People v Sampson

Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on April 9, 2026

CR-025876-25NY

Elizabeth Y. Shamahs, J.

On August 20, 2025, at approximately 3:55 AM, at the corner of 10th Avenue and W 35th Street, New York, New York, Police Officer Maria McKevitt of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) responded to the scene of a car crash, observing a black Jeep SUV pressed against a traffic bollard with a severely dented front bumper and bent hood cover. Defendant, Marlon Sampson, admitted in sum and substance, that he had been driving the black Jeep SUV. Complainant, Kelvin Garcia Mejia, observed the black Jeep SUV to have driven through a steady red light before colliding with his vehicle, a white Isuzu commercial truck. Officer McKevitt observed the front passenger side bumper and door of the Isuzu commercial truck to be dented.

Officer McKevitt observed and recovered video surveillance of that time, date, and place of occurrence which depicts a black Jeep SUV colliding with a white Isuzu commercial truck and traffic bollard. Defendant is depicted exiting from the driver's seat of the black Jeep SUV.

Police Officer Angel Solis administered a portable breath test to defendant, which indicated that defendant had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .10. Defendant was placed under arrest and removed to the NYPD's Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit (IDTU) for chemical testing. Defendant submitted to an intoxilyzer test, which indicated that defendant's BAC was .08.

For these acts, defendant was subsequently charged and arraigned in Criminal Court with [*2]three counts of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] §§ 1192 [1], [2], [3]).

In papers dated February 2, 2026, defendant, through counsel, moves this Court for, inter alia, suppression, preclusion, hearings, a Bill of Particulars, discovery, a Sandoval hearing, additional motions, and any other relief the Court deem just and proper. The People oppose in papers dated March 2, 2026.

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

Defendant moves this Court to suppress physical evidence, namely, field sobriety results, intoxilyzer results, and video recordings as fruit of the poisonous tree, or for a Dunaway/Mapp hearing, on the basis that defendant had been driving in a lawful manner within the speed limit before being stopped and arrested by the police absent probable cause that the vehicle committed a traffic infraction (Defendant's Motion at 5). Defendant also argues that he lacks access to information and that any deficiencies in his papers should be liberally construed in his favor (Defendant's Motion at 5). These claims fail.

A combined Dunaway/Mapp hearing tests an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether physical evidence recovered, such as a weapon or contraband, should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. A motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful arrest, or for a Dunaway hearing alternatively, must be made in accordance with Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 710.60. Pursuant to CPL § 710.60, a defendant must state the legal ground for the motion and must also make sworn allegations of fact supporting the motion. See People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 (1993); People v Smythe, 210 AD2d 887 (1997). A motion to suppress evidence as the product of an illegal arrest can be denied, without a hearing, when the motion lacks factual allegations to support the conclusion that defendant was unlawfully seized. See People v Brunson, 226 AD2d 1093 (4d Dept 1996); People v Purcelle, 282 AD2d 824 (3d Dept 2001). Conclusory allegations of an unlawful seizure can also result in summary denial of a suppression motion. See People v Toxey, 220 AD2d 204 (1st Dept 1995); People v Lofton, 129 AD2d 970 (4d Dept 1987).

In order to obtain a Dunaway hearing, a defendant must allege a sufficient factual basis to demonstrate there was some material factual dispute that requires resolution by such a hearing. People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993). In this regard, the Court of Appeals has explicitly stated, "[a]n allegation that 'I did nothing giving rise to probable cause' is without more, plainly insufficient because probable cause is a mixed legal-factual issue, and the pleading lacks the factual portion of the equation." Id. at 427. To obtain a hearing, a defendant must deny the specific act charged. People v Nazario, 220 AD2d 695, 695 (2d Dept 1995). The more information the People provide, the more a defendant must deny or allege. Cf People v Gonzalez, 247 AD2d 328, 329 (1st Dept 1998) (defendant could not simply deny selling drugs without denying the specific allegations as to the sale). A defendant's failure to deny facts establishing probable cause "may be deemed a concession" (People v Toxey, 220 AD2d 204 [1st Dept 1995]). In assessing the sufficiency of the defendant's factual allegations, and whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing, the Court of Appeals in People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 426 (1993) provided the following guidance: "[T]he sufficiency of defendant's factual allegations should be evaluated by (1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant's access to information." It must also be borne in mind that "[h]earings are not automatic or generally available for the asking by boilerplate allegations." Id. at 422; see also People v Long, 36 AD3d 132, 133 (2006), aff'd. 8 NY3d 1014 [*3](2007).

Here, while defendant characterizes the circumstances of his arrest as an unlawful car stop, evaluated against the pleadings, defendant fails to dispute the factual allegations in the complaint and papers and does not contest any of the facts giving rise to probable cause for defendant's arrest. Defendant admits to driving. Defendant does not deny the intoxication, the car crash, that officers responded to a collision and observed the crashed cars, his admission to officers, the complainant's reporting to officers, the portable breath test, or any other fact noted in the complaint giving rise to probable cause. The rest of defendant's assertions are cursory denials. Thus, defendant's motion does not amount to sworn allegations of fact sufficient to support any ground for suppression, nor does it create any factual issue warranting a hearing. See People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 587 (2006); People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 422 (1993). Defendant has access to information as he has the accusatory instrument and all of the discovery in this case. In addition, the information supplied to police officers from the complainant, an identified citizen, is presumed reliable. People v Boykin, 187 AD2d 661 (2d Dept 1992). See also People v Burch, 59 AD3d 266 (1st Dept 2009) (summary denial appropriate where defendant failed to raise legal basis for suppression and defendant fully aware that arrest based on citizen victim complaint). For these reasons, defendant's motion for suppression on these grounds, or for a combined Dunaway/Mapp hearing, is denied.

Next, defendant also moves to suppress evidence or for a hearing as to physical evidence recovered from defendant's vehicle, namely, pepper spray and a stun gun on the ground that his car was unlawfully searched (Defendant's Motion at 6). The People only note in their response that the pepper spray and stun gun were recovered and vouchered pursuant to a lawful inventory search at the 10th Precinct at 7:58 AM the same day (People's Response at 2). The People, however, do not assert that they intend to use this evidence at trial and defendant is not charged in relation to these items. For these reasons, defendant's motion to suppress as to these items is denied with leave to renew. See CPL 710.60.

In sum, defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence, or for a Dunaway/Mapp hearing, is denied.

VTL 1194 — AYALA/JOHNSON

Defendant motion to suppress breathalyzer, alcosensor, and other chemical test results based on failure to comply with VTL 1194, or for hearings alternatively, is granted to the extent that a Johnson hearing is ordered to be conducted before trial.

STATEMENT EVIDENCE

Defendant's motion seeking suppression of statements as the byproduct of an unlawful arrest and seizure, or a Dunaway/Huntley hearing in the alternative, is denied. A combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing tests an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to determine whether a post-arrest statement from defendant should be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful seizure. For the reasons stated supra, defendant's motion for suppression, or for a combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing is denied.

Defendant's motion seeking suppression, or a Huntley hearing in the alternative, to test the voluntariness of defendant's statements is granted to the extent that a Huntley hearing is ordered based upon the allegations contained in counsel's affirmation, entitling him to such relief. CPL §710.60 (3); CPL §60.45). Defendant is not required to set forth specific factual allegations of involuntariness in order to obtain a Huntley hearing. Accordingly, a Huntley hearing is ordered as to the voluntariness of defendant's statements.

IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE

The People have served notice of a non-police arranged point out which occurred on scene at 4:15 AM on the same date and at the same place of occurrence as the incident, occurring before defendant's arrest at 4:25 AM. Defendant moves to suppress this identification evidence as the byproduct of an unlawful arrest and seizure, or for a combined Dunaway/Wade hearing alternatively. Defendant's motion is denied for the reasons stated above with respect to probable cause. In addition, defendant's motion seeking suppression on these grounds is additionally denied as the non-police arranged point out occurred prior to defendant's arrest and thusly cannot be fruit of the poisonous tree. See People v Pleasant, 54 NY2d 972 (1981) (an identification made subsequent to, and because of, an unlawful seizure, must be suppressed, unless the court finds an independent source for the identification).

Defendant's motion to suppress identification evidence as unduly suggestive is denied. The People assert that there were no police arranged identification procedures utilized in this case as the witness identified defendant when the police arrived contemporaneously to the incident without police involvement. Defendant is not entitled to suppression or a hearing as the identification was not police arranged. People v Marte, 52 AD3d 737 (2d Dept 2008) (in order to suppress a pre-trial ID on the ground that it was suggestive, defendant must show there was some police involvement in the procedure); People v Coker, 121 AD3d 1305 (3d Dept 2014), lv denied, 26 NY3d 927 (2015) (notice not required and preclusion denied when witness pointed out defendant absent police involvement when officers arrived). See also People v Quinney, 305 AD2d 1044 (4th Dept 2003); People v Rumph, 248 AD2d 142 (1st Dept 1998) (hearing denied where the witness called the police and pointed defendant out to them when they arrived); People v Gillman, 219 AD2d 505 (1st Dept 1995) (hearing denied where the complainant was already in pursuit of defendant when police arrived and witness identified defendant a short distance away). The mere fact that the People did serve CPL §710.30 notice on defendant in an abundance of caution does not transform it into an identification procedure. People v Allen, 162 AD2d 538 (2nd Dept 1990); People v Twitty, 223 AD2d 744 (2nd Dept 1996). Accordingly, defendant's motion for suppression of identification evidence is summarily denied. Defendant's additional contentions in this branch are also denied.

In sum, defendant's motion for suppression, or for a Dunaway/Wade hearing, is denied.

VOLUNTARY/INVOLUNTARY STATEMENTS

The branch of defendant's motion for a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing regarding unnoticed statements sought to be used solely on cross-examination of the defendant pursuant to CPL §60.45; CPL §710.20(3); and CPL §710.40(3), is denied. The People assert that there are no such statements.

The branch of defendant's motion for a pre-trial "voluntariness" hearing regarding statements made by the defendant to civilian(s) is denied. The defendant has not asserted that the defendant made any voluntary or involuntarily statements pursuant to CPL §60.45. Accordingly, the defendant's request for a voluntariness hearing is denied.

PRECLUSION

The branch of defendant's motion to preclude the offering of any unnoticed statement evidence or unnoticed identification evidence pursuant to CPL §710.30, is denied. The People have not sought to offer any such evidence.

BILL OF PARTICULARS

Defendant's moves this Court for an Order directing the People to supply him with a Bill [*4]of Particulars under CPL §200.95. In support of this motion, he argues that the accusatory instrument is factually vague and conclusory, and that defendant cannot adequately prepare a defense without the information requested with respect to the offenses charged (Defendant's Motion at 12). The People oppose, arguing that the facts supplied in their Automatic Discovery Form (ADF) and other discovery adequately apprises defendant of the charges, and that a Bill of Particulars is therefore unnecessary. They additionally contend that the rest of defendant's requests are evidentiary matters not within the scope of CPL §200.95.

The accusatory instrument, ADF, and other papers clearly apprise defendant of the conduct constituting the subject of the accusations made against him with particularity, rendering a Bill of Particulars moot. Defendant has access to all the discovery available in this case and was served with a COC. It therefore cannot be credibly claimed that defendant is ignorant of the substance of the accusations. Accordingly, defendant has already been provided all the particulars to which he is entitled. See CPL § 200.95.

The other information requested is evidentiary detail beyond the scope of a bill of particulars. See People v Davis, 41 NY2d 678, 680 (1977) ("[a] bill of particulars serves to clarify the pleading; it is not a discovery device"). The remaining matters sought are either beyond the scope of CPL § 200.95 or are matters of evidence. Therefore, pursuant to CPL § 200.95(4), the People do not need to supply further particularization of the information and ADF. Hence, defendant's motion is denied.

DISCOVERY

The People are ordered to respond to defendant's demand to produce discoverable material in accordance with CPL §245, to the extent they have not already done so. CPL §245.20. The People are reminded of their continuing obligations pursuant to CPL §245, Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963) and People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 (1961), and are ordered to provide such material as requested in the moving papers, to the extent they have not already done so. See People v Consolazio, 30 NY2d 446 (1976). As to the defendant's specific Brady/Vilardi production requests, the People are reminded of their continuing duty to provide evidence or information that is favorable to the defendant.

PRIOR BAD ACTS OR PRIOR CONVICTIONS

Defendant seeks the preclusion of using defendant's prior bad acts and/or prior convictions at trial pursuant to People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901), People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981), and People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974) on the People's direct case or upon cross-examination.

Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible where it is offered solely to raise an inference that a defendant has a criminal propensity. People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Wright, 288 AD2d 409 (2d Dept 2001). Such evidence may be admitted, however, if it helps to establish a defendant's motive, intent, identity, knowledge, common scheme or plan, lack of mistake or accident, to complete the narrative of the crime, or provide the jury with background information. See People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 (1901); People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981); People v Lewis, 69 NY2d 321 (1987); People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 (1979); People v. Davis, 169 AD2d 774 (2d Dept 1991). In order to use this evidence, the People are required to notify the court and defendant, prior to jury selection, of their intent to introduce the evidence as part of the case-in-chief and identify the basis upon which they consider it admissible. People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981). Once a showing is made that the evidence is relevant, a trial court may admit the evidence as long as its probative value [*5]outweighs its potential prejudice. People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988); People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241-42 (1987). The permissible scope of such evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. See People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 54-55 (1988). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior bad act evidence is deferred to the trial court.

Should he testify, defendant, like any other witness, places his credibility in issue. Although a witness may not be questioned about an arrest per se, it is a provident exercise of the Court's discretion to permit cross-examination concerning any immoral, vicious, dishonest and or criminal act, even if defendant was not formally charged with it. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 373 (1974); People v Rockwell, 18 AD3d 969 (3d Dept 2005); People v Di Bella, 277 AD2d 699 (3d Dept 2000); People v Connolly, 259 AD2d 1039 (4d Dept 1999); People v Maiolo, 122 AD2d 586 (4d Dept 1986); Prince, Richardson on Evidence, 11th Ed., 6-406. A witness may also be impeached by instances of conduct demonstrating a "willingness ... to place his self-interest ahead of principle or the interests of society." People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 461—462 (1994).

The People's disclosure obligation is governed by People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974), which directs the People to notify the defendant, prior to the commencement of jury selection, of the acts which they will seek to use for impeachment purposes. However, it is defendant who must demonstrate that the prejudicial effect of such evidence so far outweighs its probative worth that it must be excluded, as it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion. See People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 378 (1974). The permissible scope of such impeachment evidence rests largely, if not completely, with the trial court. People v Gray, 84 NY2d 709, 712 (1995); People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 459 (1994). Accordingly, defendant's motion as to prior convictions is therefore deferred to the trial court. People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974).

RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

Defendant's application for an extension of time to file additional motions is denied subject to rights under CPL § 255.20(3) to move for further leave upon good cause shown.

OTHER MOTIONS

Defendant's remaining requests are denied as duplicative, premature, moot, unsupported by the record, or without merit.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.

Dated: April 9, 2026

New York, New York

ELIZABETH Y. SHAMAHS, J.C.C.