People v Wei Li

Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on April 21, 2026

Docket No. CR-029564-25NY

Marva C. Brown, J.

Wei Li, hereinafter "defendant," is charged with Forcible Touching, P.L. § 130.52(1), a class A misdemeanor, and various related charges. By Notice of Motion to Dismiss, dated January 23, 2026, the defense challenges the validity of the People's Certificate of Compliance (COC) and seeks dismissal pursuant to CPL § 30.30. The defense also moves the Court by omnibus motion for various relief. The People oppose by motion filed February 20, 2026, and the defense replied on March 13, 2026.

I. MOTION TO INVALIDATE THE PEOPLE'S CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Upon review of the submissions, the Court file and relevant legal authority, this court finds that the People's COC was VALID, along with the accompanying Certificate of Readiness (COR). Under CPL § 245.20(1), "the prosecution shall disclose to the defendant, and permit the defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph and test," all items enumerated in CPL § 245.20(1) that are "in the possession, custody and control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control". Further, where material or information discoverable under CPL § 245.20(1) exists but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control, the prosecutor shall make "a diligent, good faith effort" to ascertain the existence such material to be made available for discovery (CPL § 245.20[2]). However, "[t]he prosecutor shall not be required to obtain material or information if it may be obtained with use of a subpoena duces tecum where the defense is able to obtain the same material with the use of a subpoena duces tecum" (id.).

CPL § 245.10(1)(a) requires the People to perform their initial discovery obligations on a case "as soon as practicable" but within twenty days after arraignment for incarcerated defendants, and, within thirty-five calendar days after arraignment for all others.^FN1 Pursuant to [*2]CPL § 245.50(1), when the prosecution has exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide all required discovery, it shall serve upon the defendant and file with the court a certificate of compliance (COC). Any COC shall state that, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery, the prosecution has disclosed and made available all known material and information it has obtained subject to discovery." The COC must also identify the items provided, along with items "that the prosecution is required to disclose and of which the prosecution is aware but has been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence as evaluated under this section" (id.). If additional discovery is disclosed after a COC is filed, the prosecution must serve and file a supplemental certificate of compliance (SCOC) detailing "the basis for the delayed disclosure so that the court may determine whether the delayed disclosure impacts the propriety of the certificate of compliance" (CPL § 245.50[1-a]). However, the filing of an SCOC shall not impact the validity of the original COC if filed "in good faith and after exercising due diligence", or if the additional discovery did not exist at the time of the original COC's filing (id.).

A. The Defense Motion Comports with CPL § 245.50(4).

The People argue that the defense's motion should be denied because "it is procedurally barred under C.P.L. § 245.50(4)(c)" (P.'s Opp. at p. 2). The People argue that the defense's motion is meritless, as "the defense was provided with all alleged outstanding discovery in the People's possession prior to filing the instant challenge" (id.).

First, it is not true that the defense was given all outstanding discovery in the People's possession prior to filing the instant challenge. The People concede that certain NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) disciplinary records remain outstanding (see P.'s Opp. at p. 15). While the People argue these items are not automatically discoverable because they do not relate to the subject matter of the instant case, that does not mean that the People do not constructively possess them (CPL § 245.20[2]["(A)ll items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution"]; see also CPL § 245.55[1][prosecution must "ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the police and other investigative personnel and his or her office"]). Second, even if the People had provided all discovery prior to the instant challenge, defense's motion would not be statutorily barred. Belated disclosures can invalidate a COC, and a challenge is not dependent on there being outstanding discovery.

Here, the People filed their COC on December 4, 2025. After reviewing discovery, on December 24, 2025, the defense sent a conferral email with a list of items she believed to be missing. The People responded on December 29, 2025, indicating that some of the requested items did not exist and advised the defense that they would send a more detailed response at a later date. The parties continued to correspond back and forth throughout early January. On January 6, 2026, the Court granted the defense's application for an extension to file a challenge motion until January 12, 2026. On January 12, 2026, the Court granted a second application for an extension to file any challenges by January 23, 2026. The People served additional discovery [*3]and supplemental certificates of compliance (SCOCs) on both January 8, 2026, and January 12, 2026. The defense filed the instant challenge on January 23, 2026, in accordance with the court's deadline.

The court finds that the defense's motion is not procedurally barred. The parties' papers clearly articulate disagreement on the discoverability of certain items — something that could not be resolved without court intervention. The defense's motion is also accompanied by an affirmation that they timely made good faith efforts to confer about the missing items at issue, and that these efforts were unsuccessful, as required by CPL § 245.50(4)(c). Given the circumstances, this court finds that the defense did confer with the People in good faith to resolve the discovery issues and will not deny the instant motion on that basis.

B. The People Met Their Burden to Establish That They Exercised Due Diligence.

The defense moves to invalidate the People's COC because some items were either belatedly disclosed or not disclosed at all prior to the People's COC. Specifically, the defense argues that the People belatedly disclosed or failed to disclose the following items: High Tech Analysis Unit (HTAU) Summary of Analysis and Notes concerning the execution of a search of the defendant's phone; DAS Entity Report for the complaining witness; and IAB material for Officer Mondol, Detective Ramos, Detective Lamotta and Detective Salem. The People argue that any belated disclosures did not invalidate their initial COC, and that the outstanding items referenced by the defense either do not exist or are not automatically discoverable.

To assess the People's diligence with respect to automatically discoverable items either belated disclosed or not disclosed at all, this court must look at the totality of the People's efforts to comply with Article 245, rather than assess their efforts item by item (see CPL § 245.50[5][a], see also CPL § 30.30[5][b]). "Relevant factors for assessing the prosecutor's due diligence include, but are not limited to: the efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with the requirements of this article; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial" (CPL § 245.50[5][a]). "The court's determination shall be based on consideration of all factors listed in [CPL § 245.50(5)(a)] and no one factor shall be determinative" (CPL § 245.50[5][b]). "A court shall not invalidate a certificate of compliance where the party has exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material required to be disclosed" (CPL § 245.50[6]).

1. Belatedly Disclosed Material

Once the defense alerted the People to the missing HTAU notes and DAS Entity Report for the complaining witness on December 24, 2025, the People immediately began the process to obtain and were able to disclose these items on January 8, 2026. When considering CPL § 245.50(5)(a)'s factors, this court finds that these belated disclosures do not invalidate the People's initial COC.

First, here, the People exercised due diligence to comply with Article 245's requirements. [*4]The People began gathering discovery promptly after arraignment on September 18, 2025 (P.'s Opp. at p. 13). The People spoke to the complainant and obtained multiple text messages, pictures, and other discovery relating to the case. The People also requested all photographs, notes, and documents that were created during the investigation of this case from the arresting officer, Detective Ramos (id.). The People shared this initial discovery with defense on October 17, 2025, within the 35-day time frame required by Article 245 for non-incarcerated defendants (P.'s Opp. at p. 5). After review of the NYPD paperwork in the People's actual possession and prior to their COC, the People then engaged the assistance of Litigation Support Unit (LSU) analysts to obtain discoverable items that remained outstanding.^FN2 The People also contacted Detective Ramos multiple times to request discovery that was in NYPD's possession but remained outstanding (id.).

Additionally, the belated disclosure of these items was almost entirely due to external parties, as opposed to the lack of diligence of the assigned assistant on this case. Prior to the People's COC, they had requested and disclosed the search warrant materials, with the HTAU notes being the only item from those materials that was inadvertently not disclosed. Similarly, prior to their COC, the People requested and disclosed what they believed to be the entirety of the ECMS file for this case, with the only item missing being the DAS Entity Report for the complaining witness, which was described in the documents as an attachment, but inadvertently not included. Even a diligent prosecutor may have missed these two items.

With respect to the other factors, the volume of discovery turned was far greater than these missing discovery items, the People had no idea these items existed, and not for lack of due diligence. Once alerted to their omission, the People quickly reached out to the necessary parties to obtain these items for their prompt disclosure — all without court intervention. As for the HTAU notes, the People have indicated that they do not intend to use anything obtained from the search warrant extraction, and therefore, there is no prejudice to the defendant that these notes were not included with the other search warrant materials. Similarly, this court finds little to no prejudice to the defendant for the delay in the DAS Entity Report. As the People point out, prior to their COC, they disclosed the rest of the ECMS file, which included nearly all of the information in the missing DAS Entity Report. The ECMS "Summary of Investigation" states the contents of the Entity Report, which report negative results for the complainant's affinations with a gang, criminal history, and victimology (P.'s Opp. at p. 20). The additional information in the Entity Report that was not in the "Summary of Investigation" is the complainant's birthday, race, report date of the instant matter, location of the instant matter, addresses associated with the complainant, and summary of the instant allegations, and all of this information was provided to the defendant in other discovery (id.). In sum, it does not appear that these inadvertent non-disclosures were prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.

As such, this court finds that the People exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide automatically discoverable materials despite these belated disclosures.

2. Outstanding Discovery

The only automatically discoverable items that appear to be outstanding are several IAB logs and attachments for several officers, including testifying witnesses. Specifically, the People have yet to disclose: IAB Log #23-7718 for a substantiated claim of misconduct and IAB Log Attachments for substantiated IAB Logs 19-37174, 19-37291, and 23-7718 for Det. Lamotta, a testifying witness; IAB Log # 25-11701 for Det. Salem, who is designated as a testifying witness on the People's ADF; and IAB Log 24-20716 for a substantiated claim for Officer Mondol, who the People no longer intend to have testify.^FN3 The People argue that the IAB material that remains outstanding is not automatically discoverable, as it does not relate to the subject matter of the case.

CPL § 245.20(1)(k) governs the discoverability of potential impeachment material, including IAB records pertaining to claims of police misconduct. Prior to Article 245's amendments, CPL § 245.20(1)(k) stated, in part:

The prosecution shall disclose to the defendant, and permit the defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph and test, all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control, including but not limited to: (k) All evidence and information, including that which is known to police or other law enforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, that tends to: (i) negate the defendant's guilt as to a charged offense; (ii) reduce the degree of or mitigate the defendant's culpability as to a charged offense; (iii) support a potential defense to a charged offense; (iv) impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness; (v) undermine evidence of the defendant's identity as a perpetrator of a charged offense; (vi) provide a basis for a motion to suppress evidence; or (vii) mitigate punishment. Information under this subdivision shall be disclosed whether or not such information is recorded in tangible form and irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information.

In May of 2025, the Legislature amended Article 245, and on August 9, 2025, those amendments went into effect. Very little was changed with respect to CPL § 245.20(1)(k), and this section now reads, in relevant part:

The prosecution shall disclose to the defendant, and permit the defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph and test the following material and information in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control: (k) All evidence and information that relate to the subject matter of the case, including that which is known to police or other law enforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, that tends to: (i) negate the defendant's guilt as to a charged offense; (ii) reduce the degree of or mitigate the defendant's culpability as to a charged offense; (iii) support a potential defense to a charged offense; (iv) impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness; (v) undermine evidence of the defendant's identity as a perpetrator of a charged offense; (vi) provide a basis for a motion to suppress evidence; or (vii) mitigate punishment. Information under this subdivision shall be disclosed whether or not such information is recorded in tangible form and irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information (emphasis added).

Essentially, the Legislature moved the words "that relate to the subject matter of the case" closer to the enumerated categories of potentially exculpatory information, but otherwise, the statute remained unchanged. Notably, the Legislature did not remove the requirement that prosecutors disclose impeachment material "whether or not such information is recorded in tangible form and irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information" (id.)(emphasis added). Additionally, the Legislature chose to leave CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) alone, which pertains to the credibility of testifying witnesses, rather than add the qualifier that such impeachment material need only be disclosed when it pertains to the specific offense charged. While it is unclear why the Legislature chose to move the words "that relate to the subject matter of the case," what is clear is that the statute remains legally the same.

The Court of Appeals most recently addressed a case involving police disciplinary records in People v Fuentes, 2025 NY Slip Op 05872 (Oct 23, 2025). However, the Court's decision in Fuentes provided little guidance on how apply CPL § 245.20(1)(k) to the varying types of disciplinary records to determine whether or not individual records are automatically discoverable. First, contrary to the People's claim, the Court of Appeals in Fuentes did not find that the undisclosed IAB report at issue, which pertained to an exonerated claim of police misconduct, was "not related to the subject matter of the case."^FN4 While the Appellate Term in [*5]the Second Department did reverse the lower court's decision to invalidate the People's COC for this reason, the Court of Appeals specifically avoided ruling on that issue, stating "we affirm, albeit on different grounds" (id.). The Court in Fuentes then went on to point out that the undisclosed IAB report for an exonerated misconduct claim included notes and interviews from civilian witnesses, but that "none of those witnesses even mentioned [the arresting officer] or described misconduct" (id. at *4). Further, the Court of Appeals highlighted that the IAB notes from the interview with the arresting officer merely indicated that she obtained uncoerced consent to search and, thus, had no impact on the officer's credibility (id.) Lastly and most importantly, the Court noted that by disclosing the information about the pending federal lawsuit pertaining to this exact IAB report prior to their initial COC, the People "undisputedly disclosed the source and full content" of the allegations in the IAB report, thus giving the IAB report itself no additional impeachment value (id. at *5 ["The IAB report otherwise laid out (the complainant's) account of a purportedly lawful search and credited that account"]). The Court of Appeals concluded that, "even assuming CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) requires the People to disclose such misconduct allegations, the People did so here, filed a valid COC, and timely declared their readiness for trial" (id. at *1)(emphasis added). Fuentes did not hold, as the People argue, that police disciplinary material for testifying witnesses need only be disclosed if it relates to the specific subject matter of the case. If anything, the fact that the Court of Appeals' holding in Fuentes chose to assume rather than outright deny that Article 245 requires the People to disclose the IAB materials for even exonerated misconduct allegations further supports this court's conclusion that Article 245 requires the automatic disclosure of IAB logs and their attachments for any substantiated and unsubstantiated misconduct allegations, which bear directly on a witness's credibility.

The same cannot be said here. First, and most importantly, the People are not claiming that the undisclosed IAB materials in this case pertain to exonerated claims of police misconduct like the one in Fuentes. Admittedly, exonerated claims of misconduct, much like an acquittal in a criminal trial, have little to no bearing on a witness's credibility and will almost always be barred as a cross-examination topic. However, the same cannot be said for substantiated and unsubstantiated claims of police misconduct of testifying witnesses, which Fuentes did not address at all. Notably, the Court of Appeals in Fuentes confirmed that "misconduct allegations against law enforcement officers, when relevant to a witness's credibility, are properly the subject of cross-examination for impeachment purposes," without even addressing whether those same misconduct allegations must also specifically "relate to the subject matter of the case" (Fuentes at *4, citing People v Smith, 27 NY3d 652, 662 [2016]["subject to the trial court's discretion, defendants should be permitted to ask questions based on the specific allegations of the lawsuit if the allegations are relevant to the credibility of the witness"]).

Admittedly, the area of law surrounding the automatic discoverability of police [*6]disciplinary records is complex, confusing and often contradictory. As is the situation in the majority (if not all) of criminal cases, the parties disagree on whether specific disciplinary records "relate to the subject matter" of the instant case. Also not surprisingly, the parties often disagree about whether disciplinary materials "tend to impeach the credibility" of a testifying witness. The same can be said for the courts who are charged with making these determinations, and this unsurprising lack of agreement on these ambiguous issues has led to a wide range of decisions and varying jurisprudence on this issue (compare Matter of Jayson C., 200 AD3d 447 [1st Dept 2021][court held that a defendant in a criminal proceeding would be entitled to access to the underlying impeachment records without analyzing whether the records related to the subject matter of the instant case]; People v Rodriguez, 77 Misc 3d 23, 25 [App Term, 1st Dept 2022][First Appellate Term invalidated COC where the People failed to turn over underlying impeachment materials without addressing whether said records related to the subject matter]; People v Coley, 240 AD3d 122, 135 [2d Dept 2025][upholding invalidation of COC and finding "it is apparent that the Legislature did not intend to create an additional layer of analysis, to be employed by the prosecution, when determining what is 'related to the subject matter of the case' in regard to impeachment material"]; People v Rosario, 88 Misc 3d 129[A][App Term, 2d Dept 2, 11, 13 Jud Dist 2026][reversed lower court's decision to validate the People's COC where the People only disclosed summaries of the testifying detective's disciplinary records; case dismissed]; People v Luna, 83 Misc 3d 62 [App Term, 2nd Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dist 2024][conviction reversed, COC deemed invalid, and case dismissed where the People failed to disclose underlying IAB records for an officer involved in the case]; with People v Hespinobarros, 245 AD3d 826, 829 [2d Dept 2026][COC valid where People disclosed only summaries of disciplinary records where "where the officers' disciplinary infractions did not have any bearing on the subject matter of the case at hand, and there was no indication that any prior testimony of the officers had ever been determined incredible"]; People v Macaluso, 230 AD3d 1158, 1160, leave to appeal denied, 42 NY3d 1036 [2d Dept 2024][People are not required to disclose the entire disciplinary record for all officers involved in a case, because "a plain reading of the automatic disclosure statute establishes that the People are only required to disclose 'all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case'"]; People v McCarty, 221 AD3d 1360, 1362 [3d Dept 2023][same]; People v Johnson, 218 AD3d 1347 [4th Dept 2023][same]).

Notably, neither the First Department nor the First Appellate Term have found that disciplinary records need only be automatically disclosed when they relate to the subject matter of the case. To the contrary, within this jurisdiction where this court sits, whether records are related to the subject matter of the case appears to be irrelevant to the question of whether a disciplinary record is automatically discoverable for testifying witnesses (see Matter of Jayson C. and Rodriguez, supra). Further, this court, among many others within this jurisdiction, has routinely held that IAB logs and their underlying attachments for substantiated and unsubstantiated claims of misconduct are automatically discoverable as impeachment material for testifying witnesses, regardless of whether the People feel they are related to the subject matter of the instant case (see, e.g., People v Aron, 85 Misc 3d 1231[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2025]["Disciplinary records of police officers involved in a case always relate to the subject matter as potential impeachment and whether a witness is to be believed"]; see also People v Zachary L., 86 Misc 3d 1209[A][Crim Ct, NY County 2025][Coleman, J.]; People v Cifuentes, Docket No CR-003574-24NY [Crim Ct, NY County Jan. 8, 2025][Tatham, J.]; People v Lewis, [*7]Docket No CR-015449-24NY [Crim Ct, NY County Dec. 4, 2024][Haniff, J.]; People v Walker, Docket No CR-003525-24NY [Crim Ct, NY County Oct. 17, 2024][Rosenthal, J.]; People v Scott, Docket No CR-026941-23NY [Crim Ct, NY County Sept. 16, 2024][Pauley, J.][the People's "sincere belief" that IAB materials are not discoverable does not excuse non-disclosure]; People v Mejia-Diaz, Docket No. CR-001852-24NY [Crim Ct, NY County July 17, 2024][Weiner, J.]; People v Hernandez, CR-025819-23NY [Crim Ct, NY County April 8, 2024][Lewis, J.]; People v Sanchez, 83 Misc 3d 671 [Crim Ct, NY County 2024][McDonnell, J.]). This conclusion is based on the plain language of CPL § 245(1)(k) along with binding and persuasive appellate precedent on this issue (see CPL § 245.20[1][k] [the People must disclose impeachment material for testifying witnesses "irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information"]; Matter of Jayson C., Rodriguez, Coley, Luna, supra). To the extent that the People disagree with the overwhelming majority of judges in the NY County Criminal Court, they can and should seek a protective order.^FN5

With all of that said, here, this court finds that the People met their burden to show that they exercised due diligence to fulfill their discovery obligations as they relate to police disciplinary records despite the outstanding IAB records. When considering CPL § 245.50(5)(a)'s factors, prior to filing their COC, the People did disclose all of the law enforcement disclosures in their actual possession at the time of certification, which included a large portion of the disciplinary records for their testifying witnesses (P.'s Opp. at p. 17). This is not a case where the People only disclosed summaries of the officers' disciplinary files with no underlying records. Additionally, once alerted to the disciplinary items the defense flagged as missing, the assigned assistant promptly reached out to their office's Law Enforcement Disclosure (LED) group via email, who is responsible for maintaining and acquiring law enforcement disclosures (P.'s Opp. at p. 5). The assigned assistant provided LED with the list of items the defense argued were missing and requested that they be provided for their disclosure. As the assigned assistant received additional disciplinary materials from LED, she disclosed them to the defense and filed a supplemental COC with the court. For many of the defense's requests, the assigned assistant was told by the LED group that the items would not be provided because they were not related to the subject matter of the instant case (see P.'s Opp. Exhibit 5).^FN6[*8]The assigned assistant relayed this information to the defense promptly and disclosed what she could, evincing her attempts to comply with Article 245's discovery obligations. With respect to the remaining factors, the volume of discovery outstanding pales in comparison to that which has been disclosed. Additionally, the assigned assistant's attempts to disclose disciplinary records both before and after alerted to their omission evince due diligence. Lastly, this court does not find that the outstanding records have significantly prejudiced the defense or impeded their ability to prepare for this trial, especially considering the fact that this case will largely rely on the testimony of the complaining witness.

This court's ruling should not be construed to mean that a COC is always valid even when the People fail to disclose IAB Logs and their attachments for testifying witnesses. As stated above, this court does not agree with the People's interpretation of the current state of the law when it comes to the automatic discoverability of disciplinary records. Neither Fuentes nor the new amendments to Article 245 allow the People to determine what is relevant or may be significant when it comes to disciplinary records, nor are the People now considered the gatekeepers of this evidence. Given the uncertainty in this area of law, the People would be wise to seek protective orders to determine what to disclose, rather than continuing to unilaterally withhold materials based on their conclusion that the materials "do not relate to the subject matter of the instant case." Failure to do so could be the straw that tips the scale toward a finding that the People were not duly diligent, a COC invalid and possibly a case's dismissal. However, here, given the People's overall efforts to fulfill their discovery obligations both before and after filing their COC and given CPL § 245.50(5)(a)'s factors, this court finds that the outstanding IAB records do not render the People's initial COC invalid.

In sum, this court finds that the People have met their burden of demonstrating that they exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries prior to filing the initial COC despite the few belated and missing disclosures. As such, the defense's motion to invalidate the People's COC is DENIED. However, the People are ORDERED to turn over the remaining outstanding IAB materials requested by the defense, regardless of whether they believe they pertain to the subject matter of the instant case. However, as stated above, this delay in disclosure and any subsequent SCOCs filed as a result will not invalidate the People's initial COC.^FN7

II. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR SPEEDY TRIAL

Pursuant to CPL § 30.30[1][b], when a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of more than three months, such as the instant case, the prosecution must be ready within 90 days from the commencement of that criminal action. To satisfy the initial burden under CPL § 30.30, the defendant need allege "only that the prosecution failed to declare readiness within the statutorily prescribed time period" (People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, [*9]77-78 (1995); see also People v Goode, 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]). Once the defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed since the commencement of the action, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay (see People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]). "[A]bsent an individualized finding of special circumstances", prosecutors cannot be deemed "ready for trial" pursuant to CPL 30.30 until they have filed a valid COC (CPL 245.50[3], see also People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 [2023]).

This case was filed, and the defendant was arraigned September 18, 2025. The defendant was released, and the case was adjourned to October 28, 2025, for conversion. This time period is chargeable, because the People did not file a COC or COR during this time period. The People concede that this time is chargeable. (40 days charged)

On October 28, 2025, the People were not ready, and the case was adjourned to December 9, 2025, for trial. On December 4, 2025, off-calendar, the People served and filed a COC and COR. As stated above, the People's COC and accompanying statement of readiness were valid and effective in stopping the speedy trial period. Therefore, the People are only charged from October 28, 2025, to December 4, 2025. (37 days charged; 77 days total)

On December 9, 2025, the People were ready for trial, but the defense requested an adjournment. The case was adjourned to January 12, 2026, for trial. On January 12, the People were ready for trial, but the defense requested an adjournment. The case was adjourned to January 30, 2026, for trial. These adjournments are excluded, because the People were ready for trial, and the adjournments were expressly requested by the defense. (0 days charged)

On January 30, 2026, the instant motion schedule was set, and the case was adjourned to April 21, 2026, for a decision. This time is excludable for motion practice. (0 days charged)

As only 77 chargeable days have accrued for this case, the defense's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

III. MOTIONS TO CONTROVERT, SUPPRESS AND PRECLUDE

The defendant moved to controvert the search warrant in this case. However, the People responded and indicated that they do not intend to use the fruits of the warrant at trial, and the defense did not reply on this issue. Therefore, the issue is moot.

The defendant's motion for the suppression of tangible, non-tangible and testimonial evidence, is granted to the extent that Mapp/Dunaway hearings will be conducted. The defendant's motion for the suppression of identification evidence, allegedly attributed to him, is granted to the extent that Wade/Dunaway hearings will be conducted. The defense's request for a voluntariness hearing is referred to the trial court.

The defendant's motion for the preclusion of unnoticed statements and identification testimony is denied, with leave to renew, should the People seek to introduce such evidence.

IV. SANDOVAL

The defendant's motion pursuant to People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974] and People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 [1981] is referred to the trial court for determination.

V. BRADY/ROSARIO

The People are reminded of their continuing obligation pursuant to Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963) and its progeny. The People are reminded of their continuing obligation to supply all Brady and Rosario material as well as their supplemental discovery obligations under CPL Article 245, to be served on defense no later than 15 days prior to the first scheduled trial date.

VI. BILL OF PARTICULARS

The defendant's motion for an order compelling the People to comply with his request for a bill of particulars is denied. On February 20, 2026, the People filed an Automatic Discovery Form, which provides all the particulars the defendant is entitled to and adequately apprises defendant of the charges with sufficient specificity to prepare his defense.

VII. ADDITIONAL MOTIONS

Any additional, supplemental, or amended motions contemplated by the defendant shall be permitted only to the extent that such new or amended motions fall within the scope of CPL §§ 255.20(2) and (3). This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: April 21, 2026

HON. MARVA C. BROWN, JCC