People v Colon

Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on April 9, 2026

CR-016240-25NY

Elizabeth Y. Shamahs, J.

On May 24, 2025, at approximately 1:05 AM, at the corner of 3rd Avenue and East 109th Street, New York New York, which is a public highway, Police Officer Anthony Bux, assigned to the 23rd Precinct of the New York City Police Department (NYPD), observed the scene of a vehicle collision after responding to 911 calls regarding two cars involved in a collision, in which a 911 caller reported that his wife had been injured after they were struck by another vehicle. On scene, Officer Bux observed, defendant, Tina Colon, standing at the side of one of two crashed vehicles and she stated, in sum and substance, "he struck me first." Officer Bux observed defendant to have the odor of alcohol emanating from her breath, watery and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and was further unsteady on her feet. Officer Bux concluded that defendant was intoxicated, and defendant was placed under arrest and removed to the NYPD Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit (IDTU) for chemical testing, where she was determined to have a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.09. Defendant also stated that she did not have a license and handed over a learner's permit when being placed under arrest.

For these acts, defendant was subsequently charged and arraigned in Criminal Court with two counts of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] §§ 1192 [2], [3]) and one count of Unlicensed Driving (VTL 509[1]).

In papers dated October 14, 2025, defendant through counsel, moved this Court for, inter alia, the suppression of physical evidence or a Mapp/Dunaway/Johnson hearing in the alternative as well as for the suppression of statement evidence, or granting a Huntley hearing in [*2]the alternative. The People opposed in papers dated November 12, 2025.

In a written Decision and Order dated December 16, 2025, this Court granted defendant's motion to suppress statement evidence to the extent that a Huntley hearing was ordered to be conducted before trial as to the voluntariness of defendant's statements. This Court denied defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence, or for Mapp/Dunaway/Johnson hearings alternatively.

Now, in papers dated February 5, 2026, defendant, through counsel, moves this Court to renew the branch of her October 14, 2025 motion seeking the suppression of physical evidence and statement evidence, or for hearings alternatively. Defendant supplies the Court with additional facts in support of her original motion. The People oppose in papers dated February 27, 2026.

A motion to renew (1) shall be identified specifically as such; (2) shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination; and (3) shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion. See CPLR 2221(e). Additionally, it is well settled that an application for leave to renew a motion must be predicated on new matters not available prior to the court's decision, Matter of Ahmad v Purcell, 82 AD2d 802, 441 (2d Dept 1981), or which existed at the time the prior motion was made, but were not then known to the party seeking leave to renew, and, therefore, not made known to the court. And where there is a possibility that the deciding Court may have been mislead prior to rendering a decision, the Court may grant a motion to reargue or renew nunc pro tunc. Di Russo v Kravitz, 21 NY2d 1008, 1010 (1968) (promptly made motion for renewal properly granted, nunc pro tunc, when underlying papers were misleading).

Here, defendant's motion to renew fails to meet this standard. Defendant correctly labels her motion as a motion to renew, supplying additional facts in support of her original papers, but defendant stands silent as to why these facts could not have been presented originally. It is clear from defendant's motion that her newly articulated facts were known to defendant during the drafting and filing of her original papers, and this Court will not entertain a second bite at the apple. Indeed, "a motion for leave to renew is not a second chance freely given to parties who have not exercised due diligence in making their first factual presentation." Chong v Scheelje, 218 AD3d 691 (2d Dept 2023). Accordingly, defendant's motion is denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Opinion, Decision, and Order of the Court.

Dated: April 9, 2026

New York, New York

ELIZABETH Y. SHAMAHS, J.C.C.