Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County

Decided on April 15, 2026

Docket No. CR-050312-25KN

Masateru Marubashi, J.

[*1]

Defendant is charged, via a superseding information, with Driving While Intoxicated (VTL § 1192[3]), Driving While Intoxicated — Per Se (PL § 1192[2]) and Driving While Ability Impaired (VTL § 1192[1]). By motion filed on January 26, 2026, the defendant moves to dismiss the information pursuant to CPL § 30.30 because the filed superseding information was not a valid accusatory instrument. The People filed an opposition on March 3, 2026. Defense counsel filed a reply on March 4, 2026. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion is denied.

The criminal action commenced with the filing of a misdemeanor information on October 19, 2025. On November 20, 2025, the People filed and served a superseding information (SSI) in court. The defendant was arraigned on the SSI on the same date. On December 10, 2025, the People filed and served a certificate of compliance (COC) and statement of readiness (SOR). The People filed a supplemental certificate of compliance (SCOC) on March 5, 2026.

Defendant's Arguments

The superseding information at issue charges the defendant with the same three offenses charged in the initial misdemeanor information filed on October 19, 2025, but names "Javier Del-Aguila Perez" as the defendant, with a different docket number, a different arresting officer, and contains a different set of facts including a different time and place of offense. In short, the People filed and served the wrong accusatory instrument on which the defendant was arraigned. Neither side disputes these facts. The defendant now moves to dismiss this case arguing that the SSI is not a valid accusatory instrument and therefore the People could not have stated ready for trial on the SSI on December 10, 2025.^FN1

The People's Opposition

The People make three arguments in response to the defendant's motion. First, the People urge the Court to deny the defendant's motion because the defendant did not alert the People of the defect in the accusatory instrument prior to filing his motion to dismiss. They assert that defense counsel, by not alerting the People of the error until after speedy trial time had expired, used a "lie in wait" strategy and did not act in good faith.

Second, the People argue that the information meets the requirements of a facially sufficient accusatory instrument in that the factual allegations within the four corners of the information sufficiently establish every element of the offenses charged. They reason that the mistaken identity of the defendant constitutes an issue of fact to be decided at trial and the error does not impact the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument.

Finally, the People argue that the superseding information was a legal nullity and that the original information was never superseded. They reason that the SSI was filed in error due to a technological/ministerial error and the defect renders it a complaint and, since the law does not recognize a "superseding complaint," it was a legal nullity.

Legal Analysis and Conclusion of Law

The Court rejects the People's argument that the defendant's motion should be summarily denied for not alerting the People to the error. The District Attorney is tasked with the responsibility of preparing and submitting to the court an accusatory instrument that meets the requirements for facial sufficiency set forth in CPL Article 100. The statute places this burden solely upon the People and does not require the defendant to assist them in identifying any potential defects in the information. (See People v N.S., 58 Misc 3d 613 [Crim Ct Queens County 2018].)

The Court further rejects the People's argument that the instrument need not identify the defendant as the perpetrator for the charged crimes. Implicit in a valid accusatory instrument is a basis to believe that the defendant is the perpetrator of the charged offenses. (Matter of Jonathan YY, 134 AD3d 1344, 1346 [3d Dept 2015]; People v Jackson, 75 Misc 3d 203, 207 [Crim Ct Bronx County 2022]; People v Garcia, 48 Misc 3d 1204[A] [Crim Ct NY County 2015]; People v Defreitas, 48 Misc 3d 569, 581 [Crim Ct Bronx County 2015].)

As to the People's third argument, the Court holds that, under the unique circumstances presented, the superseding information is deemed to be a nullity and, thus, requires reinstatement of the original accusatory instrument. The Court of Appeals has held, in the context of an indictment, that when a superseding indictment is a nullity, "any action or consequence that flowed from its filing —e.g., the dismissal of the original indictment—was necessarily a nullity as well." (People v Frederick, 14 NY3d 913 [2010].) The Court of Appeals further stated that a trial court possesses the "inherent authority to reinstate the original indictment after dismissing the superseding indictment" so long as reinstatement isn't barred by constitutional or statutory double jeopardy rules. (Id. citing Matter of Lionel F., 76 NY2d 747, 749 [1990].)

The CPL treats superseding informations and superseding indictments in a similar fashion. (see CPL § 100.50[1]; CPL § 200.80.) As such, a superseding information that has been deemed a nullity is subject to the same analysis as a similarly defective superseding indictment. (see People v Thomas, 4 NY3d 143, 148 [2005] ["The drafters of the Criminal Procedure Law [*2]imported the rules regarding superseding indictments into CPL 100.50(1) by the use of virtually identical statutory language."].)

In this case, the superseding information did not effectively supersede the original information because it clearly did not pertain to the prosecution of this defendant. It was filed by the District Attorney's office in error and should not have been accepted by the court because it clearly addressed a different defendant, different docket number, and a completely separate incident. Being that the accusatory instrument is legally null and void, it logically follows that, "any action or consequence that flow[s] from its filing was necessarily a nullity as well." (Frederick at 916.) The Court holds that the dismissal of the original accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL § 100.50(1), and the defendant's arraignment on the SSI was a nullity. Therefore, the superseding information is dismissed and the original accusatory instrument, dated October 19, 2025, is reinstated. (Id. at 917 citing Matter of Lionel at 749.)

Speedy Trial Calculation

CPL § 30.30(1)(b) requires the People to be ready for trial within 90 days of arraignment for the charged offenses in this case. After careful review of the defendant's motion and the People's response, the motion to dismiss is denied; the court finds that 52 chargeable days have accrued since arraignment.

October 19, 2025, to November 20, 2025

On October 19, 2025, the defendant was arraigned on a misdemeanor information. The defendant was released, and the matter was adjourned to November 20, 2025, for the People's certificate of compliance.

32 chargeable days.

November 20, 2025, to January 27, 2026

On November 20, 2025, the People filed and served an invalid superseding information which was a legal nullity. The People have not yet filed a certificate of compliance. The matter was adjourned to January 27, 2026, for that purpose. On December 10, 2025, the People filed a valid certificate of compliance and statement of readiness that named this specific defendant, Javier A. Perez, and the correct docket number. The instant motion was filed on January 26, 2026.

20 chargeable days.

January 27, 2026, to March 30, 2026

On January 27, 2026, a motion schedule was set. The matter was adjourned to March 30, 2026, for the court's decision.

0 chargeable days.

March 30, 2026, to April 15, 2026

On March 30, 2026, the Court needed additional time to decide the instant motion. The matter was adjourned to April 15, 2026, for the Court's decision.

0 chargeable days.

The People have accrued a total of 52 chargeable days since the defendant's arraignment and the defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

Hearings

A Huntley/Dunaway/Johnson hearing is ordered.

Reservation of Rights

The defendants' request to file additional motions are denied. However, upon a showing of good cause, additional time to file further motions will be granted in accordance with CPL § [*3]255.20(3).

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: April 15, 2026

Kings County, New York

Hon. Masateru Marubashi

Judge of the Criminal Court