Supreme Court, Westchester County

Decided on April 20, 2026

Index No. [Redacted]

James L. Hyer, J.

[*1]

The following papers were considered in connection with the Defendant's motion by order to show cause (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 3"), dated March 13, 2026, seeking the entry of an Order:

1. Issuing an Order compelling Plaintiff to produce the following to the Court for in-camera review, so that the Court may determine which portions, if any, are material and relevant to Plaintiff's parental fitness and appropriate for limited disclosure to the parties:

a. A list identifying all psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, counselors, social workers, physicians, or other mental health professionals who have evaluated, consulted with, or treated Plaintiff from 2011 through the present, including the provider's name, business address, professional specialty, and approximate dates of treatment, relating to Plaintiff's mental health treatment, including, but not limited to the incidents described this motion;

b. Documents and records sufficient to identify each hospital, psychiatric facility, medical facility, or treatment center where Plaintiff was hospitalized or received treatment since 2011, including the name and address of the facility, dates of admission and discharge, and the reason for the hospitalization related to mental health treatment;

c. Documents and information sufficient to identify all hospitals, psychiatric facilities, physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, or other mental health professionals who treated or evaluated Plaintiff in connection with the following incidents, including the provider's name, address, specialty, and dates of treatment: (i) the incident alleged to have occurred in or about 2013; (ii) the incident alleged to have occurred in Boston, Massachusetts on or about October 15, 2019; and (iii) the incident alleged to have occurred in New York during or about the summer of 2021;

2. Directing Plaintiff to execute a HIPAA-compliant authorization, permitting the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to the psychiatric, psychological, counseling, or mental health treatment providers identified above for the production of records relating to Plaintiff's treatment for submission to the Court for in-camera review prior to disclosure to the parties as the Court deems appropriate; and

3. Granting any such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper; and further requested the following immediate relief (hereinafter "Immediate Relief"):

SUFFICIENT CAUSE APPEARING THEREFORE, it is

ORDERED, that shall produce to the Court, for in-camera review within twenty (20) days of service of this Order, the following materials so that the Court may determine which portions, if any, are material and relevant to Plaintiff's parental fitness and appropriate for limited disclosure to the parties:

a. Plaintiff shall provide a list identifying all psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, counselors, social workers, physicians, or other mental health professionals who have evaluated, consulted with, or treated Plaintiff from 2011 through the present, including the provider's name, business address, professional specialty, and approximate dates of treatment, relating to Plaintiff's mental health treatment;

b. Plaintiff shall provide all documents and records sufficient to identify each hospital, psychiatric facility, medical facility, or treatment center where Plaintiff was hospitalized or received treatment since 2011, including the name and address of the facility, dates of admission and discharge, and the reason for the hospitalization related to mental health treatment;

c. Plaintiff shall provide all documents and information sufficient to identify all hospitals, psychiatric facilities, physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, or other mental health professionals who treated or evaluated Plaintiff in connection with the following incidents, including the provider's name, address, specialty, and dates of treatment: (i) the incident alleged to have occurred in or about 2013; (ii) the incident alleged to have occurred in Boston, Massachusetts on or about October 15, 2019; (iii) the incident alleged to have occurred in New York during or about the summer of 2021;

ORDERED, that Plaintiff shall execute a HIPAA-compliant authorization, permitting the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to the psychiatric, psychological, counseling, or mental health treatment providers identified above for the production of records relating to Plaintiff's treatment for submission to the Court for in-camera review prior to disclosure to the parties as the Court deems appropriate;

ORDERED, that the Court shall determine, after an in camera review, which portions of such records, if any, are material and relevant to Plaintiff's' parental fitness and appropriate for limited disclosure to the parties.

PAPERS DOC. NO.

Order to Show Cause/Affirmation in Support of Defendant/

Affirmation in Support of Defendant's Counsel ^FN1/

Affirmation in Support of Plaintiff's Brother/

Exhibits A-D 1-8

Affirmation of Plaintiff 9 ^FN2

Relevant Factual and Procedural History

On August 27, 2025, as a self-represented litigant, Plaintiff commenced this matrimonial action with the filing of a summons and complaint (hereinafter "Complaint"),^FN3 asserting that the parties had married on February 20, 2019, and thereafter had two children being: (1) C.G. (D.O.B.: [Redacted]); and (2) B.G.J., (D.O.B.: [Redacted]) (hereinafter "Children"). The Complaint sought the entry of a judgment of divorce dissolving the parties' marriage pursuant to New York State Domestic Relations Law (hereinafter "DRL") § 170(7) based upon the alleged irretrievable breakdown of the relationship of the parties and seeking ancillary relief including custody of the Children.

On November 10, 2025, a family offense proceeding was commenced by Defendant against Plaintiff in the New York State Family Court, Westchester County known as, [Redacted], under file number [Redacted] and docket number [Redacted] (hereinafter "Family Offense Proceeding"). The petition (hereinafter "Petition"),^FN4 is verified by Defendant and asserts Plaintiff engaged in the following acts against Defendant, some of which were committed in front of the Children: (1) assault in the third degree; (2) harassment in the second degree; (3) harassment in the third degree; (4) stalking in the fourth degree; (5) menacing in the third degree; (6) coercion in the third degree; and (7) disorderly conduct.

The Petition asserts that Plaintiff's mental health has long been a concern of his family, partially due to his failure to take prescribed meditations:

"The Respondent has a history of mental health problems. The Respondent's family, including his father, has expressed concern regarding his mental health. Upon information and belief, he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and he does not take his prescribed medication for it."

The Petition includes the following allegations by Defendant against Plaintiff asserting [*2]that she and one of the Children have been physically attacked by Plaintiff:

"Over the past two (2) years, I have endured physical and emotional abuse, financial manipulation, and harmful living conditions due to the Respondent's violent behavior, manipulation, and erratic behavior. On September 17, 2025, after I was woken up by Respondent in the early part of the morning, Respondent began yelling at me loudly after a brief conversation. I was scared because I was in my bedroom and had nowhere to escape. Respondent left after yelling at me and spat in my face [T]he Respondent called me "garbage," saying he wants to "get rid of [me]". On or about September 13, 2025, the Respondent pulled C.G.'s hair. While sitting in my home office, I observed the Respondent grab our daughter by the hair and forcibly move her head from side to side. His facial expression appeared angry and aggressive. He told me that he pulled her hair because she had spilled a drink made with green vegetable-fruit powder onto the floor.

* * *

In August 2024, during a conversation about the Respondent's ongoing unemployment and job search, I attempted to express my concerns about our financial situation and the need for a stable plan moving forward. In response, the Respondent became extremely angry and agitated. He raised his voice and took several steps toward me in an aggressive manner. In that moment, I feared he was going to strike me in the face, as he came very close to doing so. He abruptly turned and punched the wall directly next to my head with significant force instead, leaving a large hole in the drywall."

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has also attacked his brother in front of one of the Children:

"On or about July 22, 2025, the Respondent physically assaulted his younger brother to the point that his brother began bleeding from his face. He did this in front of C.G., our child, who, at the time of the assault, was screaming, 'It is inappropriate to beat someone!' "

Defendant further asserts in the Petition, that Plaintiff's asserted domestic violence against her has involved financial abuse:

"Even now, as we are going through our separation, the Respondent has withdrawn money from our joint account on numerous occasions to pay for the rent for his new apartment. He told me that he would redirect his paycheck to be deposited to his own bank account, as opposed to our joint bank account. He is aware that this leaves me extremely vulnerable and affects the Children and my ability to cover child-related expenses, general family expenses, and the mortgage. Respondent has removed more than $20,000.00 over a small period of time and is trying to financially leverage his control over me, as he is using these funds for his personal expenses only."

The claims made by Defendant against Plaintiff in the Petition extend to allegations that he has engaged in surveillance of she and the parties' nanny without consent:

"In January 2025 and June 2025, I discovered hidden cameras in our live-in nanny's bathroom and our master bedroom, respectively. I never consented to or knew about these cameras, and it made me extremely fearful to know that Respondent was watching me at all times. It was even more concerning given that the Respondent is a senior [*3]product cybersecurity engineer, possessing both the technical expertise and resources to conduct surveillance and circumvent security measures."

On November 14, 2025, Defendant appeared with counsel filing an acknowledgement of service of the Complaint,^FN5 and thereafter filed an answer with counterclaim (hereinafter "Answer"),^FN6 seeking dissolution of the parties' marriage pursuant to DRL § 170(7) and ancillary relief including custody of the Children.

On December 2, 2025, court attorney Hadassah L. Holmes, who was assigned to preside over the Family Offense Proceeding, entered a temporary order of protection (hereinafter "1st TOP"), against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant and the Children, to remain in effect through December 23, 2025, directing that: (1) Plaintiff stay away from Defendant and the Children; (2) refrain from communication with Plaintiff and the Children, except between the parties through Our Family Wizard to effectuate communication pertaining to the Children; (3) refrain from conduct that would constitute a family offense against Defendant and/or the Children; (4) refrain from remotely controlling, monitoring or otherwise interfering with any electronic device or other object affecting the home, vehicle, or property of the Defendant and Children by connection through any means, including, but not limited to, the internet, Bluetooth, a wired or wireless network, or other wireless technology.

On December 15, 2025, Defendant's counsel filed a request for judicial intervention.^FN7

On December 16, 2025, a court notice ^FN8 was issued directing a preliminary conference to be held before the undersigned on January 7, 2026, at 2:00 p.m.

On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion by notice of motion (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 1"),^FN9 seeking the entry of an order granting the following relief: "(1) Directing the immediate listing of the marital residence for sale at a fair market value, upon terms to be agreed upon by the parties, or, in the absence of agreement, as directed by the Court; or (2) In the alternative, directing a court-supervised process for the sale of the marital residence to preserve the marital asset and prevent default or foreclosure; or (3) In the further alternative, temporarily allocating responsibility for the carrying costs of the marital residence, including the mortgage, taxes, and insurance, pending further proceedings in this action; and (4) Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just, proper, and equitable to preserve the marital residence and prevent irreparable financial harm pending resolution of this action.

On December 23, 2025, Defendant filed a cross motion (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 2"),^FN10 granting the following relief: "(1) Issuing an Order removing and transferring the [*4]Family Court Family Offense Proceedings titled [Redacted] (File No. [Redacted]; Docket No. [Redacted]) to the Supreme Court in the State of New York, Westchester County to the action captioned, [Redacted] (Index No. [Redacted]), and consolidating that Family Court Family Offense Action with the related Supreme Court Action pursuant to CPLR §§ 326, 602; (2) Issuing an Order consolidating Defendant's Motion Sequence 1 with the instant cross-motion; (3) Awarding Defendant exclusive use and occupancy of the marital residence during the pendency of these proceedings; (4) Alternatively, directing the Parties to place the marital residence on the market for rent with the Parties to distribute the rental proceeds towards maintaining the status quo of expenses including child expenses such as childcare and housing for the Defendant and Children and then the parties splitting the remaining proceeds, if any, 50/50; (5) Restricting the sale of the marital residence during the pendency of these proceedings unless otherwise mutually agreed by the Parties; (6) Directing Plaintiff to direct all utilities and bills of the Marital Residence to be sent to the Defendant and for the Defendant to have access to all Marital Residence bills and for Plaintiff to add her contact information to all relevant portals for the payment of and access to such bills, including but not limited to utilities, internet, mortgage; (7) Awarding Defendant L.L.G., pendente lite sole legal custody and primary residential custody of the minor children of the parties' marriage, to wit: C.G. (DOB [Redacted], age 3 years) (referred to as "C.G." or together with the other child as "Children") and B.G.J. (DOB [Redacted], age 11 months) (referred to as "B.G.J." or together with the other child as "Children") and directing the Defendant appropriate supervised visitation to the Plaintiff; (8) Awarding Defendant sole legal custody with primary residential custody of the Children with appropriate supervised visitation to the Plaintiff; (9) Awarding Defendant an order for child support in the amount of no less than $5,878.74 per month to be paid by Plaintiff pursuant to the Child Support Standards Act and to pay 63.89% in add-on expenses of the Children; (10) Pursuant to DRL § 236, directing the Plaintiff to comply with the Automatic Orders and maintain 50% of the daily household and customary expenses for the parties, and shall pay 50% of all utilities including, including the mortgage, oil, gas, water, and heat, and expenses in connection therewith, pendente lite; (11) Directing Plaintiff to immediately reimburse Defendant for 50% of the utilities and carrying costs incurred by the Defendant to maintain the daily household and customary expenses for the Parties' Children and marital residence since Plaintiff stopped sufficiently contributing to such expenses, on or about, November 2025 in violation of Automatic Orders; (12) Directing Plaintiff to reimburse the Defendant for funds in the minimum amount of $34,480.22 and any additional amount withdrawn from the parties' joint Citibank Joint Checking account ending in [Redacted]; (13) Directing Plaintiff to immediately reimburse Defendant for 63.89% of the Children's add-on expenses including unreimbursed medical and dental, childcare, and extracurricular activities, incurred by Defendant, since Plaintiff stopped substantially and satisfactorily contributing to such expenses, on or about, November 2025 in violation of Automatic Orders; (14) Directing that Plaintiff attend psychiatric therapy on a regular and continuous basis to ensure the safety of the Children while under his care as a component of supervised visitation; (15) Directing that Plaintiff take his medicine as prescribed by his doctors on a regular and continuous basis as a component of supervised visitation; (16) Awarding Defendant an order for pendente lite maintenance in the amount no less than $1,504.04 per month to be paid for by the Plaintiff and for the Court to consider the financial circumstances of the parties and the marital lifestyle for needs-based and above-cap support; (17) Directing Plaintiff to refrain from withdrawing funds from the Parties' joint account ending in [Redacted]; (18) Restraining the Plaintiff from [*5]removing and/or disposing any marital property subject to equitable distribution; (19) Ordering that Plaintiff pay the Defendant's reasonable attorney's fees in this matter; and (20) Granting any such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper."

On December 23, 2025, court attorney Hadassah L. Holmes, entered a second temporary order of protection (hereinafter "2nd TOP"),^FN11 inclusive of the same directives as the 1st TOP to remain in effect until February 19, 2026.

On December 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed submissions in opposition to Motion Sequence No. 2.^FN12

On January 7, 2026, a preliminary conference was held wherein appearances were made by Plaintiff as a self-represented litigant, Defendant and Defendant's counsel, and the attorney for the Children who was appointed and appeared during the conference, for which a so-ordered court transcript was filed (hereinafter "1/7/2026 Transcript").^FN13 Following this Court advising Plaintiff of his right to be represented by counsel, Plaintiff advised that he sought to proceed as a self-represented litigant.^FN14 This Court then provided to both parties documents which were marked as court exhibits and filed, being the self-represented litigant information sheet and part rules.^FN15 Upon request of Defendant's counsel and with no objection of Plaintiff, this Court directed that the Family Offense Proceeding be consolidated with this action and that upon commencement of any further proceedings before the New York State Family Court pertaining to the parties, notice was to be filed with this Court to determine if consolidation was warranted.^FN16 Following the terms of a stipulation as to certain interim issues being placed upon the record followed by an allocution of the parties, Motion Sequence Nos. 1 & 2 were withdrawn without prejudice by the parties.^FN17

On January 8, 2026, the following were filed by this Court: (1) preliminary conference order;^FN18 (2) consolidation order;^FN19 and (3) attorney for the Children appointment order, [*6]appointing [Redacted], Esq., as attorney for the Children.^FN20

On January 12, 2026, a stipulation was so-ordered by this Court between the parties pertaining to exclusive occupancy of the marital domicile, interim parenting time, and temporary orders of protection.^FN21

On March 3, 2026, a conference was held before the undersigned wherein all parties and counsel appeared, for which a so-ordered court transcript has been filed (hereinafter "3/3/2026 Transcript").^FN22 Following this Court being advised that no custody resolution had been reached, the parties advised of their financial status after which this Court directed replenishment of the retainer of the attorney for the Children and the appointment of a forensic evaluator with the parties to share in the cost equally subject to reallocation at trial.^FN23 During the conference Defendant asserted the existence of deficiencies in the discovery responses received from Plaintiff, including records pertaining to Plaintiff's mental health which Plaintiff objected to providing, and this Court directed the parties engage in motion practice with Defendant filing a motion by March 13, 2026.^FN24

On March 3, 2026, an order was entered directing that a forensic evaluator would be appointed and setting forth additional discovery deadlines.^FN25

On March 5, 2026, an order appointing forensic evaluator was entered appointing Dr. Megan Wright, Psy.D., to conduct a forensic evaluation of the parties and Children,^FN26 and acceptance for which was filed.^FN27

On March 11, 2026, Defendant's counsel filed a letter requesting the appointment of a mediator,^FN28 after which an Order of Reference appointing a mediator was entered.^FN29

On March 13, 2026, Defendant filed Motion Sequence No. 3,^FN30 seeking the above-[*7]referenced relief, which was conformed,^FN31 (1) denying the Immediate Relief sought; (2) directing service be completed by March 17, 2026; (3) directing all answering submissions and/or cross motions be filed by March 31, 2026; (4) directing all answering submissions to cross motions be filed by April 14, 2026, being the return date for Motion Sequence No. 3 and any cross motions filed.

In support of her application, Defendant filed an affirmation (hereinafter "Defendant's Affirmation"),^FN32 asserting that Plaintiff suffers from mental health conditions, information for which is needed for this Court to make the custody determinations before it:

"During the marriage, Plaintiff has informed me that he had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had been prescribed medication to treat the condition. *** I have also personally observed Plaintiff taking medication for this diagnosis earlier in the marriage. *** Several years ago, Plaintiff abruptly discontinued taking his medication. He told me that a doctor had informed him that he no longer had bipolar disorder and therefore did not need to continue treatment. However, Plaintiff never showed me any documentation or confirmation from any medical provider supporting these statements. To the best of my knowledge, Plaintiff is currently not taking any medication. *** Furthermore, Plaintiff's brother has also confirmed that Plaintiff had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed medication for that condition. *** On or around July 2025, I requested that Plaintiff provide medical records so that I could understand his condition better and ensure the safety and well-being of our children. However, Plaintiff refused and became very angry. *** Because Plaintiff's statements regarding his diagnosis and treatment have been inconsistent, the underlying mental health and prescription records are necessary to determine the nature of his condition for the safety of the children and whether he has discontinued recommended treatment.

* * *

Plaintiff's mental health condition, treatment history, and medication compliance are directly relevant to the Court's determination of custody and parenting time. Plaintiff has admitted to a prior diagnosis of bipolar disorder, has a documented history of psychiatric episodes requiring hospitalization, and has demonstrated aggressive and erratic conduct toward family members, including toward his own child. At the same time, Plaintiff claims that he no longer suffers from the condition and does not require treatment, yet he has refused to provide any documentation supporting that claim. Without access to Plaintiff's mental health and prescription records, the court cannot determine the nature and severity of Plaintiff's diagnosis, whether he was prescribed medication and whether he discontinued it against medical advice, whether he currently requires treatment or monitoring, and whether medical providers have expressed concern regarding his stability. These records are therefore material and necessary to determine whether Plaintiff can safely exercise custody or parenting time and what safeguards if any may be required to protect the best interests of the children."

Defendant's Affirmation alleges that due to his mental health issues Plaintiff has been hospitalized twice:

"As stated in my Family Offense Petition dated November 20, 2025, Plaintiff has previously experienced psychiatric episodes that resulted in hospitalization. For example, on or about October 15, 2019, while on a business trip, Plaintiff alleges he had Delta-8 THC or marijuana and became severely agitated and made alarming threats, including expressing a desire to harm colleagues. Plaintiff, during this incident, was screaming statements, such as "I am going to kill someone," which caused significant alarm among individuals present. As a result of this behavior, emergency services were called and Plaintiff was hospitalized in Boston. Upon his return to New York, his employer, concerned by his conduct and statements, arranged for a medical evaluation. Following that evaluation, his employment was terminated. I am concerned that this episode may have reflected a more serious underlying psychiatric condition.

On or about the summer of 2021, Plaintiff again experienced a severe episode in which he returned home in an extremely agitated and irrational state while we were residing in Manhattan. I returned home to find the residence in complete disarray. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff entered the home shirtless and behaving erratically. For example, he was putting soil in a water bottle and tried to drink it. Fearing for my safety, I first called Plaintiff's father using Plaintiff's phone because I did not have his contact information at that time, as this was the first time I was seeing something like this firsthand. He did not answer so I left him a voicemail asking him what I can do at that moment. I also called Plaintiff's brother, [Redacted] but no one answered the phone. I then called 911, after which Plaintiff was transported to New York Presbyterian Lower Manhattan Hospital. We went to the hospital together and while we were there, he was speaking nonsense, saying "I want to go to space" repeatedly. The nurse gave him medication and after an hour or two, he calmed down. I told the doctor that I was informed that Plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. I recall that the physician at that time advised Plaintiff not to use such substances given his history of bipolar disorder. *** The doctor then released him later that night and I took Plaintiff home. Plaintiff had told me that day that he had lost his wedding ring and his wallet in the laundry room of our house. I was able to find his wallet but could not find his wedding ring. By the time I got home with Plaintiff, I got a phone call from Plaintiff's brother, D.G., on Plaintiff's phone. I told D.G. what was happening. Due to the gravity of the situation, D.G. said that he will fly to New York. *** He stayed for a couple of days but at that point, Plaintiff calmed down."

Defendant's asserts that Plaintiff's erratic behavior has included his being physically abusive with her:

"Additionally, on or around September 17, 2025, Plaintiff came into our bedroom and woke me up asking about C.G.'s class birthday celebration. I told him that I would drive her myself since he could not attend. Plaintiff then raised his voice at me saying "don't you understand why I can't attend? I have work to do and you notified me last minute! However, I told him that I reminded him a week before. However, he began to bring up marital issues, escalating the conversation. He spat on my face and left. Due to this incident, he vacated the residence."

In support of her application, Defendant submitted an affirmation of the brother of the Plaintiff, D.G.^FN33 who corroborated Defendant's statements pertaining to the mental health diagnosis of Plaintiff, as well as his erratic behavior including physical abuse of family members. With respect to Plaintiff's mental health conditions and medication, he stated:

"Around 2013/2014, I learned that B.G. was diagnosed with a serious mental health condition. Both my younger brother, K.G., (DOB: [Redacted]) and I were informed about this diagnosis. I learned he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and possibly schizophrenia, and that he had been prescribed medication to treat these conditions. Around 2011, B.G.'s life seemed to change dramatically. After 2013/2014, I observed prescription pill bottles with B.G.'s name on them. B.G. had told me that these medications were prescribed to treat his mental health condition.

* * *

On several occasions, including in 2015 and again around 2021, my family members and I believed that B.G. was behaving erratically again. I flew out to see him in person a few times because we were concerned that he might be experiencing a mental health episode. During one of these times, he was taking bupropion XL 300mg, quetiapine, 25mg, and oxcarbazepine, 600mg. Based on my observations over the years, there's a clear difference between B.G.'s behavior depending on whether he is taking prescribed medication. When he is taking medication, he appears functional, coherent, and stable. When B.G. is not taking medication, his behavior becomes irrational, agitated and difficult to communicate with. In family text message conversations, B.G. stated that he stopped taking his medication. See Exhibit B; Text messages with family. B.G. also stated that he believed he was misdiagnosed and he did not believe he actually had a mental health condition. See Exhibit B; Text messages with family. B.G.'s statements indicate that he is in denial about his mental health condition."

D.G. advised that Plaintiff had previously been arrested and physically attacked both his mother and other brother:

"In, or about, 2012, B.G. attacked our younger brother, K.G. when K.G. was visiting him in Lafayette, Indiana. K.G. told me that one night B.G. was drinking and then began trying to provoke him during an argument and called him names such as 'worthless.' K.G. attempted to defuse the situation, but B.G. escalated the confrontation. B.G. eventually shoved and pinned K.G. against a wall during the argument trying to get a reaction from him. K.G. wouldn't give a reaction and eventually B.G. let go. *** In or about 2013, B.G. was looking for a place to stay. Our father, D.G. (DOB: [Redacted]), would not let B.G. move in with him because our father had remarried and had a four (4) year old son (our [*8]stepbrother) and he did not feel safe with B.G. being around our step-brother. Our mother, P.V. (now deceased) allowed B.G. to stay with her. B.G. stayed with our mother for about six (6) months. At one point, our mother told K.G. and me, B.G. was awake for five to eight days straight without any sleep. Around that time, B.G. physically attacked our mother. He grabbed her and pinned her down onto the ground, placing his hands upon her neck and shoulders. Our mother was screaming at him to 'get out!' during the incident. She eventually got out of the house and ran outside. While running, she cut her leg. Police were called, and B.G. was then arrested. From my understanding, B.G. was then taken to a psychiatric institution in Jackson, Michigan, where he remained for several days."

D.G. then recounted an incident in 2025 wherein he came to visit the parties due to Defendant's concerns regarding the behavior of Plaintiff and was attacked by Plaintiff:

"In, or about, July 2025, L.L.G. contacted me several times expressing concern about B.G.'s behavior. L.L.G. said B.G. was acting strange and that there were serious issues at home. L.L.G. stated that she 'did not feel safe' and did not know how to ask B.G. questions or get answers from him. With these concerns, L.L.G. asked if I could come to New York to stay there a few days. I flew to New York and arrived at B.G.'s and L.L.G.'s house on, or about, July 21st, 2025. When B.G. asked me why I was there, I told him that L.L.G. had called because she believed that he might be off his medication again. Later that evening, we were inside the house sitting in the television room with baseball on the TV. B.G. had ordered wings and we were sitting on the couch. Out of nowhere, B.G. saw my painted toenails and made several hostile comments towards me including, 'you're going to fucking hell, you gay motherfucker' and 'you're broken!' B.G. appeared to be attempting to provoke a reaction from me. I did not react. That same evening, L.L.G. had also told B.G. that she wanted a divorce. B.G. reacted angrily and said things such as, 'you're going to have to pay for everything!,' 'I'm going to take the kids!' and 'I'm going to take everything!' Later that night, B.G. followed me around the house and made another comment, stating 'I bet you want to go fuck my wife now and go to bed.' I did not respond to that comment and ignored it.

On the morning of July 22, 2025, I woke up early at approximately 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. C.G., their daughter and my niece, and L.L.G.'s father, were already awake. C.G. and I spent time playing together for approximately thirty minutes to an hour. While in the middle of play, B.G. came downstairs and began yelling, "get the fuck out of the house!" I responded that I would leave if L.L.G. asked me to leave because she was the one who had invited me into their home. B.G. then began swinging punches at me and attempted to strike me approximately four or five times. I blocked several of the punches. During the altercation, L.L.G. attempted to step between us to stop B.G. B.G. put his hands on L.L.G., moved her out of the way, and punched me directly in the face, splitting my lip open. C.G. witnessed this entire incident. After B.G. punched me, I left the house and walked to the nearest CVS pharmacy and obtained alcohol and other supplies to clean my injury. I then walked to a nearby fire department, where one of the personnel examined my injury and stated that they could stitch it up for me. However, I declined the assistance and decided to treat it myself. The fire department also called the police on my behalf. Police officers from the Rye Police Department arrived at the firehouse, where [*9]they took my statement and photographed my injuries. See Exhibit C; Police Report 2025. The only reason why B.G. was not arrested at that time was that I had asked the officers not to arrest him."

On March 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed an answering submission limited to an affirmation of Plaintiff (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Affirmation").^FN34

Thereafter, no further submissions have been received or otherwise considered pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 3.

Legal Analysis

A. Defective Submissions.

Pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (hereinafter "CPLR") § 2106:

"(a) The statement of any person wherever made, subscribed and affirmed by that person to be true under the penalties of perjury . . . may be used in an action in New York in lieu of and with the same force and effect as an affidavit . . . Such affirmation shall be in substantially the following form:

'I affirm this ___ day of ______, ____, under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York, which may include a fine or imprisonment, that the foregoing is true, and I understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law.'

(Signature)" (CPLR § 2106).

An affirmation which fails to comport with the requirements of CPLR § 2106, shall be inadmissible and must be disregarded by the Court (see Great Lakes Insurance SE v. American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association Inc., 228 AD3d 429 [1st Dept 2024]).

Here, the affirmation of Defendant's counsel (hereinafter "Defendant Counsel's Affirmation"),^FN35 filed in support of Motion Sequence No. 3, does not comply with CPLR § 2106 and must be disregarded as it only provides the following:

"[Redacted], an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of New York, affirms the following to be true under the penalty of perjury."

The Plaintiff's Affirmation also does not comply with CPLR § 2106 and must be disregarded as it only provides the following:

"I, B.G., affirm the following under penalties of perjury:"

Moreover, even of Plaintiff's Affirmation did comply with CPLR § 2106, it was unsigned and would need to be disregarded due to failure to comply with 22 NYCRR §130-1.1a.^FN36

Accordingly, both Defendant Counsel's Affirmation and Plaintiff's Affirmation have been noted herein as filed for completeness, but have been disregarded as inadmissible submissions and not considered by this Court when making a determination as to the relief sought by the application.

B. Legal Authority Pertaining to Release of Medical Records.

CPLR § 3101(a) permits "full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action" the scope of which is to be interpreted liberally (see Lalin v. Hill of Nassau Ltd., 46 AD2d 788 [2d Dept 1974]). Discussing this interpretation, the Court of Appeals noted:

"The words, 'material and necessary', are, in our view, to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason. CPLR 3101 (subd. (a)) should be construed, as the leading text on practice puts it, to permit discovery of testimony 'which is sufficiently related to the issues in litigation to make *407 the effort to obtain it in preparation for trial reasonable' (3 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac., par. 3101.07, p. 31—13). Even under former section 288 of the Civil Practice Act, the courts tended to follow this more liberal construction as pretrial examinations became 'concerned more acutely with the preparation of the case than with the preservation of testimony.' (Southbridge Finishing Co. v. Golding, 2 AD2d 430, 434, 156 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546; see, also, Cornell v. Eaton, 286 App.Div. 1124, 146 N.Y.S.2d 449; Dorros, Inc. v. Dorros Bros., 274 App.Div. 11, 13—14, 80 N.Y.S.2d 25, 28.) And, since the enactment of CPLR 3101, the courts have continued 'to enlarge the permissible use of pre-trial procedure' begun under the former statute. (Rios v. Donovan, 21 AD2d 409, 411, 250 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1st Dept.); see, also, Matter of Comstock, 21 AD2d 843, 844, 250 N.Y.S.2d 753, 755 (4th Dept.); Nomako v. Ashton, 20 AD2d 331, 332—333, 247 N.Y.S.2d 230, 233 (1st Dept.); see, also, Siegel, Disclosure under the CPLR: Taking Stock After Two Years, Eleventh Annual Report of Administration Board of Judicial Conference, 1965 (N.Y.Legis.Doc., 1966, No. 90), pp. 148, 185.) 'The purpose of disclosure procedures', declared the Appellate Division for the First Department in the Rios case (21 AD2d, at p. 411, 250 N.Y.S.2d, at p. 820), 'is to advance the function of a trial to ascertain truth and to accelerate the disposition of suits' and, in the ***453 Comstock case (21 AD2d, at p. 844, 250 N.Y.S.2d at p. 755), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, wrote that, '(i)f there is any possibility that the information is sought in good faith for possible use as evidence-in-chief or in rebuttal or for cross-examination, it should be considered 'evidence material * * * in the prosecution or defense' (3 Weinstein (Korn-Miller), New [*10]York Civil Practice par. 3101.07.)' 8 9 Although there may seem to be a little more immediacy and substantiality to the word 'material' than to 'relevant'—the term contained in the more liberal Federal statute (Fed.Rules Civ.Proc., rule 26, subd. (b); see, also, 4 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed., 1967), par. 26.16, p. 1174 et seq.)—we believe that a broad interpretation **433 of the words 'material and necessary' is proper. In this connection, we note, the word 'necessary', even under former section 288 of the Civil Practice Act, was held to mean 'needful' and not indispensable. (Taylor v. Smith & Corona Typewriters, 179 Misc. 290, 292, 38 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866, affd. 266 App.Div. 903, 43 N.Y.S.2d 745.)" (Allen v. Crowell-Collier Pub Co., 21 NY2d 403 [1968]).

" 'The supervision of discovery, and the setting of reasonable terms and conditions for disclosure, are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court' " (Brownyard v. County of Suffolk, 244 AD3d 1051 [2d Dept 2025], citing Smith-Percival v. MTA Bus Company, 232 AD3d 928 [2d Dept 2024] quoting 101CO, LLC v. Sand Land Corporation, 189 AD3d 942 [2d Dept 2020]).

Several provisions of the CPLR set forth evidentiary privilege that may be asserted by a litigant seeking a person's records from several categories of professionals including physicians, dentists, podiatrists, chiropractors and nurses; psychologists; and social workers (hereinafter collectively "Treating Professionals"). With respect to the first category, CPLR § 4504(a) provides the following:

"Confidential information privileged. Unless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine, registered professional nursing, licensed practical nursing, dentistry, podiatry or chiropractic shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity. The relationship of a physician and patient shall exist between a medical corporation, as defined in article forty-four of the public health law, a professional service corporation organized under article fifteen of the business corporation law to practice medicine, a university faculty practice corporation organized under section fourteen hundred twelve of the not-for-profit corporation law to practice medicine or dentistry, and the patients to whom they respectively render professional medical services."

CPLR § 4507 then sets forth privilege pertaining to records of a psychologist:

"The confidential relations and communications between a psychologist registered under the provisions of article one hundred fifty-three of the education law and his client are placed on the same basis as those provided by law between attorney and client, and nothing in such article shall be construed to require any such privileged communications to be disclosed. A client who, for the purpose of obtaining insurance benefits, authorizes the disclosure of any such privileged communication to any person shall not be deemed to have waived the privilege created by this section."

Finally, CPLR § 4508 sets forth the privilege pertaining to records of a social worker:

"Confidential information privileged. A person licensed as a licensed master social worker or a licensed clinical social worker under the provisions of article one hundred fifty-four of the education law shall not be required to disclose a communication made by [*11]a client, or his or her advice given thereon, in the course of his or her professional employment, nor shall any clerk, stenographer or other person working for the same employer as such social worker or for such social worker be allowed to disclose any such communication or advice given thereon; except

1. that such social worker may disclose such information as the client may authorize;

2. that such social worker shall not be required to treat as confidential a communication by a client which reveals the contemplation of a crime or harmful act;

3. where the client is a child under the age of sixteen and the information acquired by such social worker indicates that the client has been the victim or subject of a crime, the social worker may be required to testify fully in relation thereto upon any examination, trial or other proceeding in which the commission of such crime is a subject of inquiry;

4. where the client waives the privilege by bringing charges against such social worker and such charges involve confidential communications between the client and the social worker."

In the context of contested child custody litigation, it has been determined that the parties engage in a waiver of physician patient privilege, as noted by the Appellate Division, Second Department:

" '[I]n a matrimonial action, a party waives the physician-patient privilege concerning his or her mental or physical condition ... by actively contesting custody ... However, [t]here first must be a showing beyond mere conclusory statements that resolution of the custody issue requires revelation of the protected material' (McDonald v. McDonald, 196 AD2d 7, 13, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Baecher v. Baecher, 58 AD2d 821, 396 N.Y.S.2d 447)" (Bruzzese v. Bruzzese, 152 AD3d 563 [2d Dept 2017]).

In discussing the public policy rationale permitting the waiver of party privilege to communications with Treating Professionals, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department noted the following:

"We find it significant, however, that the Legislature has spoken in formulating the State's policy interest in the welfare of children. The purpose of article 10 of the Family Court Act, which governs Child Protective Proceedings, is 'to help protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-being * * * ' and to provide a procedure 'for determining when the state * * * may intervene against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so that his needs are properly met' (Family Ct. Act, s 1011). In furtherance of that policy, privileges attaching to communications between husband and wife, physician and patient, and social worker and client are not grounds for excluding otherwise admissible evidence in any proceeding under article 10 (Family Ct. Act, s 1046, subd. (a) (vii)).

Additionally, we note that a certified social worker is not required to treat as confidential a communication which reveals the contemplation of a 'harmful act' (CPLR 4508, subd. 2). At least then, to the extent of our concern with that privilege, it does not strain logic to conclude that statements made or information given by the respondent to the social worker bearing adversely upon the health, safety and welfare of the infant are not privileged within the contemplation of the statute and are subject to compulsory [*12]disclosure (Community Serv. Soc. v. Welfare Inspector Gen. of State of New York, 91 Misc 2d 383, 398 N.Y.S.2d 92; see also People v. Brooks, 50 AD2d 319, 320, 376 N.Y.S.2d 928, 929, rvsd. on other grounds 42 NY2d 866, 397 N.Y.S.2d 792, 366 N.E.2d 879).

Thus we do not find it an impermissible encroachment *519 upon the legislative function to hold that where it is demonstrated that invasion of protected communications between a party and a physician, psychologist or social worker is necessary and material to a determination of custody the rule of privilege protecting such communications must yield to the 'dominant * * * duty of the court to guard the welfare of its wards' (Matter of Bachman v. Mejias, 1 NY2d 575, 581, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907, 136 N.E.2d 866, 869, supra; Matter of Do Vidio v. Do Vidio, 56 Misc 2d 79, 80, 288 N.Y.S.2d 21, 23, supra )" (Perry v. Fiumano, 61 AD2d 512 [4th Dept 1978]).

In Perry, the Court noted the importance of balancing the benefit of obtaining material and relevant information from records of Treating Professionals with the vital necessity of protecting the patient-provider relationship of the party with their providers:

"It is not our purpose, however, to discourage troubled parents from seeking professional assistance from the many public and private counseling agencies which are available to aid in relaxing matrimonial tensions and preserving family entities. Nor would we want a custodial parent to forgo needed psychiatric or other help out of fear that confidences will later be unfairly and unnecessarily revealed through the animus act of a present or former spouse. To avoid such potentially chilling effects, it is apparent that these privileges may not cavalierly be ignored or lightly cast aside. There first must be a showing beyond 'mere conclusory statements' that resolution of the custody issue requires revelation of the protected material. While the court need not adhere to strict adversary concepts in custody cases (Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 NY2d 445, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1, 180 N.E.2d 402; Johnson v. Johnson, 25 AD2d 672, 268 N.Y.S.2d 403),***" (Perry, Id.; see also Worysz v. Ratel, 101 AD3d 893 [2d Dept 2012] ["Moreover, in this case, the mother's psychiatric records may contain embarrassing or potentially damaging material that is irrelevant to the issue of the mother's fitness as a parent'])."

The requirement of a showing that the records of Treating Professionals sought are material and necessary requires that the party seeking such records allege that the mental health of the party for whom the records are sought is at issue with respect to the custodial issues before the court (see McDonald v. McDonald, 196 AD2d 7 [2d Dept 1994]; Lauren S. v. Alexander S., 205 AD3d 632 [1st Dept 2022]; King v. Pelkey, 229 AD3d 1161 [4th Dept 2024]). Following such an assertion being made by a litigant, the Appellate Division, First Department has set forth the factors which the reviewing court should consider prior to making a determination as to if disclosure should be made and if so, what safeguards should be employed to ensure that only material and necessary disclosure is made to the adversary:

"Accordingly, we direct that although the hospital shall produce the records, for such use as the Special Term justice may direct, there shall be no disclosure of such records to adverse parties, except to the extent that the Special Term shall direct, in the light of the circumstances then existing. In making such direction, the justice shall consider any psychiatric testimony offered or proposed; whether there has been a waiver of privilege; [*13]and whether the records are material and necessary for the purpose of determining custody, or whether *416 the court and the parties have sufficient information to determine future custody without such disclosure, or perhaps even preliminary examination by the justice himself. Before permitting disclosure of these records or any part of them to the parties, the Special Term justice shall himself examine the records and determine which if any parts of the records shall be disclosed. In our view, the power of the justice to permit appropriate disclosure for the purposes of the custody proceeding or to make a preliminary examination of the records himself does not depend solely on whether or not there has been a waiver of the privilege." (People ex rel. Hickox v. Hickox, 64 AD2d 412 [1st Dept 1978]).

C. Defendant's Relief Requested.

Here, Defendant is seeking to compel Plaintiff to produce for in-camera review by this Court, information and documents pertaining to Plaintiff's mental health treatment since 2011. In support of her request, she has asserted that the information sought is material and necessary as the parties are engaged in a contested custody litigation and the information sought is needed for this Court to make a determination as to the custodial issues presently before this Court. In support of the relief requested, Defendant has submitted an affirmation wherein she recounts that Plaintiff has been diagnosed with mental health conditions, has been prescribed medication to address these conditions, but now is not taking such medication as he is of the belief that he was misdiagnosed.

Defendant further sets forth in her sworn statement, a detailed chronology of events wherein she asserts that she has been subject to domestic violence by Plaintiff over a two-year period, including physical assaults on both she and one of the parties' Children. Defendant describes Plaintiff's behavior as having impacted his life beyond the parties' relationship noting Plaintiff's tumultuous employment history, the allegation that without consent he engaged in surveillance of she and the parties' nanny and physically attacked other family members. These allegations are corroborated by Plaintiff's own brother who sets forth in his own sworn statements submitted to this Court his own historical perspective as to Plaintiff's pattern of erratic behavior dating back over a decade. As noted above, due to Plaintiff's submission being defective it was disregarded, leaving all of the allegations made unrefuted with no opposition being made.

While this Court is concerned about the privacy interests of Plaintiff, due to the public policy concerns noted above in Perry, they must be taken into consideration together with the parens patrae interests of this Court to obtain sufficient information needed to make the custody determinations before it, and in the event of a conflict between the two, the latter must prevail. Accordingly, having reviewed the factors set forth in Hickox it is determined that the relief requested in the instant application is warranted as this Court finds that the mental health records of Plaintiff are material and necessary to the custody issues to be made in this action. While the mental health diagnosis of Plaintiff alone would not likely result in such disclosure, Defendant has, through her submissions, successfully established a nexus between Plaintiff's mental health and his history of erratic behavior which surely is necessary for this Court to examine when making a best interests analysis as to the custody of the Children.

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, by April 24, 2026, Plaintiff shall file the following in hard-copy submission for in-camera review:

1. A list identifying all psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, counselors, social workers, physicians, or other mental health professionals who have evaluated, consulted with, or treated Plaintiff from 2011 through the present, including the provider's name, business address, professional specialty, and approximate dates of treatment, relating to Plaintiff's mental health treatment, including, but not limited to the incidents described this motion;

2. Documents and records sufficient to identify each hospital, psychiatric facility, medical facility, or treatment center where Plaintiff was hospitalized or received treatment since 2011, including the name and address of the facility, dates of admission and discharge, and the reason for the hospitalization related to mental health treatment;

3. Documents and information sufficient to identify all hospitals, psychiatric facilities, physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, therapists, or other mental health professionals who treated or evaluated Plaintiff in connection with the following incidents, including the provider's name, address, specialty, and dates of treatment: (i) the incident alleged to have occurred in or about 2013; (ii) the incident alleged to have occurred in Boston, Massachusetts on or about October 15, 2019; and (iii) the incident alleged to have occurred in New York during or about the summer of 2021; and

4. Fully executed HIPAA-compliant authorizations for the release of information to this Court, permitting the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to the psychiatric, psychological, counseling, or mental health treatment providers identified above for the production of records, relating to Plaintiff's treatment, for submission to the Court for in-camera review prior to disclosure to the parties as the Court deems appropriate (hereinafter collectively "Plaintiff's Mental Health Information").

Upon receipt of the hard-copy submissions pertaining to Plaintiff's Mental Health Information, same shall be filed by this Court on NYSCEF sealed in such a manner that only this Court and Appellate Courts may review same. Thereafter, a subsequent Decision shall be entered pertaining to what portions of Plaintiff's Mental Health Information this Court finds to be material and necessary, and to the extent needed, this Court will then direct Defendant's counsel to prepare subpoenas to be so-ordered by this Court for the production of documents from Plaintiff's Treating Professionals to be released directly to this Court for in-camera review. Upon receipt of any records from Plaintiff's Treating Professionals resulting from the issuance of such subpoenas, same shall be filed by this Court on NYSCEF sealed in such a manner that only this Court and Appellate Courts may review same, and this Court will then issue a Decision pertaining to what portions are material and necessary, likely requiring inclusive of a protective order regarding the limitation of further dissemination of disclosed information.

D. Other Relief.

To the extent relief is not granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Motion Sequence No. 3 is granted as set forth herein; and it is further

ORDERED that by April 21, 2026, the Defendant's counsel shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry on the self-represented Plaintiff and attorney for the Children, via NYSCEF filing and e-mail, and file proof of service with the Court on the same day.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: April 20, 2026

White Plains, New York

ENTER:

HON. JAMES L. HYER, J.S.C.