialysis;

11. failing to provide emergent respiratory support;

12. failing to adequately monitor [Decedent's] signs and symptoms of progressive kidney and multi-organ failure including, but not limited to fluid retention, shortness of breath, fatigue, confusion, weakness, irregular heart beat and chest pain or pressure;

13. failing to obtain or properly interpret necessary lab work;

14. failing to timely obtain medical consult;

15. failing to consult with [Decedent's] nephrologist;

16. failing to obtain necessary pulmonary, nephrology and cardiology consult;

17. failing to timely transfer [Decedent] to hospital;

18. failing to establish appropriate admission protocols;

19. failing to provide necessary respiratory support;

20. failing to establish appropriate transfer protocols; and

21. failing to provide necessary training or supervision to staff.

In addition to these allegations of negligence, Plaintiff further alleges that Putnam Ridge violated New York State statutes and federal regulations governing residential health care facilities.

In support of their motion, Defendants Hubner and Putnam Ridge submit an affirmation of a physician expert in family and geriatric medicine. The expert opines, in sum and substance, that Defendants Hubner and Putnam Ridge did not commit any of the above acts or omissions, that Putnam Ridge did not violate any statute or regulation in Decedent's care, and that Decedent's death was caused by his many other comorbidities, not by lack of dialysis. Defendants Hubner and Putnam Ridge have thereby established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing all claims against them.

In opposition, Plaintiff's nephrology expert opines that Defendant Putnam Ridge should have ensured that Decedent would receive dialysis timely before admitting him. The expert further opines that both Defendants Hubner and Putnam Ridge were negligent in failing to ensure that he received dialysis timely after admission, whether at Putnam Ridge or by transfer to another facility. Plaintiff's case manager expert opines that Defendant Putnam Ridge was negligent in accepting Decedent for dialysis care without ensuring continuity of that care, by failing to disclose the potential discontinuity of dialysis care before admitting him, and by improperly relegating responsibility for dialysis care entirely to a third-party contractor. The case manager expert further opines that these breaches of the standard of care are "signs of substandard admission protocols and training."

Of particular relevance here, Defendant Hubner and Putnam Ridge's admissions director both testified, in effect, that whether Decedent received dialysis was entirely determined by the third-party dialysis contractor retained by Putnam Ridge for that purpose, and that they were not aware of and did not inquire as to when or whether Decedent would receive dialysis. The admissions director further testified that she did not communicate the third-party contractor's dialysis schedule to MHRH staff. She also testified that she was not aware of whether Putnam Ridge had written admissions protocols, policies or procedures in place at the time of Decedent's admission related to dialysis patients (or otherwise).

Based on their testimony and the relevant medical records, in addition to Plaintiff's experts' opinions, Plaintiff has demonstrated triable issues of fact as to several allegations of negligence. As to Defendant Hubner, the remaining allegations are: failing to accurately determine Decedent's dialysis needs (allegation #2 above), and failing to arrange for emergent dialysis (allegation #4, in part). As to Defendant Putnam Ridge, the remaining allegations are: failing to provide Decedent with necessary dialysis, failing to promulgate or enforce appropriate admission protocols, failing to establish necessary protocols and procedures for the acceptance of residents requiring dialysis, failing to promulgate or to enforce necessary protocols to assure administration of dialysis to residents in accordance with their needs, failing to accurately ascertain Decedent's dialysis needs before admission, falsely or inaccurately representing that it could provide the necessary dialysis that was required by Decedent, accepting a resident for whom it could not provide necessary care, failing to comply with physician orders for dialysis, failing to make the arrangements necessary to provide Decedent with dialysis as required or in accordance with his physician's orders, failing to provide emergent dialysis, and failing to provide necessary training or supervision to staff (allegations #1—#10 and #21, above).

The other allegations of negligence, as well as allegations of statutory and/or regulatory violations, were not addressed by Plaintiff's experts and must be dismissed (CPLR 3212[e]; Pirri-Logan v Pearl, 192 AD3d 1149, 1150 [2d Dept 2021]).

On the issue of proximate causation, Defendant Hubner's and Putnam Ridge's expert opines, in sum and substance, that Decedent's other comorbidities likely caused his death, and that the absence of dialysis at Putnam Ridge could not have been a substantial contributor. While the expert relies on many of Decedent's medical records and the autopsy report from Danbury Hospital, he fails to address the emergency department physician's note, quoted above, stating that the lack of dialysis for four days "very likely contributed" to Decedent's cardiac arrest and death. As discussed above, Plaintiff's nephrology expert also opines that the lack of dialysis was a cause of cardiac arrest. Therefore, there remain triable issues of fact regarding proximate causation of Decedent's death.

That said, Defendants Hubner's and Putnam Ridge's expert's opinions established, prima facie, that Defendants' negligence did not cause or contribute to any of Decedent's other injuries alleged to have occurred prior to August 22, 2022. Even more specifically, the experts establish that up through Defendant Gorich's examination of Decedent at approximately 7:00 a.m. that morning, Decedent was medically stable. Plaintiff's experts do not contest those opinions. Accordingly, Defendants Hubner and Putnam Ridge are entitled to summary judgment to limit Plaintiff's damages claims to only those injuries that Decedent suffered after 7:00 a.m. on August 22, 2022, as related only to the remaining claims of negligence against them.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the summary judgment motion by Defendants Hubner and Putnam Ridge is granted to the extent that Plaintiff's damages claims are limited to injuries, pain and suffering Plaintiff incurred after 7:00 a.m. August 22, 2022, and the motion is otherwise denied.

Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants Hoskins, Wilson, Beliveau, and MHRH

On January 5, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff's request to extend her deadline for filing a summary judgment motion beyond January 9, 2026. Plaintiff's cross-motion was filed on February 11, 2026, well beyond that deadline. Plaintiff did not request permission to file a cross-motion and did not state good cause—or any cause—for the Court to consider the untimely motion. Accordingly, the motion must be denied (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]). In any event, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Hoskins, Wilson, Beliveau and MHRH were addressed above, and Plaintiff's cross-motion papers do not warrant any different outcome.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's cross-motion is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that any relief not specifically granted herein is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the caption of this action is amended to remove Defendants Kwon, Gorich, Hoskins, Wilson, Parmar, Bon Secours, and Khan, and shall hereafter read as follows:

ANTJE ANITA LANDANNO, as Executrix of the Estate of CLEMENT R. LANDANNO, Deceased,

Plaintiff,

against

Index No.: 2023-53414

JEANNE HUBNER CNP; SARA BELIVEAU LCSW, CASE MANAGER; ATLANTICARE MANAGEMENT LLC d/b/a PUTNAM RIDGE; and WESTCHESTER COUNTY HEALTH CARE CORPORATION d/b/a MID-HUDSON REGIONAL HOSPITAL,

Defendants.

; and it is further

ORDERED that within ten (10) days of the date hereof, counsel for the MHRH Defendants shall give notice to the Dutchess County Clerk of the Court's order amending the caption (CPLR 8019[c]); and it is further

ORDERED that a pretrial / settlement conference is scheduled for April 14, 2026 at 9:30 a.m., at which counsel for the remaining parties must have full authority to discuss settlement; and it is further

ORDERED that pretrial motions, including motions in limine, must be filed no later than April 20, 2026, and all such motions shall have a return date of May 8, 2026, with opposition papers due May 1, 2026 and reply papers due May 8, 2026.

Jury selection remains scheduled for May 18, 2026 at 9:30 a.m.

The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: April 1, 2026

Poughkeepsie, New York

ENTER:

MARIA G. ROSA, J.S.C.