People v Saunders

Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County

Decided on April 23, 2026

CR-700650-25CN

Ilona B. Coleman, J.

In her omnibus motion, Ms. Saunders moves for an order dismissing the charges of AC § 19-190 (b) and VTL § 1146 (c) (1) as facially insufficient (CPL 170.30 [1] [a], 170.35 [1] [a]); suppressing a statement she allegedly made to law enforcement (People v Huntley, 59 NY2d 868 [1983], Dunaway v New York, 422 US 200 [1979]); suppressing tangible evidence as the fruit of an illegal seizure (Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 645 [1961]); precluding unnoticed statement and identification testimony; directing the People to produce any evidence or information favorable to the defense (Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 [1963]); granting a bill of particulars (CPL 200.95); and precluding the People from introducing evidence of prior bad acts at trial (People v Sandoval, 43 NY2d 371 [1974], People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 [1901]).

As an initial matter, the court will not deny the defendant's omnibus motion as untimely. Due to the case's unique procedural history, the defendant's arraignment on the misdemeanor information was delayed for several months. The complaint was not converted until January 29, 2026, and the defense filed this motion within a reasonable time thereafter, in accordance with a motion schedule set by the court on March 2, 2026. The motion is therefore timely (see CPL 255.20 [1]), and the court will consider the merits.

The motion to dismiss is denied. The defense argues that the charges of AC § 19-190 (b) and VTL § 1146 (c) (1) are facially insufficient for failing to allege that the defendant acted negligently (see People v Torres, 37 NY3d 256, 264-267 [2021] ["failure to exercise due care" is an element of each offense and is equivalent to ordinary civil negligence]). To the contrary, the allegations support the inference that the defendant acted negligently (see Miranda v Century Waste Servs., 210 AD3d 590, 591 [1st Dept 2022].^FN1 The information alleges that, while the victim was walking within a marked crosswalk with "the pedestrian signal for the [] crosswalk displaying a walk signal," the defendant turned her vehicle into the crosswalk and struck the [*2]victim. The defendant told deponent Detective Gregory Gianacopulos that "she did not see anyone in the intersection." These facts, taken as true, establish that the victim was inside the crosswalk and had the right of way (VTL 1112 [a]). Accordingly, the defendant should have seen the pedestrian and had a duty to yield to him (VTL 1111 [1] [a], 1146 [a]; see also Larsen v Spano, 35 AD3d 820, 822 [2nd Dept 2006] [driver who struck pedestrian had "common-law duty to see that which she should have seen through the proper use of her senses"]). Under these circumstances, the fact that the defendant struck the victim with her vehicle is sufficient in itself to support an inference of negligence (Miranda v Century Waste Servs., 210 AD3d at 591; see also People v Hatton, 26 NY3d 364, 370 [2015] [mens rea "may be inferred from conduct as well as the surrounding circumstances"]).

The defense's reliance on People v Sanson, 59 Misc 3d 4 (App Term, 2nd Dept 2018), and People v Urena, 65 Misc 3d 145(a) (App Term, 2nd Dept 2019), is misplaced. In each case, the Appellate Term Second Department found that the accusatory instrument contained no factual allegations establishing the defendant's failure to exercise due care (Sanson, 59 Misc 3d at 8; Urena, 65 Misc 3d 145[A] at *1). In those cases, though, the accusatory instruments did not specifically allege that the pedestrian had the right of way at the time they were struck. In Sanson, the complaint alleged only that the defendant "[struck] a pedestrian in the crosswalk, thereby causing her to sustain physical injuries" (People v. Sanson, 52 Misc 3d 980, 982 [Crim Ct, Queens County 2016]), and in Urena, the information alleged only that "the defendant, while operating a work van, turned from Maple Street onto Main Street [. . .] striking and killing [. . .] a pedestrian on the Main Street crosswalk" (People v Urena, 54 Misc 3d 978, 980 [Crim Ct, Queens County 2016]). Here, the information establishes that the victim had the right of way, and thus Sanson and Urena are inapplicable.

Separately, the motion to suppress is granted to the extent that a combined Mapp/Huntley/Dunaway hearing is ordered. Contrary to the People's argument, the defense is entitled to a Huntley hearing even if their factual allegations are deficient, and a Huntley hearing is granted (see CPL 710.60 [3] [b], [4]). Further, in this case, the Mapp and Dunaway motions are "grounded in the same facts involving the same police witnesses" as the Huntley motion and will not significantly alter the scope of the hearing. The court therefore "deem[s] it appropriate in the exercise of discretion" to order Mapp and Dunaway hearings as well, regardless of any pleading deficiencies (People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 429 [1993]). The request for an adjournment after hearings and before trial is referred to the hearing court.

The motion to preclude is denied as there is no indication the People intend to introduce unnoticed statements or identification testimony.

The motion for a bill of particulars is denied. The People filed a bill of particulars as part of their automatic disclosure form. That document and the accusatory instrument contain all the information the defense has demanded that is authorized in a bill of particulars (CPL 200.95 [5]).

The motion for a supplemental discovery order is granted to the extent that the People are reminded of their obligations pursuant to Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963), CPL § 245.20 (1) (k), and CPL § 245.60. The People filed a certificate of compliance in this case, which the defense does not challenge. Nor has the defense shown that court intervention is necessary to ensure compliance (see CPL 245.35).

Finally, the motion to preclude evidence of prior bad acts is referred to the trial court. The People are directed to provide supplemental discovery to the defense as soon as practicable and at least fifteen days prior to the first scheduled trial date (CPL 245.20 [3]; CPL 245.10 [1] [*3][b]).

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: April 23, 2026

New York, NY

Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.