Rodriguez v Security USA, Inc.

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on March 24, 2026

Index No. 100035/2025

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion Sequence No. 015) numbered 234-236, 256 and (Motion Sequence No. 016) numbered 239-258 were read on these motions. The Court considered the following papers in connection with Plaintiff's Notice of Motion seeking (1) revision of deposition schedule; (2) setting specific deposition dates; and (3) clarification as to Plaintiff's issues regarding depositions.

The Court has further considered the following papers in connection with Plaintiff's Order [*2]to Show Cause seeking, inter alia, leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d], clarification of statutory application, modification of the deposition deadline, and related relief: the Order to Show Cause, the Affirmation of Plaintiff in support with exhibits annexed thereto, the supplemental and second supplemental affirmations, and the Affirmation in Opposition submitted on behalf of Defendants.

II. Findings of Fact

This action, sounding in defamation, was commenced by Plaintiff, appearing pro se, against Defendants SECURITY USA, INC. and RAMI HAHITTI. The present application arises within the context of ongoing disputes concerning deposition discovery previously directed by this Court.

By Order dated December 18, 2025, this Court directed that depositions proceed. Following that directive, disputes arose concerning the manner, scope, and conditions under which depositions would be conducted. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 153). The record reflects that Defendants engaged in conduct which this Court, in its January 21, 2026, Decision and Order, expressly found to constitute an attempt to impose unilateral conditions upon a Court-ordered discovery directive, and the Court cautioned that such conduct could give rise to relief under CPLR §3126. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 174).

On January 23, 2026, the parties appeared before the Court. Plaintiff was prepared to proceed with depositions utilizing a non-stenographic recording method permitted by statute. Defendants objected to that method, expressed a preference for stenographic transcription, and stated on the record that they would not bear the cost of such transcription. The Court thereafter directed Plaintiff to bring a motion addressing the recording issue.

By Decision and Order dated March 6, 2026, this Court fixed stenographic transcription as the recording method for depositions, placed the cost of that method upon Plaintiff as the noticing party, and directed that depositions be completed within ninety (90) days. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 230-233).

Plaintiff now moves for leave to reargue that determination, contending that the Court misapprehended the statutory framework under CPLR §3113[b], and seeks additional relief including modification of the deposition deadline, clarification of statutory interpretation, and the fixing of date-certain depositions. Defendants oppose the application, asserting that Plaintiff has failed to identify any matter of fact or law overlooked or misapprehended by the Court and that the motion constitutes an improper attempt to relitigate issues previously decided.

III. Conclusions of Law

A motion for leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court and must be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the Court in determining the prior motion. It is well settled that such a motion is not designed to provide an unsuccessful litigant with successive opportunities to reargue issues previously decided or to present arguments different from those originally presented (see Mazinov v Rella, 79 AD3d 979 [2d Dept 2010]; McGill v Goldman, 261 AD2d 593 [2d Dept 1999]; Peretz v Zhenjun Xu, 205 AD3d 746 [2d Dept 2022]; Haque v Daddazio, 84 AD3d 940 [2d Dept 2011]).

The Court of Appeals has long cautioned against the misuse of motions to reargue, noting that such applications are not to be employed simply because a party is dissatisfied with a prior [*3]determination (see Fosdick v Hempstead, 126 NY 651 [1891]).

Applying these principles, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this Court overlooked or misapprehended any controlling principle of law or material fact in rendering its March 6, 2026 Decision and Order. Rather, Plaintiff's submissions reiterate and expand upon arguments previously raised regarding deposition recording methods, cost allocation, and the procedural conduct of Defendants. Such repetition does not meet the standard required for reargument.

With respect to the statutory framework, CPLR § 3113 [b] provides that deposition testimony shall be recorded "by stenographic or other means." The statute, by its plain language, permits flexibility in the method of recording depositions. The Appellate Division has recognized that such methods are "freely permit[ted]" under CPLR § 3113 [b] and the applicable Uniform Rules (see Jones v Maples, 257 AD2d 53 [1st Dept 1999]). The record further references authority recognizing that audio recording may constitute a reasonable method of ensuring an accurate record of testimony (see Miller v Saha, 151 AD3d 1316 [3d Dept 2017]).

However, CPLR § 3113 [b] does not eliminate the Court's authority to regulate discovery or to resolve disputes concerning the way depositions are conducted. Nor does the statute mandate a particular allocation of costs wny here a party objects to a noticed recording method. Rather, the statute operates within the broader framework of CPLR Article 31, under which the Court retains discretion to supervise disclosure and to ensure that discovery proceeds in a fair and orderly manner.

The Court further finds that CPLR § 3113 [b] and CPLR § 3126 address distinct legal issues. CPLR § 3113 [b] governs the permissible methods of recording deposition testimony, while CPLR § 3126 concerns sanctions for willful or contumacious non-compliance with discovery obligations. The Court's prior determination expressly declined to impose sanctions, finding no sufficient basis to conclude that Defendants' conduct rose to the level required under CPLR § 3126.

Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff's contention that its prior determination rested upon a misapprehension of law. The March 6, 2026, Decision and Order represented a proper exercise of judicial discretion in resolving a discovery impasse that had prevented the completion of depositions previously ordered by the Court.

Nevertheless, the Court is compelled to address the procedural posture of this action. The record reflects an extraordinary volume of motion practice, including multiple affirmations, supplemental submissions, and successive applications concerning issues that have already been addressed by the Court. This pattern has materially delayed the completion of discovery and has diverted the parties and the Court from the orderly progression of the case.

The ninety-day deadline imposed by the March 6, 2026 Decision and Order was intended to provide a clear and finite period within which depositions would be completed. However, considering the continued disputes and the absence of fixed deposition dates, the Court finds that a limited enlargement of that period is appropriate to ensure that depositions are completed in a meaningful and enforceable manner.

At the same time, the Court finds that continued, unrestrained motion practice cannot be permitted to impede the progress of this action. The Court therefore exercises its inherent authority to regulate proceedings before it and to impose reasonable limitations on further applications.

Finally, the Court finds that the failure to establish firm, date-certain depositions has been a principal cause of delay. The parties shall therefore be directed to promptly confer, fix definite deposition dates, and submit those dates to the Court by stipulation so that they may be so ordered and enforced.

[*4]IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

The Court has considered the parties' remaining arguments and finds them to be without merit or unnecessary to reach.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the time to complete depositions is enlarged, and all depositions shall be completed within ninety (90) days from the issuance of this Decision and Order; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall, within ten (10) days from the issuance of this Decision and Order, confer and fix firm, date-certain deposition dates for all witnesses previously directed to appear; and it is further

ORDERED that such agreed-upon deposition dates shall be reduced to a written stipulation and submitted to the Court to be so-ordered; and it is further

ORDERED that, considering the excessive and repetitive motion practice reflected in this record, no further motion practice shall be permitted without prior leave of the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that any request for leave to make a motion shall be made by letter, not exceeding two pages, setting forth the proposed relief and the basis therefor; and it is further

ORDERED that all other relief requested is denied.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: March 24, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT