Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County

Decided on April 17, 2026

Index No. CV-000839-25

Eric J. Wursthorn, J.

[*1]

The Court held a bench trial in this matter on March 24, 2026. The principal issue is whether plaintiff, a nursing and rehabilitation facility, has proven that the defendant electronically signed the Admissions Agreement which plaintiff submitted into evidence. Defendant denies signing the agreement and claims that his signature was electronically pasted onto it without his knowledge or consent. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that plaintiff did not meet its burden, and the defendant is otherwise entitled to judgment in his favor.

At the trial, plaintiff appeared by counsel, Melissa Rocco, Esq., and the defendant was self-represented. Plaintiff admitted two documents into evidence (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2) and called two witnesses: Elizabeth Garro and Yuriko Moises. Defendant did not offer any documents into evidence and called three witnesses: Gafaar Salamie, Doris Onwuamaegbu, and Adaeze Obi. After hearing the testimony of the witnesses and reviewing the admitted evidence, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

[*2]Findings of Fact

Defendant was admitted into plaintiff's nursing/rehabilitation facility on October 13, 2022, for the purposes of receiving nursing, health care and/or rehabilitation services from plaintiff. Defendant resided and received treatment at plaintiff's facility from October 13, 2022, until November 30, 2022. When defendant was first admitted, he had a private health insurance policy from nonparty Aetna. Aetna paid a portion of defendant's bill for the first ten days of his admission, but after that period, on October 23, 2022, defendant's insurance coverage was "cut". Neither side has explained to the Court whether Aetna denied coverage for the remainder of plaintiff's admission or if the defendant was no longer insured by Aetna after October 23, 2022.

Plaintiff admitted into evidence an Admissions Agreement dated October 13, 2022 as a business record, which plaintiff claims the parties entered into. Said agreement provides that defendant "consent[ed] to admission to and treatment by [plaintiff's] facility and health care providers" (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Paragraph B[a]). Paragraph B(c) of the Admissions Agreement provides in relevant part as follows:

[Defendant] agrees to arrange and be financially responsible for payment for services provided by the attending physician, the attending physician's designee or in the event the attending physician or designee is unavailable, a physician who is contacted for emergency treatment of the [defendant].

The agreement was purportedly electronically signed by defendant on multiple designated signature lines throughout the 41-page document and was signed on plaintiff's behalf by Jasmine Hernandez, identified therein as plaintiff's authorized agent. No information was provided to the Court about Ms. Hernandez, or her role as plaintiff's agent or with respect to execution of the agreement.

Defendant did not dispute that his signature appeared on multiple pages of the Admissions Agreement. Instead, he claimed that plaintiff pasted his signature electronically onto the agreement without his knowledge or consent. Defendant has been making this claim as early as June 2025, when plaintiff previously moved for summary judgment. Said motion was denied in a decision/order by the Hon. Joaquin E. Orellana dated October 30, 2025. The Court takes judicial notice of defendant's sworn affidavit submitted in opposition to that motion, wherein defendant claims in relevant part: "[t]he plaintiff got the defendant's signature from somewhere and used computer to paste it in all over the defendant's space saying that the defendant signed that while the defendant did not sign that."

At trial, defendant testified that "[n]obody did not give me any paper. I did not sign any paper for them." However, defendant admitted that he did sign two sheets of paper that was presented to him by a transporter when he arrived at plaintiff's facility after he was transported from the hospital on October 13, 2022. Specifically, he testified that a transporter brought him two sheets of paper and told him to sign so that he would get a bed and so that insurance would pay for transportation. According to defendant, after signing these papers, he was then transported to his room. Plaintiff's counsel did not take the opportunity to cross-examine defendant with respect to his direct testimony, and no further testimony was elicited regarding the transporter and the two pages the defendant admits he signed on the date of his admission.

In addition to denying that he signed the Admissions Agreement, defendant claims that plaintiff refused to discharge him despite his requests to do so. On October 14, 2022, the [*3]morning after he was admitted, defendant testified that a therapist came to his room. According to defendant, he told the therapist that his reason for being there was to make sure he will be able to walk up and down stairs in his apartment. Defendant testified that the therapist took him to the stairs and "we walked up and down, the first day." According to defendant, the therapist came back the next two days, and defendant repeated walking up and down the stairs with the therapist.

By the fourth day, defendant testified that the therapist told him he was "doing very, very, very, very well." Defendant claims he told the therapist "Ok, if I'm ok, I should go home" but the therapist told him "no you don't want to go home . you're going to go upstairs." Defendant asked "why should I go upstairs? If I can walk up stairs, I need to be discharged." Defendant claimed that no one listened to him. He testified that he spoke to the nurse, then the supervisor and asked to be discharged: "My house was a stone throw — about two or three blocks. I don't eat your food, I don't do anything, I'm here only for physical therapy evaluation. They didn't listen to me. My job place, they were calling me, calling me. I was taking it easy because if I called police, they're going to say I was crazy, they're going to check me into a psych ward, because it's going to be my word against them." Defendant claims that he kept telling plaintiff's employees that he wanted to be discharged, but they did not listen. Defendant claims he was only discharged after he "lost it" and threatened to kill himself or jump out the window.

Defendant called his wife, Doris Onwuamaegbu, to testify on his behalf. Mrs. Onwuamaegbu, who the Court acknowledges is an interested witness, confirmed that she brought food to the defendant while he resided at plaintiff's facility, that she was upset because she felt that the defendant should come home, and at some point during defendant's admission, she took all his clothes and belongings so he could come home. Mrs. Onwuamaegbu testified that she told defendant that he should tell plaintiff to discharge him because he was "doing nothing there." Mrs. Onwuamaegbu confirmed that "[t]hey [plaintiff] don't want him to go" but did not provide any further detail regarding this claim or explain to the Court how she knew this information.

Plaintiff called Yuriko Moises, a Concierge and Patient Advocate who was not employed by plaintiff when defendant signed the Admissions Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). As of the date of the trial, Ms. Moises testified that she had been working for plaintiff for the past ten months. Ms. Moises testified about the regular procedure by which a resident's signature on an admissions agreement is customarily obtained by plaintiff. Specifically, Ms. Moises' testimony was based upon her training and experience and as a custodian of plaintiff's records such as admissions agreements.

According to Ms. Moises, Concierge and Patient Advocates go to a resident's room, introduce themselves to the resident, go over the admissions agreement using an iPad and obtain the resident's signature electronically, twice, using the iPad. The first time, a resident electronically signs "an acknowledgment and understanding" of what the Concierge and Patient Advocate explained to them. Ms. Moises testified that this first signature appears on page 10 of the Admissions Agreement. Ms. Moises further testified that the second signature she obtains appears on page 13 of the Admissions Agreement, which then prefills every other signature line a resident can sign in the 41-page Admissions Agreement. The Court notes, based upon its review of Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, that defendant's signatures on pages 10 and 13 of the Admissions Agreement appear identical in the Court's lay opinion (CPLR 4536; see i.e. People v Hunter, 34 [*4]NY2d 432 [1974]), even though Ms. Moises testified these two signatures would have been collected separately.

Ms. Moises explained that residents are further advised they do not have to sign and agree to every section of an admissions agreement. Residents can omit certain signatures if they don't agree to the subject provisions. Once the admissions agreement is signed, Ms. Moises testified that she uploads the signed agreement to the resident's chart and provides a copy to the resident for their records.

Notably, plaintiff's counsel did not connect Ms. Moises' training and experience to the period during which defendant resided at plaintiff's facility. Specifically, Ms. Moises did not testify as to whether these practices were in place on October 13, 2022, when the Admissions Agreement was allegedly executed, or generally what practices were in place during the relevant time period.

Ms. Moises did not testify that said agreement was uploaded to defendant's chart or otherwise contained within defendant's medical records. There is also no acknowledgement in evidence that defendant received a signed copy of the fully executed Admissions Agreement. Instead, on page 10 of the Admissions Agreement, directly above the signature line on which Ms. Moises testified she would collect a resident's first signature, the agreement provides as follows:

This Agreement and its Attachments, including but not limited to a Consent for Treatment, Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement and Assignment of Benefits, indicated above, which are incorporated by reference, are legally binding on all parties. It should be read carefully and understood before signing. By signing below, the undersigned consents to be legally bound by this Agreement and acknowledges that, in advance of signing, the undersigned read the Agreement, any questions asked regarding the Agreement were adequately answered, and after the parties signed the Agreement, the undersigned received a complete copy of the executed Agreement.

(Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff also admitted into evidence an invoice dated September 12, 2024, wherein plaintiff sets forth the private charges billed to defendant in connection with his stay at plaintiff's facility from October 13, 2022 through November 30, 2022 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). The invoice was admitted into evidence without objection based upon the testimony of plaintiff's Account Receivables Manager, Elizabeth Garro. Ms. Garro testified that she has been working for plaintiff for three and a half years and handles all of plaintiff's billing. Ms. Garro further testified that this document was maintained contemporaneously, or at or about the time that defendant was a resident at plaintiff's facility. However, the document is dated nearly two years after defendant was discharged.

This document sets forth the following outstanding charges by plaintiff to defendant's account as follows:

DESCRIPTION	DATES	CHARGES	BALANCE
[*5]COINSURANCE [5 @ $448.95]	10/13-10/17/22	$2,244.75	$2,244.75
COINSURANCE [6 @ $448.95]	10/18-10/23/22	$2,693.70	$4,938.75
ROOM & BOARD [8 @ $472.00]	10/24-10/31/22	$3,776.00	$8,714.45
ROOM & BOARD [29 @ $472.00]	11/01-11/29/22	$13,688.00	$22,402.45

Ms. Garro explained that defendant's coinsurance responsibility of $448.95 was determined by Aetna, $472.00 was plaintiff's standard rate for room and board for a semi-private room in 2022, and both these fees were regular and customary for the services plaintiff provided. No proof was submitted to the Court to support plaintiff's claim that Aetna had determined defendant's coinsurance responsibility nor did either party show what Aetna paid plaintiff in connection with defendant's admission and treatment.

Ms. Garro testified that to date, plaintiff has not received any payment from defendant despite due demand. Ms. Garro further testified that plaintiff charged defendant his coinsurance responsibility while billing the insurance company he provided to defendant, Aetna, until defendant's insurance was "cut" on October 24, 2022, at which point defendant became a private-pay patient. Ms. Garro admitted she did not know why defendant's insurance was "cut."

Ms. Garro claimed that she participated in calls with defendant to discuss his lack of insurance coverage. Specifically, she stated: "[n]umerous attempts were made by phone and by mail presenting the bill to [defendant]" and "we even had a conversation with the insurance company explaining how the cut was issued and that this was his responsibility." No further information regarding these communications was elicited by plaintiff's counsel on direct examination.

On cross-examination, defendant asked Ms. Garro:

Q. So when did you call me and then ask me about the bills?

A. I would have started in, I started working at the Plaza on December 5 of 2022, so my first contact would have been in December to you.

Q. Nobody called me. No called me.

A. I spoke to your wife one time also.

Q. My wife?

A. Yes.

Q. Your honor. Ok. Nobody called me, I haven't even seen your face.

Again, plaintiff's counsel declined to ask Ms. Garro any questions on rebuttal.

Ms. Garro further testified: "[b]ills were sent monthly", although no additional copies of bills were submitted to the Court. Ms. Garro claimed that the defendant had not disputed [*6]plaintiff's bill in writing. However, she admitted that the defendant called plaintiff and said he had insurance and insurance should cover it. When asked if defendant was aware the services plaintiff provided to him would require a payment, Ms. Garro responded, "he should have been."

No evidence or testimony was given by plaintiff regarding the specific services provided by plaintiff to defendant and for which defendant was billed, beyond the following generic description given by Ms. Garro: "inpatient rehabilitation services". Defendant's remaining witnesses included two friends who visited him while he was a resident at plaintiff's facility: Gaafar Salamie and Adaeze Obi. Defendant did not ask either of these witnesses any questions which were material or relevant to the claims and defenses in this case.

In its complaint, plaintiff has asserted four causes of action: breach of the admissions agreement, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment and account stated. Plaintiff requests a money judgment against the defendant for $22,402.45 with interest from December 1, 2022. Defendant's sole defense asserted in his answer generally claims that he does not owe the underlying debt.

Conclusions of Law

As can be gleaned from the Court's findings of fact, infra, the record is replete with gaps. Upon this record the Court now applies the established facts to the applicable law and will consider each of plaintiff's claims in turn. For the reasons that follow, defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor on all claims.

Breach of Contract (First COA)

Plaintiff's first cause of action is breach of contract. The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are as follows: the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance under the contract, the defendant's breach of that contract, and resulting damage (Noto v. Panck, LLC, 228 AD3d 516 [1st Dept 2024]). Here, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden to establish that the defendant signed the Admissions Agreement through admissible evidence and testimony, and was thus obligated to pay for the charges associated with his admission and treatment at plaintiff's facility pursuant to said agreement.

Although plaintiff admitted the Admissions Agreement into evidence as a business record, defendant denied signing the document. It was thus plaintiff's burden to establish the authenticity of the Admissions Agreement at trial (Knight v. New York and Presbyterian Hospital, 42 NY3d 699 [2024]). There is no uniform manner to prove that a contract is authentic. Rather, "[t]his may be done through any of the recognized methods of authentication, including, but not limited to, the testimony of a witness who was present at the time of the signing, an admission of authenticity, proof of handwriting, and, as particularly relevant here, through circumstantial evidence" (Knight v. New York and Presbyterian Hospital, 42 NY3d at 704 citing Jerome Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 9—103 and Young v. Crescent Coffee, Inc., 222 AD3d 704 [2d Dept. 2023]).

Defendant was the only witness who testified at trial with personal knowledge of the events that occurred on October 13, 2022, when the agreement was purportedly executed. Neither of plaintiff's witnesses were employed by plaintiff on that date and plaintiff did not call its agent who executed the Admissions Agreement on its behalf, Jasmine Hernandez.

Compare Ms. Moises' testimony to the plaintiff's witness' testimony in Knight v. New York and Presbyterian Hospital, supra at 704-705. In that case, Dewitt Rehabilitation and [*7]Nursing Center ("Dewitt"), a nursing and rehabilitation facility, was seeking to enforce venue selection clauses contained in two separate Admissions Agreements which were allegedly electronically signed by the decedent-resident. The Court of Appeals summarized the claims made by the facility's witness about the authenticity of the Admissions Agreements as follows:

Trimarchi stated that in February and March of 2019, she was employed as the director of admissions at Dewitt, and that she searched Dewitt's records for decedent's admission agreements. She affirmed that the agreements were kept and maintained in the ordinary course of Dewitt's business and, while Trimarchi had no personal recollection of decedent, she confirmed that "based upon the signature" of a Dewitt representative, the representative "was present when [decedent] signed" each agreement. Trimarchi then described the custom and practice of Dewitt representatives during the admission process, which involves the representative meeting "with each resident to review the admission paperwork," and determining whether the resident is "oriented," "responsive and conversing appropriately." If the representative determines that the resident is oriented, the representative reviews "every page of the [a]dmission [a]greement with the resident" and then "personally witnesses the resident execute all signature pages," either by hand or electronically. According to the affidavit, the representative's signature establishes that he or she "reviewed every page of the [agreement] with [decedent].

Based upon this witness's testimony, as well as the copies of the subject agreements, the Court of Appeals determined that Dewitt met its burden and established that the electronically-executed Admissions Agreements were authentic.

To be clear, this Court is not requiring plaintiff to make the same and/or similar claims as Dewitt's witness did in the affidavit considered by the Court of Appeals. However, a comparison of the established facts in Kinght highlights just how woefully short of its burden of proof plaintiff here has fallen. Ms. Moises' testimony about plaintiff's business practices and her experience and training lacks a connection to the plaintiff's business practices on October 13, 2022, the date that defendant allegedly signed the Admissions Agreement. Ms. Moises did not even testify as to whether she was aware of plaintiff's business practices on that date with regards to execution of Admissions Agreements between plaintiff and residents such as defendant. Having only worked for plaintiff for ten months prior to the date of trial, the manner in which plaintiff presented Admissions Agreements to potential residents and executed such agreements two and a half years prior to her employment could have significantly changed in the intervening period of time.

Nor did Ms. Moises testify about whether plaintiff followed the procedures she outlined during her testimony with respect to the Admissions Agreement at issue in this case, to wit, that a Concierge and Patient Advocate came to defendant's room with an iPad and presented the Admissions Agreement to defendant and collected his signature two times which was then applied to the Admissions Agreement on both pages 10 and 13 and all other portions of the Admissions Agreement which has been submitted into evidence.

The Court further notes that Ms. Moises did not testify as to whether the Admissions Agreement was uploaded to defendant's chart or whether there was any indication in plaintiff's files that defendant received a copy of the Admissions Agreement after it was executed. To the extent plaintiff could rely upon the provision on Page 10 of the Admissions Agreement which provides that "after the parties signed the Agreement, the undersigned received a complete copy [*8]of the executed Agreement", an argument not advanced by plaintiff's counsel at trial, such reliance would be futile. This provision, as written, would have the resident sign an acknowledgment, before the Admissions Agreement is fully executed, that they will receive an executed copy of the Admissions Agreement after it has been fully executed. As Ms. Moises testified, a resident's signature would be collected again at page 13 and then all other provisions of the Admissions Agreement would be discussed with a resident to determine whether they agree to all other provisions contained in the 41-page document. Thus, this so-called acknowledgment provision is contingent upon the parties executing the agreement, and is too attenuated from execution, printing the agreement and delivery to the resident, to otherwise serve as circumstantial evidence that the agreement was executed by the defendant.

Further, Ms. Moises' testimony was inconsistent with the evidence submitted to the Court. Specifically, Ms. Moises testified that she collects signatures from residents twice, and that the first signature appears on page 10 and the second signature appears on page 13. On the Admissions Agreement submitted into evidence, the court observes in its lay opinion that defendant's signature appears identical on both pages. Otherwise, plaintiff did not attempt to disprove the possibility that defendant's signature was pasted onto the Admissions Agreement without his knowledge or consent, as he has consistently argued since plaintiff moved for summary judgment nine months ago.

Indeed, even plaintiff's claim that Aetna paid some portion of defendants' admission and treatment from 10/13/22-10/23/22 is not established through sufficient evidence so as to support plaintiff's claim that the Admissions Agreement is authentic. Plaintiff has not submitted into evidence defendant's medical record which would establish the treatment that defendant received. Nor did plaintiff call a treating doctor or other employee who provided treatment to defendant who could testify as to the treatment and care that defendant received from plaintiff. Based upon this record, plaintiff has not shown that the Admissions Agreement is authentic through circumstantial evidence.

Plaintiff does not argue that the parties' conduct manifested an intent by both parties to be bound (Kowalchuk v. Stoup, 61 AD3d 118 [1st Dept 2009] ["an unsigned contract may be enforceable, provided there is objective evidence establishing that the parties intended to be bound"]). Here, there is not only a dispute about the treatment that plaintiff provided to the defendant, but plaintiff has not resolved the parties' dispute in its favor as to what plaintiff communicated to the defendant regarding his financial responsibility for his admission and the treatment he received. Defendant claims that plaintiff's employees told him his insurance would cover the services he received, and plaintiff failed to come forward with any evidence which would support a contrary finding.

Assuming arguendo that plaintiff had met its burden, defendant denies signing anything other than two pieces of paper presented by a transporter. Defendant did not admit to electronically signing anything. As compared to Knight v. New York and Presbyterian Hospital, supra at 705-706, defendant has done more than come forward with bald assertions. Indeed, defendant does not argue that it is not his signature on the Admissions Agreement. This admission lends to his credibility. The Court otherwise credits defendant's testimony, given the details he gave about the transporter and the care and treatment he received at plaintiff's facility, over plaintiff's unsubstantiated record-keeping, and finds credible defendant's claim that his signature was copy and pasted onto the agreement without his knowledge and consent.

Accordingly, defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor on plaintiff's first cause of [*9]action for breach of contract.

Quantum Meruit (Second COA)

Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate the existence of an enforceable contract does not necessarily preclude a recovery in this action. The Court now turns to plaintiff's remaining claims. A cause of action for quantum meruit has four elements: "[1] the performance of services in good faith, [2] the acceptance of the services by the person to whom they are rendered, [3] an expectation of compensation therefor, and [4] the reasonable value of the services" (Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP v. Carucci, 63 AD3d 487 [1st Dept 2009]). Here, absent from the record is any description let alone proof of what services plaintiff provided to defendant, which necessarily precludes a determination of their reasonable value. The Court cannot presume that plaintiff provided basic nursing supervision, nor is there any evidence in the record from which the Court could calculate the value of the 48 days of housing and food, even if refused, which plaintiff provided to the defendant. Moreover, plaintiff admits that it received payment from defendant's insurer, Aetna. Without telling the Court what amount Aetna paid to plaintiff, the Court cannot calculate whether plaintiff has not yet received compensation for the reasonable value of the otherwise undetermined services plaintiff provided.

Accordingly, defendant is also entitled to judgment in his favor on plaintiff's second cause of action.

Unjust Enrichment (Third COA)

To establish unjust enrichment, plaintiff must show "that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at that party's expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit [the other party] to retain what is sought to be recovered" (Kramer v. Greene, 142 AD3d 438 [1st Dept 2016] quoting Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 NY3d 173, 182 [2011]). An unjust enrichment claim does not lie where there is an enforceable agreement between the parties (Accurate Copy Serv. of America, Inc. v. Fisk Bldg. Assocs. L.L.C., 72 AD3d 456 [1st Dept 2010] citing Singer Asset Fin. Co., LLC v. Melvin, 33 AD3d 355, 358 [2006]). Like the Court's analysis of plaintiff's quantum meruit claim, plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient proof which would permit the Court to determine the extent to which, if any, defendant was unjustly enriched.

Moreover, defendant testified that he did not receive any physical therapy after four days, that before the fourth day, a therapist observed him walking up and down the stairs, and that he wanted to leave plaintiff's facility who refused to discharge him. Defendant also testified that he did not eat plaintiff's food and just lay in bed, doing nothing, until he was ultimately discharged. Defendant's wife confirmed that testimony. Based upon this record, plaintiff has not shown that defendant was unjustly enriched or that it would be against equity or good conscience to permit defendant to not pay any monies in addition to the unspecified amount that plaintiff received from defendant's insurance company, Aetna. Indeed, plaintiff's failure to establish through admissible evidence what it was paid by defendant's insurance company for the first ten days that the defendant was a resident at plaintiff's facility prevents the Court from determining what amount, if any, defendant should be obligated to pay in addition to that.

Moreover, plaintiff's invoice indicates that it only seeks to recover charges for room and board, which this Court reasonably reads to mean that plaintiff did not provide any medical treatment to the defendant. The only information that the Court knows about defendant's stay at [*10]plaintiff's facility comes from the defendant, whose claims do not support a finding that plaintiff is entitled to $472 per day for a semi-private room at plaintiff's facility.

Accordingly, defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor on plaintiff's third cause of action.

Account Stated (Fourth COA)

Finally, an account stated exists when bills, invoices or statements evidence a party's indebtedness and that party does not object within a reasonable time (Russo v. Heller, 80 AD3d 531 [1st Dept 2011]; see also Ryan Graphics, Inc. v. Bailin, 39 AD3d 249 [1st Dept 2007]). Where either no account has been presented or there is any dispute regarding the correctness of the account, the cause of action fails (Abbott, Duncan & Wiener v. Ragusa, 214 AD2d 412 [1st Dept 1995]). Here, the only invoice that was submitted into evidence was dated September 12, 2024, nearly two years after plaintiff provided services to defendant. Fatal to this claim is plaintiff's utter failure to present any evidence or testimony about if or when this bill was sent to the defendant. Further, Ms. Garro admitted that the defendant disputed plaintiff's claim that he owed any money above and beyond what his insurance paid plaintiff.

To the extent that Ms. Garro claimed she contacted defendant after she began working for plaintiff on December 5, 2022, Ms. Garro's testimony lacked sufficient detail to otherwise support a cause of action for account stated. Moreover, this action was filed on January 17, 2025, less than six months after the date of the 9/12/24 invoice, and no testimony or evidence was given by plaintiff regarding the intervening period.

On this record, plaintiff has also failed to prove a claim for account stated and defendant is entitled to judgment on this cause of action as well.

Conclusion and Order

In accordance herewith, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant Godfrey Onwuamaegbu is granted judgment against Plaintiff Plaza Rehabilitation and Nursing Center on all claims; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly; and it is further

ORDERED that this constitutes the Court's decision and order after trial and that any requested relief not expressly granted herein is denied.

Dated: April 17, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Eric J. Wursthorn, J.C.C.