People v Morris

Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on April 17, 2026

Docket No. CR-047557-25KN

Hemalee J. Patel, J.

The defendant Natifa Morris ("Defendant") is charged with violation of Penal Law § 165.40 (Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree). By notice of motion dated January 30, 2026, the Defendant moves, inter alia, for an order dismissing the accusatory instrument in the interests of justice pursuant to CPL 170.30(1)(g) and 170.40. By response dated and served February 20, 2026, the People oppose the Defendant's motion. For the reasons stated below, the Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

This case, ostensibly regarding stolen property, revolves around a French bulldog named Terpz. The complaining witness ("CW") received Terpz as a gift^FN1 in 2024. In March 2025, the CW had surgery and left Terpz with her child's father ("Mr. Howard") while she recovered. Mr. Howard, in turn, left Terpz with a family friend ("Ms. Carter"), who was also a friend of the Defendant. Both the Defendant and Ms. Carter repeatedly contacted Mr. Howard to pick up Terpz over the months that followed, but received no response.^FN2 They concluded that Terpz had been abandoned (see Deft Mtn Exh J). Ms. Carter left Terpz with the Defendant temporarily while out of the country on vacation in June 2025, and, upon her return later that month, transferred possession of Terpz to the Defendant permanently. The Defendant acted on the assumption that she was now Terpz's owner, spending more than $1,500 on veterinary care for the dog (see Deft Mtn Exh K).

In September 2025, the CW contacted the Defendant regarding Terpz. The Defendant evinced surprise, responding "[w]ow nah that's crazy" and expressing sympathy that Mr. [*2]Howard would behave as he had (see Peo Resp Exh 3). The Defendant appears to have been open to giving the dog back, but demanded reimbursement for her out of pocket expenses (see id.). The tone of the communications became more adversarial, and the Defendant ultimately demanded proof of the CW's ownership (see Peo Resp Exh 5). After the Defendant failed, possibly due to public transit delays, to meet the CW at a local precinct to resolve the issue, the CW reported the alleged theft to the NYPD, who subsequently arrested the Defendant.

The Criminal Procedure Law allows the Court to dismiss an accusatory instrument if, among other grounds, such "[d]ismissal is required in furtherance of justice, within the meaning of [CPL] 170.40" (CPL 170.30[1][g]). CPL 170.40, in turn, provides the following list of factors:

"(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;

(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense;

(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial;

(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant;

(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant;

(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the offense;

(g) the impact of the dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community;

(h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system;

(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant or victim with respect to the motion; [and]

(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction would serve no useful purpose."

(CPL 170.40[1]).

"In deciding such a motion, 'a court must strike a sensitive balance between the individual and the State' interests to determine whether the ends of justice are served by dismissal of the [accusatory instrument]" (People v Burke, 174 AD3d 915, 916 [2d Dept 2019] [quoting People v Jenkins, 11 NY3d 282, 287 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)]). No one factor is determinative, and "when an action is dismissed in the interest of justice pursuant to CPL 170.40, the judge must consider, 'individually and collective,' the specific factors listed and must state the reasons on the record" (People v Berrus, 1 NY3d 535, 536 [2003] [quoting CPL 170.40]).

Here, the seriousness of the offense is minor and the circumstances are anodyne, amounting at most to unlawful retention of a dog that had been left in the care of others for months without communication. The harm, likewise was minor. While theft of a pet may be a traumatic experience in some cases, the only allegation here is that the CW was deprived of a dog gifted to her son after having voluntarily parted with the dog for at least six (6) months. There is serious doubt in this case whether a crime was even committed, since the Defendant has submitted evidence substantiating her claim that she believed the dog to have been abandoned (cf. People v Ricchuiti, 93 AD2d 842, 844 [2d Dept 1984] ["Larceny is, of course, an intent crime; intent must be proven with respect to every element thereof"]). Indeed, the People's assertion that the Defendant possesses stolen property is undercut by their inability to point to a person who stole the property, in spite of having the entire chain of custody before them (see [*3]People v Colon, 28 NY2d 1, 8 [1971]; see also People v McFarland, 181 AD2d 1007, 1007 [4th Dept 1992]). Neither the character of the Defendant nor the behavior of law enforcement are in issue in this case, nor are the safety and welfare of the community at risk. By contrast, the impact that imposing sentence upon a dog sitter, in addition to serving no purpose or effect that the Court can discern, would be unlikely to inspire confidence in the justice system among the general public. Indeed, a judgement of conviction in this case would "serve no useful purpose" whatsoever (CPL 170.40[1][j]). This is a dispute over the ownership of a dog, which is a civil matter and never should have been made a criminal one.

Accordingly, the Defendant's motion is GRANTED and the accusatory instrument is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All requests for relief not expressly granted herein are deemed DENIED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.

Dated: April 17, 2026

Brooklyn, New York

ENTER:

Hemalee J. Patel,

Judge of the Criminal Court