JPM v GGP Staten Is. Mall, LLC

Supreme Court, Richmond County

Decided on March 24, 2026

Index No. Redacted

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion Sequence No. 003) numbered 65-77, 100-104, 110 and (Motion Sequence No. 004) numbered 78-99, 105-109 were read on these motions.

The following papers were considered in connection with Motion Sequence No. 003 by defendants GGP Staten Island Mall, LLC, Brookfield Properties Retail, Inc., and Universal Protection Service, LLC d/b/a Allied Universal Security Services (hereinafter collectively the "Mall Defendants"), and Motion Sequence No. 004 by defendants T-Mobile USA, Inc. and T-Mobile Store #3811 (hereinafter "T-Mobile"), each seeking summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 [a]: Notices of Motion; Affirmations in Support with exhibits annexed thereto, including deposition transcripts, surveillance evidence, contractual agreements, and incident reports; Statements of Material Facts; Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition; Reply Affirmations; and all prior pleadings and proceedings herein.

Oral argument was conducted before this Court on March 24, 2026. At that time, counsel for the respective parties represented that settlements had been reached with plaintiff. However, no stipulations of discontinuance, releases, or settlement agreements have been submitted to the Court. Accordingly, the motions remain pending and must be adjudicated.

II. Findings of Fact

This action arises out of a violent and rapidly escalating altercation that occurred on September 23, 2022, at the Staten Island Mall, a substantial commercial shopping complex consisting of common areas under the ownership and operational control of GGP Staten Island Mall, LLC and Brookfield Properties Retail, Inc., and individual retail spaces leased to tenants, including T-Mobile.

The record, which includes deposition testimony, documentary evidence, and partial surveillance footage, reflects that the incident was not a singular, isolated occurrence, but rather a [*2]dynamic and evolving sequence of events involving multiple actors, shifting locations, and a progressive escalation of hostility culminating in the use of a weapon. The Court is therefore required to examine not merely a discrete moment of injury, but the entire continuum of conduct leading thereto.

Plaintiff, who was a minor at the time of the occurrence, testified that he arrived at the mall during late morning hours after leaving school early. He met with several acquaintances and proceeded to browse retail establishments within the mall. Plaintiff further testified that he was a frequent patron of the mall and had previously observed disturbances involving groups of youths. This testimony is of particular relevance, as it bears upon both the foreseeability of the events in question and plaintiff's subjective awareness of the risks inherent in remaining present during such confrontations.

After approximately thirty minutes of ordinary retail activity, plaintiff and his companions encountered another group of individuals. A verbal confrontation ensued. Plaintiff described the groups as "circling" one another, with tensions escalating rapidly. However, he conceded that he could not identify which individual initiated physical contact.

The surveillance footage submitted in support of the motions captures portions of this encounter but does not provide a continuous or complete record. Due to camera panning and limitations in coverage, the critical initial moments of the altercation are not fully depicted. This evidentiary deficiency is of substantial import. It prevents the Court from conclusively determining, as a matter of law, the genesis of the conflict and requires that competing inferences be drawn from the available evidence.

What is not in dispute is that the altercation did not remain confined to a single location. Rather, it progressed through the mall's common areas, drawing in additional participants and increasing in intensity. The participants moved through areas under the control of the Mall Defendants, and the confrontation ultimately entered the T-Mobile store.

Once inside the T-Mobile premises, the encounter unfolded in several discernible stages. Initially, the participants remained separated by store fixtures and continued their verbal dispute. At this juncture, plaintiff exited the store. He then reentered shortly thereafter. This sequence is particularly significant. It demonstrates that plaintiff was not compelled to remain in the environment of escalating hostility, but instead made a conscious decision to return to the locus of conflict.

Following plaintiff's reentry, the situation deteriorated rapidly. The verbal confrontation escalated into a physical melee involving multiple participants. Additional individuals entered the premises, further intensifying the conflict. During this phase, an individual entered carrying a knife or machete and inflicted a slashing injury upon plaintiff's arm. The participants immediately fled the scene. The entirety of the in-store sequence transpired within approximately two minutes.

The record further establishes that T-Mobile employees did not physically intervene in the altercation. Instead, they contacted mall security, consistent with their training and operational protocols. There is no evidence that T-Mobile maintained on-site security personnel or that it was contractually obligated to do so.

Security services at the mall were provided by Allied pursuant to a contractual agreement with the Mall Defendants. That agreement imposed responsibilities including patrol, monitoring, incident response, and enforcement of mall rules. The incident report generated by Allied reflects that several participants in the altercation were known to security and had previously been banned from the premises. Security personnel arrived after the stabbing had occurred.

Following the incident, plaintiff left the premises with his companions and delayed seeking medical attention. He subsequently provided inaccurate information to medical providers regarding the cause of his injuries. While this conduct bears upon credibility, it does not resolve the dispositive legal issues presented by these motions.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Threshold Procedural Considerations and Effect of Settlement

The Court first addresses the procedural posture of the action in light of the representations made at oral argument that settlements had been reached.

It is axiomatic that courts do not render advisory opinions and that a matter becomes academic where no live controversy remains (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707 [1980]). However, the mere representation of settlement, without the filing of stipulations of discontinuance or documentary proof of settlement terms, does not automatically divest the Court of jurisdiction or relieve it of the obligation to determine pending motions.

Indeed, where motions have been fully submitted and cross-claims remain unresolved, courts may properly adjudicate such motions notwithstanding settlement, particularly where such determinations bear upon derivative or collateral rights among defendants (see McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369 [2011]).

Moreover, the existence of cross-claims for indemnification and contribution necessitates judicial determination, as such claims may survive settlement depending upon their nature and the terms of the settlement agreements.

Accordingly, in the absence of formal discontinuance or evidentiary proof establishing that all claims, including cross-claims, have been extinguished, the Court proceeds to determine the motions on their merits.

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that deprives a litigant of his or her day in court and should be granted only where the movant establishes, by admissible evidence, a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 [1985]).

The failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see id).

Where the movant meets this burden, the opposing party must demonstrate the existence of triable issues of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must afford that party the benefit of every favorable inference (see Negri v Stop & Shop, Inc., 65 NY2d 625 [1985]).

The Court's function is not to resolve issues of fact or to assess credibility, but rather to determine whether such issues exist (see Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395 [1957]).

Where the facts are in dispute, or where differing inferences may reasonably be drawn, summary judgment must be denied (see Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361 [1974]).

C. Motion Sequence No. 004 - T-Mobile

The Court turns first to the motion by T-Mobile, as its liability must be assessed independently based upon its role as a commercial tenant.

A commercial tenant owes a duty to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition under the circumstances (see Basso v Miller, 40 NY2d 233 [1976]). This duty includes taking minimal precautions to protect against reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third parties (see Nallan v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 NY2d 507 [1980]).

However, foreseeability is the critical determinant of duty. The Court of Appeals has made clear that a defendant is not required to guard against risks that are so attenuated or extraordinary that they could not reasonably have been anticipated (see Maheshwari v City of New York, 2 NY3d 288 [2004]).

The record before the Court establishes that the altercation originated in the mall's common areas, beyond the control of T-Mobile, and entered the premises in a sudden and rapidly escalating manner. The entire sequence within the store unfolded in a matter of minutes, with the escalation to weapon violence occurring within seconds.

There is no evidence of prior similar incidents within the T-Mobile store, nor any indication that T-Mobile had notice of a specific threat. In analogous circumstances, courts have consistently held that such sudden and spontaneous criminal acts are not reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law (see Novikova v Greenbriar Owners Corp., 258 AD2d 149 [2d Dept 1999]; Rivera v 21st Century Rest., Inc., 199 AD2d 14 [1st Dept 1993]).

Additionally, T-Mobile had no contractual obligation to provide security services, which were expressly assigned to the Mall Defendants and Allied. The absence of such obligation further militates against the imposition of liability.

Even assuming the existence of a duty, the Court finds that T-Mobile did not breach any such duty. The evidence demonstrates that its employees responded in a reasonable and prudent manner by contacting mall security. The law does not impose upon retail employees a duty to physically intervene in violent altercations, particularly where such intervention would expose them to danger (Maheshwari, supra).

Furthermore, plaintiff's own conduct constitutes a superseding cause of his injuries. The evidence demonstrates that plaintiff voluntarily participated in the altercation, exited the store, and then reentered to reengage. Such conduct severs any causal nexus between T-Mobile's alleged negligence and plaintiff's injuries (see Boltax v Joy Day Camp, 67 NY2d 617 [1986]; Tisdell v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 139 AD3d 844 [2d Dept 2016]).

The introduction of a weapon by an unidentified third party constitutes an independent, intervening act that further breaks the chain of causation (see Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 NY2d 308 [1980]).

Accordingly, T-Mobile has established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

D. Motion Sequence No. 003 - Mall Defendants

The analysis with respect to the Mall Defendants is materially different, as they retained control over the common areas where the altercation originated and bore responsibility for the provision of security services.

Landowners owe a duty to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition, including taking minimal precautions to protect against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties (see Basso, [*3]supra; Nallan, supra).

Foreseeability is established where prior similar incidents render the risk of harm reasonably predictable (see Mason v U.E.S.S. Leasing Corp., 96 NY2d 875 [2001]). The law does not require identical prior incidents; rather, it is sufficient that the general type of conduct be foreseeable (see Haire v Bonelli, 107 AD3d 1204 [3d Dept 2013]).

The record reflects evidence of prior disturbances involving groups of youths and the presence of individuals who had previously been banned from the premises. The participation of such individuals in the subject incident raises triable issues as to whether the risk of violent confrontation was foreseeable.

The adequacy of the security measures implemented by the Mall Defendants presents a quintessential question of fact. While defendants have demonstrated the existence of a security program, including patrol and incident response protocols, plaintiff has raised issues regarding whether those measures were effectively implemented and whether earlier intervention could have prevented the escalation of the altercation (see Jacqueline S. v City of New York, 81 NY2d 288 [1993]; Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506 [1984]).

Issues of proximate cause likewise preclude summary judgment. The evolving nature of the altercation, the movement across different areas of the premises, and the alleged deficiencies in security response present a factual matrix that defies resolution as a matter of law (see Burgos v Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92 NY2d 544 [1998]).

With respect to Allied, the Court finds that triable issues exist under the framework set forth in (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., 98 NY2d 136 [2002]). The breadth of Allied's contractual obligations raises a question as to whether it assumed a comprehensive duty to maintain safety (see Palka v Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 NY2d 579 [1994]).

E. Cross-Claims

To the extent that defendants have asserted cross-claims for contribution, such claims are extinguished pursuant to General Obligations Law § 15-108 [a] in light of the settlements represented on the record (see McDermott v City of New York, 50 NY2d 211 [1980]).

Cross-claims for contractual and common-law indemnification, however, are not automatically extinguished by settlement and may survive where a party seeks to shift the entirety of the loss (see McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369 [2011]; Rosado v Proctor & Schwartz, 66 NY2d 21 [1985]).

In light of the Court's determination granting summary judgment to T-Mobile, all cross-claims asserted against T-Mobile are DISMISSED.

As to the remaining defendants, the Court lacks a sufficient evidentiary record to determine the viability of indemnification claims in the absence of the settlement agreements and any allocation of liability. Accordingly, such claims are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

ORDERED that Motion Sequence No. 004 by defendants T-Mobile USA, Inc. and T-Mobile Store #3811 is GRANTED, and the complaint and all cross-claims are DISMISSED as against said defendants; and it is further

ORDERED that Motion Sequence No. 003 by defendants GGP Staten Island Mall, LLC, Brookfield Properties Retail, Inc., and Universal Protection Service, LLC d/b/a Allied Universal [*4]Security Services is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that all cross-claims for contribution are DISMISSED pursuant to General Obligations Law § 15-108 [a]; and it is further

ORDERED that any remaining cross-claims for indemnification are DENIED WITHOUR PREJUDICE; and it is further

ORDERED that the action shall continue as against the remaining defendants unless discontinued.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: March 24, 2026

Staten Island, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT